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Abstract 
In the eyes of the chroniclers, the Jacquerie of 1358 was the most important 
peasant revolt in late medieval France. Yet despite this, the uprising has not 
generated the quality of scholarship that other revolts from the late medieval 
period have encouraged, such as the Ciompi of 1378 in Florence or the English 
Peasants' Revolt of 1381. In popular perception, the Jacquerie remains a violent 
spasmodic riot typical of the so-called 'pre-industlial revolt', itself a model 
forwarded thirty years ago and never rigourously examined. Rather than 
focussing on the complexity within the uprising, recent work has concentrated on 
whether the rebellion was co-opted by elites (a theory that this thesis will 
debunk); indeed, the last substantial monograph on the subject was Simeon 
Luce's Histoire de fa Jacquerie in 1896. Luce's work made use of letters of 
remission, paid pardons issued by the French crown, to forward a more 
sympathetic view of the rebels. However, Luce never exploited the documents 
fully and quoted only occasionally from their nalTatives. By surveying the 
remissions systematically, and retuming to the full population of documents 
available, this thesis offers 'a wholly new view of the revolt its leadership, its 
geographical dimensions, duration, organisation and ideology. Moreover, it 
challenges many old theories about the medieval 'crowd' as mindless, doomed to 
failure and dominated by the clergy and other elites. In their place, it constructs 
a new model around cOlllil1Unal ties in the medieval village, sophisticated 
organisation within the revolt itself and participants' identities as the defining 
factor of the crowd's ideology. 
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1 - INTRODUCTION 
Isolated, he may be a cultivated individual; in a crowd, he is barbarian -
that is, a creature acting by instinct. He possesses the spontaneity, the 
violence, the ferocity and also the enthusiasm and heroism of primitive 
beings whom he further tends to resemble by the facility with which he 
allows himself to be impressed by words and images ... An individual in 
a crowd is a grain of sand amid other grains of sand, which the wind stirs 
up at will.! 
So wrote Gustave Le Bon in his classic study Tlze CrOYFd, A Study of the Popular 
Mind of 1896. This image of the crowd held sway over the fields of both history 
and psychology for a considerable time: a revolt represents spontaneous, 
barbaric, plimitive violence. Worse, the individuals within the movement were 
powerless to resist - the 'contagion' of the barbarism within the crowd was 
unstoppable. Those caught up in the riot lack control over their destiny - actions 
are instinctive rather than planned. The crowd gives in to its plimal instincts and 
with it loses their capacity for reason: '[t]he laws of logic have no action on 
crowds'.2 Within the group, all individualism is lost and 'impressed by words 
and images' rebels possessed the same mindset. 
Le Bon's theOlies were attacked by social psychologists who followed 
on. Early challenges came from Floyd Allport and Sigmund Freud, amongst 
others, who sought to re-establish the importance of the individual within the 
movement. To them, crowd action was the product of separate individuals acting 
in a similar fashion: "the individual in the crowd behaves just as he would 
behave alone only more SO".3 However, crowds are no more the product of a 
I G. Le Bon, The Cr01l'd. A Study of the Popular Mind (London: Benn, 1896), p. 13. 
:' ibid., p. 113. 
3 See F. Allport, Social Psychology (Boston, Mass: Houghton Mifflin, 1924). 
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group of heroic individuals than they are .an expression of a primitive 'group 
mind'. Rather, a combination of the identities of the participants come together 
to form the crowd's ideology. Later psychologists forwarded Emergent Nonn 
Theory - the crowd is governed by rules that emerge during the movement.4 
CUlTent trends have developed this theory into what is known as a 'social identity 
model', whereby the identities of the participants govern the nOlms that emerge.5 
Social psychologists now stress that crowds are melting pots of ideology from 
which sophisticated social agendas are forn1ed and identities expressed.6 
Historians such as George Rude and E.P. Thompson have echoed that 
sentiment. 7 Revolts are complex organisms, propelled by the ideologies and 
identities of the participants who shape the agenda. In any conception of the 
cro'vvd, the insurgents themselves require the focus. Rather than acting with the 
spontaneity of primal instincts, the identity and ideas of the mob are the crucial 
factors in creating the dynamics that propel the movement. 
Successful challenges to assumptions that the crowd was a mindless mob have 
led historians to theorise that the 'complex crowd' must only be a modern 
im10vation. Charles Tilly argued that developments in European culture, most 
notably urbanisation, industrialisation and the growth of the state, led to an 
4 See R. Tumer & L. Killian, Collective Behaviour (London; Prentice-Hall, 1987). 
) See S. Reicher, 'The St Paul's 'riot', European Journal of Social Psychology. 14 (1984), pp. 1-
21. 
6 For an excellent discussion of various psychologists' views on the crowd and a summary of the 
CUITent thinking on the subject, see S. Reicher, The Psychology of Crowd Dynamics (in press). 
7 See G. Rude, The Crmrd in History: a Study of Papillar Disturbances in France and England, 
1730-1848 (New York: Wiley, 1964); and "The London Mob of the eighteenth century', The 
Historical Journal, 2 (1959), pp. 1-18; E.P. Thompson "The moral economy of the English crowd 
in the eighteenth century', in Past and Present 50, (1971), pp. 76-136. However, while arguing 
against a simple characterisation of the crowd, they still champion the food riot the prototypical 
'pre-industlial' revolt - as the major form of protest, although they do not demonstrate that this 
was the case. 
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evolution in the nature of revolts. S These 'industrial-era' revolts are described as 
more complex, distant from the spasmodic riot of the so-called 'pre-industrial 
revolt'. 9 For Tilly, it was a given that popular movements prior to the birth of 
nation state were less sophisticated than their modem counterpart. For protest 
before the Industrial Revolution, Le Bon's vision of mindless mobs remained 
largely intact. 
Of course, this model has been challenged. The work ofN.Z. Davis, and 
before her Yves-Marie Berct\ have stressed that in their respective periods the 
riot was in fact a far more textured and complex organism than Tilly's typology 
suggests. 10 Each historian in turn has demonstrated that their chosen rebellion 
was as sophisticated as any that followed. However, instead of dismissing 
Tilly's generalisation about the pre-industrial revolt from the vocabulary of the 
historian, each new work has served only to push the moment these 'complex' 
popular movements devolved backwards in time in the public perception. For 
example, Davis's work, which stressed the impOliance of 'leaders' and ideology, 
have been taken as indicative of developments new to the sixteenth century. 
The image of the medieval revolt as spasmodic and destructive remains prevalent 
in the textbooks and surveys that cover the late middle ages. 
The only syntheses, until recently, came to conclusions similar to Tilly - Michel 
MoHat and Philippe Wolffs Ongles, Bleues and Jacques (translated into English 
S C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990-1992 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1992) and C. Tilly, 'How Protest Modernized in France, 1845-55', The Dimension ofQllalitative 
Research, ed. B. Aydelotte et al. (Princeton, 1972), pp. 192-256. 
9 This ternl has found favour in many works - Rude devotes a whole chapter to 'The Pre-
Industrial Revolt' in The Crowd in Histol)'. The teTIn itself implies a sharp shift from before 
industrialisation to afterwards, of which there is no evidence. 
10 Sce N.Z Davis, 'The Rites of Violence: Religious Riot in Sixteenth Century France' and 
'Strikes and Salvation in Lyon', Society and Culture in Ear~y Modem France (Stanford, Calif.: 
Stanford University Press, 1975); Y.-M. Berce, HistolY of Peasant Revolts, t1'. A. Whitmore 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1990). 
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as Popular Revolutions o/the Late Middle Ages) described the medieval revolt as 
a violent, conservative backlash caused by poverty and misery. I I Guy 
Fourquin's Anatomy 0/ Popular Rebellion followed suit - conflicts were 
conservative, harking back towards a supposed golden age. 12 These historical 
works also stressed other old ideas tied to this paradigm, for instance, that 
crowds contained a substantial proportion of "elites': Fourquin devotes a whole 
chapter to this theme. 
Individually, however, there has been excellent work, particularly on the 
Ciompi of Florence in l378 and the English Peasant's Revolt of l381, that serves 
to give us a more textured survey of medieval violence, and challenged these 
images of the barbaric pre-industrial riot. Richard Trexler's studies, for example, 
have placed an emphasis on the establishment of identity within the crowd, while 
Sam Cohn has shown that the leaders came exclusively from within the rebellion, 
not outside. 13 The English Peasants' Revolt of l381 has been studied from 
every angle, with interpretations ranging from high politics to localised 
microstudies: for example, Rodney Hilton and Chris Dyer stressed the 
organisation and sophistication of the peasantry.14 This work has helped recreate 
the Great Rising as a subject wOlihy of further study. 
11 M. MoJlat and P. Wolt1~ Popillar Revolutions ofrhe Late Middle Ages, tr. A. LyttonseJle 
(London: AJlcn & Unwin, 1975). 
12 G. Fourquin, The Anatomy of Popillar Rebellion il1 the lvfiddle Ages, tr. A Chesters (Oxford: 
North-HoJland Publishing Co., 1978). 
13 For example, R. Trexler. "Neighbours and Comrades: The Revolutionaries of Florence, 1378', 
Social Analysis, 14 (December 1983), pp. 53-105 and "Follow the Flag: The Ciompi Revolt Seen 
from the Streets', Bibliotlu':que d 'Hwnanisme et Renaissance, 46 (1984), pp. 357-92; S. Cohn, 
The Labollring Classes in Renaissance Florence, (London: Academic Press, 1980). 
14 See R.H. Hilton, 'Popular Movements at the end of the fourteenth century', in R. H. Hilton, 
Class COI!flicrs and the Crisis 0/ Felldalism (London: Temple Press, 1985) and also R.H. Hilton, 
Bond Men Made Free (London: Temple Press, 1973); C. Dyer, "Thc Social and Economic 
Background to the Rural Revolt of 1381', in The English Rising of 1381, ed. T.H. Aston and R.H. 
Hilton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). For an example of the range of 
scholarship encouraged by the Peasants' Revolt, sce collected other articles in The English Rising 
of 1381. For related scholarship on the relation between lords and peasants in England, see E.B. 
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With the attention lavished upon the two most memorable revolts in late 
medieval Italy and England, the same emphasis could be expected for late 
medieval France's most important revolt. Taking its name from the Jacques 
Bonhommes (the slang tenn for the peasantry), the Jacquerie began on 28 May 
1358, when the ganison at Saint-Leu d'Esserent was attacked by peasants from 
the sun'ounding area, and from there spread quickly across the north of the 
country, stretching as far west as Rouen and as far east as the borders of Bar. IS 
Yet within two weeks, this great revolt had collapsed: on 9 June, Parisian troops 
(who themselves had rebelled under the leadership of Etienne Marcel) J 6 and men 
from Meaux were crushed by the crown's forces when attempting to destroy the 
fOliress known as the Marche on the other bank of the Seine. 17 The victorious 
men-at-am1s laid waste to the town that had harboured the force, before 
beginning on a campaign of destruction throughout the countryside. This 
counter-offensive effectively destroyed many villages involved in the Jacquerie. 
The next day, 10 June, a large force of Jacques, led by one Guillaume Cale, was 
defeated outside Clem10nt by the anny of Charles of Navarre, whose men then 
also tumed their attention to the peasants in the surrounding area. These great 
noble counter-offensives (and several on a smaller scale) swept up the remaining 
pockets of resistance over the next two weeks. While the Jacquerie may have 
been brie±~ its impact was undoubted: the chronicler Jean Ie Bel posited that the 
Fryde, Peasants and Landlords in Medieval England. c. 1380-1525 (New York: St. Mar1in's 
Press, 1996). 
15 The size of the Jacquerie has been underestimated by many historians. The revolt will be 
mapped extensively in Chapter 4, in the section 'Mapping the Revolt'. 
16 The Parisian revolt of 1358 will be discussed in 'Marcel' in Chapter 3. This thesis will argue 
that the two rcbellions were entirely distinct. 
17 Most historians have accepted that Jacques were involved in the Parisian otTensive against the 
fortress. This argument will be refuted in Chapter 3, specifically the section on 'The Attack on 
the MarcJ£. 
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Jacques 'would have killed and destroyed everything had God by his grace not 
sent help, for which each good man must give thanks' .18 
Yet unlike the Ciampi or the Peasants' Revolt, the Jacquerie remains an 
unreconstructed example of the pre-industrial revolt in the historiography. For 
Mollat and Wolff the 'movement as a whole was as incoherent as it was 
spontaneous'. 19 By describing the movement as mindless and irrational, the 
Jacquerie has been dismissed as unimportant. Andre Leguai states that 'it is not 
even the most serious movement of the time which interests us,.20 Having 
already been convinced that the Jacque1-ie is nothing but a messy 1-iOt, he 
wondered how 'a blazing fire of fifteen days' can be compared with longer 
struggles like the Tuchinerie in the Languedoc, which may have lasted over 
twenty years.21 It is in this manner that the movement has been ignored: 
textbooks like R.H.C. Davis's A History of Medieval Europe and Martin Scott's 
Medieval Europe ignore it all together, and Georges Duby's France in the 
Middle Ages devotes only a couple of lines to the rebellion.22 Yet 
unquestionably the Jacquerie was the most impOliant revolt in medieval France, 
at least in the eyes of the contemporaries. There are over twenty accounts of the 
Jacque1-ie, by chroniclers in France, Flanders, England and Italy; no other single 
revolt can claim such coverage. Only eight chroniclers record the Pm-isian 
'Revolt of the Hammermen' in 1382, and only fOUlieen English chroniclers 
reported the great English Peasants' Revolt of 1381. For the Tuchinerie, we only 
IS Bel, C!l/·Oll., v. 2, p. 257, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 152. 
19 Mollat and Wolft~ Papillar ReJlollifions, p. 123. 
20 A. Leguai, 'Les n::voltes rurales dans Ie royaume de France, du milieu du XIVe siecle Ii la fin 
du XVe', Le Moyen Age, 88 (1982) p. 58. 
21 Leguai, 'Les revoltes rurales', pp. 58-59. References to the rebel bands known as Tuchins stali 
as early as 1363 and continue until their supposed destruction in 1384. 
22 R.H.C. Davis, A His/Oly of Medieval Europe (Harlow: Longman, 1970): M. Scott, Medieval 
Europe (London: Longmans, 1964); G. Duby, France in/fie Middle Ages 980-1460, trans. 1. Vale 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1991), p. 279. 
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have a short paragraph or two by the king's chronicler at St. Denis, Jar removed 
from the events and long after the revolt had been suspended. 
Of course, the word jacquerie itself has survived to us as synonymous 
with a bloody rising of the peasantry, which offers a good indicator of how the 
revolt is preserved in historical memory. Napoleon was said to have responded 
to the request to arm the people by stating that he 'did not wish to be the leader 
of a jacquerie,.23 Emile Zola cOlmnented that: 
Always, from century to century, the same exasperation bursts forth, and 
a 'jacquerie' arms the labourers with their pitchforks and their scythes, in 
which state they remain until they die.24 
This depiction of a typical 'jacquerie' is indicative of how the original rising was 
perceived: violent, manic and spontaneous. It is a madness that overtakes the 
peasantry rather than an expression of social grievances. 
This is because of the chroniclers' pOlirayal of the Jacquelie, particularly 
the lingeling image of the Jacques is provided to us by Jean Ie Bel,25 and later 
repeated and made famous by Froissart,26 which reinforces the modem prejudice: 
23 Quoted in E. Littre, Dictionnaire de fa Langue Franc;aise (Paris, 1863), reference for 
'Jacquerie', pp. 155-6. 
24 Zola, La Terre ( 1877), Premier Parie, Chapitre V, trans. D. Pannee, The Earth (London: 
Penguin, 1980), p. 91. 
25 The Chronique de Jean fe Bef was written contemporary to the revolt. Jean Ie Bel himself was 
a canon of Saint-Lambert in Liege, although he still had strong connections to secular society: in 
1327, Ie BcI became involved in military action against the Scots, and Auguste Molinier reports 
that he 'was always in the entourage of nobles'. A. Molinier, Le sources de I'hisloire de France 
des origincs aw: guerres d 'ltalie (1494), vol. 4, Les Valois. 1328-1461 (Paris, 1904), pp. 4-5. 
The best discussion of chronicle accounts of the Jacquerie is M.-.T. de Mcdieros, Jacques et 
Chrolliqueurs, fllle elude comparee de recits contemporains relalan/ la Jacquerie de 1358 (Paris: 
Honore Champion, 1979). While an excellent discussion of the relevant accounts, its analysis of 
the Jacquerie, which uses the chronicles as its base, is necessarily limited and differs little from 
traditional views of the rebellion: it is intended as a study of the reportage of the revolt, rather 
than the revolt itself. 
26 Jean Froissarfs account of the Jacquerie comes from his first book which, as Moliner notes, 
'was copied, which Froissart honestly admits at the beginning, from Jean Ie Bel's clzronique, with 
some additions and rehandlings'. There is only one significant difference between Froissart's 
account and Jean Ie Bel's, and that will be discussed in Chapter 3, specifically 'The Marche of 
Meaux'. Molinier, Les sources de I'his/oire, vol IV, pp. 5-14. 
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Soon afterwards, around Pentecost, a mysterious affliction broke out in 
many parts of the realm of France, in the regions of Beauvais, Amiens, 
Brie, Perthois, the lIe de France and Valois as far as Soissons. Some 
rural people had assembled in their villages but nowhere with a leader. ... 
Thus these leaderless people gathered together, burnt, and robbed 
everything and murdered gentlemen, noble ladies and their children; they 
raped ladies and virgins without any mercy whatsoever.... Certainly 
among Christians, even Saracens, there has never been such uncontrolled, 
diabolical madness. 27 
Jean Ie Bel and Froissmi also include stories of the atrocities to lend gravitas to 
their accounts: for example, a knight was roasted on a spit, before the Jacques 
'wished to force feed [the noble ladies and their children] the roasted flesh of 
their father and husband'. Other chroniclers add to this gtizzly image. The 
Chronique de regnes des Jean II et Charles V claims that the Jacques 'killed all 
the gentlemen they could find and did the same to gentle ladies and many of the 
children with madness beyond measure'.28 The continuator of Richard Lescot's 
chronicle (the royal chronicler of Saint-Denis) is similarly scathing: '[a]s this 
pack of rabid dogs went about, coming and going, they single-mindedly devoted 
themselves to destroying Senlis, Ermenonville, Thien)' and razing the castles 
nearby to the ground and attacking the castle of Beaumont-sur-Oize'. Lescot 
also places emphasis on their murder of children, even those still 'sweetly 
kl ' , 79 suc'mg .-
Yet this is not the only impression the clu'oniclers give of the Jacquerie; 
even Richard Lescot attributes reason to the rebellion: 
27 Bel, Chroll., v.2, p.257, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 151. 
2, Chron. des reglles. v.1, p. 180-1, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 167. 
29 Lescot, Chrol1., p. 126-7, trans. S. Cohn, PP, p. 170. The continuator of Richard Lescot's 
chronicle was, like Lescot before him, a monk at S1. Denis. Molinier suggests the continuation 
was written around 1390. Molinier, Les SOllrces de f'histoire, vol IV, pp.19-20. 
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since the plundering was happening everywhere and.no one was around 
to oppose the brigands and enemy troops, the fields now lay barren. As a 
result, on 27 May 1358 the peasants rose up ... 30 
Jean de Venette extends more sympathy towards the Jacques: 
the peasants living near Saint-Leu-d'Esserent and Clermont in the diocese 
of Beauvais, seeing the wrongs and oppression inflicted on them on every 
side and seeing that the nobles gave them no protection but rather 
oppressed them as heavily as the enemy, rose and took arms against the 
nobles of France. 31 
In addition, chroniclers saw complexity within the revolt. According to Jean de 
Venette, the revolt began with a certain lighteousness, a 'zeal for justice', but 
'since their lords were not defending them but oppressing them, [they] turned 
themselves to base and execrable deeds'. 32 The Chronique de Quatres 
Premiers Valois describes how the leadership of the Jacques convinced the 
followers to take a more reasoned path and introduced order into what began as 
chaos.33 These tempered views condemned the rebels for their brutality but 
simultaneously accredited them with a degree of organisation and saw their cause 
as justifiable. 
Recently, the value of chronicles to the histOlian has been questioned. 
Fourquin, for example, described them as useful plimarily as a guide to class 
prejudices (by focussing on 'what they gloss over or alter'), and urged turning to 
30 ibid. 
31 Venette. Chron., v. 2, p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 76. The chronicle was written 
sometime before 1365, and was probably the closest to the Jacquelie in tenns of geography and 
perhaps ideology - Jean shows sympathy with the peasants, although he celtainly does not 
approve of their actions. There is some debate over the exact identity of the author, but he 
celiainly was a Carmelite fi'iar from Venette, near Compiegne, in the supposed 'heartland' of the 
revolt. See Cohn, PP, p.171 for a sholi discussion. 
32 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Vellerte, p. 77. 
)3 Chroll. premiers Valois, p. 72, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 159. The chronicler was an anonymous 
NOIl11an cleric, at one pointfamilier of Philippe d' Alenyon, Archbishop of Rouen (1359-71), but 
composed the chronicle sometime between 1397-9. Based primarily on the Chroniques des 
regnes Jean Jl et Charles V, it was 'detailed and original for the wars ofNollnandy and also for 
the Parisian incidents', including the JacqueJie. Molinier, Les sources de l'histoire, vol. 4, p. 25. 
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'more reliable' data for discussion of revolts themselves.34 As is evident in the 
passages quoted above, chroniclers did not remain objective about a movement 
like the Jacquerie. There can be serious contradictions between accounts on 
crucial information that one might expect historical accounts to be consistent 
,-
upon.-) Outside problems with the accuracy of their reportage, there are 
problems of intertextuality (as evidenced by Froissart's update of Ie Bel's 
original account): can we speak of chronicles as distinct n31Tatives when they 
bOlTOW heavily from each other? The picture is further complicated by the 
existence of 'un veritable laboratoire historique', the monastery of Saint-Denis, 
which produced not only the crown-sanctioned Grandes Chroniques de France 
but numerous other histories (like the work of Richard Lescot), and influenced 
many of the works that have survived to US.36 Yet we should not discount 
chronicles simply because they are problematic. In the case of the Jacquerie, the 
chroniclers" personal and subjective accounts give us a sense of how the revolt 
was experienced by its contemporaries, and offer the only interpretations of the 
p31iicipants' motivations within the source material. Inconsistency between 
chroniclers can raise questions about the revolt, with one set of chroniclers 
fervently cli tical of the movement, and another more sympathetic to the rebels.37 
However, most modems histOlians have simply concurred with the 
fonner group (particularly Ie Bel and Froissali), ignoring the more balanced 
accounts of the likes of Jean de Venette. As mentioned, Mollat and Wolff's 
34 Fourquin, Anatomy of Popular Rebellion, p. 162. 
35 Probably the best example is the attack on the Marche of Meaux, which FroissaJi claims 
Jacques took part in, but no other chronicler does the same. This will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
36 Molinier, Les s01lrees de I 'histoire, vol. 4, p. 25. Also quoted in D. Hay, Annalists and 
Historians. Western HiSTOriography ji-OI11 rhe Eig/zrh to rhe Eigl7reenth Centuries (London: 
Methuen, 1977), which provides a good summary of the late medieval chronicle tradition and the 
influence ofSt. Denis. pp. 63-87. 
37 For a discussion of the usage of chronicles in the study of popular revolt, see S. Cohn, Llistfor 
Liberty (London: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 14-20. 
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synthesis emphasises the incoherence and violence of the Jacquerie, contrasting 
it with sophistication of the so-called 'cluster' between 1378-82, including the 
Ciompi and the English Peasants' Revolt. 38 These latter revolts are identified as 
complex reactions to the change in social conditions following the Black Death; 
the Jacquerie instead was likened to the hysterical knee-jerk reactions of the 
Flagellants and the persecution of the Jews that immediately followed the first 
strike of the plague. This acceptance of the revolt as a violent, spasmodic mess 
was most stridently expressed by Jean Flammemlont's inf1uential article written 
in 1879.39 Flammennonfs model was generally in agreement with Ie Bel and 
others whose 'rabid dogs' and 'execrable deeds' paved the way for the popular 
meaning of the teml Jacquerie, even if he gave some credence to the views ofthe 
sympathetic chroniclers. For example, he based his picture of Guillaume Cale on 
the account from the Clzronique des Quatres Premiers Valois. 4o Otherwise, 
according to FlanU11ennont, Jacques were essentially mindless. In distinguishing 
between the uprising in Paris and the Jacquerie, Flmml1ennont suggests that the 
peasantry were too crude to have been part of such a complex political struggle: 
That supposes a plot and by consequence that the men were capable of 
reason, directed by intelligent leaders. We find nothing like this within 
the .Tacquerie; the insurgents were the gross peasants, without education, 
without instruction.41 
33 Mollat and Wolff entitled their chapter on 1378-82 as 'The Years of Revolution', pp. 138-211, 
with a conscious glance forward to the 1848, the Oliginal Year of Revolutions. For a discussion 
of the misleading nature of this claim, and the lack ,of evidence suggesting these years to be a 
distinct 'cluster', see Cohn, Lustlor Liberty (London: Harvard University Press, 2006). pp. 225-
7. 
39 J. Flammennont, 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis', Re1'lle Historique, 9 (1879), pp. 123-144. 
40 Flammel1110nt details that 'Gui11ame Karle ... was a man of great stature, remarkable for his 
beauty and intelligence ... he recognised immediately that the Jacques were indisciplined brutes 
and rcfused to command them, but they threatened him with death and he had to accept', 
Flammel1110nt, 'La Jacquelie en Beauvaisis', p. 140. The Chronique des Qllalre Premiers Valois 
describes the same. Flammermont also records that Cale was aided by a Hospitaller, a detail only 
mentioned in that chronicle. 
41 Flammermont, 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis', p. 127. 
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FlanU11ennont's article responded. to an earlier attempt to present a more 
humanised view of the revolt, in line with these other chronicle reports. Some 
twenty years earlier, Simeon Luce's Histoire de fa Jacquerie forwarded a new 
view of the violence, one more sympathetic to the peasants.42 Concentrating on 
the causes of revolt, Luce portrayed the Jacques as motivated by a series of 
failures by the nobility to preserve order and to protect its communities. Instead 
of wild animals, Luce gave the peasants reason. 
Although Luce provided the last thorough analysis of the Jacques, a 
couple of modifications to his argument have been proposed since. Building on 
Luce's work, Raymond Cazelles suggested that the Jacquerie was not, in fact, a 
peasant revolt at all.43 Rather, he argued that the Jacquerie was made up of a 
combination of rural artisans, townsmen and the clergy. The presence of minor 
functionmies meant this could not be a rebellion against royal power. He also 
believed that the organisation and planning of some of the Jacques' assaults was 
such that it would require outside intervention - Cazelles drew on Luce's thesis, 
and suggested that the provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel, may have 
instigated the whole revolt. He then theorised that the revolt was set into motion 
before 28 May, and that the rising of the Jacques was a premeditated attack on 
the nobles' fortifications as part of a larger campaign for power by Marcel. 
David Bessen's 'The Jacquerie: class war or co-opted rebellion?,44 used 
Cazelles' assumptions to further another theory. Assuming Cazelles to be light 
about the socio-economic makeup of the Jacques, and that the revolt, to use 
42 S. Luce, Histoire de fa Jacquerie d'apres des docllments inMits, first published 1859, 2nd 
edition (Pmis, 1894). 
43 See R. Cazelles, 'The Jacqueric', in The English RiSing [if J 381, ed. Aston and Hilton 'thc rich 
found thcmselvcs side-by side with thc poor, the royal official with thc lord's subjcct', p. 77. 
44 D. Bessen, 'The Jacqueric: Class War or Co-Optcd Rebcllion?', Journal of Medieval HislolJJ, 
II (1985), pp. 43-59. 
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Bessen's own tenn, was a co-opted rebellion,he argued that Charles of NavarTe 
was more likely to have directed it than Etielme Marcel. The Jacquelie was 
instigated in an attempt to destabilise the crown's faltering control of the region, 
creating conditions in which Navarre could make substantial gains. The 
Navarrese forces crushed the Jacques only when it is clear to Charles that they 
could no longer be controlled. 
Neither of these arguments have proved convincing, but both are at least 
attempts to desclibe complexity within the violence. However, they place 
emphasis on outside forces providing organisation and direction to the 
movement, rather than from within the rebellion itself. Their beliefs stem from a 
prejudicial assumption: that such organisation was beyond the peasants' abilities. 
Luce used chronicles but went beyond them, building his study upon analysis of 
letters of remission, and on his groundwork (and his printed examples) Cazelles 
and Bessen built their studies. Letters of remission, paid pardons issued by the 
crown, detail the crimes and pleas of innocence of several hundred rebels and 
rebel communities from the SUlmner of 1358, including Jacques and followers of 
Etienne Marcel. There are almost two hundred remissions issued for Jacques 
alone, containing the names, locations and actions of insurgents; when we 
include remissions for nobles involved in the repression and urban rebels, that 
number swells to well over two hundred. 
Yet Luce, Cazelles and Bessen barely scratched the surface of a source 
that offers another layer of meaning, as well as specific evidence, concerning the 
revolt. Rather than use this mass of documents to find insight into the insurgents 
of the revolt, the narratives of scattered remissions have been used sparingly to 
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fill in background details of grand political conspiracies. The unsystematic use 
of these remissions has produced images of the Jacquerie that a more 
comprehensive use of them could dispel. Undoubtedly, the anecdotal evidence 
they provide is useful, but Luce provided full transcliptions for a small sample of 
these documents a fact which subsequent historians of the Jacquelie either did 
not recognise or failed to point out. Without going back to the Oliginal 
documents, Cazelles and Bessen continued in this manner, apparently assuming 
that the remissions published by Luce were the entire set of such documents. 
The potential now remains for a wide-ranging survey of these remissions, 
complemented by the new emphasis upon the complexity of the crowd. After 
introducing the letters of remission, this thesis will undertake that task: first by 
deconstructing the recent arguments that the Jacquelie was a co-opted rebellion; 
second, we will establish the basics of the revolt and the retaliation; third, the 
composition of the rebels will be examined; finally, we will create a new model 
of how the revolt worked. The Jacquerie deserves the same level of in-depth 
analysis that has been conferred on other revolts like the Ciompi and the 
Peasants' Revolt of 1381. 
21 
2 - REMISSIONS: FORM AND FUNCTION 
The senes of the registres du Tresor des charles conserved in the Archives 
Nationale runs from 1302, during Philippe Ie Bel's reign (IT 35), until 1568 (IT 
226). Written in either French or Latin, these registers represent a broad 
spectrum of the documents issued by French royal chancery from the later 
Middle Ages. They include the highest political action, like the granting of 
privileges to the bonnes villes, alongside pardons issued to common thieves. 
Michel Fran<;:ois, in his brief 'Notes sur lettres de remission trans Clites dans les 
registres du Tresor des charles', identified eight categories of document 
contained within the registers: ordonnances, letters of anoblissemenl, letters of 
naturalite, amortissements, concessions or confirmations of priveleges, letters of 
abolition and letters of remission. 45 It is the last of these categOlies that contains 
the most infonnation for the histolian interested in the .Tacquerie. 
Of the ninety-five thousand documents contained within the registre du 
Tresor des chartes, over fifty-three thousand are letters of remission.46 When we 
consider that there are virtually no remissions issued until 1350, then the 
percentage of documents that were remissions in the later registers was much 
higher. In the early registers, IT 36 to 49, which cover 1302 to 1314, for 
example, only seventeen of the 2,850 documents are remissions (0.6%). By 
45 M. Franyois, 'Note sur lcs lcttres de remission trans crites dans lcs registres du Tresor des 
cIJalies', Bibliotheqlle de l'ecole des chartes, 102 (1942), pp. 317-24. For a blief discussion of 
fourteenth century remissions, see P. Texier, 'La remission au XIVe siecle : significations et 
fonctions', in La Fallte, la d:pressioll et le pardon, v. I of Actes du 107e COllgres national 
societes sal'al1tes, Brest 1982 (Paris: CT.H.S., 1984), pp. 193-202, although it is only a basic 
typology of the types of document issued. 
46 Remissions can be further subdivided into three categories: 'pardons', issued when the 
supplicant witnessed the crime but did not participate; 'abolitions', where the legal proceedings 
have yct to stmi against the individual who obtains grace, and true 'remissions'. The distinction 
is not made clear by the documents themselves, and will not be used here. N.Z. Davis, Fiction ill 
[he Archives. Pardon Tales and their Tellers (Cambridge: Polity, 1987), p. 153. 
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JJ236, however, which covers the years 1523-24, 614 of 640 documents are 
remissions (96%). 
A letter of remission is a pardon granted by the crown to an appellant. 
The crown either quashed or reduced the punishment Oliginally inflicted (which 
may either be implisomllent or a collective punishment issued to a community, 
like a fine). On most occasions, the pardon contained an explanation of the 
events leading up to its issue: sometimes a plea for clemency on account of the 
age or hardship of an individual, but most often a description of how the 
individual was innocent (or less culpable) of the crime he had been originally 
punished for. A royal notary and clerk prepared a draft of the document with the 
supplicant or people on behalf of them. The letter was then recorded on 
parchment, and then transClibed into the royal chancery records (the JJ series).47 
Remissions had to be paid for. Chancery letters were categOlised, and the co.st 
was dependent on which particular category they fell into; a letter of remission 
was recorded as a charte. The cost of remissions was theoretically constant 
between the fourteenth century and the early seventeenth century: 3 livres (60 
SOUS), split between the crown and the notary and wax-melter involved in the 
document's creation.4~ In reality, however, the price would be higher: references 
to additional taxes upon remissions suggest that there were hefty surcharges 
payable to the crown.49 By the l550s, the average remission would cost two 
months wages of an unskilled labourer, although in certain cases the fees were 
47 ibid., p. 10. 
4, ibid, p. 153. 
49 B. Geremek, The Margins of Society in Late Medieval Paris, trans 1. BinTll (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), p. 240. Geremek makes reference to a document issued in 1400 
where the king complains he has not been receiving the six SOilS tax on remissions, because it had 
been withheld by local officials. 
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waived for those who could .not afford it. 50 Luce's sample of remissions 
represents a paIiicularly expensive brand of remission: to have the remission 
recorded in the royal chancery - the JJ series - incurred an additional charge.51 
All letters of remission within the registres du Tn?sor des chartes were 
issued in the name of the crown. 52 The invocation of the king or regent's name 
was fonnalised and appears the same in all the documents; in the majority of the 
examples used in thesis they begin 'Charles, eldest son of the King of France, 
regent of the realm, duke of Nonnandy and dauphin of Vienne'. 53 Often this was 
shortened to just 'Charles aisne etc.'. From here, the documents had a standard 
opening clause, 'Let it be known to all present and future ... ',54 before giving the 
name of the supplicant or supplicants and detailing the actual pardon itself. The 
end of the remissions were also formalised, giving the place of issue and the 
date; for example: 'Issued in Paris, the year of grace l358 in the month of 
September'. 55 The document was then finished with 'par Ie monsieur Ie regent' 
(and often 'et son conseil'), and the signature of the notary who created the 
document. 
50 Davis, Fiction ill [ize Archives, p. 154. 
51 ibid, p. 145. 
52 Remissions were not solely the prcserve of the Valois monarchs in this period. We do see 
examples issued by the dukes of Brittany and the vicomtes of Turenne, amongst others, over the 
course of the late middle ages. See M. Naisset, 'Brittany and the French Monarchy in the 
Sixteenth Century: The E,idence of the Letters of Remission', French HistOlY, 17, n.4, p. 425-
439 (2004) and P. Flandin-Blety, 'Lettres de remission des vicomtes de Turenne aux XIVeme et 
XVeme siec1es', IvJemoires de fa societe pOllr l'lzistoire du droit et des institutions des anciens 
pays bOllrgllignolls, comtois et rom{lnds (1988), pp. J 24-143. 
53 In the French remissions, this is 'Charles, aisne filz du roy de France, regent Ie royaume, duc 
de Nonnandie et da1phin de Vienn·ois', In the infrequent Latin remissions, this is written 
'Karolus, regis FraneoTUm primogenitus, regnum regens, dux Normannie ct dalphinus Viennois' 
54 Again, in the Latin texts 'notum facimus universis, presentibus et futuris .... ', 
55 In French, the clause is worded 'Donne it Paris, ran grace de mil CCCL VIII, ou moys de 
septcmbre', In Latin documents, the equivalent is . Datum Parisius, anno domino MCCCLVII, 
mense marcii'. 
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These notaries held responsibility over the final fODnof these 
documents. 56 Both the supplicant's story and the crown's offer of grace needed 
transcription in a fonn acceptable to the courts. That meant changing the 
dictated version from dialect to standardised French or Latin, but more 
importantly, selecting appropriate formulas and phrases to describe the crime, 
and the grace the supplicant received. These fonnulas identified the whole range 
of 'climinal behaviour' from murder or theft to grand political conspiracies and 
treason.57 With variations dependent on the individual notary, we would expect 
remissions of the same period that refelTed to a patiicular type of offense to 
appear broadly similar in the final documents. 58 In applying the crown's 
vocabulary onto these narratives, the notaries exercised considerable power on 
the fonn which the pardon took. 
Rather than simply rubber-stamping succesful pardons, the crown often 
set the agenda for the production of these documents. Remissions were regularly 
issued as part of a royal entry into a town, publically demonstrating the crown's 
mercy;59 in the case of the J acquerie and Marcel's revolt, a general amnesty was 
proclaimed in the first instance, and remissions issued to those who felt excluded 
:;6 For a discussion of the role of the notary in the production of these documents, see Davis, 
Fictioll in the Archil'es. pp. 18-23. 'vVhile Davis does find the notary to be imp0!1ant, she argues 
than'emissions have 'a variety about them that seems impossible to attribute merely to the talents 
of a limited number of notarial hands'; instead, Davis argues that the supplicant is a major factor 
in shaping the wording of the pardon. 
57 For a discussion of the importance of stereotypes, see C. Gauvard, 'De grace especial': crime. 
erat el societe en France (I lafin du Moyen Age (Paris, : Publications de la Sorbonne, 1991), pg. 
198-209. Gauvard's conclusion is that these stereotypes of grand crill1inalite were far removed 
from the reality of crime; this thesis will argue that the stereotypes themselves can actually help 
us get closer to the reality of how revolts were viewed. 
53 There were many different notaries whose signatures appeared at the bottom of these 
documents, but for the Jacquerie, all use the same vocabularly that will be described later in this 
chapter. There are only minor differences in style between notaries, and the tenninology remains 
consistent: for example, G. de Montagu prefen'ecl variations on 'les effroiz, commocions, 
assemblees estoient des genz du plat pais contre les nobles' (for example, AN, JJS6, f. 147, nos. 
421,422), whereas J. Douhen used 'les genz du plat pais se esmeurent et firent plusiers effroiz et 
commocions contre les nobles' (for examples, AN, JJ90, f. 151 ,no. 294). 
59 For discussion, see L. Bryant, The King and the City in the Parisian Royal Entry Ceremony: 
Politics. Art and Ritual in Ihe Renaissance (Geneva: Libraire Droz S.A., 1986), pp. 24-6. 
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from it. Indeed, the very process of issuing a pardon was an active intrusion on 
the part of the crown into the administration of justice. Through these 
documents, loyal subjects could be rewarded and elTant subjects punished 
(through fines and confiscations of property). Remissions could be granted 
provisionally on payment of a charge or completion of a pilgrimage. While 
granting a remission, the crown could set policy - it was in a remission that the 
town of Meaux was banned from having communal government. 
If the pardoning agenda was set by the crown, and the wording was set by 
the notary based on the crown's distinctions, then it was the supplicant who 
provided the nalTative on which the pardon would be based.60 Natalie Davis's 
work on remissions in the sixteenth century emphasises the creative aspect of the 
pardon.61 Rather than the final contract between crown and defendant, the 
remission was pati of the pardoning process itself These remissions, if they 
were to be accepted, would either explain the participant's activities or at least 
place them in a context that makes them pardonable. They also offered 
testimony to the individual's previous reputation, and his good name and 
renown. Often, it was the only input that a 'defendant' might have in the 
criminal procedure - the remission natTative would be read at the start of the 
judicial process, like an opening statement. 62 Thus, the onus was on the 
supplicant to create a narrative that convinced the crown of their innocence and 
informed them of any mitigating circumstances. 
60 Davis describes the supplicant as the 'first author'. Davis, Ficlion in the Archives, p. 18. 
61 Although Davis' book is rather sensationally titled, it does not claim remissions to be entirely 
fictitious, rather that the storytelling represents a distinct literary style in which numerous voices 
can be heard. However, others have questioned the validity of these documents,describing them 
as 'a tissue of counter-truths', Pierre Braun, 'La valeur documentaire des Jettres de remission', in 
La/allte. fa repression et le pardon. v. I ofActes dL! ID7e Congres national societes savantes. 
Brest 1982 (Paris: C.T.H.S., 1984), quoted in Davis, Fiction in the Archives, p. 10. 
62 ibid., p. 10. 
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Those involved in the rebellions of 1358 were as concerned to prove their 
suitability for a pardon as the petty criminals who form the backbone of Davis' 
studies. This remission for a Jacque, Gillebart Colas, indicates the fon11 that 
these pleas could take: 
Let it be known to all present and future that Gilleba11 Colas, living at 
Acy in Meucien (Oise)63, poor small trader of chicken, cheese, eggs and 
other small merchandise to make a living and to supp0l1 his wife and 
children, who had previously under constraint and against his will and 
wishes with other Jacques of the said village and men of the land from 
Mucien, La Fe11e and other places nearby ... [was] taken and imprisoned 
in the castle of Dammartin ... he is a man of good life and honest. 64 
In this case, it is clear why Gillebart sought forgiveness: at the time of his 
supplication he was implisoned. Gillebart based his plea for clemency on his 
social status: he was a poor merchant and must provide for his wife and children. 
The remission also features two popular excuses that appellants used to argue for 
their personal w011hiness to be granted a remission. One we have already 
mentioned: he claimed to have led a good life up to this point (although this 
remission does not claim that the subject was of good renown). The other was a 
defence repeated in many of the Jacques' remissions: that they had been forced 
into action by others. Davis' caricature of these remissions as 'fiction' helps us 
remain vigilant regarding the nature of the document. Claims of non-
involvement, for example, should be treated with caution. Perhaps Gillebart was 
better off financially than his plea suggests. For the histOlian, however, the 
document provides more than just story-telling. Any sense of fiction is kept brief 
6.' Where a location is not commonly known, and there is no map or table nearby for reference, [ 
have included the modern department in parentheses. 
64 'Sa voir faisons a taus presenz et a venir comme Gillebart Colas demourans ;i Acy en Meucien 
petit et pouvre marchant de pouillaie, de fourmage et oeux et autres petites marchandises pour 
gaegner sa vie et de sa femme et enfans, ait este n' a gaires par contrainte autre son gre et sa 
\·olente avec plusiers des Jacques de la dicte ville et les gens du pais de moncien, de la Fel1e et 
d'ailleures environs ... prendre et emplisones au chastel de Dammartin ... il est un hOll1l11e de 
bonne vie et honeste', AN, JJ86, f. 151, no. 430. 
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- there was no great nanative to prove Gillebarfs innocence. They offer new 
information concerning the rebellion - Gillebart did not deny that the men of 
Acy did rise up. Although Gillebart may have been exaggerating his financial 
difficulties, his occupation as a sometime merchant of dairy goods is useful to 
surmise exactly who the Jacques were. Though the language of the remission 
was intended to portray the appellant's reduced culpability, the basic facts of the 
case - the defendant's status and location, the crime itself and the punishment -
are undisputed. 
The useful data that these documents provide about individuals and their 
transgressions against the crown have been the basis for several excellent studies 
of criminality and social status. Bronislaw Geremek's study of the marginallx of 
Paris was based on a variety of documents, including remission letters for the 
inhabitants. Although he culls numerous stories fi:om these remissions, Geremek 
admits 'it is clear that the costs necessarily incUlTed in obtaining a letter of 
remission were such that marginal people rarely appear in the documents'. 65 The 
most comprehensive study of the remission is Claude Gauvard' s two volume De 
Grace Especial. Built upon remissions, criminal and judicial records and other 
documents, she concentrates on the reign of Charles VI and seeks to build a 
typology of crime between 1380 and 1420.66 Although remissions were not her 
only source, they undoubtedly make up the vast mqjority of the documents she 
covers. Yet even in this exhaustive work, Gauvard avoids discussing popular 
protest: group violence appears, characterised by the term rixe, but this was 
65 Geremek, The kIm'gins o[Sociefy, p. 310. 
66 Gauvard, De grace especial. Also see C. Gauvard, 'L'image du roi justicier en France it 1a fin 
du Moyen Age d'apres les lettres de remission', in Lafallle, v. I of Acles du I07e COl1gres, pp. 
165-192. 
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mainly bar fights or small scuffles, not collective action. 67 The exclusion of 
remissions concerning rebellion or revolt (notably the lzarelle in Rouen and the 
tax revolts in Paris of the 1380s) in such an exhaustive study tells us something 
about the position that popular violence occupies: it was connected to the world 
of criminality and justice, but somehow set apart from it. 
As mentioned, Luce used remissions to give a more human side to the 
J acquerie, more in line with the sympathetic chroniclers like Jean de Venette 
than the scalding fury of Jean Ie Bel, whom Flammennont would champion. Yet 
he did not exploit the source to its fullest. His Pieces Just?fzcatives contained 
sixty-t\VO documents, of which fifty-four are remissions, and fonned the core of 
h· I' 68 IS ana YSIS. This sample is skewed: for instance, Luce reprinted every 
document that mentions the attack on Meaux (of which there are nineteen, 
representing almost a third of his Pieces Justificatives). These incidents had only 
weak connections to the Jacquerie, (as we will discuss in "The Attack on the 
Marche' in Chapter Ill). Further considering that these remissions were for 
scattered individuals rather than for settlements and groups, in real numbers there 
were very few individuals from Meaux pardoned compared with the Jacques in 
the countryside. Because the attack on Meaux was spearheaded by Parisi ens, not 
Jacques, Luce's analysis heavily weighted Etienne Marcel's percieved 
involvement, yet Luce did not supplement this with analysis of the remissions 
issued for his followers. 
67 Gauvard states that over 51 % of group crimes within the remissions can be classified as 'rixe-
homicide' (which Gauvard uses to refer to bar-fights and similar attacks), and another 23% is 
thefts or burglaries (p. 275). Collective crimes makes up only 1.6% of Gauvard's remissions (p. 
242). Even in a two-volume study like Gauvard's, there is little attention played to popular 
revolts, which Gam'ard suggests there is no evidence of in the remissions. Gauvard, De grace 
especial. 
6S Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 217-350. Luce's selection includes some other royal documents and all 
the revclant chronicle descriptions of the events of 1358. Only tifty-two of these documents are 
actml transcriptions - two of these documents are just short descriptions of what the remission 
contains. 
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Raymond Cazelles and David Bessen both turned to Luce's summary to 
wlite miicles about the Jacquelie but neither returned to the oliginal registers. 
These later studies feature the same shortcomings seen in Luce's book: they 
sample from Luce's already skewed Pieces Justificatives as though they were the 
full collection of documents. FUliher, the data available on the majolity of the 
Jacques was marginalized in favour of a focus on those with the most interesting 
nanatives surrounding their participation. With these in hand, Cazelles and 
Bessen constructed histories of the rebellion that place an emphasis on the 
Parisian-led attack on Meaux rather than the greater group of remissions, as 
though those from Meaux were typical Jacques. The misunderstanding of the 
sources led both to deeply flawed arguments, as will be discussed in Chapter 3, 
'The Theory of Co-opted Rebellion'. 
A thorough analysis of the Jacquelie requires equal focus to be placed on 
all the documents. Broadly speaking, there are four types of remission issued for 
subjects involved in the rebellions of 1358 clearly defined within the source 
matelial: (1) those individuals and settlements that rose up in the countryside, (2) 
remissions for those nobles involved in the vengeance upon the peasantry in the 
wake of the Jacques, (3) remissions for those involved in the Pmisian uplising 
and (4) for those involved with the King of Navarre. 
The remissions that exist make up an unusual sample. They do not 
represent all those the crown forgave for their pali in the uplisings. The masses 
of rebels had received grace for their climes in general amnesties issued directly 
after the revolt, supposedly pardoned as a group on the 10 August in a general 
remission issued in Palis. On that same day, the Pmisian rebels were pardoned: 
A great number of the good people and loyal commoners of this city of 
Palis conceived and intended to act against our lord, and the royal 
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majesty '" our loyal friends Gentian Tristan, presently provost, the 
aldermen, bourgeois and inhabitants of this city have humbly beseeched 
us to show pity and mercy and to find a gracious remedy. Thus 
considering the good love and loyalty which the provost, bourgeois, and 
inhabitants of this city have always had towards our lord and to us and 
which has been demonstrated by the capture and destruction of these 
traitors, rebels and enemies of the crown of France, we are inclined to 
grant this supplication. 69 
Yet this document did not represent the end of the pardons for the Parisians: 
rather, it triggered the start of numerous remissions for people connected to 
Marcel's revolt. Other remissions were issued on the very day that the general 
pardon was sent out. Our sample consists of individuals who required specific 
pardons not covered by the general pardon. The remissions for individuals and 
distinct communities thus represent the exceptions, not the main contingent of 
those forgiven. 
Luce's centrepiece, the attack on the Marche of Meaux, represents a 
microcosm of the bigger picture. A general remission was issued to those of the 
town, stating that the residents are given grace for their pariicipation, updated to 
include a clause that does not allow the city to have a communal government. In 
effect, the remission itself confirmed this punislunent and stripped Meaux of its 
communal privileges: 
Let it be known to all present and future that we have heard the 
supplication made by our loyal friend 1ehan Maillari, bourgeois of Paris 
containing matters concerning the misdeeds in the town of Meaux the 
Saturday past, the eve of the feast of Saint Barnabas (1 0 June) '" [the 
enemies] entered the town of Meaux by the gate of Saint-Remi for 
attacking the MarcM of the said town of Meaux and damaging the houses 
of the nobles and non-nobles ... we have acquitted, remitted and 
pardoned and re-established the peace, and their good reputation and 
name and also their goods, excepting that the said town cannot have a 
69 AN, ]]86, f. 80, no. 240, reprinted in OrdolZlwl1ces des Rovs de France de la troisieme race, 
ed. D.-F. Secousse, vol. 4 (Paris, 1734), trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 179-81. 
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cOl1Ul1Unal government. (17 'aura cmps ne commune) '" Issued in Paris, 
the year of grace 1358 in the month of AUgust,70 
However, this remission did not include all the inhabitants, as further remissions, 
like this one for Guillaume de Chavenoil, indicated: 
recently we have forgiven and pardoned generally all the inhabitants of 
the town, city and Marche of Meaux ," except a number of certain 
persons, including the said Guillaume de Chavenoil, priest and canon of 
Meaux,71 
So when we consider individuals like Guillaume de Chavenoil, and how they 
relate to the group that attacked the Marche, we must bear in mind that crown 
consciously rejected them from the initial grace, 
The JJ senes contains 214 remissions that were linked to members of the 
Jacquerie. Of these, 188 of them are issued between JJ 86 and JJ 90 inclusive, 
with 139 alone in JJ 86, the main register for the Jacquerie, running from July 
1358 until early January 1359. I will tum to statistical analysis later, but below is 
an example of a remission issued to a rebel in the wake of the rebellion: 
Charles, eldest son of the King of France (etc,), Let us make known to all 
those now and in the future that Jean des Hayes, of Rhuis in Verberie 
(Oise), at the time of the ten'Of (elfi'ois) and uprising (commocion) that 
reigned and was recently caused by the men of the countryside (genz du 
plat pais) against the nobles of the realm, was made, against his will and 
wishes and by constraint of the people, captain of the said village (ville 72) 
70 'Savoir faisons Ii tous presenz et Ii venir, comme oye ]a supplication a nous faite par nostre ame 
et feal 1ehan Maillali, bourgeois de Pmis, contenant que, comme pour cause du meffait qui advint 
en la ville de Meaulx le samedi veille de teste saint Barnabe apostre dernier passe ... enh'erent en 
]a dicte ville de Meulx par la porte Saint Remi, pour assaillir le Marchie de Meaulx, dommagier 
en ville ct villener nobles et non-nobles qui dedans estoit '" nous avons quicte, remis et pardonne 
et restabliz au pais, it leur bonne fame, renommee et it leur biens, excepte que la dicte ville n 'aura 
corps de commune', AN, 1186, f 75, no. 288. This document is included in Luce's Pieces 
Justicalires, but rather than transcribing a section of it there is only a short description of the 
content. 
71 AN, 1186, f 91, no. 274, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 228-9, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 183. 
72 The term ville is used in almost every remission to reter to settlements of any size, from 
villages like Rhuis here to even the city of Paris. While the word may have originally meant 'a 
group of rural houses', it also came to be applied to any important settlements, rural or urban. 
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of Rhuis, who otherwise feared they might kill him, bum down his house 
and destroy or distribute his goods, and because of that he was present at 
the said revolt against the nobles, but the said Jean did not bum or knock 
down houses of the said nobles; nor did he take or hand out their goods; 
nor did he make a profit or pillage more than the sum of three escus .... 
on the Sunday after the feast day of the Holy Sacrament (3 June) that had 
past, the said Jehan and a esquire, with many others, had come to the said 
town (ville) of Verb erie ... [.Tehan cried out] 'For God's sake, good lords, 
watch what you are doing for your actions are very bad', and despite this 
and against his will, wishes and consent, the said esquire was killed, and 
for this reason the said nobles would hate him and have hostility towards 
the said Jehan ... Issued in Paris, the year of grace 1358, in the month of 
October. 73 
This document stresses that Jehan des Hayes was less involved with the rebellion 
than he had been accused of. Although he was a capitaine, he had not taken part 
in the most terrible of the outrages, neither had he made a profit above 3 escu7,. 
Not only does Jehan excuse himself from the worst of the violence, he also 
claimed he wamed the other Jacques not to kill the squire in Verbelie. Yet Jehan 
felt forced to seek a remission because of the nobility's hatred of him and the 
grudge they bore were likely to have held towards him. 
The vocabulary of these remissions from the Jacques remained constant 
from document to document. First, the Jacques were referred to the gel17, dll plat-
pays: men of the countryside. This was the language the crown used to describe 
On each occasion that vilfe is used, I have given my best approximation to the type of settlement 
(for example, I have translated it as village in the case ofRhuis, town in the case of Senlis and 
city in the case of Paris). 
73 'Charles ainsne fils du roy de France .... Savoir faisons a to us presenz et il venir, que, com me 
lehan des Hayes, de Ruys, lez Verberie, ou temps des efTroiz et commocions qui derrainement et 
n'a gaires ont este faiz par les genz du plat pais contre les nobles du royaume, eust este contre son 
gre et volente et par contrainte du peuple, esleu capitaine de la dicte ville de Ruys, ou autrement 
il eust este en doubte d'avoir este mis il mort, sa maison arse, et gastez et dessipes ses biens, et 
avec ce ait este aus dictes commocions faites contre les diz nobles, sanz ce que Ie dit lehan ait 
este a ardoir ou abatre aucuns maisons des diz nobles, ne en ycelles prendre ou disspier leurs 
biens, ne en aucun prouftlt de pillage qui monte a plus de la somme de trois escuz ... Ie 
dymanche apres Ie Saint Sacrement delTainement passe, Ie dit lehan et un escuier, avec plusiers 
autres, s'en venoient en la dictc ville de Verberie ... 'Pour Dicu, beaux seigneurs, gardes que 
vous faites, car c'est trop mal fait', ct tout ce non obstant, ils mistrent, contre son gTe, sa volente 
et consentement, Ie dit escuier it mort, et pour ce aucuns des diz nobles pourroient avoir 
malivolence et hayne au dit .Tehan ... Donne it Paris, ran de grace mil CCCLVIII, ou mois 
d' octobre', AN, JJ86, f. 156, no. 444, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 280-1. 
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these insurgents, directly opposed to the 'nobles of the realm'. 74 The greater. 
violence was described as a 'terror' (efFois) or a 'movement' (commocioll). The 
Jacques were specifically accused of having 'sent [nobles] to death, burnt their 
homes, and destroyed and distributed their goods' .75 Unlike the inhabitants of 
the town, the Jacques were described spatingly: we are often given little 
infomation about the appellant's occupation or status within a community. 
The remission above was for an individual, but remissions were also 
issued for village communities or collections of local peasants who were accused 
of patiicipation in the Jacquerie: 
Let it be known to all present and future that the inhabitants resident in 
the villages of Bettancourt and Vroil in Perthois (Marne), along with 
many other men of the countryside have been involved in the terror that 
the men of the countryside recently int1icted with great speed upon the 
nobles of the realm. They conspired and assembled with other men of the 
countryside many times without burning or knocking down houses, 
killing people or mistreating anyone .,. Our friend, loyal counsellor and 
lieutenant in these parts, the count of Vaudemont, SUlllill0ned them before 
him at a certain time and place ... without knowing anything about them, 
he condemned them to pay a fine of two-thousand ecus.76 
As with the vocabulary of remissions for individuals, the Jacquelie was desclibed 
as 'the terror', the Jacques were the 'men of the countryside' engaged in 'burning 
or knocking down houses, killing people' (although the men of Bettancourt and 
Vroil claim not to have been involved). This remission does not list any of the 
individuals who appealed; they were described only as 'inhabitants'. This 
remission also gives a clear indication of what could be gained from recieving a 
pardon. The reduction of a fine imposed earlier upon the villagers raises 
74 The phrase 'non-nobles' or 'gens du plat pays contre nobles' or 'nobles de royaume' is fairly 
ubiquitous in the remissions, but has been the subject of some debate. BeSSell, who does not 
show familiarity with remissions outwith Luce, claims that they are infrequently referred to as 
'non-nobles', but it is very rare to find a document that does not make reference to the non-noble 
status of the supplicant(s) some\vhere in the document. 
75 This phrase, with variations, appears in almost all the remissions concerning the Jacquerie. 
76 AN, JJ86, f. 117, no. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 266-8, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 187. 
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important questions about the nature of the punishment, which we will retum to 
in the 'Retaliation' section of Chapter 6, but also reminds us of the failings of our 
sources: we have only records of those who successfully quashed their 
conviction, and no record of the nature of any original punishments. References 
to any fine or punislm1ents issued to other settlements indicate this was a fairly 
typical treatment of rebellious villages involved in the Jacquerie . 
These collective remissions for the Jacquerie were different from those 
considered typical in the studies of Davis and Gauvard. As the document above 
demonstrates, these were issued to communities, villages, parishes and 
collections of peasants who acted m concert against the crown during the 
upnsmg. There is less of an emphasis on paid remuneration: Bettancourt and 
Vroil had their fines alleviated, but some of these supplicants make their pleas 
based on their extreme poverty. While pardons could be issued to those without 
the finances to hire an advocate on their behalf, usually through the generosity of 
the court, this was unusual. 77 Pardons could be issued by the crown as pari of a 
celebration, such as the king's entry to a city. However, neither of these events 
could account for the number of individuals who had no occupation recorded. 
The traditional crux of the remission seen in criminal cases - the impOliance of 
an individual's good name and renown - is often missing. Most supplicants were 
unknown to the court, nor could they have afforded the advocacy or suppOli that 
the traditional supplicant would have had. 
The majority of these remissions were issued seemingly in bulk, a short 
time after the end of the Jacquerie. By contrast, in Gauvard's study of the reign 
77 Geremek desclibes such an event as 'exceptionar, Gercmek, The Margins a/Society, p. 63. 
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of Charles VI, the majority of remissions were issued a long time after the crime 
was committed, with the greatest proportion coming after one year.78 
Table I. Time taken to issue a remission. 
Time after crime Proportion 
'peu de temps' 3.5% 
Less than 15 days 5% 
Less than 1 month 8.5% 
A month 18% 
Between 1 and six months 20% 
Six months to a year 8% 
Over a year 28% 
'il y a longtemps' 9% 
Gauvard's sample shows that obtaining a remission was a drawn-out process; 
over 45% of Gauvard's remissions are issued after at least six months. For some 
Jacques, the process also took 'a long time', but the vast majority received grace 
promptly after the rebellion. The majority of the Jacques' remissions were 
issued within 'between one and six months': 78% compared with only 20% in 
Gauvard's sample. Rather than the time-consuming criminal cases that compose 
the majority of cases in Gauvard's study, remissions for the Jacquerie are issued 
quickly to a mass of appellants. Remissions, at least as regards their widespread 
use, were relatively new, but the nature of the Jacquerie itself created an 
unprecedented administrative bu~den. 
7S The following table is taken from Gauvard, De grace especial, p. 71. 
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The first remissions issued in the direct aftennath of the rebellion connected to 
the Jacques are not for the 'gem du plat-pays'. Rather, in July 1358, only a 
month after the revolt's conclusion, the crown started dispensing justice and, 
more accurately, grace to its own loyal followers. The first individuals to receive 
remissions were members of the nobility pardoned for the excess they cOlmnitted 
in their counter-offensive against the peasants. These remissions give us 
information sUlTounding the movements of the Jacques. The lord ofSaint-Dizier 
first attacked against rebels closest to him in Saint-Liviere.79 Two later 
remissions confinn that the men of Saint-Liviere were involved with the Jacques, 
speci fically on their lord's lands. 8o 
Other remissions for individuals and settlements were granted to those 
who defended themselves against the attacks of the nobles: 
We have heard the supplication of the said ville of Saint Lumier in 
Champagne (Marne) ... [they] assembled, armed and made plans together 
there to guard and defend against certain nobles ... especially against our 
loyal friend the Lord of Saint-Dizier. ... Issued in Paris in the year of 
grace 1358 in the month ofNovember. 81 
The remission above refers us to an attack on rebels in a village where we have 
no record of activity in the Jacquerie. Not only do we get a sense of the 
geography of the repression, but we gain some insight into its scale. For 
example, we have a remission for a group of brigands hired by the crown to help 
bring an end to the violence in the region.82 This obviously indicates the lengths 
79 AN, JJ86, f. 210, no. 578. 
so AN, JJ86, 1'. 129, no. 377 and AN, JJ86, f. 210, no. 578. 
31 'oye la supplication habitants des dictes ville de Saint-Lumier en Champagne ... [the 
supplicants] assemblcz anlles et fait conspiracies ensemble it garder et deffendre contres aucuns 
nobles ... especialcment contre nostre 3me fealle Seigneur de Saint Dizier ... Donne a Paris l'an 
de grace mil CCCL VIII ou mois de Novembre', AN, JJ86, f. 210, no. 578. 
S2 AN, JJ90, f. 225, no. 444, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 303-4. 
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the crown was willing to go to put down the rebellion. The remission dates the 
brigands' violent repression of the villagers to 10 September, almost three 
months after the initial revolt. Perhaps this I?ives a new depth to Jean de 
Venette's depiction of the repression as the equivalent of a scorched earth policy: 
'Verberie, La Croix-Saint-Ouen near Compiegne, Ressons (Oise), and many 
other country towns lying in the open fields which I have not seen and do not 
note here, mourned their destruction by fire,.B3 If this repressive violence was 
continuing so long after the event, while the crown was simultaneously 
dispensing its grace to hundreds of individuals and communities across the 
regIOn, then it creates a new context m which to place the whole body of 
remissions: the crown's definition of its role in the remissions as 're-establishing 
the peace' was not simply a rhetorical flourish, but rather confirmation that these 
remissions were intended to end the continuing violence between nobles and 
peasants in the countryside.84 
Of course, the rebellion in the countryside was just one uprising that the crown 
faced in 1358. The rebellion in Paris, spearheaded by an aggressive Estates-
General and Etienne Marcel, was also documented by thirty-three documents 
(not including duplicates) within the registres des Tresor des chartes. Again, 
like the Jacques, many individuals involved in the dissent received pardons from 
the crown for their participation. These remissions, while shating much of the 
basic fonn of those issued for the Jacques, used a different vocabulary to 
describe events: 
83 Venette, Chrol1 .. v. 2, p. 263. trans. Birdsall, Vel1erre, p. 77. 
S4 This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, during the section on 'Retaliation'. 
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Charles eldest son of the King of France, regent of the realm and duke of 
Nonnandy and dauphin of Viem10is, let it be known to all present and 
future .... Nicolas Ie Flamenc, draper and bourgeois of Paris, by the false 
encouragement and evil inducement of the late Etienne Marcel, provost 
of merchants of the said city (ville) of Paris, and of Charles Toussac,85 
Gilles Marcel,86 Jehan de Lille and any other of the traitors of the said 
city who were false traitors and rebels to the crown of France who had 
executed justices in our said city (ville), at several times had taken anns 
with those against us ... we pardon and graciously remit ... the said 
Nicolas who to this day has a good life and renown and an honest 
standing and also good relations with our good and loyal subjects 
issued in Paris in the year of grace 1358 in the month of August.s7 
The f01111 of these documents was similar to those issued for the Jacques. They 
started with the king's name, described the individual's reduced culpability for 
the crime originally accused of, and pardoned the appellant of all the criminal 
charges but did not exclude the possibility of future civil charges. Excepting 
pardons for Paris, Meaux and Amiens, these documents were issued for 
individuals. The crown handled Marcel's pariisans promptly after the rebellion. 
All of these remissions were issued directly after the trouble in August of 1358, 
most in August but a couple as late as December. If the Jacques' pleas of 
clemency were dealt with quickly in comparison to the average criminal, then the 
partisans of Marcel were dealt with even quicker - all were issued within four 
months of the rebellion. Unlike the Jacques, 1358 represented the end of the 
matter within the courts; no documents were issued after December for 
,5 Charles Toussac was a Parisian money-changer, one of the 'Council of Eighty' organised by 
the Estates-Genera/ to draw up a list of concessions the Estates wished to extract from the 
Dauphin. 1. Sumption, The Hundred Years War, v. 2, Trial by Fire (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 254. 
S6 Gilles Marcel was Eticnne's cousin, and also part ofthc 'Council of Eighty', ibid, p. 254. 
07 'Charles aisnc fils du Roy de France regent le royaume ct duc de nonnande et dauphin de 
viennois, savoir faisons it tous presenz et it venir comme Nicolas Ie Flamenc drappier et 
bourgeois de paris par les faux ennortement et malaises inducien de feu Estienne Marcel provost 
des marchans de nostre ville de Paris de Charles Toussac, Gilles Marcel, lehan de Lille et 
aucunes autres de nostre ville noz traitres qui comme faux traitres et rebeIJes de mons de nous de 
la couronne de France aus este mis a mOli justices en nostre dicte ville se soit par plusiers fois 
annes avec eulx contre nous ... nous pardonnons et remettons gracieux ... qui Ie dit Nicolas a 
tous jours este de bonne vie et renomee et de honeste vie oy aussi la bonne relation de nos bon et 
loyal subjet de mons', AN, JJ86, f. 68, n. 209. 
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individuals involved in the Parisian uprising. On the other hand, documents for 
the Jacques continued to tlickle from the chancery until the end'ofthe 1370s.88 
Several other notable differences seperate the Parisians' pardons from 
those of the Jacques. The Parisian supplicants cited Etienne Marcel and his 
deputies like Gilles Marcel and Jehan de Lille as responsible for the revolt. 
While the individuals pardoned for involvement in the Jacquerie were acting 
'under constraint and against their will and wishes', the supplicants involved in 
the Parisian uprising were 'persuaded' by the heads of the movement into action. 
The 'commotion' or 'terror' in which the men of the countryside 'knocked down, 
destroyed and burned' the property of the nobles and 'sent them to death' was 
replaced for the city with a different Clime: being 'a false traitor and rebel 
towards the King of France'. These insurgents were the 'men of Paris', not 'men 
of the countryside'. 
The rebellion of Charles of NavarTe, and his followers, also produced a 
substantial number of remissions on the troubles of 1358. Although the rebellion 
was as much a dynastic conflict as a true uplising, the remissions indicate that a 
variety of 'nonnal' people were caught up in it. Fish merchants, moneychangers 
and fUlners all were forced to seek the crown's grace in the wake of the events. 89 
The remissions themselves followed the same basic principles as those we have 
seen already: they were wlitten in the name of the regent, detailed the crimes of 
the burghers involved and the grounds for reduced culpability: 
88 The latest remission we have connected to the Jacquerie is .11145, n. 498, which is in carly 
1394. This remission, however, is for the murder of a brigand who was active during the 
coml17ociol1. The latest remission issued specifically for mcmbers ofthc Jacqueric (and not, for 
example, noblcs who had killed Jacques) is J1107, n.186 where thc inhabitants of Hangest 
receive thcir remission aftcr a long process, in July 1375. 
89 For example, in AN, .1190. f. 12-15, nos. 26 and 29 are issued to fish merchants, nos. 21, 22 and 
27 are issued to money-changers, and no. 30 was issued to a furrier. 
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Let it be known to all present and future ... for many rebellions, treason 
and unpleasantness committed and perpetrated against the crown of 
France ... Jean de Maours, Collart de Lille and Jacques de Rue bourgeois 
and habitants of Amiens who offended and cOlmnitted the crime of lese-
majeste and treason ... in the company of the ICing of NavalTe and the 
English enemies of the said realm ... issued at Paris in the year of grace 
1358 on 20 August.9o 
There are sixty remissions for suppOliers of NaValTe, all of which come from 
JJ86, 87 or 90. The earliest fully dated remission was issued on 20 August 1358, 
ten days after the general amnesty. This first batch of remissions was issued for 
the Jacques and Marcel's followers. There is another batch released in 
November and December after a second wave of stIikes by the forces of the 
crown on suspected Navan'ese paliisans, this time brought on by rumours of a 
second conspiracy. Communities like Amiens were issued remissions, but 
pardons were intended mainly for individuals. These remissions, like those 
before, were issued swiftly, certainly in comparison to Gauvard's analysis of 
criminal remissions. 
These remissions also used a distinct vocabulary to describe allegiance to 
the NavalTese cause. It was a 'rebellion' against the lightful king. More 
importantly, the rebels were 'traitors' who committed the crimes of 'treason' and 
'lese-majeste'. Much has been made of the crimes that could not be pardoned 
which, according to Gauvard, included lese-l71ajeste, yet here were men indicted 
for that very ofIence, and gained reduced sentences. Mentions of lese-majeste 
90 • Savoir faisons a tous presenz et a venir ... pour p1usiers rebellions prodicions et malnaistres 
commcttant ct perpetrant contre la couronne de France ... Jean de Maours, Collart et Lille et 
Jacques de Rue bourgeois et habitants d'amiens qui en offendant et commettant crime de 1cse-
majcste royal et traison ... de 1a compangie du roy de navane et des eng10is ennemis du dit 
royaume' AN, JJ86, f. 72, no. 219. 
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were only found in remissions to the followers of NavalTe and a scattering of 
references among Parisiens who aided the' enemies of the crown'. 91 
Another type of document within the registre du Tn?sor des clzartes that can help 
shed further light on the events of 1358 are donations of property. Several are 
made to those who served the crown against the uprisings, and several of the 
donations themselves consist of property confiscated from rebels, who suppOlied 
NavalTe or Marcel. In this famous example, the Marshal Boucicaut recieved the 
property of Robeli, Bishop of Laon: 
Since Robert Ie Coq, bishop of Laon has been and is a rebel, disobedient 
to our lord, to us and the realm '" we confiscate all the temporalities of 
his bishopric ... Lord Jean Ie Meingre, called Boucicaut, marshal of 
France, has performed for us during the present wars and which he 
continues to offer day after day ... [and] we have given, authorised and 
delivered the house which the said bishop had in Paris ..• Issued at the 
Louvre in Paris, the year of grace l358 on 11 August.92 
These documents help us discover yet more 'rebels' within the registres du 
Tn?sor des chartes. 93 It is not only the highest political movers like Ie Coq who 
have their property confiscated; nor is it only royal marshals that receive them: a 
Norman knight Jehan De Muisenit and his sister Blanche were rewarded for loyal 
service with land taken from some of the lesser NavalTese soliders. We can also 
estimate their wealth and their holdings, perhaps including their political power. 
It informs us about the geography of the rebellions, as well as an indication of 
91 Phillip IV's reign sees the beginning of widespread usage of the concept of treason, but it is 
Charles the Dauphin's reign that encourages the concept of the 'crown' as the offended pmiy, 
see S.H. Curtler, The Laws o(Treason and Treason Trials in Later Medieval France (CUP: 
CambJidge, 1981). For general discussion of the uses of treason during Charles's regency and 
reign see also pp. 4-20, 28-54, 163-180. 
92 AN, .IJ89, f.280, no. 525, ed. D.-F. Secousse, Recl/eil, trans. Cohn, PP. pp. 194-5. 
93 Donations of property will be used sparingly in this thesis; they will not be included in any 
tables concerning the Jacquerie, although examples of them will be used to illustrate general 
points. 
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where the crown's loyal servants. were found. They also give us some idea of 
how the crown administered punishment. 
They also confirmed the fixed vocabulary used to describe different 
rebellions. In the document that grants Boucicaut ownership of Robert Ie Coq's 
house, the bishop is desclibed as a 'rebel' and aiding the 'enemies of the crown'. 
In the document issued to Sir Jehan de Musenit, the rebels have committed the 
crime of 'treason and rebellion', and Charles of Navane is desClibed as the 
mortal enemy of the crown.94 Again, this parallels the language used in the 
remissions for the Parisian rebels. Political rebellion was treated differently in 
the sources from the rural popular movement. 
Donations were issued for paIiisans of both Navane and Marcel, but no 
documents show propeliy being taken from an individual or group involved with 
the Jacquerie, although two remissions were issued in which property is granted 
specifically for good service against the Jacques. In all, thiliy donations of 
property were either made to those who served the crown against the rebellions, 
or confiscated property owned by rebels. As one would expect, considering that 
these were issued plimarily for those who were connected to the Navane or the 
Parisian rebellion, they are all issued in the wake of August 1358. 
As stated, there were several distinct types of remission concerning the rebels of 
1358. In the rush to produce several hundred of these documents within a couple 
of months, a distinct vocabulary for each type of remission emerged. This 
vocabulary even transfened to other documents, like donations and confiscations 
9" 'confisques a nostre dit seigneur a nous pour la trahison ct rebellion des des sus dictes maticres 
qui se sont renduz ennemis et rebelles de nostre dit seigneur ... avec Ie roy de navarre nostre 
ennemi mortel. Donne au Louvre des Paris ran de grace 1358 ou moys de mais ... .', AN, 1190, f. 
30. no. 65. 
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of property. When Bessen attempted to explain why no remissions suggested 
NavalTese forces worked with the Jacques, he claimed 'the occasionally vague 
descriptions of disloyal deeds ,95 made these hard to find. Yet, of the 307 
remissions for men involved in the three rebellions combined, only five suggest 
any doubt whatsoever as to which of the three distinct challenges to the crown 
they belonged. These are issued late in 1358, and refer to settlements to the far 
south of the Dauphin's lands. These are the exceptions and, as I will argue later, 
were probably distinct revolts other than those of the Jacques, the Parisian revolt 
and the mistoricatic disobedience of NavalTe.96 Instead, what characterises the 
selies is the clmity with which the different rebels can be identified, be they 
'conspiring with the men of Pmis' and Etienne Marcel, 'rebels and traitors with 
the King of NavalTe' who had committed " lese-majeste' , or 'men of the 
countryside' who were caught up in the revolt against the 'nobles'. 
The tumult of 1358 also represented a change in the administration of justice. 
Not only did the Jacques and others speed up the normal channels of chancery 
remissions, the sheer mass of remissions is even more in the context of the 
number nonnally issued in the year. This is especially true when considering 
that although the remission is not a new document, by 1358 it had only just 
begun to be issued regularly. Previously, no more than two hundred had been 
issued mlliually with any regularity. 
95 Bessen, 'The Jaequerie', p. 53. 
96 These remissions will be discussed in Chapter 6, 'Peasant Resistance'. 
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Table II. Comparison of remissions issued. 
Average remissions issued per year, 1350-7 (JJ80-84) 174 
Remissions issued within 6 months between late 1358 and 271 
early 1359 for the Jacques, Marcel's partisans and the 
Navarrese 
Remissions issued per year, 1361-3 (JJ91-2) 123 
The number of remissions that had to be issued by the French crown, and the 
volume of individuals who needed pardons, was of an unprecedented scale. 
Gauvard claims that remission production was at its height between 1380 and 
1400, but the output for 1358 was greater than any year in her period. There 
were more than twice as many documents issued in six months than would be 
expected in an entire year dming the early 1360s. What differences to the 
normal practice of the granting remissions did such a huge turnover of 
documents cause? What role did the rebellions have in stimulating new turnover 
in terms of remissions? 
Below is a table showing the remissions issued in the JJ selies. I have included 
only volumes that contain over 400 documents within them.97 Note that volumes 
are not issued strictly chronologically: one does not necessmily start where the 
previous volume ends. Several volumes consist of a collection of documents 
brought together that were missed out in other collections, spanning as much as 
two decades. There can be no guarantee that a remission from JJ58 was issued 
earlier than ]]59, for example: 
97 Data taken from Franyois, 'Note sur Ies Iettres de remission'. 
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Table III. Remissions issued per series. 
Series (JJ) Years Number of documents Number of remissions D;(,age of remissions 
35-49 1302-14 2850 17 0.6 
54 1317 701 2 0.3 
56 1317-19 620 6 1.0 
58 1317-20 487 0 0.0 
59 1318-21 611 1 0.2 
61 1322-3 493 2 0.4 
62 1323-5 531 5 0.9 
64 1342-8 756 8 1.1 
66 1329-34 1502 9 0.6 
68 1322-49 429 80 18.6 
71 1337-40 427 6 1.4 
72 1329-45 568 II 1.9 
74 1340-6 756 18 2.4 
75 1342-6 609 38 6.2 
76 1340-8 406 110 27.1 
77 1345-9 443 113 25.5 
80 1350-1 780 290 37.2 
81 1351-3 959 348 36.3 
82 1352-5 695 300 43.2 
84 1352-7 823 427 51.9 
86 1357-9 620 437 70.5 
87 1357-60 758 440 58.0 
90 1356-61 638 363 56.9 
91 1361-3 510 243 47.6 
92 1361-3 523 127 24.3 
96 1364-5 434 166 38.2 
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The importance of the rebellions of 1358 within the production of pardons is 
stressed by this table. Remission remained a small minority within the registres 
du Tresor des chm'tes until 1358. There is one exception in JJ68, a series that 
has 18% of remissions, however this series is a conglomerate of documents 
issued between 1322 and 1348 and is not necessarily a good representation of 
early-fourteenth century administration. The general trend is clear: remissions 
were present in the registers from the beginning of the fourteenth century, but it 
is the late 1340s that see a massive growth in the production of remissions, which 
continues into the 1350s, The increase in remissions was not a product solely of 
the rebellions of 1358. Yet 1358 gives the production of remissions another 
massive boost, so that almost 75% of JJ86 (1357-9) consists of remissions. If we 
are to understand these documents as indicative of the French crown's focus, 
then its primary concern was the punislunent and pardon of the rebels. 
Following 1358, the number of remissions retumed back to the levels of the 
earlier 1350s, before growing again in the 1370s. The level of remissions issued 
in the wake of rebellion is a substantial, even if momentary, change in previous 
practice for the French crown. 
Another change is the language of these documents: they shift from entirely in 
Latin at the beginning of the fourteenth century to almost universally French by 
the end. Thus, during Gauvard"s time period, the reign of Charles VI, remissions 
were nearly always written in the vemacular. By JJl38, for example, only three 
of the two hundred and fifteen remissions in the collection are in Latin. In the 
context of the 1350s however, this is exceptional: remissions were still primarily 
written in Latin. Fran90is collated the numbers of remissions recorded in French 
47 
and Latin.9S These figures place particular focus upon the years around 1358 as a 
watershed: 
Table IV. The language of remissions in the registers. 
JJ Series Number of Number 111 Percentage Percentage 
Remissions Latin Latin French 
80 (1350-1) 290 280 97% 3% 
81 (1351-3) 348 340 98% 2% 
84 (1352-7) 417 400 96% 4% 
85 (1357) 138 50 36% 64% 
86 (1357-59) 437 120 27% 73% 
92 (1361-3) 127 0 0% 100% 
Franyois attributes this switch from Latin to French as a product of the switch in 
administrations from Jean II to the dauphin Charles.99 This change can be seen 
in all forms of administration. lOo For example, of the sixty-four documents that 
were issued for Saint-Quentin in Jean II's reign, fifty-one were issued in Latin 
and thirteen in French; of the thirteen issued by Charles in his regency to the 
same bonne ville, only three were in Latin and ten were in French. lol The 
return of Jean II to pO\ver sees a shift back towards Latin, used in 79% of royal 
administrative documents, indicating the exceptional nature of Charles V's 
9S Franyois, 'Note sur les lettres de remission', pp. 321-4. Franyois only offers figures for a 
scattered collection of series. After ]]92, almost all remissions are written in French. 
99 For Fran<;:ois, 'the registers correspond to particular moments in the history of our language and 
royal chancel1erie', This is no doubt true, but he does not suggest any reason why this change 
occurs. p. 322. 
100 Sec S. Lusignan, La langue des rois au Moyen,.{ge, leji-anr,:ois ell France et en Anglelerre 
(Pmis: Presses universitaires de France, 2004), pp. 116-126, for details oflanguage used in 
Charles's reign as both Dauphin and Charles V. 
101 Lusignan, La langue des rois, p. 91. 
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selection of the vernacular as his language of choice. 102 In this context, JJ86, 
with the remissions for the Jacques, NavalTese and followers of Marcel, looks 
like just an extension of the Dauphin's new policy. However, if we take a look at 
the remissions issued for the rebels, there is something new in JJ86: 
Table V. The language of remissions in JJ86. 
JJ86 Number of Number 111 Percentage Percentage 
Remissions Latin Latin French 
Jacques 136 7 5% 95% 
Marcel "" .).) 0 0% 100% 
NavalTe 26 4 15% 85% 
Total 195 11 5% 95% 
Unrelated 242 109 45% 55% 
Remissions 
Remissions for crimes not related to rebellion were almost as likely to be written 
in Latin as they were in French throughout JJ86, the register consisting of 
documents issued in the wake of the summer of 1358. Documents relating to the 
rebellion however, are almost exclusively in the vernacular. If we exclude the 
NavalTese documents, then only 4% of the remissions for the Jacquerie and the 
followers of Marcel were written in Latin. Meanwhile, 45% of remissions for 
standard climinals were written in Latin. The continuing shift towards French is 
supported entirely by remissions issued for the rebellions of 1358, particularly 
the Jacquerie. 
102 ibid., p. 125. 
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It would be useful for our purposes to presume this is connected to the 
lower economic class of the Jacques; after all, Lusignan argues that the selection 
of French was 'intended to bring the King's word closer to that of his 
subj ects' . 1 03 When we consider how an individual might seek to use his 
remission - to present to his local lord, to give him immunity from criminal 
prosecution, to obtain release from imprisonment - we could see how the 
peasantry would favour a document in the vemacular easily understood by local 
officials. Operating outside the world of advocates, paid counsels and long-
established reputations that remissions were nom1ally issued, these individuals 
required pardons that could be used within their society. This would explain why 
we see more Latin pardons for the followers of NavalTe, who tended to be of 
higher status. 
The complete absence of Latin from any of the remissions issued for 
those of Marcel suggests this might not be the only reason. These Parisians were 
often men with professional occupations and were granted their pardons based on 
their' good name and renown'. What links them is that they were granted their 
remissions during the same administrative frenzy. The rebellions of 1358 not 
only represented the first crisis in the rule of the regent, they represented the first 
administrative challenge: how does the crown adminster grace and re-establish 
the peace in the countryside, where private violence between nobles and peasants 
had raged from May to August? With the courts having begun the process of 
switching from Latin to French for the remission letters, the massive number of 
pardons - more issued in a couple of months than were normally issued in two 
years - issued in the wake of these events were processed quickly. Hence we see 
103 Lusignan, La langlle des rois, p. 121. 
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the same vocabulary repeating .itself from document to document, the same 
phrases to describe action and the same claims of non-involvement or being 
forced into action repeated in the vast majOlity of the remissions. It is not 
surprising that they should also be produced in the same language. This was 
mass justice, issued quickly and efficiently to hundreds of appellants. 
The remissions issued in the wake of the Jacquerie did not represent a revolution 
in the French administration of pardons. Remissions had became common in the 
preceding years, and within the previous twelve months there seems to have been 
a shift from Latin to French. Most likely, this was an innovation of the new 
regime of the dauphin Charles. Yet the J acquerie represented a watershed in 
these new fonns of administration. Suddenly, not only were the vast majority of 
documents being issued in the vernacular, but the administrative centre issued 
more remissions than ever before, at almost four times the monthly rate. The 
fonnation of a distinct vocabularly to desclibe each revolt, the issuing to 
cOlmnunities as well as individuals, even the fonn that these letters took: all of 
these are indicative of an embryonic document finding rigidity through usage. 
Letters of remission were not historic documents with a long history of re-
establishing peace after violence: rather, their fonn and function were suddenly 
forged tln-ough being processed for hundreds of rebels in the lIe de France. 
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3 - THE THEORY OF CO-"OPTED REBELLION 
A People's War in civilised Europe is a phenomenon of the nineteenth 
century. It has its advocates and opponents ... In the generality of cases, 
the people who make judicious use of this means will gain a 
proportionate superiority over those who despise its use ... we ask 'what 
is the effect which such a resistance can produce? What are its 
conditions, and how is it to be used?' 104 
In 011 War, Carl von Clausewitz wondered whether nineteenth-century am1ies 
could take advantage of the phenomenon of revolution, and suggested that public 
fervour would be an excellent weapon for generals to marshal against opposing 
forces. This idea of a political group using popular movements to fmiher their 
own aims has proved attractive to histOlians, even though the concept of an army 
influencing the mob has long been rejected by social psychologists: ideology 
cannot be 'simply imposed on mindless subj ects', indeed, historically' [c ]rowd 
members certainly neither needed, nor had, leaders standing over them telling 
them what to do' .105 The image of a workers' revolt manipulated by powerful 
elites has affected the entire conception of the medieval revolt in the eyes of 
modem historians 1 06. 
As an example, when David Bessen examined whether the Jacquerie was 
a 'Class-War or Co-Opted rebellion?' 107 in his 1988 3liic1e, he strongly favoured 
the latter - the 'Jacquerie' was simply Charles of NavalTe's attempt to employ a 
peasant anny against the French crown. By either usurping the leadership of the 
104 Gen. C. von Clausewitz, 011 War, tr. Col. 1.J. Graham (London: Truber, 1940), v. ll, pp. 341-
2. 
105 S. Reieher, The Challenge ortlze Crowd (forthcoming). 
106 The is demonstrable in case ofthe revolt of the Ciompi, wllere Mollat and Wolff focussed 
upon 'cliques around men like Salvestr·o de Medici, Giorgio Scali and Alberto Strozzi' rather 
than the numerous leaders fi'om the artisan class, Mollat and Wolff, Poplllar Revolutions, p. 154. 
For a discussion ofleadership within the Ciompi, see Cohn, Lllstjor Liberty, pp. 120-9, and for a 
short discussion of the historiography on that revolt, see Cohn, PP, pp. 201-5. 
107 Bessen, 'The Jacquerie'. 
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Jacques, or by instigating the entire rebellion, Charles the Bad had simply anived 
at Von Clausewitz's conclusions several centUlies earlier: that elites can utilise 
peasants to destabilise opposing forces. 
Bessen was not the first to emphasise the importance elite groups played 
111 organising rebellion. Guy Fourquin devoted a whole chapter to '[t]he 
preponderance of elites in rebellion' .108 Neither was Bessen even the first to 
suggest that elites had led the Jacquerie. Raymond Cazelles made the same 
argument for the Jacquelie ten years earlier, but claimed that it was Etienne 
Marcel who had marshalled the rural forces to aid his rebellion in the capital;I09 
Simeon Luce himself made a similar argument in 1897. 110 For both Cazelles and 
Luce, the attack on the Marche of Meaux represented the centrepiece of their 
theories, w'hen the Parisians and the rural rebels joined together to destroy the 
fortress. The idea of the Jacquerie as a 'co-opted' rebellion has, in several 
works, become accepted. III 
Letters of remissions tell a very different story. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Marcel or Navan'e were behind the Jacquerie; indeed, the remissions 
suggest that the peasants were often openly hostile to both townsmen and 
Navarrese forces. Surprisingly, given the importance that the attack on Meaux 
has been granted in the historiography, there is no evidence to suggest that 
Jacques were involved in any meaningful way in the assault. To begin rebuilding 
the image of the Jacques as an important historical movement, we must first 
lOS Fourquin, Anatomy of Popular Rebellion, pp. 63-80. 
109 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', in The English Rising of 1381, pp. 74-84. 
110 Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 99-104. 
III For example, see F. Autrand, Charles V, le Sage (Paris: Fayard, 1994), and the chapter on 'La 
Jacqueric' pp. 318-330, which includes a section on the role of'Les COl71mandos Parisiens' in the 
rebellion. In the article on the Jacquerie in the Dictionmy of the Middle Ages, cd. J. Strayer 
(Scribner: New York, 1986), J.B. Henneman descibes Cazel1es's article as 'the authoritative 
work', and states that 'only in the Beauvaisis, where the worst atrocities occurred, does the 
Jacqueric seem to have pursued an independent course', vol. 6, pp. 35-6. 
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dismantle accusations that it was simply an extension of elite groups' political 
ambitions. The following chapter seeks to challenge theOlies that NavalTe or 
Marcel co-opted the Jacquerie for their own purposes, or that Meaux represented 
the great unification of urban and rural rebels; the Jacquerie was undoubtedly a 
distinct rural movement which was not controlled from outside. 
NAVARRE 
The peasants were quite happy to recognise their lords as leader both in 
revolts and .. in nationalistic movements .. .It is precisely in real 
Jacqueries that the presence of noble leaders is conspicuous. 1ll 
Guy Fourquin's Anatom:v of a Popular Rebellion confidently declared that 
medieval popular revolt was dominated by aristocratic leaders, subveliing the 
will of the rebels to f'rniher their own ends. Peasant rebels were "manipulated 
tactical force[ s r: 'the leading roles remain, directly or indirectly, with the elites 
in many types of disturbances'. 113 F oUl'quin' s model has been relentlessly applied 
to almost every popular movement of the Middle Ages. The search for nobles 
within a rebellion has become so common that it is no longer necessary to 
identify th.em within the crowd; rather, it can be assumed they are there, even if 
chronicles or documentary sources offer no or little evidence of this. I 14 
Fourquin's views on the Jacquelie have been echoed by other historians, 
the best example being Raymond Cazelles' two-pronged attack on previous 
scholarship; first, he maintained that the insurgents were rural aliisans; and 
112 Fourquin, Anatomy of Popular Rebellion, pp. 76-7. 
J 1.1 ibid., p. 70. 
114 Mol1at and Woltl, for example, while accepting the importance of non-elite leaders, talk of the 
'sacred union' between the upper bourgeoisie and the people' in this period. Mol1at and Woltr~ 
Popular Revolllfiol1s, p. 299. 
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second, that the Jacquerie was organised by Etienne Marcel. Following. that 
came another theory from David Bessen 115 that the mastermind behind the 
Jacquerie was none other than its eventual vanquisher, Charles ofNavane, Count 
of Evreux and son-in-law of King Jean II (or Charles the Bad, as history has 
remembered him): 
The Navanese were sympathetic or tolerant116 of the Jacques, as long as 
their actions were directed against Navane's enemies. Once the violence 
of the Jacques could not be controlled and threatened the position of the 
Navanese and the Parisians, the rebellion was quickly crushed. The 
opportunity to use the initial rural revolt as a means of expressing 
political dissent and forcing concrete refonn within the govennnent 
brought disparate groups together, not in a social war but in an act of 
political expediency 
Charles of Navane was a significant thorn in the crown's side over the period. 
He represented a real dynastic rival to the regent Charles, being the grandson of 
Louis X, and conmlanded large numbers of followers in the north of France and 
had a history of dealings with the English crown. During the years before and 
after the Jacquerie, his forces took control of many of the key fortifications of the 
lIe de France, and later that summer he would be welcomed into Paris as the 
city's captain. Remissions for Navanese supporters refer to Charles the Bad as 
. . l' 117 Y 1 .. d . dIN an . enneml morte . et now lere IS It suggeste 111 any recor s t lat avane 
may have controlled the rural revolt or that the two rebellions were linked 
together to further distinctly Navanese aims. Rather, Bessen constructed a 
nanative grounded solely on the presumption that peasant rebellions need nobles 
11:; 'Class War or Co-Opted Rebellion?' is a bold title, but one that Bessen shies away from in his 
actual argument (at least until the conclusion). Bessen's argues '[iJt seems quite likely that nobles 
who call be classed as supporters of Charles of Navarre were sympathelic to alld lolcrall! ()fthe 
non-noble rioters' (my emphasis). Bessen, 'The Jaequerie', pp. 43-59. 
116 This phrase, "sympathetic and tolerant', appears several times in the article. We are asked to 
make the logical leap from some Navarrese being "sympathetic and tolerant' of the Jacques to 
them having been in charge of it. Bessen, "The Jacquerie' pp. 46, 48, 51, 56. 
117 For example, see AN, JJ90, f. 98, no. 178. 
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at the helm, and those nobles could have supported Navane. There is no 
evidence of any peasant activity that was 'co-opted', but given the prevailing 
scholarship, this was an acceptable thesis. 
When Fourquin originally argued that the nobility had a role in the Jacquerie, he 
encouraged historians to disregard the majority of the chronicle evidence: 'Must 
we follow Froiss31i blindly in his repeated insistence on the hostility of the 
Jacques to the nobles in 1358?,118 To propose that the Navanese controlled 
these revolts requires the same approach: the chronicles display contempt for 
both the Jacques and the King of Navane, but never once suggest that the two 
rebellions were interlinked. Bessen' turned to the documents that show quite 
clearly that the Jacques were hostile to the nobles, at least in the eye of the 
crown: the remissions. 
Yet within this supposedly supportive dataset of remissions, as Bessen 
admits, 'there is no single document' within remissions issued to both Navanese 
individuals and Jacques that indicates a link between the twO. 119 He describes a 
'sparseness of source materials describing the event', 120 which is simply wrong-
the vast databank of remissions provide ample evidence of the character of the 
violence. Many remissions give us clear descriptions of many of the rebels on 
either side. 
We have already discussed the distinctive language that is used to 
describe the Jacques. They are refened to the gcnz du plat-pays: men of the 
countryside, described primarily as being 'against the nobles'. There are several 
variations on this theme; they can also be described as 'non-nobles against the 
118 Fourquin, Anatomy of Popular Rebellion, p. 76. 
119 Bessen, 'The Jacquerie' p. 49. 
120 ibid, p. 53. 
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nobles of the realm'.l21 Occasionally, we see them described as "communs' or 
'peuple', but even Bessen concedes that this group is 'almost always 
counterpoised with les nobles'. 122 The revolt itself was referred to as the 
commocioll or the effi'oi, giving a sense of the chaos that ensued in its wake. 
This language remains constant throughout all the remissions, making it simple 
to spot a remission for the Jacques even when surrounded by the mass of general 
remissions that make up the rest of the registers. 
As mentioned, particular tenns were used in conjunction with Navarrese 
pardons that we do not find in the remissions for the Jacques. The lacquerie 
itself was identified as the "time of the commotion between the men of the 
countryside and the nobles', and the Navarrese rebellion was identified as a 
separate temporal entity ('at the time that the Navan'ese and other enemies of 
ours ... [came together] for wounding and damaging our subjects and the 
realm '),123 For example, Navan'ese partisan Jehan Bugdenet and his aides were 
described as 'rebels against us and the crown of France'; 124 a change of emphasis 
to the sole target being the regent, not the 'nobility' and' good men' of France,l25 
There is even a clearer example of this distinctive text in a document donating 
land confiscated from a Navarrese partisan: 
121 Bessen argues that only a portion of the thirty-four remissions in the Pieces Justificatives that 
refer to the Jacqucs (again, making reference only to those fully reprinted in Luce) specifically 
say 'non-nobles': 'Any explanation of the usage must first note that the phrase was not always 
used in the precise fonn of les nobles con/re les nOllnobles. More frequently, the tenns used 
instead of nOl1llOhles were les gen7. dll plat pavs, les habilal1= or les peuple of a specific region, or 
les cOll1munes of an area'. However, while it is true that some do not, they do all describe it as 
someone against the nobles, be that the 'peuple', the 'rustics' or the' gens du play pays' ibid., p. 
58. 
121 ibid. 
123 'Que comme ou temps que le navaITois et autres ennemies de mons ... pour grever et domagier 
noz subgies et le royaume cest assavoir au 1110is d'aoust dernier passe', AN, JJ90, f. 98, no. 178. 
124, rebelle de mons de nous et de la COUTOnne de France', AN, JJ90, f. 30, no. 65. 
125 It should be noted, of course, that the Jacques are accused (if not as frequently) of having 
acted against the crown of France, but they are always indicted of actions against the nobles, 
whereas the Navaresse are never accused of this but only in their opposition to the crown. 
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for the treason and rebellion of these said matters that they had given to 
enemies .... and rebels against our said lord and to us with our mOlial 
h . f ]')6 enemy t e Kmg 0 Navarre. -
Treason (trahisoll) is a term not used in any of the remissions for the Jacques, 
and has its own implications: this was an assault upon the monarch. This 
distinction defines the differences between these two outbreaks of unrest: the 
Navarrese uprising was a treasonous attack aimed at the regent, while the 
Jacquerie was targeted only against the nobility as a whole. Perhaps more 
impOliant was the description of the Navarrese interest as a 'rebellion'. The 
whole nature of what constitutes a 'rebellion', and how a rebellion is defined, has 
coloured many debates on what constitutes popular action. Fourquin, for 
example, prefers rebellion to revolt in cases were the 'movements were stmied 
either by a new social group which wishes to belong to the elites, or by elites 
who are not satisfied with their 10t'.127 This distinction is not simply one for 
modern historians either. Cohn makes clear that this is also a distinction of 
contemporaries: 
Statutes, criminal records, town council proceedings, and chronicles often 
restlicted the use of the word rebellion for aristocratic challenges to the 
dominant power, be it a king, count or city-state, or the 'rebellion' of a 
b· '11 ·]18 su .lect VI age or CIty. -
Cohn contrasts this use of 'rebellion' with the commocions of the lower classes 
in France and Flanders, and indeed the Jacquerie is referred to in almost all the 
remIssIOns as a commociol1. 129 The French crown made a deliberate contrast 
126 'pour la lraison et rebellion des dessus diz matieres qui se sont renduz ennemis .... et rebelles 
de nostre dit seigneur et de nous avec Ie roy de navuITe nostre ennemi martel' AN, J]90. f. 198. 
no. 178. 
127 Fourquill, Anatomy ofa Papillar Rebellion, p. 116. 
128 Cohn, Lustfor Liberty, pp. 3-13. 
129 ibid. 
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between the organised lese-l71ajeste of the 'rebellion' and. the commocion or 
effi'ois of the 1acquerie. 
The whole sample of remissions tied to Navarre's rebellion is substantial, 
and it is hard to make any generalisations on the exact makeup of the Navarrese 
force. I have found sixty remissions that specifically refer to Navarre's rebellion 
using the phrases above, but there are many more documents (like confiscations 
of property) within the chancery series. They include actual lieutenants of 
Navarre, like Adam de Prusieux, a knight who had spent a 'long time in the 
company and audience of the King of Navarre, our enemy' .130 Also, towns that 
had sided with Navarre, like Paris, were pardoned, along with individual 
townsmen accused in complicity in the treason, like 1ehan de Maours, Colmi de 
Lille and 1 acques de Rue of Amiens. All of these groups of remissions used the 
same vocabulary, described above. The most interesting sub-bracket of these 
remissions are local villagers who, in August, either took up arms and cOlllillitted 
crimes against the allied troops of the Navarrese and English, or in fear for their 
lives acceeded to whatever these enemies of the crown demanded. This sample 
includes priests like 1ehan Bugnedit131 and 1ehan de Pris (who was also the cure 
of his village),132 carpenters like 1ehan Magneut 133 and even butchers134. The 
remissions for these individuals, rural men who were involved in fighting in the 
summer of 1358, make no mention of the Jacquel-ie whatsoever - peasants 
resisting or joining the Navarrese rebellion were considered distinct from their 
neighbours who had rampaged against the nobility two months earlier. 
130 AN, ]]86, f. 129,110.376. 
131 AN, JJ90, f. 71, no. 133, 'Jehan Bugnedet, prestre esperanf. 
1-'2 AN, .1190, 1'. 98, no. 177 . lehan de Pris, prestre cure de 1a ville de Foilloy'. 
133 AN, JJ90, f. 100, no. 187. 
13~ AN, JJ90, f. 82, no. 149. 
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Faced with remissions that clearly show the two revolts to be distinct, Bessen 
based his argument on scant threads within individual remissions: in this case, 
the remissions for urban centres, and two documents issued to individuals within 
the centre of the rural revolt. However, neither of these groups suggest anything 
conclusive. Bessen first argued that the involvement of towns loyal to Navane 
within the revolt proved that Navanese partisans controlled the revolt. Although 
these towns may have risen up, there is nothing to suggest they were directly 
linked to the Jacquerie. For example, Bessen lists Paris as one of the towns that 
had Navanese support, and that took part in the Jacquerie. Yet, against 
Cazelles's argument that the 1:\'10 were the same,135 every clu'onicle and remission 
states that the Parisian revolt and the Jacquel-ie were entirely separate, as we will 
discuss presently. There is absolutely no evidence that towns like Rouen or Laon 
were involved in the J acquel-ie from either the chronicles or the remissions, and 
as will be argued later, neither is there much evidence of involvement at Meaux. 
Only three of Bessen's pro-Navanese towns are linked by remissions to the 
Jacquel-ie: Amiens, Montdidier and Senlis. In the case of Amiens, it is 
problematic to descl-ibe the town as having supported the Jacques: 
Charles, etc., Let it be known to all present and future that in times past 
the aldennen [esqllevins] and commune of the city of Amiens have been 
and, (we continue to hope) always will be good, loyal, and true in their 
obedience as subjects to my lord, to us, and to the crown of France. And 
they have realised that they have incUlTed our indignation for what has 
happened at several assemblies of the people of the three estates, which 
we found offensive, even if they were encouraged and advised by some 
who claimed at the time to be members of our council. ... In addition, 
during this present year, when we left Compiegne for Corbie, 
accompanied by many armed guards, we wrote to the mayor, many 
leaders of the guild and others of the city, ordering them to come to 
Corbie to talk with us. They did not obey or heed our command but sent 
us envoys, suggesting that we should go to the city of Amiens and that 
our men should go there unanned. They said they feared the noblemen in 
135 See Cazel1es, 'The Jacquerie', pp. 74·84. 
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our troops, because they heard some of these persons make certain threats 
... At the request of the common people of the Beauvaisis and without 
our permission, the mayor, aldennen and the commune [of Amiens] sent 
their own people out [to join] the common people of the Beauvaisis, who 
had just begun to assemble. In addition, many individuals of Amiens 
went by their own will, although it was said that those who were sent 
only went four, five or six leagues outside the city and its environs and 
then immediately returned... Moreover, in all the assemblies with the 
other bOl1l1es villes of the realm, they requested the King of NavalTe to be 
freed, hoping, it is said, that he would be good and loyal to my lord, to us, 
and to the crown of France ... Also, they put on the hoods, part blue and 
red, as a sign of their unity and alliance with the city of Paris ... 
Moreover, after the treaty made between us and the said King of Navarre, 
when we were with our troops at the bridge of Charenton, they agreed 
that this King should be the leader, because the city of Paris had written 
to them that it had been among the things agreed to and negotiated 
between us and this King. ·136 
Whatever rebellion the Amienois may have been involved in, they were part of a 
general backdrop of sedition and confusion against the crown, rather than as 
some orchestrated master-plan to unite townsmen and peasants in the NavalTese 
cause. All the allegations of rebellion were treated distinctly; refusing the 
crown's demands, sending men to the Jacques, pledging allegiance to NavalTe 
and showing unity with the Parisians were all different crimes. Clearly, there is 
confusion about the involvement with the Jacques: men were sent out to the 
countryside, then called back, and others joined of their own accord. Colm links 
this account to that of the Chroniqlle Nonnande, which records that 'the mayor 
of Amiens also sent forth a hundred men of the commune, but the town council 
disapproved and recalled them. They returned without more or less doing any 
hann to the nobles· J37 . Amiens cannot be used as an example of a NavalTese 
136 AN, JJ86, f. 79, no. 239, reprinted in Secousse, pp. 97-9, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 197-8. 
137 La Chrollique Ilormande dll XIVe sicc!e, ed A. and E. Molinier SHF (Paris, 1882), p.181, and, 
for discussion, Cohn, Lusl for Liberly, p. 169. This chronicle, wTitten by a Norman noble, was 
composcd sometime aftcr 1372, although whether the work is Oliginal or a compliation of other 
chronicles is still disputcd. In the case of the Jacqucrie, the account is almost exactly the same as 
Jean de NoyaJ's Flemish chronicle, the so-called 'Version non normande', ed. J. Kervyn de 
Lettenhove, Lvlore el croniqlles de Flandres (Brussels, 1896) vol. 2, pp.85-6. See Molinier, Les 
sources de l'hisloire, vol. 4, pp. 23-5. 
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town's control of the Jacquerie; the municipal elite could not agree whether a 
relatively minor force of 100 men should go or not, and the general uproar only 
led to instability within the town. This small force, that did not reach six leagues 
from their home city before being recalled, could not have dictated the Jacques' 
agenda. Perhaps Amiens was indicative of how confusing politics was in the 
rebellions in northern France, with the city attempting to increase its power 
through involvement in all three great rebellions; it was certainly not indicative 
of strong links between the peasants and the municipal elites. 
The same can be seen in Montdidier. Despite the inhabitants receiving a 
remission for participation, their mayor simultaneously sought grace for having 
hung a thieving cleric during the rebellion. 138 He was not involved in the rest of 
the revolt. Others of the urban elite seemed to be at odds with the rebels; the 
inhabitants attacked the nobles of Montdidier, and long past the revolt these 
knights held a grudge against the townsmen.139 In Senlis, townsmen evicted the 
nobles from their houses. 140 If the top-ranks of the urban society were pro-
NavalTese, but those involved with the Jacques were fighting against those top 
ranks, then surely the insurgents were anti-NavalTese? 
None of these remissions mentioned NavalTe, and more importantly, the 
agency is granted not to townsmen, but rather to the 'men of the countryside'. A 
ragtag collection of burghers joined the mass of peasantry in their uprising; they 
did not orchestrate a revolt that the peasantry then joined. All the chronicle and 
I1S AN, J1106, f 121, no. 393. 
139 The remission for the habitants recorded that 'aucuns des diz nobles pourroient avoir 
malivo1ence ou hayne aux dessus diz [habitants]" AN, JJ86, f 154, no. 437. 
140 See AN, J.l86, f 127, no. 421. 
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remission evidence indicates that urban suppOli was, at most, ancillary to the real 
insugents, the men of the countryside. 141 
Apart from these towns, Bessen alleges that two remissions show a link between 
Navarre and the Jacquerie, but neither shows any definitive connection. The first 
was issued to a Jacque, Jehan Bernier. After the defeat at Clennont, he was 
offered 'letters of commission' from the King of Navane: 
'this [Jehan] Bernier of Villers Saint Pol (Oise), acting in fear and on pain 
of death, was with those [men of the countryside] through the said tenor 
and was for many days in their company, until this Guillaume Cale, 
calling himself captain of the Beauvoisis, and many others of his 
adherents and accomplices were executed at Clennont thus putting an end 
to their mad enterprise, and so it happened that. because these certain 
nobles of our realm, enemies of the said countryside, for the stated 
causes, were running amock and causing destruction for a time to tllis 
said land and the goods of the fields, some people from the said land, of 
Senlis and of Villiers, and of the neigbouring sunoundings of Clern10nt 
and Beauvoisin, came before to the King of Navane (then captain, 
rebellious and hostile to the said realm, to our Lord the King142 and to 
us 143) and obtained from him certain letters of commission by which the 
said J ehan Bernier, of Villers, was made captain there and guard of the 
countryside in [N avane' s] absence so that the people and commons could 
work there and cultivate the lands and reap and secure the goods of the 
fields. The said Bernier refused this said cOlm11ission for the space of 
around a week, and finally, against his will and wishes and by constraint, 
he accepted it and went to stay in the said town (ville) of Senlis, without 
leaving it and without making use of the said commission, saving that he 
wrote to many villages (villes) of the countryside asking that they would 
come to him in the said town (ville) to see and plan how they could begin 
resisting the said [nobles'] rampage ... ,144 
141 This will be expanded upon in the Chapter IV, 'Mapping the Revolt'. 
142 This refers to King Jean II. 
143 This refers to the Dauphin Charles. 
144 'Ie qucl Bemier dc Villers Saint Pol, aient hOlTeur, doubte et paour de mOli, demoura avec 
eulx aus diz effrois et fu par plusiers jours en leur compaignie, jusque a ce que Guillaume Ca1e, 
soi portant capitaine du dit pais de Beauvoisin et plusicrs autres ses adherens et complices furent 
mis a mOli iJ Clem10nt et descheirent de Jeur fole emprise, et il soit ainsi que, pour cc aucuns 
nobles elu elit royaume, malveillans et ennemis du dit plat pais, pour les causes dessus dictes, 
coulToient et gastoeint pour Ie temps de Iors icelui pais, et Ies biens des champs, plusiers 
personnes du dit pais, tant de Senlis comme de Villiers, voisins d'environs Clennont en 
Beauvoisin, venissent a present par dcvers Ie Roy de Navarre, a donc capitaine d'icellui et nostre 
rebelle et malveillant du dit royaume, de monseigneur et de nous, et obtenissent de Ii celiaines 
Jettres de commission par lesqulles Ie dit Jehan Bemier, ele Villers, fu commis de par lui capitaine 
et garelc elu dit pais, lui absent, afin que Ie peuple et common el'icelui peust labourrer et cultiver 
Ies terres et ouster ct metlre iJ sauvcte Ies biens des champs, Iaquelle commission Ie elit Bemier 
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First, it is important to note that Bernier was not a Navan"ese agent; rather, he 
was a Jacque who refused a commission to protect the countryside against the 
nobles' rampage. The key example of Bessen's argument never accepted the 
commission from Navarre, even under duress. It was, of course, in Bernier's 
best interests to downplay the relationship with NavaITe; perhaps he had been 
eager to help at the time but there is no evidence in the remission to suggest this 
was the case. Moreover, Bessen argued that Navarre was instrumental in the 
organisation of the Jacques, selecting targets and driving the programme of 
destruction from the very start. Yet the only example Bessen has, even if we 
believe that Bernier accepted the commission willingly, happened after 
Clermont, once the Jacques had been defeated and the emphasis had shifted to 
the nobJes' chevaucJuze of the countryside. Far from being involved in turning 
the Jacques to a Navarrese agenda, Bernier abandoned the Navarrese only once 
the Jacques had been defeated. Navarre was approached by the peasantry who 
wanted calm restored to the countryside in the wake of his retaliatory attack; this 
was an attempted truce between peasants and their enemy, not an indication of a 
long-agreed pact. 
Bessen refers to just one other remission, and this one makes no reference 
to collusion with Navarre. Rather, Bessen believes the man to have been linked 
previously to the Navarrese cause: 
refusa par l'espace de huit jours ou environ, et finablement, contre son gre et volente et par 
contrainte, la receut et s'en ala demourer en la dicte ville de Senlis, sens soi partir ne sens 
cxecutier ou user en aucune maniere de la dicte commission, tors tant seulement qu'il escript it 
plusiers villes du dit plat pais que il venissent a lui en la dicte ville pour veoir et orderener 
commcnt on pOUIToit mectre remede et resister aus diz COUITCUX ... ' AN, JJ86, 1'. 133, no. 387, 
reprintcd in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 276-8. 
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Charles, .. .let it be known to all that Gennain de Reveillon, inhabitant of 
Sachy-Ie-Grant in the Beauvoisin (Oise), waged retainer145 of the Count 
of Montfort, during the commotion or terror of the men of the countryside 
of the Beauvais against the nobles of the land and by constraint of the 
said people and their captain, rode out with them for three days or so in 
their company to Mello, Pont-Saint Maxence and Montataire, and that on 
the last of these three days, when the said people were in anns and fired 
up, on the hill of Montataire, they requested of that said Gennain that he 
be their captain in the absence of their general captain, who was then in 
Ennenonville. The said Germain excused himself several times for many 
causes and reasons. Finally, because he did not wish to obey their request 
and to their wishes. they seized his hood injuriously, and said that he 
must be their captain for half-a-day and one night, whether he like it or 
not, and they intended to pull him off his horse, and with that pulled out 
several swords with the intention of cutting off his head ifhe did not obey 
them. In fear and to avoid the threat of death, he became their captain for 
half-a-day and a night only, at the said place of Mello 146 , where they 
encountered the men of the King of Navarre, who at the time were 
forcing themselves upon the said land of the Beauvaisis to destroy and 
pillage there. There, at the said Mello, Germain left and returned to his 
house as quickly as he could, and he did so without having caused any 
damage, nor in any other manner setting tIres, robbing nor killing anyone, 
nor doing anything else that was wrong. However, what is worse, the 
said nobles went on to bum, steal, ravage and assaulted all the said 
supplicant and all his movable and inherited goods, and he suffered losses 
to the value of three thousand moutons. or thereabouts. and he has nothing 
left but his wife and his children ... he was a homme de labour who 
cultivated and sent his goods to safety. 147 
140 I have translated familia as a waged retainer of the Count. Gennain was listed as a homme 
de labour, and he had 3,000 mOIlfOI1S worth ofpropcrty, so this would suggest hc was a 
landowner of some standing. Yet afclIl1i!ier would not be a courtier or a high-ranking associate 
of the Count of Montfort; there is no reason to believe he was part of the Count's inner circle, or 
shared the Count's political views. 
146 Mello was the hometown of Guillaume Cale, the alleged 'leader' of the Jacquerie. 
147 'Charles, ainsne fils du roy de France, regent le royaume, due de N0l111andie et dalphin de 
Yiennois, savoir faisons a to US, presenz et a venir, a nous avoir este expose par Gel111ain de 
Reveillon, demourant a Sachy-le-Grant en Beauvoisin, familier du conte de MontfOli, que, 
comme, en la commocion ou esmeute du peuple du plait pais de Beauvoisins n'a gaires tilite 
contre les nobles dudit pais, ledit Gennain, par contrainte dudit peuple et de leur capitaine, lors 
eust chevauchi6 par trois jours ou environ en leur compagnie Ii Mello, Ii Pont-Saint Maxence, et Ii 
Montataire, a la deneine des quelx trois jOUl11eeS, 1edit peuple estant en a1l11eS et esmeu, sur la 
montainge de Montatiare, eust requis audit Gennain qu'il vousist pour lors estre leur capitaine en 
rabsence de leur capitaine general, qui lars cstoit devant EI111eJ1onville, lequel Germain s'en 
excusa par plusiers fois et pour plusieurs causes et raisons. Et finablement, pour ce qu'il ne 
vouloit obeir a leur requcste et a leur voulente, Ie pristrent par son chaperon injurieuscment, en 
disant qu'il seroit leur capitaine pour demi jour et une nuit, vousist au non, ct le vouldrent sachier 
jus dessus son cheval, et avec ce sacherent plusieurs espees sur lui pour Ii caper la teste s'il n'eust 
obey a eulx. Lequel, pour doubte et pour eschever au peril de la mort, fu leur capito"1ine cle111i jour 
et une nuit tant seulle111cnt, au dit lieu Mello, encontre les gens du roy de Navarre, qui lors 
s'efforcoient d'entre au dit pais de Beauvoisins pour icellui grever et gaster, duquelliey de 
Mellou le dit Gennain se departi et s'en reppaira en sa maison si tost comme il post eschaper, 
senz ce qu'il ait autrement chevauchi'e, ne en aucune 111aniere boute fcu, pille ne occis personne, 
ne metJait en aucune maniere autre111ent; mais, qui pis est, depuis, les dis nobles ont ars, pille, 
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Obviously, this was a complex remlSSlOn with many sections worthy of 
comment, from Gennain de Reveillon claiming around 3,000 moutons of 
damage, to his appointment as captain (if only for half a day and night!) in the 
absence of the general capitaine. 148 Gennain was linked to nobility, but was also 
a h0711me de labour with substantial holdings. Yet most interestingly for us is the 
reference to Navane: the encounter with the Navanese who were pillaging the 
land seems to be the turning point for Gennain. Presumably after his force was 
defeated, he escaped home. 
This remission suggests antagonism between Navarre and the peasants, 
but Bessen does not mention this. Rather, Bessen only remarks that Germain de 
Reveillon was a familiar of the count of Montfort, Jean de Boulogne, who 
Bessen claims had supported the Navanese cause in 1355. He supplies' no 
evidence that Jean of Boulogne was still allied to the NaVaITeSe cause, or that he 
showed anything but loyalty to the crown in this period after receiving grace. 
To make the logical leap that it was 'very likely' that Gennain 'adhered to the 
rebel's cause' is stretched. 149 Bessen argued that had he not suppOlied Navane, 
he would have left Boulogne's service, yet if anything the fact he stayed in his 
service once Boulogne had re-pledged himself to the crown indicates the 
gaste et essille audit suppliant tous ses biens meubles et heritages, et Ii ont fait dommage jusques 
a la value de trois mille moutons, ou environ, et ne Ii est rienz demoure fors sa femme et sa 
enfanz '" commc il soit homme de labour qui a it cueillir et mettre a sauvete ses biens', AN, 
.IJ86, f. 102, no. 308, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp.261-3. 
148 This will be discussed in more depth later, but there is reason to believe that this general 
capilaine might be Guillaume Cale, the captain made famous by the chroniclers. The three 
villages mentioned here that Gennain takes control of- Mello, Pont-Saint-Maxence and 
Montataire - are all contained within the very small region in which we find other evidence of 
Cale (Mello is in fact Calc's home village, and one other remission mentions Cale being in 
Montataire). Others have taken the reference to mean that Gennain took control of the whole 
force of the Jacques; but there is no evidence to suggest he led any other than the three villages. 
149 Bessen, 'The Jacquerie', p. 52. 
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opposite. 150 Even then, one wonders what his master's loyalty mattered anyway, 
considering that Germain was involved in a bloody battle against the nobility. 
Yet most importantly, the remission details exactly how the peasants and the 
NavalTese met - as enemies, not as friends. At the end of Gem1ain's time as a 
Jacque, he, along with his comrades, faced vengeance at the hands of their 
supposed organiser, Charles ofNavalTe. 
These two remissions offer scant evidence of a link between NavalTe and 
the Jacques: the remissions combined indicate one individual who was offered a 
commission by NavalTe once the Jacquerie had ended, the other for an individual 
related to a Count who had once showed loyalty to Charles the Bad, three or 
more years before the Jacquerie. Neither suggests any link during the rebellion 
itself, and neither indicates that the crown considered these individuals NaValTeSe 
suppOliers. The only time either individual came into contact with Navan'e 
during their stay with the Jacques was on the fields at Clennont, where they 
faced first-hand a crushing defeat at the hands of NavalTe and his companions, or 
afterwards, when NavalTe's men where ravaging the countryside in retaliation. 
No other document for either the Jacques or the Navarrese pardoned in the wake 
of 1358 mentions any link between the two rebellions. Bessen only used 
remissions for the Jacques taken from Luce's Pieces Just(ficatives,151 but there is 
a large sample available especially as regards NavalTese partisans. For example, 
150 After initially stating that Gennain 'was at least uncommitted to the Navanese cause', Bessen 
then transmutes this into 'the evidence strongly suggests that a Navanese supporter participated 
in the Jacquerie', ibid. , p. 53. 
151 Bessen does not reference Luce's Pieces JlIstijicatives as the source of his data. This in itself 
might not be a problem, but not recognising this in turn does not recognise the slightly 
idiosyncratic nature ofLuce's collection, obviously in its skewed sample, as mentioned earlier, 
but also in its tendency to only extract certain sections of the remission, and occasionally to 
change from straight transcription to a summary by Luce himself. 
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rather than give a sense of the scale of the documentation, Bessen misrepresents 
the sample: 
Other cases of Pro-Navarrese individuals who took an active role in the 
Jacquerie have not yet been identified ... This paucity of evidence can be 
attributed to the fact that most NavalTese were pardoned by means of a 
blanket pardon, issued either by a treaty or by a letter, coveting all of 
their unspecified crimes and rebellion. ls2 
Of course, not only were the NavalTese pardoned by a blanket pardon, but so 
were the followers of Etienne Marcel and the Jacques themselves. IS3 Moreover, 
NavalTe's men also received individual pardons, exactly the same as with the 
Parisians and Jacques. Bessen cannot find any individuals with links to the 
Jacques in the remissions referring to the NavalTese, and his only examples, the 
two quoted above, come from the Jacques themselves, wrong-headed as they 
may be. Yet chroniclers and remissions do testify to animosity between the 
peasants and NavalTe. 
First, the viciousness of the NavalTese retaliation 111 itself indicates 
substantial animosity between the two groups. Good examples are the 
remissions that Bessen uses, both of which desctibe the execution of Cale and 
many of the rebels at Clem10nt by NavalTe and his troops. It was undoubtedly 
bloody - many were executed at Clermont, where the Chronique Normande 
estimates 800 were beheaded. Bessen argued that the Navarrese had stepped in 
only because of 'the bourgeois-NavalTese abhorrence at the use of vicious 
brutality,154 by the peasants, yet the remissions and chronicles both testify that 
152 Bessen, 'The Jacquerie', p. 53. 
153 For the Parisians, see AN, .JJ86, f. 80, n. 240, reprinted in Cohn, PP, p. 179-81. There is no 
specific general pardon for the Jacques, but many remissions make reference to a general 
amnesty: for example, 'we [the crown] desired and decreed that all the nobles give remission to 
and pardon the men of the countryside as well as to those of the nobility', JJ98, f. 84, n. 252, 
reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, p. 224, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 191-2. 
154 ibid., p. 56. 
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the viciousness of Navarrese retaliation was even more brutal than the Jacquerie 
that came before it. 155 
Second, there IS evidence that even before the battle at Clermont the 
Jacques would have considered conspIracy with Navarre an offence. The 
remISSIOn to Mathieu de Leure1, issued for his part 111 the execution of Jean 
Bernier (a different Bernier than Bessen's example who refused the Navarrese 
cOll11nission I56), has been discussed already, but it does again provide insight into 
the animosity held towards Navarre: 
Around the time of this feast day [of Corpus Christi], Jean Bernier, a non-
noble, was allegedly accused of treason, for letters from the I(jng of 
Navarre were found on him, and he was c0l11111only known for such deeds 
in the region. For this, he was led to Guillaume Cale ... Guillaume 
handed him over to EtieI111e du Wes, the captain of the village of 
Montataire, to be put to death, if he and the villagers judged that he 
deserved it. Informed about [Bernier's] life and reputation and in the 
presence of two or three hundred people of this village and the 
surrounding countryside, this Etienne had him led barefoot in his shirt to 
the cross in front of the palace of these monks of Montataire (Oise), 
where he conunanded Jehan Ie Charon to execute and put him to death; 
the command was obeyed. 157 
Thus, the Jacques meted out punishment for collusion with Navarre, and their 
sentence was death. The description of the execution - which is as detailed an 
image of an execution that we find in the sources indicates that it was a brutal 
and public spectacle. There was dramatic capital to be gained in the ceremonial 
murder of a Navarrese agent. 
I:'" See the Chapter 4, section on 'Retaliation'. 
1,,6 Notably, the previous remission that Bessen relies upon also concerned a Jehan Bernier of 
Montataire who was suspected of being a Navarrese partisan. However, the Bernier referred to 
here was executed before Cale's death at Clennont, while the f0ll11er clearly lived long past 
Clcnnont (which even mentions Cale's death) and only had relationship with Navarre after the 
Jaequerie. Although it seems like an unlikely coincidence, lehan Bernier was a common enough 
name within the remission sample for us to assume that these two individuals were different. 
157 AN, J.J98, f. 84, no. 252, repIinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 333-5, tr. Cohn in PP, pp. 191-2. 
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Secondly, the premIse of the trial may have centred. around Jehan's 
possession of the letters, but emphasis was also placed on Jehan's prevIOUS 
character. Much like the remissions, which took into account a supplicant's 
previous good name and renown when passing judgement, Bernier's execution 
was because he was commonly known for associating with Navane in this 
region. In the trial itself, it was '[Bernier's] life and reputation' that convinced 
the villagers of his guilt. The importance placed on the fact that Bernier was a 
known Navanese sympathiser strongly suggests that the Jacques were well aware 
of those within their midst who had ties to the King of Navarre. 
It was the people of Montataire who passed judgement on Bernier. Two 
to three hundred came out for the execution, and Cale placed Bernier's fate in the 
hands of the villagers, not just their captain. There was great public antipathy 
towards those who sympathised with Navan'e - collusion with Navarre was not 
just considered a crime by Etienne du Wes, but also by the villagers in the fIe de 
France. 
Considering that Bessen believed that Navanese followers had infiltrated 
the higher echelons of Jacques high-command, and pressured the leaders into 
following a Navanese agenda, it is telling that Guillaume Cale himself, the 
fabled 'leader' of the movement, clearly considered Bernier's crime wOlihy of 
execution. This antipathy towards the Navanese within the movement gainsays 
Bessen's suggestion that the 'heads' of the Jacquerie favoured Navane. At every 
level of the Jacquerie - Guillame Cale, the local village leader and the villagers 
themselves - conspiracy with Navane was considered a capital crime. 
One remission is not representative of an entire sample, nor do we know 
if the reaction of the villagers of Montataire to this Navanese agent would have 
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been replicated across the north of France .. Yet one remission that explicitly 
mentions Navane (and that read wrongly) is all that Bessen has suggested to link 
the two groups. This remission indicates a strong anti-Navane feeling before the 
attack in Clermont, and demonstrates that opinion within the Jacques' high-
command and the countryside was largely hostile. 
While negative evidence is usually not the best way to proceed, the almost 
complete absence of evidence within over 250 remissions issued to either the 
Jacques or the Navanese paliisans that suggests complicity between the two, is 
impressive. All evidence indicates the two movements were considered entirely 
distinct: different language is used to describe the 'rebellion' and the 
'commotion' respectively, different clusters of remissions, and different 
descriptions of the individuals involved. The only remission that mentions a 
link between NaValTe and the Jacques prior to Navane's slaughter of the 
peasantry at Clermont indicates that conspiracy with Navan'e was punishable by 
death! 
So, if there is no evidence, where does this asseliion come from'? First, 
Bessen's studies focussed on Navane, who was undoubtedly aided by the chaos 
of 1358. Navane's eagerness to end the rebellion shows he celiainly did not 
approve of the actions ofthe Jacques. Idle specula tion apart, the theory is born 
from the same roots that all such theories of the nobility manipulating the 
peasantry: that peasants in the Middle Ages were incapable of organising 
themselves and achieving the successes they did in the initial stages of the 
uprising. As I will show in Chapter 6, the remissions shows in great depth that 
the peasants did organise themselves, appointed their own leaders and selecting 
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their own objectives. The evidence from the letters of remISSIOn IS 
incontroveliable, and their silence is weighty: the Navarrese rebellion and the 
peasantry's commotion were distinct phenomena in the eyes of the French 
crown. 
MARCEL 
It can still called be doubtful, in spite of the arguments and the evidence 
produced here for the first time, that Marcel was the instigator of the 
Jacquerie; it is certain however that, once the first impulse began, the 
provost of merchants assisted the movement in the most active manner. 15~ 
The idea that Etienne Marcel was the behind the rising of the Jacques is not new. 
Simeon Luce first put it forward at the end of the nineteenth century, and made it 
central to his thesis on the Jacqucrie. Yet Luce admitted that the evidence was 
sketchy. He had only snippets of chronicle evidence for support: for example, 
one chronicle's statement that Guillaume Cale 'sent some of his wisest and most 
notable men to see the provost of merchants in Paris and wrote to him that he 
was at his service ... this filled the leader of the three estates with joy ... and 
they were all ready to give him help,.159 Yet this report certainly does not 
suggest that Etienne Marcel instigated the Jacquerie, and rather suggests that any 
contact came after the start of the Jacquerie and just before the Navarrese 
attack. 160 Luce's argument did not hold well: two years later, Flammennont 
lOS Luce, Jacqllcrie, pp. 105. 
159 Chrol1. premiers Valois, p. 72, tr. Cohn, PP (2005), p. 160. 
160 Luce's other example is equally inconclusive: it is a quote from an anonymous fragment of 
chronicle reprinted by Secousse, which states 'the Parisians, as said, in the absence of the Regent, 
beaan an incursion against the fortified castle the Louvre; they then pillaged and stole all that 
th:y found in the Hotel de Ville de Paris, and they invited, by letter and order, all the villcs, all 
the burghs and villages of the realm, to revolt and to take anns against the nobles: this is what 
made the men of the people, in the Beauvaisis and in many other places in France, rise up where 
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launched a stinging rebuke. Luce's. interest in the attack on Meaux clearly 
affected the rest of his analysis, from the argument itself, to the composition of 
his Pieces JlIst(ficatives: nineteen of the documents are not issued to Jacques at 
all, but instead to Parisians and men of Meaux involved in the attack on the 
MarcM. 
One notable historian, Raymond Cazelles, took up Luce's emphasis 
although he fails to credit Luce's work. Nonetheless, all Cazelles's references 
come from documents that Luce published in his Pieces Just!ficatives, and his 
general thesis follows Luce's: 
Coming immediately after the affair at Saint-Leu, this coalition of towns 
against their neighboUling castles must have required some planning and 
it is impossible to believe they happened by chance. In his famous lettter 
to the people of Ypres, written two months after the Jacquerie, Etienne 
Marcel only disassociated himself from the excesses of these actions in 
the Beauvaisis. He did not deny a previous understanding with the 
echevinages to weaken the nobility by destroying their castles. I am even 
inclined to think that the planning by towns must have been some time 
before 28 May and the fighting at Saint-Leu. 161 
Not only does this passage indicate that Cazelles believed the revolt to have been 
led by Marcel and planned in advance, but it also grants prime agency in the 
Jacquerie to the 'towns'.16:? It is a 'coalition' of urban centres that forms the core 
of the revolt. In this new reading of events, townsmen of Senlis 'accepted the 
help of the Jacques' in attacking castles, rather than townsmen of Senlis joining 
a great number of nobles were executed'. This may well be suggestive, if taken in isolation from 
the many chronicles that suggest no link, but similarly, it is celtainly not 'incontroveliible fact', 
as Luce calls it. There is no other evidence to support this fragment. More importantly than 
disagreeing with other chroniclers, it disagrees with the mass of remissions that indicate that the 
Parisian revolt and the Jacquerie were distinct. Luce, Jacquerie, p. 103. 
161 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', pp. 79-80. 
162 In Sociere polilique, noblesse el COllronlle, Cazelles' section on the Jacquerie is almost exactly 
the same as his article in the English Rising, but he includes a map with an-ows spreading 
outwards from towns to show the revolt 'spreading' from urban centres, yet there is no evidence 
at all to support these assertions; rather, it is simply a visualisation of Cazelles' theories on the 
revolt. R. Cazelles, Societe polifique, l10blesse el courOl1ne SOliS les regnes de Jeall !I Ie Bon el 
Charles V (Paris: Geneve-Paris, 1982). 
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the Jacques in their offensive. 163 As ilU10vative as this reading might be, it is also 
unfounded, and contradicts the entire body of remissions that Cazelles claimed to 
have studied. Cazelles must even admit that other 'coalition' members like 
Amiens and Montdidier only 'helped' the Jacques in destroying the targets. IM 
Cazelles argues that these towns led the assaults, yet must concede that they only 
offered occasional support - as mentioned earlier, the Amienois's paltry force of 
one hundred men were recalled before they got four leagues from the city due to 
an internal dispute. Moreover, the odd instances where the townsmen were 
involved are outnumbered by the numerous remissions where village 
communities committed attacks. 165 
The idea that the Jacquerie was composed of townsmen will be disproved 
later in this thesis,166 where it will be shown that instead the rebels were 
predominantly men of the countryside and the insurgent unit was the local 
village. It will also been shown that rather than being manipulated by elites, it 
was led by peasant leaders who had clear ideas of objectives. 167 Rather, this 
chapter will deal with the one specific allegation that Cazelles made which has 
gained some credence - that the Jacquerie was organised and manipulated by the 
Parisian provost of merchants, Etienne Marcel. 
When we look at the remissions issued to Parisian rebels who had taken part in 
the revolt of 1358, we see with c1ality that this uplising and the Jacquerie were 
163 ibid., p. 79. 
164 ibid. 
165 Urban involvement in the revolt will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4, 'Mapping the 
Revolt'. 
166 Antagonism towards towns will be dealt with in Chapter 4 ('Mapping the Revolt'), and the 
mral makeup of the rebels will be dealt with in Chapter 5 ('The Composition of the Jacquerie'). 
The village as the focal point of the insurgency will be discussed in Chapter 6 (,Peasant 
Communities'). 
167 See 'Leadership', in Chapter 6. 
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not linked. The remISSIons for those involved in Marcel's revolt can be 
separated into tvvo distinct groups. First, general remissions were issued (and 
reissued) to the Parisians for their part in the rebellion. A second set were then 
issued for those who were excluded from the general pardon. These individuals 
seem to have missed the opportunity, generally by not having reported to court 
within three days of the original amnesty. In many of these cases, the individuals 
had fled. These men therefore represent an exception to the vast majority who 
were forgiven in the general amnesty. That said, there is nothing to suggest that 
these individuals' stories are not representative, and they serve to give a flavour 
of the Parisian revolt. 
Apart from the general remission to the Parisians, and several pardons 
issued multiple times to the same individual,169 there are twenty-two Parisiens 
granted pardons by the crown in the wake of the revolt. l7O Eighteen of these 
were issued in August 1358, in the wake of the rebellion and directly after the 
original general pardons were transcribed. Three more were issued in October of 
the same year, and one more in November. Despite the vast literature on Etienne 
Marcel, no-one has ever attempted to catalogue these documents. 171 They do, 
however, point to a new understanding of the Parisian revolt. 
16S For the purposes of this table I have seperated those Parisians pardoned for involvement in the 
revolt of 1358 with those pardoned for being part of Parisian- Navarrese alliance between June 
and July. These are pardoned in November 1358 at the start of the register ]]90, specifically 
between no. 1 and no. 32. Other historians, notably S.H. Cuttler, combined these two groups for 
analysing Parisian treason; however, my intcntion here is to discuss the initial revolt, not the 
political machinations that followed it. See S.H. Cuttler, The Law o.fTreasol1 and Treason Trials 
in Later Medieval France (CUP: Cambridge, 1981), p. 166. 
1C,0 For example. AN. JJ86. no. 196 and no. 209 are both pardons issued to Nicholas Ie Flament. 
There is also examples when substantially different pardons are issued, one for rebelling against 
the crown in 1358, and secondly for treason with Navarre in the months that followed, as for 
Nicolas de la Court Nemie, AN, JJ86, [ 72, no. 220 and J.l90, [ 38, no. 78. 
170 Not included in this sample is Jean Marcel, Etienne's brother, who was accepted by the crown 
as having no part in the rebellion. AN, ]]86, [ 65, no. 194. , 
171 Cuttler includes a list of ·thosc pardoned individually' for being . adherents' to Etienne 
Marcel, including those who were pardoned for the later conspiracy between Marcel and Navarre. 
However, this list seems confused: there are several individuals missing (specifically Etienne de 
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Table VI. Names and occupations of Parisian rebels 
REMISSION INDIVIDUAL OCCUPATION 
86,206 PielTe de Lagny 
86,209 Nicolas Ie Flament Draper 
86,214 Guillaume Ie Fevre Fish-seller 
86,216 Jacques du Chatel 
86,220 Nicolas de la COUli garde de fa mannaies de 
Nemie Rauen 
86,230 Jean Hersent 
86,233 Laurens de Veullettes Lingier 
86,238 .Tehan de Monteux Knight 
86,248 Henry de Chastillon Knight 
86,252 Guillot BOill1achet Man at am1S 
86,253 .Tehan Fagnet Merchant 
86,271 Gieftl-on Ie Flament 
86, 272 Thomas Gascogne 
86,278 Etienne de la Fontaine Argentier du roy (Royal 
Master of the Robes) 
86,282 Etienne de Resnie Captain of many 
soldiers 172 
86,285 Phillipe de JeUlTe Especier 
86,289 J ehan Pisdoe 
86,292 Maron Pisdoe 
86,371 J ehan de Lyon Sergeant of Arnis 
86,390 Guillaume d'Augeuil 
86,519 Salemon de la Tour poor archer and 
miserable person 
86, 527 Jehan de Saint-Leu cure of Ste Genevieve 
As with NavalTese sympathisers, each of these remissions issued to Marcel's 
suppOliers used distinctive language to identify the Parisian rebellion. For 
example, this is the remission issued to Guillame Ie Fevre: 173 
Charles ... let it be known to all present and future that at the instigation, 
prompting and encouragement of the late Etienne Marcel fonner provost 
Resnie, 1ehan de Monteux, Salemon de la Tour and khan Hersent). It could be that Cuttler was 
using a different definition of 'adherents' rather than just anyone involved in the revolt, but he 
does not make this clear. The Law of Treason, p. 166. 
m The following remission (AN, JJ86, f. 93, no. 283) is for 3 number of men who 'venuz en 
all11eS' to the M;rche of Meaux: it is possible that these were the soldiers who Etienne du Resnie 
\V3S captain of However, as these men were not involved in the Parisian revolt, they are not 
included in this table. 
m Interestingly, this remission is issued twice in the S3me month. Exactly why is unclear, 
although the second remission does start off by making reference to the previous remission 
before repeating it word for word. Secousse references this second version (AN, 1J86, f 85, no. 
255) but the text he uses is in fact identical to the first version (AN, JJ86, f. 69, no. 214). 
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of merchants of the city of Paris, many of his allies, followers,. 
collaborators and accomplices said and maintained that during the whole 
time they governed the good city of Paris and its surrounding countryside, 
all that they did was for a good end - the ransom and deliverance of our 
above mentioned lord (King Jean II) - for the public good, and for the 
great number of good people and faithful commoners of this city of Paris. 
Without the authority of our lord or of us and unaware of the great acts of 
treason and plotting, conspiracies, and other crimes which this provost 
and his accomplices did in secret, they resolved and strove to go against 
our lord, ourselves and his royal majesty, agreeing to rebel and take as 
their leader the King of Navarre, to make alliances with him and the 
English and other enemies of the crown of France. They wore a silver 
buckle enamelled half in vennillion, half in blue, with 'to a good end' 
written underneath it. And they wore paIii-coloured hoods as a sign to 
live or die with this provost, against all others, and took up anus against 
us to take away our royal prerogatives, that is, [they decided] to be rebels 
[rebelles] against our lord and us, and to say abusive words against us 
personally and cOlmnit many other crimes, misdemeanours and felonies 
against the royal majesty. By these means, they wished the people to 
believe that we would order our soldiers to destroy and rob them, that we 
would abandon the city along with other cities and surrounding districts 
within the realm of France to these soldiers, and that we had absolutely 
no intention of delivering and paying the ransom for our lord, although 
these things are self-evidently false. For these crimes and felonies or 
some of them, Guillaume Ie F6vre, fIshmonger at Les Halles in Paris and 
bourgeois of the city, who, it is said, recently fled and is now absent [had 
1-4 been charged]. / 
This example indicates the precise language that the remissions used to describe 
Marcel's revolt. One distinguishing characteristic of this rebellion was the paIii-
coloured hoods (recorded in another remission as half red, half blue) 175 worn by 
the rebels, which was repeated in several remissions and represented an 
important symbol of what was understood as the Parisian revolt. It even appears 
in remissions for other bOl1l7es vi1les, like Meaux and Amiens. 176 Crucially, 
however, it does not appear in any remissions for the Jacques. 
174 AN, JJ86, f. 85, no. 255, reprinted in Secousse, Ordol1l1G1zces, pp. 83-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 
192-4. 
175 See AN, ]]86, [ 78, no. 239. 
176 ibid 
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These same stock phrases that are in this remission are repeated, with a 
few variations, for every Parisian rebeL 177 First, every remission made reference 
to the instigation of the rebellion by Etienne Marcel, and sometimes other 
individuals, normally at the beginning of the remission. A typical example is 
'that this Nicolas Ie Flamenc, draper and bourgeois of Pmis, by the false 
promises and wickedly induced by the late Etienne Marcel fonner provost of 
merchants of our city (l'ille) of Paris, by Charles Toussac, Gilles Marcel, Jehan 
de Lille and also others of our said (ville),.178 These references to being misled 
by wicked demagogues are important - they provide the context for which the 
crown could offer amnesty to the Parisians, as these traitorous leaders had misled 
them. They also marked a sharp contrast with the remissions for the Jacquerie, 
where individuals most often are desclibed as having acted out of fear for their 
own safety. Whether this distinction is valid or not is unimportant; the basis for 
justifying participation in each rebellion is different. 
Secondly, like the Navarrese example, there is a specific vocabulary to 
the Parisian rebellion. Unlike the 'temps du cOlllillotion " the Parisian rebellion 
is desclibed as 'des grans traisons, rebellions, conspiracions annees chevauchees 
invasions et desobessiances·.179 The Parisian rebellion is not the 'men of the 
countryside against the nobles', rather it is the 'Clime of lese-majeste .. against 
our said lord, us and the crown of France'. 180 Again, the substance of these 
remarks are important, but they are not the tum of phrase of a single chronicler; 
177 This template has several minor variations, but the clauses listed below appear in each 
document tabulated above. 
178 'Que comme Nicolas Ie Flamenc drappier et bourgeois de Paix par les faux enhortements et 
mauvaises inducion de feu Etienne Marcel, jadis provost des marchans de nostre ville de Paris, de 
Charles Toussac, Gilles Marcel, 1ehan de Lille et aucuns autres de nostre dicte ville'. AN, JJ86, 
f 68, no. 209. 
179 AN, JJ86, f 70, no. 216. 
ISO For example, AN, 1186, f 99, no. 298. 
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these tenns were used in every pardon the crown issues to the Parisian rebels, 
and was the crown's judicial definition of the violence. lSI 
Moreover, no remissions for the Jacquerie mentioned any links between 
the two revolts, and only one mentions Marcel, but it does not suggest 
cooperation. Hue de Sailleville initially was forced to join the Jacquerie, before 
having second thoughts: 
because of the great fear that he had of the excesses and outrages which 
the men of the countryside connnited against his will, and which he was 
powerless to prevent, he went to the Provost of Merchants, who was then 
in Paris. .. to reveal these matters to him and to seek advice so that the 
aforesaid things should stopl82 
Etienne Marcel was not part of the Jacquerie; to Hue de Sailleville, he 
represented an opportunity to stop it. This concurs with Etienne Marcel's letter 
to the conm1Unes of Picardy and Flanders, which stated that the Parisians 'would 
rather have died than have approved these deeds and the manner in which they 
were COlllillitted by some of those people', and that they 'sent three hundred 
troops from our people and confidential letters to stop the great evil' .183 Marcel 
considered himself an enemy to the Jacques, and Hue de SailleviIIe concuned. 
Even uprisings that occured within the sunoundings of Paris, like 
Montmorency, make no reference to Etienne Marcel's insurgency. The same 
goes for those remissions for the Parisians: they do occasionally refer to the 
'countryside of Paris' but not further - indeed, this could be seen as an area 
defined to contrast with the rest of the countryside that the Jacquerie represented. 
lSI This distinction was also made by pamphleteers some four centuries later, by those from 
Champagne in 1790, who in the wake of the Revolution made the case that they had shown 
loyalty to the crown in 1358 when its deputies left Paris for Provins in the wake of Marcel's 
coup. The Parisian rebellion was essentially treasonous; the Champenois felt no reason to 
mention the Jacquerie. which their neighbours certainly \vere involved in. Les Champenois all 
mi. au pal'allele des evenemens de 1358 et 1789, 24th Feb 1790. 
132 AN, JJ90, f. 96, n. 288; reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 253-4. 
183 Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Pi cardy and Flanders, in Oeuvres de Froissart 
ed. de Lettenhove (Bruxelles, 1868), vol. 6, pp. 470-1, reprinted and trans. in Cohn, PP. p. 177. 
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If uprisings in Montmorency, Montdidier, Senlis and others were engineered by 
Parisian infiltrators of the Jacquerie, then the crown was unaware of this. If the 
Jacques aided the Parisians in their rebellion, then there is no word in either set 
of remissions to indicate this. 
Moreover, even when Cazelles implied unity, for example Etienne 
Marcel's attempt to stir up the countryside around Paris to his cause, the 
documents provided clear distinctions. Marcel sent Jean Hersent to the village of 
Chatres (Essonne) to organise resistance against the crown ('by virtue of the 
command given him to the late Etienne Marcel, then provost of merchants'). 184 
However, this remission detailed events outside during the traditional timeframe 
of the Jacquerie, it concerned 'a certain Sunday' after 24 June, two weeks after 
Clermont and the end of the peasants' rising. It could be an exception, a late 
outbreak of peasant violence, but far more likely Marcel was preparing the 
countryside for the Dauphin's attempts to regain Paris, and the inevitable siege. 
By 29 June, the Dauphin and 12,000 troops would be encamped on the other side 
of the Seine. 185 The crown is unequivocal: this action was part of the Parisian 
uprising, not the Jacquerie, and the remission makes no mention of the 'time of 
commotion and telTor', the 'men of the countryside' or the conflict of the 'non-
nobles against the nobles'. Just as with the remissions of Navarre, the crown had 
a very clear sense of which rebellion each individual belongs to. 
If the Parisian remissions do not mention any links between the Jacques 
and Marcel, what do they say about the Parisian revolt itself? First, there are far 
1,4 AN, .1.186, f 75, no. 230, reprinted in Luee, Jacqllerie, pp. 263-4. The inclusion of this 
remission in Luce's Pieces Justificatives has led some to see a link with the .Iaequerie that was 
not there; although this document sheds light on the Parisian attempts to secure the outlying 
countryside prior to the Dauphin's seige, it makes no mention of the 'men of the countryside', the 
'tenor and commotion' or anything else connected to the rural revolt. 
1,5 Sumption, Fire, p. 338. 
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fewer remissions issued for the Parisian rebellion than the Jacquerie. All 
nineteen were issued quickly - ban-ing a few, almost all these remissions were 
issued within a month of the end of the Parisian rebellion. By contrast, for the 
Jacques, some individuals still received pardons seven years after the revolt. 
Virtually all of Paris was granted grace by August 1358, yet the nobles were 
simultaneously still pillaging the countryside. Of course, all remissions are 
exceptions issued to those who missed the initial general pardon. Nonetheless, it 
hints at the logistical differences between pardoning those of a city and trying to 
administer grace, and upholding the peace, to the countryside of the north of 
France. Long after the Parisians had all received pardons, the repression in the 
countryside was still continuing, and remissions attest to nobles holding grudges 
against their peasants into the 1370s. While the exceptions to the general 
pardons of Paris could be dealt with in a couple of weeks, the process of 
restoring the peace to the countryside took years. For the crown, Paris could be 
dealt with quickly; the Jacquerie required more effort. 
Excepting the general pardon, the Par-isian remissions are granted to 
individuals, not communities of rebels, as they were in the case of the Jacquerie. 
All but one individual 1g6 hailed from Paris, and most were introduced as 
'bourgeois of Paris'. This strong sense of local identity - all these men are 
Parisian at least in residence - can be contrasted with the pan-regional Jacquerie, 
spread out across the whole of the lIe de France and beyond to the borders of Bar 
and into N0l111andy. These individuals were for the mostly part of a str-ikingly 
different social class than the Jacques, for example, the King's 'argentier' and a 
186 lehan de Monteux of Courtenay stayed in Sens but was in Paris during the revolt. AN, JJ86, f. 
78. no. 238. 
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knight.187 Every remission made reference to the individual's good name and 
reputation. Only Salemon de Tour's remission made reference to poveliy, yet 
even he was employed: he was 'a poor archer and a miserable person', and he 
was also listed as a 'soldoier' .188 
There are others who had military roles as well. For example, .Tehan de 
Lyon was a 'Sergent d'annes' and Etienne de Resnie was the captain of a party 
of foot soldiers based within the city. The remissions for Marcel's supporters 
emphasise the military aspects of the revolt in Paris, which contrasts with the 
remissions for the .Tacquelie. The narratives express a military sophistication to 
the Palisian revolt, and one testifies to the level of annament of these rebels: one 
individual "took a great quantity of siege engines, war-cannons, crossbows with 
windlasses and other artillery' from the Louvre. I 89 
The Parisians were well organised, had access to the King's arsenal, and 
were anned with siege equipment. While the peasants of the lIe de France may 
also have been well organised, there is no sense that they possessed the same 
level of military armament. This was a CO lip d'eratby the burghers and the city's 
militia: as one remission desclibed it, the insurgents were 'many knights, 
counsellors and others'. 190 Within the remissions, it was the wrong-doing of the 
gens d 'armes, not just of the habitants of the city, that caught the eye of the 
authorities. The taking of the Castle of the Palaisel, where one Guillaume 
Bonachet drank wine and stole a little piece of metalwork, was clearly achieved 
by skilled military men, not enraged 10cals. 191 This emphasis on skilled 
1~7 AN, JJ86, f. 78. no. 238 and AN, JJ86, t~ 93, no. 279. 
ISS AN, JJ86, f. 187,110.519. 
1,9 AN, JJ86, f. 126,110. 371. 
190 AN, JJ86, f. 92, no. 275. 
191 AN, JJ86, f. 83, 110. 252. 
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soldiering implies that the Parisian revolt was centred on specific attacks by 
groups of soldiers on key military targets. 
The Parisian revolt was not necessarily tied to the walls of Paris, and most of the 
confusion on this issue has come from a willingness to describe all rural violence 
as part of the Jacquerie, and all the urban violence coming from Paris and 
Marcel. A medieval city could not be independent of its countryside. The 
Parisian revolt did extend beyond its walls, as one might expect, into the 
dependent countryside that surrounded the main city (like Tremblay and 
197 . Chartres), - and most famously nOlih to Meaux, where the Kmg's palace stood. 
However, the crown distinguished these events as directly connected to Paris, not 
the 'men of the countryside'. The confusion was only created when Luce and 
Cazelles attempted to create their own definitions of what made a Jacque and 
what made a Parisian rebel. 
The cornerstone of Cazelles's argument has already been summarised; 
when we think of the attacks of the Jacques, 'it is impossible to believe they 
happened by chance'. They did not happen by chance - local conul1unities 
selected their own objectives. What Cazelles meant is that he, like 
Flammermont, considered it impossible to believe that these attacks were 
organised by peasants. Perhaps the lack of historical data left to us by rural 
conU11Unities, or even prc:iudice against the peasantry that can be seen in Marxist 
literature going back to Marx himself, has convinced historians that they cannot 
be considered sophisticated enough to plan anything, and certainly not be serious 
historical actors, unlike their urban counterparts. Even when the remission 
192 See AN, JJ86, 1'. 93, no. 278 and 1J86, 1'. 75, no. 230 respectively. 
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record offered numerous nanatives indicating exactly how villagers could stand 
up against the local nobility, organise themselves, elect leaders and hold 
assemblies, it was easier to grant agency to the bonnes villes. That Marcel and 
his Parisian rebels were behind the Jacquerie is a notion completely unsupported 
by the remissions and the chroniclers. The image painted by the two selections 
of documents, and thus the crown, is entirely different - the Parisian remissions 
conjure an image of a technically advanced, well-armed military take-over of the 
centre of Paris, at the heari of which were soldiers and members of the army who 
quickly mobilised an organised resistance to the crown. Paris's armed resistance 
and the peasants' uprising in the countryside were distinct phenomena, in the 
eyes of contemporaries. 
THE ATTACK ON THE MARC HE 
When the Jacques and Parisians an"ived [at Meaux] the mayor of Meaux, 
who had never made any secret of his hostility to the Dauphin, threw 
open the gates of the city [to them] and laid out food and ch"ink for them 
on tables in the streets. The people of the town overwhelmingly 
supported him ... When they had eaten their fill, the Jacques, the 
Parisians and a crowd of men of Meaux fonned themselves up in units on 
the north side of the Marne bl"idge opposite the fortress, and prepared to 
storm it. 193 
In the second volume of Sumption's 17ze Hundred Years War, the attack on 
Meaux represents the apogee of the great rebellions of 1358, where the Par"isians 
and the Jacques came together for a final doomed assault upon the great fortress 
across the Marne. This is no surpl"ise; Meaux represented this same centrepiece 
for Luce's study of the Jacquerie. Almost every work on this pel"iod makes 
19] Sumptioll, Fire, pp. 333-4. 
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some reference to the combination of the two rebellions at Meaux. It has been. 
assumed that the attack on Meaux was pmi of the Jacquerie, and yet, barring one 
passage in Jean Froissmi's chronicle, there is no evidence whatsoever for this 
asseliion. 
This topic requires some clarity. First, I am not claiming that there was 
no link between Meaux and the peasantry; rather, evidence suggests that the 
some of the repression afterwards was initiated at the Marche. Jean de Venette is 
clear that the plat-pays took the brunt" of the nobles' vengeance, stating 
:[a]fterwards they went ravaging over the adjacent countryside, killing all the 
men they have found and setting fire to various villages' .194 Neither am I 
suggesting that no peasants took part in the assault; rather, I think it is very likely 
that some did, especially in the case of the village of Tremblay, and the 
'countryside' around Pmis and Meaux. However, no evidence, barring the 
second-hand story of Froissmi and received wisdom of the last 150 years of 
historiography, suggests that the Jacques as a separate force attacked Meaux. In 
fact, contemporary chroniclers, and the crown through letters of remission, 
desclibe the attack on Meaux as a Parisian offensive, and whatever 'Jacques' 
who were involved were not recorded in these documents. They make no 
suggestion that the two joined together to mount an attack on the fortress. 
Simeon Luce devoted a whole chapter - over a tenth of his book - to 
Meaux, entitled 'The Pmis expedition reunites with the Jacques against the 
Marche of Meaux, and the nobles of Senlis,:195 
The attack on the Marche of Meaux is undoubtedly one of the most 
interesting episodes of the' Jacquerie'; it is also one of best known. The 
three principal chroniclers of the time, Froissart, Jean de Venette and 
194 Venctte, Chron., v. 2, p. 264, trans. Birdsall, Venetie, p. 78. 
195 Luce,Jacquerie, pp. 129-147. 
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Pierre d' Orgemont, transmitted to us with the greatest detail the memory 
of this event. l96 
Yet only FroissaIi suggests that there were any rustics at all involved in the 
attack on Meaux, and the entire chapter is devoid of any other evidence. Luce 
only cited a few remissions, and barring the remission for Tremblay which will 
be discussed later, none of them refer to rural rebels. All his evidence came from 
documents relating to either Parisians or men from Meaux. However, Meaux 
proved an attractive centre-point for Luce's thesis that Marcel's rebellion and the 
Jacquerie were closely tied, and thus it came to fonn the crux of his book. 
Crucially, the emphasis that Luce placed on the attack on the Marche of 
Meaux is transferred directly into the documents that he selected for his Pieces 
Just~ficatives. He reprints every document that mentions Meaux (of which there 
are nineteen), which was unrepresentative of the nature of the Jacques, as the 
men receiving these pardons were all either from Meaux or Paris. His selection 
of these documents conceming Meaux suggested they represented over 35% of 
all documents conceming the rebellions of 1358, but rather, amount to less than 
7% of the pardons for rebellions issued in 1358 and 1359 alone. Considering 
that these remissions are for scattered individuals rather than for settlements and 
groups, in real numbers there are very few men from Meaux pardoned compared 
with other Jacques. Yet because of the Pieces JlIstificatives' emphasis, coupled 
with assumptions by historians like Cazelles and Bessen that Luce's selection 
was representative of the whole body of remissions for the revolt (which Luce 
himself made clear it was not),197 Meaux has assumed a very important role in 
discussions of the revolt. Having accepted that Jacques were involved in Meaux, 
196 ibid, p. 129. 
19" Luce referenced documents within his text not included in his Pieces Justificatives. 
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Raymond Cazelles began speculating on the makeup of the Jacquerie, based 
entirely on Luce's collection and thus also on the remissions for the attack on the 
Marche. 198 Cazelles finishes a short discussion of the makeup of the Jacquerie 
declaring that the 'rich found themselves side by side with the poor'. These are 
hardly 'insights into rural society': many of Cazelles's examples hail ii-om the 
towns of Meaux or Paris. 199 Yet this is the influence that Luce' s unexplained and 
previously unexamined sampling has had: the assumption that the Jacques fought 
at Meaux has in turn meant that historians assumed that those involved in the 
attack on the MarcM were representative of the Jacquerie.200 
As mentioned, Jean Froissart is the only chronicler to mention the Jacques' 
involvement in the attack on Meaux. Froissali was writing considerably later 
(his fIrst book has been described as 'riddled with errors"),201 and that the great 
'admirer and chronicler of heroism' was writing about his personal hero, the 
Count of Foix.202 His account was mostly cribbed from Jean Ie Bel. Indeed, his 
account of Meaux is the only area where the two chroniclers differ: 
[The Count of Foix and the Captal of Buch] rode until they reached 
Meaux and went immediately to the duchess [ofNonnandy] and the other 
ladies, who were very happy to see them, since for days the Jacques and 
the rustics of Brie as well as those of the city had harrassed them, as had 
become appalient. When these wicked people began to hear that there 
was such a great gathering of ladies and maidens with their young 
children, they gathered and with those from the country of Valois made 
their way to Meaux. From the other direction, those of Paris, well aware 
of the assembly, left Paris in herds and flocks to join others. All together 
19S Cazelles, 'The Jaequelle' pp. 76-77. 
199 ibid. 
200 For an example, see the previous chapter on Navane, and David Bessen's 'The Jaequerie' 
which assumed Cazelles's theories on the makeup of the Jacques were conect. 
201 .I.B. Henneman, 'The Age of Charles V', in Froissart: His/orian, ed .. U.N. Palmer (1981), p. 
38. 
202 ibid. p. 42. According to Pierre Tueoo-Chala, 'Froissart wished to see in the Count of Foix the 
typical hero which he \vOldd follow through the years: a valiant knight, lover of the arts, generous 
and fastious, but at the same time, cruel', in 'Froissart dans Ie Midi PyTeneen', Froissarl: 
Historian, ed. Palmer, p. 128. 
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at least nine thousand were acting violent and with mischief. All day, 
their numbers increased with people from various places coming along 
many roads to converge on Meaux, and they came as far as the city's 
gates. And the wicked people in the town did not try to block them but 
opened their gates to them. They entered in a horde so great that all the 
streets were filled up to the Marche. Now God's great grace was seen to 
be bestowed on the ladies and maidens. They would have been violated, 
raped and killed as nobles, which they were, if these gentlemen and 
especially the count of Foix and the captal of Buch had not been there. 
These two knights devised the plans to defeat the vilains.203 
This account is celiainly evocative, as the enemies filled the city of Meaux to 
begin a devilish assault upon the fortress. Only two brave knights, one of whom 
was Froissart's champion, and God's grace won the day. Froissart even uses the 
word 'vilains', which implies rustic. Yet even this account does not clearly grant 
agency to the rural rebels: the men from Brie and Valois may have harassed the 
women, but it is the arrival of the Pmisians that leads to the gates being opened. 
In that reading, the arrival of the Jacques was ancillary to the more important 
anival of the Pmisians. But as we have said, Froissmi's second-hand account 
differs from every contemporary chronicler. 
As mentioned earlier, Froissart took his lead, and many of his tales, from 
Jean Ie Bel. Le Bel's account of Meaux differs greatly from that of Froissart at 
this critical juncture, making no mention of the involvement of peasants. 
Instead, Ie Bel states that it was simply a joint enterprise between the townsmen 
of Paris and of Meaux: 
When news reached Pmis that these great ladies and gentlemen were at 
Meaux and did not dare to leave, people left Paris with malicious motives 
and gathered at a certain place until at least six thousand of them had 
anived ... The wicked people of the town did not want to block the 
entrance to those of Paris, so they opened the gates and let these wicked 
people enter freely, who like crazed men charged the March<§ to kill all in 
sight.204 
203 Froissm1, Chrol1., v. 5, pp. 104-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 156-7. 
204 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p. 261. trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 154. 
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Jean de Venette, whom Luce claims is one of the sources of his theory about the 
attack, saw no links whatsoever between the rustics and the attack on Meaux. 
Rather, Jean de Venette was quite clear that the attack was triggered by 
animosity between the inhabitants of Meaux and the Marche, then bolstered by 
the Parisian troops: 
In the same year, 1358, the duke of N0l111andy, regent of the kingdom, 
still retained his indignation against the citizens of Paris, and the strength 
and numbers of the nobles at Meaux increased. While the duchess and 
the nobles were residing in the fortress of Meaux and the duke was away 
at some distance, a contlict broke out between the nobles shut up in the 
fortress and the mayor and the citizens of Meaux. It was said at Paris that 
the citizens of Meaux hated the nobles because of their exactions and 
would gladly make war on them, if they were to receive any substantial 
aid from Paris. Therefore, some armed men came from Paris to Meaux 
and, in point of fact, the citizens attacked the nobles and the duchess in 
the fOliress, and there was fighting in the gateway on the bridge. The 
nobles, skilled in arms as they were, overcame the citizens with their 
swords and were victorious.los 
According to Venette, who was closest geographically to the revolt, the men 
attacking the Marche were from Paris and Meaux and nowhere else. The 
Chronique Nonnande agreed: 
Because the men of Meaux became frightened, they sent for help to the 
Parisians, and the provost of merchants sent them thirteen hundred anned 
men of the COlmnune of Paris, whom they received joyously. Thus they 
went to the bridge to attack the fortress of the Marche, but the nobles put 
up a strong defence ... But the nobles steadily held on to the fortress of 
the March~ and forced the Parisians to retreat.206 
The Clzronique des Quatre Premiers Valois concurs. In fact, it describes the 
events not with the discussion of the Jacquerie, but in a separate part of the 
chronicle with the revolt in Paris: 
205 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 265-6, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 77-8. 
206 Chron. norm., p. 131, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 164. 
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After the duke had left Pmis, the provost of the merchants and the men of 
Pmis took over the Louvre ... Then Piene Toussac, Pien'e Gilles, Pienes 
Guiffmi, Joscien de Mascon and many other anned men, all from Paris, 
left Paris for Meaux desiring to capture the fortress of the Marche of 
Meaux. 207 
The C/zronique de regnes de Jean 11 et Charles V also separated the events at 
Meaux from the Jacquerie, giving it its own chapter heading, 'How those of Pmis 
and Cilly were defeated at Meaux': 
On the same, Saturday 11 June 1358, many left Paris and went to Meaux, 
about three hundred, under the cOlmnand of Piene Gilles, a grocer, and 
around five hundred, who gathered at Cilly-en-Meucian under the 
command of one named Jehan Vaillant, the provost of the royal mint ... 
Afterwards, they went straight into battle going straight for the Marche of 
Meaux ... And those of Paris, Cilly, and many of Meaux, who fought 
alongside them, were defeated.208 
Curiously, the least authoritative of these nanative sources - Froissart's version 
has gained an emphasis far above that of the rest of the chronicle records. Yet, 
the other clu'onicle accounts are quite clear; the attack on Meaux was an 
enterprise between the townsmen there and the Parisian forces, not pmi of the 
Jacquelie. 
The remlSSlOns glVe the same impression as the chroniclers. Despite the 
emphasis placed on the remissions for Meaux by Luce, which has transfened 
directly into the works of Raymond Cazelles and David Bessen, none of these 
remissions show that the Jacques were linked to the attack on the Meaux: 209 
207 ChrolZ. premiers Valois, p. 72, tr. Cohn, PP, p. 158-60. 
20S Chrol1. des r(!gnes. v.2, pp. 181-4, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 166. 
209 Not included in this list are remissions issued to citizens of Meaux not involved in the attack; 
for example, Simon Rose, who was pardoned for having joined the King of Navarre, not for 
involvement with the attack on the Marche, and a party of brigands, who were involved in 
attacks on the peasantry in the months after the tumult, are not included in this table. 
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Table vn. Names and occupations of those involved at Meaux. 
REMISSION ISSUED TO OCCUPATION FROM? 
86, n. 148 Jehan de Congi Bourgeois Meaux 
86, n. 211 J ehan Chandelier Draper Meaux 
86,11.213 J ehan Ie Ladre Mounted Sergeant Paris 
of the 'Gate' 
86,n.236 Raoul d' Aucamps Bourgeois Paris 
86,n.240 Parisians NiA Paris 
86,n.274 Guillaume de Pliest, Canon Meaux 
Chavenoil 
86,n.288 Meaux N/A Meaux 
86,n.290 Thibaud Farcault Bourgeois Meaux 
86,n.300 Jehan de la Meaux 
Ramee 
86, n. 312 Jehan Rose Maitre, conseillor Paris 
'du roy', avocat du 
parlement 
86,n.340 J eannin des Bourgeois Paris 
Champs 
86,n.341 Regnault Blouart Meaux 
There are twelve remissions issued for the attack on the Marche of Meaux, and 
as said before, five other documents like arrets du parlement and two remissions 
to citizens of Meaux not connected to the attack. Considering the rest of Luce' s 
sample (remissions and chronicle extracts about the violence in the countryside 
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and the peasants' struggle against the nobles) it is clear they have. little to do 
with the Jacquerie itself. 
First of all, all twelve of these remissions are issued to townsmen, rather 
than the gel7~ du plat-pais. Secondly, the remissions clearly state that the agents 
of this attack were the citizens of Meaux and Paris. For example, the remission 
for .Tehan de Ladre, mounted sergeant of the gate ofParis,210 begins: 
Let it be known to all those present and future that we have heard the 
supplication of our very dear and loyal cousin Jehan de Chalon, lord of 
Arlay and Cusieaux, contending that during the time of the late Etienne 
Marcel, previously provost of merchants of Paris, Jean de Ladre, mounted 
sergeant of the gate of the said city of Paris, was retained with wages by 
the said city of Paris, and there certain Parisians, among them Pierre Gille 
and Piene des Banes, had been appointed captains and instructed to go 
from the said city of Paris to to Meaux, and many of these men who were 
in the company of the captains attacked the Marche and the men who 
were in there.211 
According to the remissions, the insurgents were sent from Paris and attacked 
under the command of Piene Gilles and Piene des BalTes. The Parisians were 
the leaders of the attack, while those of Meaux were depicted as having joined 
their enterprise. Other remissions suggest that instead it was the men of Meaux 
who spearheaded the effort. Jehan de Congi, for example, was 'charged with 
being in the company of and aiding those of the city of Meaux and those of Paris 
who came to their aid to assail the said Marche,.212 But none of the remissions 
210 This is one individual that Cazelles uses to suggest that the Jaequerie was made up of 'royal 
officials'. Yet this individual had nothing to do with the Jacquerie, and was under the charge of 
Pierre Gilles and Etienne Marcel; this Parisian rebel was involved solely in the attack on Meaux. 
The only link he had to the commotion was the inclusion of this remission in Luce's Pieces 
.JlIstif!catil'es. 
211 'Savoir faisons a tous presenz et a venir que nous oye la supplicacion de nostre tres chier et 
feal cousin Jehan de Chalon, seigneur d'Arlay et Cusieaux eontenant que n'a gaires ou temps que 
Estienne Marcel m01i estoit prevost des marehanz de Paris, Jean de Ladre, sergent a cheval de 
gait de la clicte ville de Paris, feust retenuz aus gaiges de la clicte ville cle Pmis, et lors certaines 
personnes cle la cliete ville cle Paris entre lcs quclles Pierre Gilles et Pierre des Barres furent 
establiz capitaines et orclonnez pour aler a Meaux, dont plusiers cles clictcs genz qui estoient en ]a 
compaignie des cliz capitaines ou ordenez combatirent le Marchie et les genz qui cleclanz 
estoienf, AN, J.J86, f 69, no, 213. 
212 AN, JJ86, f 50, no, 148. 
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transcribed or cited by Luce and used later by histolians mention peasants as 
leaders or followers at Meaux. 
Oddly, the only indication of 'peasant support' in the attack on Meaux has passed 
unnoticed. A letter pardoning individuals from around the town of Tremblay 
(Seine-Saint-Denis) suggests they may have taken part in the assault: 
Let it be known to all those present and future that we have heard the 
supplication of Jean de Quincy, Guillot Ie Charpentier, Beli du Four and 
Jeannin Coulon who live in Tremblay contending that they had been with 
many others of the sun'ounding lands, during the terror, commotions and 
assemblies that had recently been caused by the men of the countryside 
against the nobles of the realm, that had attacked and burnt many houses 
of gentlemen and pillaged and stole their goods and executed others of 
the said nobles ... and when PielTe Gilles and his accomplices went to 
Meaux, he ordered that these said individuals should go with them when 
[he was] passing through the said Tremblay and [Gilles' men] threatened 
to bum their town [ville] and houses ... the supplicants, ignorant of the 
wishes of the said Pierre Gilles and his accomplices, went with them to 
Meaux, and entered in the gate of the town [ville] without any violence or 
force. 213 
This remission for the four individuals (not the settlement as a whole) does at 
least indicate that some of the 'genz du plat pais' may have been involved in the 
attack, even though these men claimed they only entered the town, and were 
acting under duress. This is not, however, an example of widespread 
patiicipation: rather, it is a specific incident where Gilles demanded support of 
four peasants on his way to Meaux. Tremblay is not a representative settlement 
of the Jacquerie; lying on the path between the capital and Meaux, the Palisians 
213 'Savoir faisons a tous prescnz ct a venir que oyc la supplication de Jean dc Quincy, Guillot Ie 
Charpentier, Bcli du Four and Jeannin Coulon dcmouranz a Tremblay contcnu que comme il 
aient estc avec plusiers autres elu pais el'environs au etTrois commotions et assemblees qui eleux et 
n'a gaires ont este faist par les gens du plat pais contre les nobles du royaume et a ardoir et abatre 
plusiers maisons de gentils hommes et a pillier cle gaster leurs biens et aucuns cles eliz nobles mis 
a mort et avccques ce quant PielTe Gillcs et ses complices alerent a mcaulx il commancla aus 
clessus cliz en passant par Ie clit Tremblay qu'il allassent avecqucs lui en les menassent d'ardoir 
leur ville et maisons ... Ies supplicants ignorans que Ie elit Pierre Gilles et ses eliz complices 
vouloient faire alerent avecques eulz a meaux et entrerent de dans la p0l1e de la ville sans aucune 
voulente en force.' AN, JJ86, f 96, no. 286, reprinted in Luce, Jacqucric pp. 258-9. 
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passed it on their way to Meaux. It is also the only settlement mentioned by the 
remissions in what seems to be a relatively quiet area of Jacques' activity (the 
green dots represent other settlements listed as part of the Jacquerie, the black 
line is a potential path that Gilles might have taken): 214 
Map 1. Tremblay and the attack on Meaux. 
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Gilles's army, it appears, may have coerced local rebels as it moved on. 
Most importantly, it was not as Jacques that these men were involved in the 
attack on the Marche; rather, their involvement was the product of becoming 
involved with Pierre Gilles, the Parisian insurgent. The trip to Meaux was listed 
as an additional wrongdoing alongside the general damage done by these 
Jacques. The agency for the attack on the Marche of Meaux was granted to the 
Parisians; any 'Jacques' who may have been involved were merely foot soldiers 
in a predominantly Parisian army. 
Even considering Tremblay, these remlSSlOns are clear on who was 
involved: the townsmen of Meaux and Paris. The actors were not 'men of the 
countryside' , but rather the heads of the Parisian rebellion, who with the people 
21 4 Although there are no remissions for Jacques in this corridor, there are remissions that attest to 
the destruction of some property in this area. This will be discussed in Chapter 3, on ' Mapping 
the Revolt'. The scale of this map is 1 / 450,000. 
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of Meaux engineered an attack on the Marche. Only one remission for the attack 
mentioned any SOli of peasant or made any reference to the gens du plat pays the 
temps dl! commotion or effi'ois. If these remissions are any judge, the crown did 
not consider the peasanh'y to have been involved at all in the attack on Meaux. 
Every single record the crown issued concerning the attack on the Marche 
emphasises that the participants were urban-based. The assumption that this 
attack featured members of the peasanh'y is completely unsupported by the 
remission record. 
Finally, these documents indicate how historians have been influenced by 
the inclusion of remissions about Meaux within the Pieces Justificatives of 
Luce"s work. As mentioned earlier, Cazelles's analysis of the occupations of the 
Jacques is actually more a quick survey of that said selection: 
Research into the occupations of those involved in their terror springs 
other surprises ... these are clerks ... even a Canon of Meaux ... some 
royal officials ... : a gate-keeper, and a fair number of royal sergeants, 
mounted sergeants from the Chatelet and from the Paris watch .. ?15 
Despite a little exaggeration, the emphasis on Meaux is clear. These people were 
not involved in the e.ffi'ois, only in the attack of the Marche. They were not rural 
Jacques, but were rebellious townsmen. Yet Luce's inclusion of them within a 
sample supposedly concerning the rural revolt has served to confuse historians 
like Cazelles into thinking that Meaux was part of the Jacques' offensive. 
The attack on the Marche was undoubtedly important, where the citizens of Paris 
and Meaux joined forces to try to undermine the crown's position. Luce' s theory 
that it also involved the Jacques became historical fact in almost every textbook 
215 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', pp. 76-7. 
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on the Hundred Years' War. While it may be that a few rustics took part in the 
attack on Meaux, there is no evidence to suggest they did so in large numbers. 
Luce's collection, and the remissions for Meaux, have become the cornerstone of 
theories about not just about the actions of the Jacques, but also the makeup of 
the insurgents and how the rebellion itself was controlled by urban countelpmis, 
despite the fact there is little evidence of Jacques' involvement in the attack on 
Meaux. All the evidence, excepting Froissmi, points the other way: that the 
attack on the Marche was an entelprise of the Parisians and those of Meaux, with 
no substantial aid from the Jacquerie. 
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4 - THE JACQUERIE AND THE COUNTER-
JACQUERIE 
For a revolt that has attracted much recognition from both historians and the 
general public as the Jacquerie, one would imagine there would be a clear and 
well-developed sense of the exact events of the uprising and its aftennath. Yet 
many historians remain confused about the exact scale of the commociol1s. Was 
the violence localised around Paris, or was it much larger? The repression, 
recognised to be among the most bloody and destructive retaliation against any 
medieval revolt, has received very little attention.216 Historians have not 
attempted to map the retaliation, create a timeline or even explain who exactly 
was responsible for it. Rather, historians have repeated generalised chronicle 
statements about the Jacquerie being a revolt of the 'Beauvaisis' and the 
retaliation having 'destroyed all the countryside'. 
Yet the one piece of infonnation which remissions constantly provide is 
geography: most detail the location of the insurgents and in some cases the 
nobility involved in the repression. The remissions are not comprehensive; by 
their nature, they deal with only exceptions to general pardons. Yet there are 
enough of them to map out a large number of insurgent settlements. By doing 
this, we can see the Jacquerie was a problem that affected a large pOliion of 
northern France. We can establish the Jacques' attitude towards the bonnes 
l'illes, and identify targets they selected. By studying the repression, we can see 
two distinct movements: the bloody scourge of the countryside by the nobles, 
and the more measured policy of reconciliation emphasised by the crown. 
216 For example, see R.-H. Bautier, The Econol1lic Development of Medieval Europe, trans. H. 
Karoly (London: Thames and Hudson, 1971), p. 231. 
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The actions of every rebel within the Jacquelie of 1358 will never be 
fully known. The remissions only offer snapshots of the rebellion, but these 
snapshots can be illustrative. The documents may only offer a small sample of 
the villages involved, but that sample is large enough to obtain a proper sense of 
the uprising and the retaliation that followed. 
MAPPING THE JACQUERIE 
[T]he Jacquelie which broke out on 28 May 1358 in areas to the nOlih 
and east of Pmis stands out as the nearest thing to coherent social protest 
... [t]here was more or less disorganised insUlTection in other districts ... 
A host of peasant rebels could not withstand even a small company of 
trained soldiers. When the upper classes, against whom the revolt was 
directed, had had time to gather their wits and their troops, popular 
protest was easily dealt with. Peasant movements were not, in the later 
Middle Ages, serious political things.217 
Peter Lewis, in his seminal Later Medieval France, did not consider the 
Jacquerie to represent a ·serious political' issue. Pmi of his reasoning was 
concentrated on the revolt's lack of organisation, but another reason was its 
geography. In Lewis"s descliption, the Jacquerie sounds like a Parisian issue, 
which spread to a few towns or regions (Lewis mentions only Amiens). It is not 
surprising that Lewis anived at that conclusion, considering the confusion of the 
revolt's geography in the literature. There is a central contradiction at the hemi 
of many histOlians' descriptions of the violence; they desclibe the revolt as a 
Parisian phenomenon, before mentioning attacks in Champagne, near Amiens 
and even into Normandy. Philippe Contamine described the Jacquerie as 
217 P. Lewis, Later iVledieval France (London: MacMillan, 1968), p. 283. 
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occumng In 'the rich grain-growing plains in the region round Paris,;218 for 
Edouard Perroy, the rebels were the 'peasants of Beauvaisis and Soissonnais'. 219 
Mollat and Wolff described the revolt as covering the 'lIe de France and the 
Beauvaisis ... east and south of Paris, northward over the whole of Picardy, and 
from there into Normandy .... Champagne and Lorraine' ?20 While that area 
sounds extensive, they included a map which suggests a far smaller area (marked 
on this map by the polygon):221 
Map II. Recreation of Popular Revolutions' map of the Jacquerie. 
This small region encircled in black has, following Mollat and Wolffs example, 
been taken to represent the entire area covered by the revolt. Historians have 
stressed that the area between Paris and Senlis was the heartland of the revolt. 
Mollat and Wolff selected this rather narrow passage for their map based on the 
218 P. Contamine, 'The French Nobility and War', in The Hundred Years War, ed. K. Fowler 
(London: MacMillan, 1971), p. 154. 
219 E. Perroy, The Hundred Years War (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), p. 135. 
220 MoUat and Wolff, Popular Revolutions, p. 126. The map was included on p. 125. 
221 The scale of this map is 1/1,900,000. 
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testimony of chroniclers, only three of whom mentioned it spreading much 
fmiher than the Beauvaisis.222 Ironically, the chroniclers who claimed the rebels 
had the least organisation, Jean Ie Bel and Jean Froissart, also granted the 
rebellion the most extensive space, including the lIe de France, the area around 
Beauvais and Amiens, the territory as far east as Soissons and even to the 
Perthois. Yet historians seemed to have ignored Ie Bel and Froissart on these 
points. Ever since Luce's work, hist01ians have had access to a large selection of 
places where the Jacquelie occun'ed, and these were not limited to the narrow 
region suggested in Mollat and Wolffs map. 
Why is this important? Generalisations like Lewis's rely on the fact that 
the Jacquerie did not have an impact on the political landscape of France. 
However, the sheer size and scale of the Jacquerie meant that it was a 'serious 
political' event. Foreign troops and mercenaries were drafted in to contain the 
revo1t.223 Potentially, it crossed borders into neighboming countries. More 
importantly, it severely damaged and destroyed many key military installations 
across the region. This Sh011 section is not intended to be a definitive timeline of 
exactly which villages rose up and when, because that data is simply not 
available; most remissions do not give dates or offer more than a general 
indication of a community's actions. Many were issued to individuals who acted 
with 'the men of the area', and give us little sense of what the others did. The 
remissions represent only a sample of the villagers involved, and in most cases, 
to gain their pardon they claim not to be involved. Nonetheless, it is possible to 
222 In addition to the Ie Bel and Froissart, the Chroniqlle de nignes de Jean II ef Charles V 
mentioned the regions of Morency and Mucien. Chrol1. des regnes, v. I. p. 180, trans. Cohn, PP, 
pp. 166-7. 
22.' Jean Ie Bel records how 'foreign troops' were important in deteating the rural rebels; Bel, 
Chron., v.2, p. 259, trans. Cohn, PP, pp, 153. In 'Retaliation', an incident involving troops paid 
to stop the rebels pillaging the countryside will be discussed. 
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locate at least some of the rebels who were involved, establish some of their 
targets, and draw connections between urban and rural settlements. 
Insurgent action recorded in the remissions can be broadly classified into three 
'types'. The first, and least numerous, of these actions are individual wrong-
doings under the umbrella of the Jacquelie. Several individuals committed 
transgressions loosely tied to the Jacquerie, but whose actions were not p31i of a 
general offensive by villagers. As an example, in Doue (Seine-et-Mame), Colin 
Franyois and Nicaise Fremy the younger took advantage of the rebellion to break 
into the local nobleman's garden and steal 80 carps and chicken-heads. Because 
they had not sold them afterwards or made any sOli of profit on their Clime, they 
were pardoned.224 However, not all individual acts were triviaL Piene Ie 
Macon, in Saint-Germain (Oise), murdered Robert L'Escrivain,215 in what the 
supplicant assured the crown was not an act of rebellion, because the people did 
not lise nor join the other men of the countryside. Nonetheless, this action took 
place during the time of the Jacquelie, and thus in the eyes of those that issued 
the remission was part of the rebellion. These incidents are relatively rare within 
the sample. 
The second type of 'action' is when individuals or communities were 
pardoned for acting as p31i of the Jacquelie, but their exact actions were not 
stated, or they were accused of having simply joined 'the other men of the 
countryside'. The precise groups they joined are most often left unspecified. 
Perhaps some joined the main force who were defeated at Clel1110nt, but 
mAN, JJ86, f. 96, no. 291. reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 256-7. 
225 AN, JJ86, f. 218, no. 591. 
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considering that the remissions occasionally list rebels who joined Cale and the 
main force,226 it seems unlikely this would have gone unnoticed. 
The third, and most useful for this chapter's purposes, are remISSIOns 
when the insurgents acted clearly as pal1 of the rebellion, and occasionally the 
narrative also detailed exactly how and 11/170 they attacked. Several remissions 
list communities along with the properties they attacked. These help us to create 
an accurate picture of the rebellion and the movements of individual violence. 
For classification, the green places on the map indicate where an entire 
community of rebels rose up according to the remissions.227 This includes 
villages which sought remissions as a single unit, and also when a remission for 
an individual specifies that 'other men of the ville' or 'surrounding area' took 
part. The red dots specify places where the remissions identify a rebel but do 
not specify that the rest of the community took part: for example, Jean Bruyant 
of Saint-Fargeau was involved in an attack on a castle at Villers-aux-NOlU1aines, 
but we do not know if the rest of his neighbours joined in. Left off this map are 
instances when a rebel's hometown is not indicative of the revolt's location: for 
example, Jehan de la Basse came from Marseilles originally, but became 
involved in the Jacqueriein Gerberoy (Oise).22s Of course, Marseilles is not 
k d 1 · 1 . 779 mar e as a ocatIOn on t lIS map.--
226 See, for example, AN . .IJ86, f. 102, nos. 308. 309 and f. 136. no. 39 I; JJ90, f. 84, no. 252. 
227 Communities that appeared in remissions without the suggestion that they rebelled have not 
been included on this map. For example, the villages around Saint-Thierry and Reims indicated 
in AN. JJ86, f. 130. no. 380 , who were targets of the repression but were never explicitly linked 
to the revolt, have not been included. 
22S AN, JJ86, f. 175, no. 495. 
229 The place-names on this map, where unclear in the remission, have been cross-referenced with 
the Archives Naliol1ales index. which includes the 'modern' version of place-name. However, 
there are a few places not included on this map because they could not be located, like 'Vignoel' 
(AN, JJ86, f. 145, no. 425) or because neither the remission nor the index was clear as to the 
name of the settlement ('Pont (or POli)-Rouy', in AN, 1186, f. 86, no. 256). The scale of this 
map is I / 1,900.000. 
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Map III. The Jacquerie of 1358. 
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The l11.apS illustrate several interesting clusters. First, if the remissions are a 
representative sample, the area around the lIe de France does appear to be the 
heartland of the revolt. Yet it was not simply the corridor between Paris and 
Senlis. Rather, the 'heartland' extended further nOlih and east than traditional 
surveys have suggested. 
The map shows other clusters of revolt. First, a large congregation of 
incidents were recorded around Amiens and Beauvais, including villages like 
Grandvilliers, La Warde-Mauger and Breteuil (all Oise). Secondly, a cluster of 
attacks were recognised to the south of Paris: the Arpajon region. Thirdly, there 
are several attacks around Soissons. Fourthly, a large-cluster fonned around St. 
Dizier and Vitry-le-Francois, ignored by the chroniclers and later historians. 
This area, well over one hundred kilometres to the east of Paris, was virtually 
across the border with Bar. Beyond this border any attacks would have fallen 
under the jurisdiction of the Duke of Bar, and rebels may have sought grace from 
him, so this cluster may have been even more extensive, crossing into foreign 
territory. 
There were several settlements which recieved pardons but were not 
included on this map to the south, namely Orleans, Lon"is (Loiret), Gien (Loiret) 
and Vel111enton (Y onne). Their remissions did not specify that these towns 
participated in the Jacquerie, or with the 'gens du plat pays'. Of these, Gien 
seems to have the strongest links to the Jacquel"ie; the remission describes the 
'time of the commotions between the non-nobles and the nobles' although the 
pardon was issued some years later. 230 The men of Lorris and Vennenton were 
pardoned in the wake of the Jacquerie, but are described as having charged with 
230 'temps que les commocions durent entre les non nobles et nobles', AN. J1115, f. 120, no. 297. 
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the 'enemies of the crown'. These carmot definitively be desclibed as part of the 
Jacquelie, although the case of Gien seems convincing: they were rebellions 
against the crown by the lower sorts in the summer of 1358.231 
A few outliers were so distant they do not fit on this map. We will later 
discuss Pierre de Montfort, who appeared in Caen trying to stir up the peasantry 
around that area to revolt.232 Suffice it for now to say that the Jacques' influence 
could reach as far as the NODnandy coast. Indeed, a Jacque who had joined in 
Paillard (Oise), near Clermont, was later murdered in Plainville (close to Caen) 
by an inhabitant of La Falaise (Somme), partly because of his involvement in the 
.Tacquerie; the effects of the rebellion clearly stretched deep into the outlying 
regions. 111ere were other outliers too: a man from Saint-Omer (Pas-de-Calais) 
was pardoned for having risen up, seemingly around that region. According to 
the document, violence also characterised this region, and it appears to have been 
connected to the Jacquerie: 'with many others of the surrounding land in the 
terror ... [they acted] with the said men of the countryside against the nobles of 
the realm and attacked many of their fortresses and stole their goods' .233 Other 
remissions for outlying Jacque settlements also imply there may have been 
clusters of violence in those regions. For example, Montigny-Lencoup (Seine-et-
Marne), which is around 30km east of the nearest other rebel settlement, is not 
recorded as an exception, but rather as just another area of rebellion: 'with many 
other people of the sUD'ounding land ... for the men of the countryside against the 
nobles of the realm,.234 
231 Lon-is and Ve1111enton will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6, in . Peasant Resistance', 
along with similar insurgencies in GiVTY, Vitteaux and Orleans. 
2.12 AN, JJ86, f. 76, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 291-2, see also the sub-section on 
'Peasant Communication' in Chapter 6. 
233 AN, 1186, f. 194, no. 534. 
234 AN, JJ86, f. 92, no. 275. 
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Sun'ounding the major towns of the period - Senlis, Amiens, Paris and 
Meaux, for example - insurgent settlements are not so frequent. Rather, we find 
the biggest conglomeration of rebel settlements in the spaces between towns, like 
between Amiens and Compiegne, or between Compiegne and Senlis. It is from 
the areas of vacuum where the towns did not have direct control that the Jacques 
rose up. 
Although based on a small sample, an absence of insurgent settlements 
(barring Tremblay which was involved on the attack on the Marche and one 
individual from Saint-Thiebauti35 is notable between Paris and Meaux. 
Following the Marne up from the capital to the fortress, only two villages 
became involved in this well-populated area, and only one of them was involved 
in the attack on the Meaux. Indeed, this relative silence suggests again that 
whatever happened in this 'corridor' came from the instigation of Etienne 
Marcel, and his lieutenant Pierre Gilles, not from the Jacquerie. 
Considering the data, the Jacquerie was not simply a revolt of the 
Beauvaisis; rather, it affected virtually the whole of the royal domains in the 
north-east of France. Spreading out perhaps beyond the crown's administrativ.e 
boundaries, villages rebelled in clusters between the bonnes villes, and although 
the exact frequency of revolt can be hard to trace, rebels could be found heading 
north almost to Flanders, east to the extreme of the realm, south towards Orleans 
and even west to Nonnandy and Rouen. The Jacquerie, far from being an 
isolated outburst to the north of Paris, spread across all the nOlihem lands in the 
Dauphin's control. 
235 See the section on 'The Attack on the MarchC' in Chapter 3 for more discussion of this. 
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Sadly, the remissions often do not list the exact targets of each particular group, 
but on occasion they do tell us something about who the insurgents attacked. 
Overwhelmingly, the insurgents focussed upon the chc2 tea u.;v:, maisol1s and 
sometimes the fortresses of the nobility. While individuals are pardoned 
occasionally for their parts in the murder of a noble, rebels more often went after 
fortified locales and property, and in most cases these were burnt to the ground 
Even when individual targets are not listed, often a blanket statement is made 
716 
about the 'houses and forts'-' that the rebels destroyed. We cannot know how 
fortified or well-defended these settlements were (although fortresses 
presumably were military installations), and some may have been simple fam1-
houses. Yet this nonetheless testifies to the success of the rebels. Much of the 
discussion, from Flammennont to Cazelles, has concentrated on peasants' 
inability to organise successfully, and to destroy such fortified places, without 
outside in±1uence.237 Yet these remissions testify to the ability of individual 
villagers to unite and achieve victories over these bastions of the nobility. They 
also indicate the boldness ofthe rebel assault.238 
The rebel settlements we know about represent only a small propOliion of 
the Jacquerie's victims. When a target is mentioned, it is normally described 
after the general violence habitants may have committed, with 'especially the 
chateaux' added afterwards.239 Locations specified by name may have 
represented the most impOliant attack of the group, but they were not necessarily 
the only ones. The repetition of general phrases suggests that the destruction was 
236 'abatre, gaster et ardoir leurs maisons, fortresses etbiens'. See for example AN, 1186, 1'. 133, 
n. 3/;7, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 276-8. 
237 See Flammcrmont 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis'; Cazelles, 'The 1acquerie', in The English 
Rising, ed. Aston and Hilton, 
23S The insurgent's targets will be discussed in 'Peasant Resistance'. 
239 For eXJ111ple, the villagers of Mennecy had noted in the remisison they had attacked many 
houses and fortresses especially 'the chaste! of Villers-aux-Nonnains', AN, 1186, f 123, n. 363. 
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large-scale: a single peasant unit would nonnally have attacked numerous 
buildings, if phrases like 'leurs maiSOllS . were accurate. The sheer scale of these 
attacks decimated the property of the lie de France, which concurs with the 
accounts of the chronicles. La Chroniqlle des regnes des Jean II et Charles V 
records that the Jacques "knocked down all the fOliresses of the region' .240 Jean 
Ie Bel gives us a numerical estimate: 'they destroyed and bumt more than sixty 
beautiful homes (bonne maisol1s) and castles (chateau!x) in the Beauvaisis', and 
another eighty in NOTInandy and 'between Paris and Soissons' .241 The 
remissions even suggest this may have been a conservative estimate. 
Unfortunately, the majority of pardons do not give us such a clear idea of 
specific objectives. Several houses mentioned cannot be found on modem maps. 
While it may be tempting to assume that, for example, the men of Couvrot 
attacked the castle in their village, or that the men of Le Plessis-Bouchard 
assaulted either the small local fOli or even the grand tower of Bazoges-en-
Pareds nearby, there is no explicit evidence in the documents.242 What is 
specified can be divided into two categories: first, those rebels who attacked a 
specified target outside their village (the target is marked in red), and second, 
those rebels who attacked a target that the crown considered to be within their 
own settlement, like the local noble's house (the settlement is marked in orange). 
The map below represents the Jacques' objectives as identified by the 
remlsslOns: 
240Chro17. des regnes. v.l, p. 178, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 166. 
241 Bel, Clzroll., v. 2, p. 256, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 152. 
242 The two remissions refelTing to these settlemcnts (AN, JJ86, f. 115, no. 337 and JJ90, f 211, 
n. 419) do not specify a precise target; the fortifications nearby are mentioned in the Dictionnaire 
des c1ullcaLLI ct desj(Jrlijicalions du Moyen Age en France, ed. c.-L. Da1ch (Strasbourg: Editions 
Publitotal Strasbourg, 1979), p. 382 and p. 116 respectively. 
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Map V. The targets of the Jacquerie. 
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These records specify far more rebels than targets (only forty can be 
identified). Many of these targets are in fact multiple objectives - in Crevecouer 
seven houses were burned, for example243 - but the majority of remissions are 
vague about actual damage caused. 
Was there any programme to the attacks? Jonathan Sumption believed he 
had found one: '[t]he reasons are obvious when one looks at a map. These places 
were disposed in a ring around Senlis. In the wrong hands, they were in a 
position to block every road leading to the city' .244 Yet the map tells a different 
story: virtually all areas in the north-east of France were targeted. Senlis' 
experience was not unique; many other towns witnessed the neighbouring 
fortifications burnt to the ground. The bottom two towns of the ring around 
Senlis are closer to Compiegne. A cluster around Montdidier could be as easily 
described as a cluster to the south of Amiens, or even a cluster to the north of 
243 AN, JJ86, f. 56, no. 173. 
244 Sumption, Fire, pp. 329-30. 
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Beauvais. Indeed, this cluster contains the greatest conglomeration of violence, 
along with the area between Paris and Beauvais. 
In the previous paragraphs, I discussed the seeming absence of Jacques 
between Paris and Meaux. Included on this map were three 'targets' within this 
area, but they may not have been objectives of the 'men of the countryside'. The 
attacks on Pomponne, Chamy and Thorigny (all Seine-et-Mame), are all detailed 
in the same donation of propelty, to Jeanne de Chamy, wife of the late Jean de 
Chamy.245 This document is at best unclear as to who attacked these properties, 
and although they were damaged during the time of the effi'ois, it is not clear 
whether the insurgents were peasants or townsmen. It seems a reasonable 
supposition that it was the latter, that these attacks were committed by burghers 
on the march to Meaux. Given the ambiguity, once again there is no specific 
evidence of Jacques activity between Pmis and Meaux.246 
The Jacques were successful in destroying property and f0l1ified 
installations across the length and breadth of n011h-eastem France, with 
significant victOlies for the Jacques. For example, the 'palatial domain ,247 of 
Robert de Lonis at Ennenonville, worth over 25,000 livres according to one 
j4~ document, was burnt to the ground by the Jacques.-' There were successes 
against other military fortifications: for example, those against the castles at La-
Celle-en-Brie,249 Jouy-sous-Thelle (Oise) 250 and Villers-aux-Noill1ains 
24; X 1 a 14, ff. 391, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 306-9. 
246 Also from the above register, one document (X2a, 1, fol 212) mentions an attack on a house 
on Messy, which also does falls around Meaux. In my opinion, this document offers no data as to 
who committed the damage (the document is a donation of property to the noble), but my belief 
is that it was more likely to be the townsmen. 
247 Sumption. Fire, p.70. 
248 AN, JJ86, f. no. 308, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 260. 
249 AN, JJ90, f. 225, f. 102, no. 444, replinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 303-4. 
250 AN, JJIOO, f. 220, no. 478. 
III 
(Aisne).251 Indeed, the habitants of Crugny even destroyed the great fortress at 
La Fere-en-Tardenois.252 One rebel group alone was responsible for the 
destruction of four chateaux: Mesnil, Aufay, Thois and Catheux (Somme).153 
The Jacques' victories, and their destruction of several key military 
positions, emphasize that the rebellion was very much a serious political issue. 
Including reparations for the chateau at Ennenonville (Oise), Robert de LOlTis 
claimed over 75,000 livres in damages caused by the Jacques.254 The great castle 
at Poix (Somme) was burnt to the ground. We know that several castles 
destroyed by the Jacques were rebuilt, for example at Moreuil, while others were 
left ruined, like Verberie.255 It was not just an issue about recompensing the 
nobility for the loss of their propeliy, but the Jacquelie weakened the military 
in±iastructure of the French crown. That same fOliress at Poix, no doubt 
weakened after being looted by the Jacques, would be occupied by the English in 
September 1358.256 Lagny (Seine-et-Mame), one of the main garrisons of the 
Dauphin's troops, was attacked by the Jacques and acted as an assembly point of 
the retaliatory force, but fell quickly to the English in 1359.257 In fact, over sixty 
fOliified places in the lIe de France were occupied by Anglo-NavalTese 
companies in the August and September 1358, just a few months after the 
Jacquerie.258 While perhap's we cannot draw a direct cOlTelation between the 
Jacques' attacks and the victOlies of the Dauphin's enemies in this region in 
201 AN, JJI OS, f. 20, no. 60. 
202 AN, JJ86, f. 125, no. 36S. 
253 AN. J.190. f. 98, no. 294, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllcric, pp. 296-7. 
254 AN, JJS6, f. 102, no. 30S, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllcric, p. 260. 
200 Saleh, Dictiol1l1airc, pp. SIS, 120S. 
206 Sumption. Fire, p. 372. 
257 ibid. 
25S ibid. For details of Lagny and the Jacques, see AN, JJ91, f. 173, no. 333. 
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following years, the area certainly provided little resistance against enemy troops 
in the wake of the J acquerie. 
The bulk of the Jacques were peasants or rural villagers. Yet townsmen were 
involved, often in events ancillary to the main revolt. The chroniclers did report 
the involvement of townsmen, but did not specify the nature of their 
pmiicipation. For example, the chronicles charge that the Jacques attacked the 
city of Senlis. The Chronique des Regnes des Jean II et Charles V describes how 
the Jacques 'forced many of the town to ±lee into the countryside,.259 Richard 
Lescot also describes a great antagonism towards certain towns: 'as this pack of 
rabid dogs went about, coming and going, they single-mindedly devoted 
themselves to destroying Senlis, Ennenonville, Thierry ... '. 260 Yet the remissions 
suggest something else: it was the townsmen of Senlis themselves who were 
complicit in removing the nobles from the city. As reported earlier, a great C1Y 
within the city inspired the burghers to evict the lords. This confusion continued 
in towns like Beauvais, for which the C/zronique Normande describes the 
following: 
The other peasants reassembled ... including even some of the [town of] 
Beauvais, who [also] were against the nobles. They sent many to 
Beauvais, where they were killed with the consent of the town's 
commune ... at the time the peasants went into the Beauvaisis around 
Compiegne and ordered that all nobles be sent and handed over to them, 
but the bourgeois refused and gave guarantees to the noblemen, who 
d · h fC" "61 staye 111 t e town 0 omplegne.-
The remissions confi1111 that Compiegne was a place that offered safety to the 
nobles: the priest and curate Jean Rose moved his family there when the 
Jacquerie tried to use him as a pawn in forging an alliance between the Jacques 
2S9 Chrol1. des regnes. v.l, p. 178, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 166. 
260 Lescot, Chron., p. 126, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 170. 
261 Chroll. norm., p. 128, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 163-4. 
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and the town.262 However, the above quotation indicates the confusion: the 
townsmen of Beauvais were involved in their own attack upon their town. 
The remissions show that whenever the townsmen were involved in the 
Jacquerie, there was little clarity of purpose. Classifying 'urban settlements' is 
also problematic, but several large towns are mentioned in remissions for the 
Jacquerie. This map indicates each urban settlement, and whether the remissions 
indicate the whole town took part (red), one townsmen joined the 'men of the 
countryside' (blue) or whether there was confusion within the townspeople 
d · . . h I ( ) ?63 aroun J ommg t e revo t orange.-
Map VI. Urban centres and the Jacquerie 
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262 AN, JJ86, f. 124, no. 365, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 272-4. 
263 The scale of this map is 1 / 1,800,000. 
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Table VIII. Urban involvement in the Jacquede 
REMISSIONS TOWN PARTICIPATION 
JJ86, n. 239 Amiens Confusion; townsmen leave then are 
recalled; some join of their own free 
will. 
JJ86, nos. 51O, Senlis Confusion; townsmen attacking 
511 townsmen 
JJ86, n. 584 Beauvais One individual ] 0111S 'lnen of the 
countryside' 
JJ86, n. 297 Montlhery One individual joins 'men of the 
countryside' 
JJ86, n. 534 . Saint-Omer One individual joins 'men of the lands' 
JJ87, n. 231 Caen One individual spreading propaganda 
JJ86, nos. 437, Montdidier Confusion; townsmen revolt while 
456 mayor disapproves 
JJ1l5, n. 297 Gien Inhabitants attack nobles' houses 
JJ86, n. 313 Pontoise Men from the plat-pays around took 
part 
Of these, Montlhery, Saint Omer, Beauvais and Caen seem to have only involved 
one man from each settlement who had joined the 'men of the countryside' .264 
This tallies with the chronicle accounts concerning Beauvais - the few townsmen 
who did join the violence were acting against public opinion in the town. As we 
264 Those individuals are Gauchier Lore (Montlhery, AN, JJ86, n.297), Regnaut Corbel 
(Beauvais, AN, JJ86, f. 2 11, no. 584), Jean Michelet (Saint-Orner, AN, JJ86, f. 194, no. 534) and 
Pierre Montfort (eaen, AN, JJ87, [ 136, no. 231). 
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discussed earlier in 'Marcel', confusion clouds the involvement of Senlis, 
Montdidier and Amiens?65 None had much to do with the Jacquerie itself. Even 
in the case of Pontoise, the remission specifically mentioned that peasants from 
the outskirts of the town were involved in the liot.266 
Only in Gien is it clear that the burghers were the main insurgents, rather 
than joining the men of the countryside. A 'great party of those' from the town 
attacked the gardens and the houses of two knights, the brothers lehan and 
lehannot du Martroy.267 Nonetheless, these houses were seven leagues 
(somewhere in the region of twenty-five to thirty miles) from the settlement. 
This seems a long way for burghers to travel - perhaps the repOlis Vv'ere inconect 
and the villagers from the outlying countryside were the men responsible, 
although there is nothing to support that thesis. Gien itself is hardly 
representative of the Jacques, situated one hundred kilometres south of the 
nearest settlement that can be positively linked to the Jacquerie.268 
The examples of urban-rural interaction suggest conflict, not co-
operation. Jean Rose was sent with letters proposing an alliance with the men of 
Compiegne, which the town rejected.269 This animosity towards the Jacques 
from townsmen can be found elsewhere in the sources. In Caen, the remissions 
for Piene de Monfort shows that the town autholities anested suspected 
JacquesYO The individual from 'the countryside around Pontoise' fled into the 
to>1'11 to escape the rebels, just as did Jean Rose in Compiegne. Even beyond the 
260 See 'Marcel', in Chapter III. 
266 AN, JJ86, f. Ill, no. 313. 
267 AN, J]115, f. 140, no. 297. 
263 It seems possible, perhaps likely, that Gien was not pali of the Jacquerie at all, and rather was 
pmi of the wave of violence that took in other southern settlements like Vitteaux and Vermenton 
which will be discussed in the chapter on 'Peasant Resistance'. However, the remission docs 
claim the men ofGien to be involved in the revolt of the 'gens du plat pays'. 
269 AN, JJ86, f. 124, no. 365, reprinted in Luce, Jacqucric, pp. 272-4. 
270 AN, JJ87, f. 76, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, 1717. 291-2. 
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safety they provided and the efforts of officials to an'est Jacques, towns aided the 
nobility over their rural brethren: the remission for Corbeil shows the townsmen 
joined forces with the nobles to put down the revolt.271 When rebel peasants 
interacted with men from the towns, the consequences were generally negative, 
not positive; they were centres of conflict as much as co-operation. 
Do we get any indication about how the revolt ended? The defeat of Guillaume 
Cale's force at Clennont was certainly a pivotal moment in the Jacquerie 
according to the chroniclers. For example, La Clzroniqlle Normande records: 
And at the time the King of Navane assembled a great army, consisting 
of men-at-arms from England, Nonnandy and Navane. They marched to 
the castle of Clermont, and sent for one of the captains of rustics to talk 
with him, promising that he wanted to be on their side. Thus, he [Cale] 
went there, but as soon as he anived, the King chopped off his head. 
Then with all his men he attacked the villains, who thought that they were 
coming to aid them as had been promised, but they were mistaken. The 
King's men killed more than eight hundred ofthem.272 
The Chronique des Quatres Premiers Valois account was more detailed,273 but 
other chroniclers remarked that the Jacques were tticked by the Navarrese.274 
What exactly happened was unclear: was Cale really beheaded? What is clear is 
that the remissions confim1 that Clermont was a substantial defeat for the 
Jacques. As recorded elsewhere, one remission recorded that 'Guillaume Cale, 
calling himself captain of the Beauvoisin, and many others of his adherents and 
271 AN, JJ86, f. 127, no. 372. 
272 C17ron. norm., p. 130, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 164. 
m Although its account of Cale's personal demise is brief (' [Navarre 1 beheaded the captain of 
the Jacques'), the description of the battle gives tigures for the Jacques' force (four thousand 
troops and six hundred horsemen organised in three batal1ions), lists thirty-six nobles that took 
part in the battle, and details the nobles' movements on the tield. Yet this is the only account that 
goes into such detail, and is wlitten some f0l1y years after the event - no contemporary chronicle 
offers any corroboration. C17rol1. premiers Valois, p. 73-4, t1'. Cohn, PP, p. 160-1. 
274 See for example Venette, Chrcm., v. 2, p. 265, trans. Birdsal1, Venelle, p. 77: "the king of 
Navarre summoned some of the unsuspecting peasant captains to him with smooth words and 
s1ewthem'. 
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accomplices were executed at Clermont thus putting an end to their mad 
enterplise,.275 The reference to execution apart, the remissions do not mention 
betrayal by Navane. Nonetheless, the crown considered Clermont to mark the 
end of Cale' s participation. 
But did the Jacquelie continue even atler Clermont? Sadly, the majority 
of remissions only give us a very rough impression of time. Events are most 
often recorded as having vaguely taken place in the 'time of cOlmnotion and 
tenor', specific dates are very rare. Only occasionally does a remission specify a 
date, but even these dates were approximations (such as 'around the feast of 
Saint-Jolm the Baptist just passed,).276 The date is used mainly as an indication 
of the context of the event, and that it took place within the confines of the 
Jacquerie. Only a few remissions are more specific; on the 3 June, the men of 
Rhuis attacked the nobles at Verberie, for example.277 There is not much specific 
evidence to suggest that the majority of the revolt did not fall within the 'blazing 
fire of fifteen days'. 278 
Yet on occasion remissions hint that the revolt actually continued for a 
period considerably after the defeat and betrayal at Clennont. For instance, the 
men of Louveciennes (YveIines), with 'many others' who were 'Jacques 
Bonhommes', attacked a house at Marly-en-Roy (Yvelines) on the Feast of the 
Magdalene, on the 22 July.279 Another document, concerning a castle destroyed 
by the non-nobles at Jouy-sous-Thelle (Oise), near Beauvais, mentioned that the 
'tenor began' against them around the 'feast of Saint Christopher', on 24 July.28C1 
m See the section on Navarre in Chapter 3, and AN, JJ86, [ 208, no. 571. 
276 AN, JJ86, f. 76, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 291-2. 
277 AN, JJ86, f. 256, no. 444, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 280-1. 
278 Leguai. 'Les revo ltes rura les', p. 58. 
279 AN, JJ86, f. 130, no. 380. 
2,0 AN, JJJ 00, f. 230. n. 478. 
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Located in the heart of the lIe de France .as much as six weeks after the alleged 
'end' of the violence, these two remissions suggest that the Jacquerie may not 
have been crushed in the shmi amount of time previously believed. Yet, only 
these documents suggest an alternative timeline. 
What do the remissions tell us then about the revolt itself? It covered a greater 
area than the historiography now suggests. It may have continued later into the 
summer than historians now believe and longer than the chroniclers rep01ied it. 
Urban sites were far from instrumental in the revolt; instead, they were sites of 
confusion, where participation was never clear cut. Only on two occasions, in 
Gien and Montdidier, did the town populace as a whole appear to have taken pari 
in the rebellion. The bulk of examples suggest that townsmen were often 
opposed and antagonistic towards the peasants. Except from the area between 
Paris and Meaux which was considered part of Marcel's revolt, viliually the 
whole of the nmih of France was covered by the insurgency. Finally, Jacques 
were remarkably successful when it came to destroying propeliy and military 
installations, even against the considerable obstacles of attacking nobles, who 
certainly possesed superior arn1S and experience. 
Thus, our conclusion contradicts the traditional picture of the Jacques as 
'unimp01iant'. How could such a large-scale revolt which caused such damage 
be anything other than catastrophic? If nothing else, the swift collapse of the 
realm's defences in this area to the English and the Navanese in the months 
following the Jacquerie indicates that the French crown's military strength in this 
central region was weakened. What repOlis we do have suggest that the property 
damaged alone may have exceded many of the ransoms due after Poi tiers. The 
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Jacquelie may have been blief, but its size and scale.brought severe problems for 
the Dauphin and the defence of the realm. 
RETALIATION 
The roughness of the repression corresponded with the ease first 
encountered by the rebels. Case after case could be examined. Hangings, 
spectacular beheadings of the persons most deeply involved, even 
drawing and quartering, make up a dismal story. Sanctions were founded 
often enough on the principle of collective responsibility; penalties, 
whether physical or pecuniary, affected in an arbitrary fashion a whole 
group - or some elements of a group - which was presumed guilty, if not 
of the deeds, at least of not having prevented them. Everything took 
place as if government wished to intimidate even more than punish.:>81 
Mollat and Wolff s charactelisation of the inevitable failure of medieval popular 
violence and resulting repression by vengeful authorities concurs with Emile 
Zola's vision of the end ofajacquelie: 'the same exasperation bursts forth '" in 
which state they remain until death' .282 Historians like Guy Fourquin presumed 
that all medieval revolts ended in this kind of bloody defeat.2S3 As for the 
Jacquelie, R.-H. Bautier devotes more sentences to the "butchery' of the 
repression than the rebellion.284 It was also assumed that this failure came at the 
hands of an authority or 'state' which wished to inflict terror arbitrarily on the 
lower orders, rather than resolve the situation judicially. 
Repressive measures are enacted by authOlities for two reasons. First, 
repression perfonned a retaliatory function, enabling the transgressors to be 
punished for their involvement. Second, looking forward, repression could be 
2,1 Mollat and Wo1ft~ Popular Revollltions, p. 310. 
232 Zola, The Earth, trans. Pallnec, p. 91. 
28.1 Fourquin, Anatomy of Popular Rebe11iol1, p. 25, 'cven in thesc closing ycars of the fOUlieenth 
century ... rcvolt led only to rcpression and not to rcvolution'. 
234 Bautier, The Economic Development Cif Medieval Europe, p. 231. 
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intended to prevent future revolts, by indicating the kind of response future 
rebels might expect. Both of these have been traditionally considered to be 
effective, even in the case of medieval revolts; for example, E. Kiser and A. 
Linton suggested that the repression of English Peasants' Revolt quelled popular 
h 78'i I' I' . bl b 7R6 B protest over t e next century,- . a c aIm t lat IS questlOna e at est. - ecause 
repression was considered to produce positive results for central government, it 
was presumed that retaliation would always be carried out by the 'state'. 
However, in recent studies the power of the retaliation has been challenged, and 
with it the notion that states automatically represses their subj ects after a 
disturbance?87 This is not a modern phenomenon: in fact, there are numerous 
examples from the medieval period. Even in Paris, the French crown showed in 
1382 it was willing to forgive its subjects without much bloodshed: after the 
revolt of the Hammer men, the crown pardoned all but seven of the citizens 
involved, but even this proved too harsh and the agreement to pay their taxes 
2S5 Kiser and Linton's generalisation is based on work done on popular revolt in Guyenne, which 
they conclude by saying was deeply affected by the repression of Le Fronde of 1648-53. Yet, 
although they declare this to be a qualitative survey, their results are not backed up by an 
adequate sample. They are only concerned with twelve rcvolts between ISIS and 1789: for 
example, statements like' Prior to the Fronde, tax increases tended to generate revolt, after the 
Fronde, they rarely did' are based on seven revolts between ISIS and 1645 and four revolts 
between 1652 and 1789. The ascription of whatever changes may have occurred (and within a 
sample of only twelve it is doubtful that these can be accurately tracked) to the repression of one 
revolt alone disrcgards a ccntury-and-a-half of social change that may also have brought pressure 
on revolt. Moreover, the concept that the repression after Le Fronde, howcver bloody, \vould 
have affected at all several generations distant to the original rebels cannot be taken for granted. 
E. Kiser and A. Linton, 'The Hinges of History: State-Making and Revolt in Early Modern 
France', American Sociological Review, 67, n. 6 (Dec, 2002), pp. 889-910. 
2,6 There are great rebellions after 1381, and there are minor ±1are-ups in the years after 1381; 
Thomas Walsingham reported a conspiracy in September 1382 in Norwich, and an aboliive rising 
in Kent in 1390 for example. See The Peasants' Revolt of 1381, cd. R.B. Dobson (London, 1991) 
pp. 334-335. 
20i Repression docs not necessarily result in a reduction in the level of popular political protest. 
Sociologists and political scicntists concur that repression of rcvolts can lead to a variety of 
responses from participants, including an unwillingness to participate in the future, but also an 
increased belief in the necessity of violence for future rebels to achieve their goals as well as 
radicalising the populace that had previously been uninvolved. Whatever tangible effects 
repression has. and whatever cOlTelation there might be types ofrepression and its effects on 
popular violence seems impossible to spot. For example, Karl-Dieter Opp and Wolfgang Roehl 
describe "disparatc effects of repression ... [that] sometimes deters and sometimes radicalises the 
paJiicipants of political protests. K.-D. Opp and W. Rochl, "Repression, micromobilization, and 
political protest', Social Forces, 69, n. 2 (Dec, 1990), p. 523. 
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immediately broke down.288 Indeed, only two years before the Jacquerie, the 
Count of AIl11agnac (and by extension, the French crown) discussed concessions 
with rebels, not punishing them, when the people of Toulouse rose to dispute a 
new tax.289 In the negotiations that followed, in retu111 for safe passage for the 
Count, it was declared that no new tax would be levied and the inhabitants would 
not be punished for their actions. 
The conception of repression by the 'state' in the Middle Ages is strongly 
influenced by an acceptance of the preponderance of violence in medieval 
society, specifically Huizinga's depiction of the 'Violent Tenor of Life' .290 In 
Pieter Spierenburg's study of the development of repression, he theorised that 
repressive forces were very rarely punished for taking action against those who 
attacked them: 
we note an acceptance of f01111S of private violence and the predominance 
of a reconciliatory stand instead of serious punislunent ... in such a 
climate of acceptance of violence no particular sensitivity prevailed 
towards the suffering of its convicts.291 
Thus, a lack of proper social institutions, like an accepted criminal justice 
system, promoted vengeance and violence that was ultimately sanctioned by the 
authorities.292 Lacking effective and accepted mechanisms of state control, 
medieval society tolerated private violence by victims against those who 
2SS Cohn, LUSI for Liber/y, p. 153. 
2SQ ibid., p. 152. 
290 J. Huizinga, The Wallillg oflhe Middle Ages, trans. F. Hopman (Hannondsw011h: Penguin, 
1972). 
291 P. Spierenburg, The Speclacle of Suffering, ExeCliliol1s and Ihe Evolulion of Repression: From 
A Pre-industrial lVlelropolis 10 Ihe European Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1984), pp. 7-8. 
292 In other cases, 8 lack of solid institutions has been linked to an increase in what we might call 
chaotic violence, particularly in the case of the medieval Inquisition; R. Kieckhefer argues that 
'in certain contexts complex institutions can serve as checks upon the arbitrary will of 
individuals'. Yet Kieckhefer stresses that we should not consider medieval retaliation to be any 
more chaotic than its modern counterp81i: 'forms of repression ... have become more common 
which are far more brutal and systematic than their medieval countei']Jarts·. R. Kieckhefer, 
Repression ofHere.lJ' inlVJedieval Germany (LivellJool: Livel']Jool University Press, 1979). p. 
112, p. ix. 
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committed cnmes against them, and retaliation went unpunished. In these 
models, the society of the Middle Ages actively encouraged repression and 
private violence. 
However, Sam Colm has shown that this vision of the failure of the 
medieval uprising and its inevitable bloody repression was not representative of 
the actual results of rebellion in this period. Not only were revolts frequently 
successful, but even failure did not necessarily result in bloody recriminations: 
'[i]n 70 percent of cases found in chronicles (726 of 1012), either the chronicler 
did not mention any repression or the rebels won their demands'.293 
Of course, in the case of the Jacques, the chroniclers and contemporaries 
do mention repression. Even Etienne Marcel noted the extreme reaction of the 
nobility, and the excessive bloodshed of the retaliation, in a letter written to the 
towns of Pi cardy and Flanders: 
The gentlemen of the Beauvaisis and the Vexin assembled and destroyed 
and pillaged all the country of the Beauvaisis. Under the excuse of the 
deeds done in the Beauvaisis, the nobles in many and diverse places held 
large assemblies and raided many places in the region on this side of the 
Somme and the River Oise. They overwhelmed those who had nothing to 
do with these deeds in the Beauvaisis, who were guiltless and innocent, 
invading, robbing, sacking, burning, killing and destroying all the 
. h d' d f d "94 ' country, Just as t eyare omg aya ter ay.-
The chroniclers echoed Marcel's words, and their description of the repression is 
often clearer than descriptions of the revolt itself. Jean Froissmi described a 
scene of carnage as the nobles at Meaux exacted a bloody revenge on both the 
townsmen who attacked them and the peasants in the neighbouring countryside: 
When these wicked people saw' them so well-ordered and that they were 
not such a great number to face them, they were no longer so bold as 
before ... Thus, those [Jacques] in front, now feeling the blows they had 
293 Cohn, Llistfor Liherty, p.152. 
294 Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Picardy and Flanders, in Oeuvres de Froissart 
ed. de Lettenhove, (Brussells, 1868), VI, pp. 470-1, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 177-8. 
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dreaded, retreated in hOlTor, all at once, one falling on top of the other ... 
Thus all sorts of men-at-anns then came out of the balTicades and quickly 
won over the square, striking down these wicked people. And they beat 
them senseless, butchering them like animals '" And the gentlemen had 
killed so many they became completely exhausted and worn out. They 
dumped the bodies in heaps into the river Marne.295 
Froissart's expression of joy at the destruction of the wicked Jacques was not the 
only opinion on the issue given by the chroniclers. If the exceptional violence of 
the Jacquerie was demonstrated by descriptions of behaviour towards women, 
then many chroniclers descriptions of the repression indicated that the nobles' 
violence too was exceptional. By highlighting these extremes, they considered it 
both unnecessary and also dispropoliionate in its nature. Jean de Venette, for 
example, records: 
OvelTunning many country villages, they set most of them on fire and 
slew miserably all the peasants, not merely those whom they believed to 
have done them harm, but all they found, whether in their houses or 
digging in the vineyards or in the fields. Verberie, La Croix-Saint-Ouen 
near Compiegne, Ressons, and many other country towns lying in open 
fields which I have not seen and do not note here, mourned their 
d . b fi )96 estructlOn y lre.-
Others conculTed. La Clzronique normande du XIVe siecle hinted that the nobles 
not only wrought destruction but also made a hefty profit off their retaliatory 
attacks: 'they burned everything in many places, killing and hunting down the 
people and calTying off their wealth, of which much was to be had,.:m 
Moreover, when compared to their often scant coverage of the rebels' 
actions, the chronicles reported detailed infonnation concerning the retaliation. 
In the passage above, Jean de Venette gives a clear indication of some villages 
attacked, while he only mentions one target as representative of the Jacques' 
295 Froissart, Clzrol1., v. 5, pp. 105-6, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 156-7. 
296 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 264, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 77. 
297 Chrol7. norm., p. 133, trans. Cohn, pp, p. 165. 
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rampage.298 The Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois describes the battle at 
Clennont where the Jacques were defeated, as well as the resulting retaliation by 
Charles of Navarre and a collection of nobles from Amiens and Bray.299 The 
chronicles' sympathies naturally lay with the nobility, and the exploits of nobles 
and their retaliatory attacks would have been easier to compile than the uprising 
of faceless peasants. Yet there was obviously something appealing about 
including these tales. 
This large amount of detail does not mean that the chronicle accounts always 
concurred. When looked at together, the repOlis of the regent's location are 
confusing. La Chronique nonnande du XIVe si(xle placed him in Compiegne, 
assembling knights and nobles for the attack on Meaux, whereas La Chronique 
des d:gnes de Jean 11 et Charles V described him as heading first for la Ferte-
Milon, then back towards Paris.30o Almost every chronicle suggests a different 
noble whose role in the defeat of the Jacques was paIiicularly impOliant; for 
example, Jean de Venette mentions the Count of Montdidier, whereas the 
Chronique des Quatres Premiers Valois focusses on the Count of Roucy. The 
only two accounts that agree are unsurprisingly Jean Ie Bel and FroissaIi, whose 
account was based on Ie Bel's chronicle. No other source gives a prominent role 
to the Lord of Coucy, and each chronicler details their own particular counter-
offensive, and it is \vorth noting that the Count of Foix was Jean Froissart's 
298 Jean de Venette mentions the castle of Enllenonvillc because it was 'then the strongest in 
France', rather than to give any sense of the geography of the revolt as he did with his description 
of the retaliation. Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 265, trans. Birdsall, Venetie, p. 77. 
299 ClIron premiers Valois, p. 73-4, tr. Cohn, PP, p. 161-2. 
300 ClIron. des regnes. v.l, p. 186, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 169. 
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personal hero.301 This table indicates the major acts of vengeance committed by 
nobles against the peasants as recorded by the chroniclers:302 
Table IX. Retaliatory attacks listed by the chroniclers. 
LEADER CHRONICLE DEPARTED ATTACKED SIZE OF 
FROM FORCE 
Lord of Couey. Jean Ie Bel Couey-Ie-Chateau 'all around' 'great many 
Enguerrand VI Jean Froissart (Aisne) nobles' 
Count of Foix Jean le Bel Meaux Area around 
Jean Froissart Meau.x 
'Troop of Chrol1iques des Amiens, Bray Poix, Roye, 1000 
gentlemen ,3(1.' Quatres Gerberoy, swordsmen. 
Premiers Valois Gaillefontaines 90 
(Somme) archers304 
Robert, Count of Chrol1iques des Roucy (Aisne) Brie 
Rouey Quatres 
Premiers Valois 
Charles of Navarre La Chroniqlle de Clermont? Beauvaisis. 
regl1es de Jean II Verberie, La 
ei Charles V, Croix-Saint-Ouen 
Jean de Venette near Compiegne, 
Ressons (Oise) 
The Regent La Chroniqlle de Meaux Chateau-Thierry, 
reglles de Jean 11 la Ferle-Millon 
et Charles V and the 
surrounding area 
(Aisne) 
Count of Saint-Pol. Jean de Venette Montdidier Verb erie, La 
Montdidier Croix-Saint-Ouen 
near Compiegne, 
Ressons (Oise) 
Like the chronicle accounts of the initial revolt, the focus falls firmly on the lIe 
de France. Again, this is the area that has been recognised as the heal1land of 
301 This was discussed in 'The Attack on the Marchc', 
302 This definition is not always clear-cut. For example, Mahieu Raoul de Couey's defence of the 
castle ofle Plassie, as detailed by La Chronique Normande, is not included because it is unclear 
whether the violence continued after the end of the battle instigated by the Jacques, On the other 
hand, the 'troop of gentlemen' described by La Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois is 
included despite the facl they attacked a 'troop of Jacques' for two reasons: first, this is noted as 
being after the point that 'the Jacques had been defeated', and that the spectacle of 'buming at 
least three hundred' sounds more like retaliatory violence than the result ofa military 
engagement. 
303-The chronicle lists' Le Baudrain de la Heuse, Monsignor Guillaume Martel, Monsignor Jehan 
Sonnain, Monsignore khan Ie Bigot and the chief officers of Caux', After Poix, they were joined 
by 'the monsignor de Beausant. monsignor the castellan of Beauvais, [and] monsignor de 
Boulainvilliers', 
304 The initial force was listed by the chronicler as 300 swordsmen, but after Poix the three 
monsignors added 700 swordsmen and 90 archers to the force, 
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the Jacquerie by later historians. The chroniclers were chiefly concerned with 
the violence taking place in the region around Paris. When the chroniclers noted 
a place from which the retaliation started, it is marked in red; when they noted a 
target of the retaliation, it is marked in blue:305 
Map VII. The repression as detailed by the chroniclers . 
• , r~ dnl rer 
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The repreSSIOn took many forms. For example, after the attack on 
Meaux, if we can trust the chroniclers, two noble offensives took place. First, the 
localised and bloody burning of the region by the Count of Foix that caught the 
chroniclers' eyes. Secondly, the regent rode out with a force fifty kilometres to 
305 This map is to a scale of I / 900,000. 
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the East to the area around Chateau-Thierry. Localised repression existed, like 
that c0l1U11itted by the Count of Roucy around his lands, but so did great armed 
campaigns across the countryside by groups of nobles. The force that depmied 
from Amiens originally headed west to Bray, before turning back east and then 
south into the lIe de France itself: for example. Of course, localised repression 
could have resulted in as many casualties as large movements. 
There is little doubt that the retaliation was bloody and widespread, and 
many historians have been content to record this as the complete explanation of 
the violence. Yet these chronicle accounts do not answer all the questions. What 
happened outside the lle de France? Did the repression end tension, or create 
more? Social historians have challenged the assumption that retaliation quashes 
violence rather than encourages other actions. Who actually were these nobles? 
Were they acting with the support of the regent? 
The chronicles are not our only accounts of the retaliation. The crown did not 
only pardon rebels, but also errant nobles for the excesses they committed in the 
wake of the initial revolt. Moreover, some peasants were also pardoned for acts 
they committed under the pressure of assault, and gave details regarding their 
assailants. The remissions record previously unknown counter-offensives 
against the rural and urban rebels. 306 The remissions are a valuable tool for 
tracking the activities of the forces that put down the rebellion. This table 
represents the remissions that suggested large-scale chevauchees of nobles, rather 
than instances of private violence: 
306 Charles of Navarre's offensive against the rebels was not mentioned in any remissions for the 
Navarrese, but only mentioned in the narratives of remissions for the Jacques, The remission of 
Jehan Bernier, who later refused a commission to serve under Navarre, mentions the damage 
done by the Navarrese to the countryside, as does the remission for the people of Mello, see AN, 
.1.186, f. 133, no. 387 and JJ86, f. 102, no. 309 respectively. 
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Table X. Retaliatory attacks listed by the remissions. 
JJ Nobles from ... Description of Attack .... 
Assailants 
86, 142 Sa int-Dizier, 'Our good lord and Peliois, lowlands of 
Graney fliend', Nobles Champagne 
86,309 Mello Nobles, Navarre's Mello 
troops 
86,356 Unclear Nobles Soissons 
86,365 Compiegne 'Nobles, Officers of J aux, trying to cross 
the crown and the.1iver Oise 
citizens of 
Compiegne 
86,380 Loivre, at Reims Nobles Villages around Brie 
86,420 Meaux Brigands Montlhery 
86,421 Unclear Nobles Senlis jUI 
86,578 Saint-Dizier, Saint- Nobles Saint-Lumier 
Vrain 
90, 292 Saint-Dizier Nobles Favresse 
90,444 Brie Brigands La-Celle in Blie 
91,333 Lagny Nobles Bordellis, Vaires 
108,60 Beauvaisis, Nobles, Robeli of Herelle, Villers-aux-
Fouencamps Rogois Erables 
115,297 Seven leagues Knights Gien 
outside Gien 
The striking contrast with the chroniclers is again that of the geography: as with 
the rebellion itself, the remissions highlight a great diversity of action occuning 
outside the lIe de France. Whereas the chronicles concentrated on the 'supposed' 
hemiland of the revolt, the remissions indicate that the repression spread across 
the nOlih of France. The heartland is still well represented, but there were 
numerous centres that the repression spread from, especially to the south and 
east. The map belows adds information from the remissions: when they indicate 
a centre from which retaliation spread, the location is marked in green; targets 
30~ are marked orange. 
307 Several remissions mention the attack on Senlis, but only this one details the actual attack by 
the nobles. 
103 The scale of this map is 1/1,900,000. 
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Map VIII. The repression as detailed by the chroniclers and remissions . 
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Of all the counter-insurgency movements, the most powerful originated 
from Saint-Dizier. While the chronicles place the centre of the nobles ' counter-
offensive in the ile de France, the remissions make numerous mentions of the 
damage caused by the lord of Saint-Dizier and his push west; for this, he and the 
lord of Grancy were pardoned in early 1358: 
At the supplication of our friends and loyal knights and advisors, Eudes, 
lord of Grancy, Jean, lord of Saint Dizier and of Vignorry .. . to oppose 
and resist the disloyal and hateful companies and disorderly wishes of the 
people of the country of Perthois and the lowland parts of Champagne, 
who had imprisoned, conspired against and ordered executions of the said 
lords of Grancy and Saint-Dizier and those other nobles of the land, 
together with their wives and children, and for making false and bad 
remarks . .. [and also] had assembled with weapons with the sound of the 
bells of the countryside ... The said supplicants and many other nobles 
and non- nobles had then assembled, both in arms and on horses as well, 
and used their royal office, setting fires in the houses and in these villages 
(villes) , communities and the countryside, and they took, pillaged and 
scattered many of their goods of the said communities, along with many 
goods belonging to the nobles and non-nobles not guilty and not 
implicated with these said communities through ignorance. They cut off 
the heads of several of those responsible, and also executed others ... In 
consideration of the said acts of the said communities and the countryside 
and others who had acted against the said nobles . , ' we wish to remit, 
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quit and pardon the said seigneurs of Grancy and of Saint-Dizier and with 
all the other nobles and non nobles, their consOlis, accomplices and 
aides.309 
According to the remissions, the Lord of Saint-Dizier appears as the main force 
in the retaliation against the Jacques. For example, the men of Saint-Lumier 
(Marne) had fOlmed together to protect themselves against Saint Dizier: 
Let it be known to all those present and future that we have heard the 
supplication of the inhabitants of Saint-Lumier in the Champagne ... The 
said supplicants had for many acts assembled, armed and made 
conspiracies together there to guard and defend against any nobles and 
any others of the land and others [as well] and also against the annies of 
Champagne ... especially against our loyal friend the lord of Saint Dizier 
queux of France and other nobles of the said land and in the town of 
Saint-Verain.3IO 
The charge by Saint-Dizier's men also could enrage passions. The remission for 
Jean Favresse, leader of villagers around Favresse (Marne), states: 
the lord of Saint-Dizier with a great number of soldiers rode towards 
Vitry in Perthois, This greatly enraged the people of the region. In many 
villages, they rang their bells and assembled to attack this lord of Saint-
Dizier, feming that he wished to hann them.311 
While these two extracts do not mention the damage done by the counter 
movement, the news of the repression travelled very fast, and created enough 
fear that villages assembled in defence against Saint-Dizier's repression. Saint-
Dizier was situated in the eastern extreme of the region affected by the Jacquerie, 
and the details of this push westward suggest as much destruction as the 
chroniclers desclibed around the ile de France. Of course, the number of 
309 AN, .1J86, f. 49, no. 142, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 247-8 . 
. '10 'Savoir faisons a tous presenz et a venir que nous oye la supplication des habitans de la ville 
de Saint Lumier en Ch81npaigne .... iceulx supplicants se soient par plusiers fois assemblez 
am1ez et fair conspiracies ensemble deulx garder et deffendre contre aucuns nobles et aucuns 
autres du pais et d'ail1eurs et aussi annez aus champaigne .. , especialement contre nostre ame et 
fealle scigneur de Saint Dizier queux de France et aucuns auu'es nobles et auUTs du dit pais cn la 
ville de Saint-Verain', AN, 1J86, f 210, no. 578. 
311 AN, JJ90, f. 149, no. 292, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 293-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 190-
191. 
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remissions does not necessarily cOlTelate with the impOliance of any given event, 
but the excesses committed by St. Dizier's forces were considered impOliant by 
the crowd, and were feared by the peasants. 
As described above, fear of the nobles' attacks could cause peasants to act. In the 
village of Jaux (Oise), news that the nobles, officers of the crown and the people 
of Compiegne were coming forced the habitants, and their captain Jehan Ie 
Grant, into action: 
Since the said commotions, at the time when the nobles raided, along 
with our officers and many others of the town (ville) of Compiegne came 
to the bank of the river Oise at the forest of Compiegne and they wished 
to cross over the said river to the said village (vi1le) of J aux on the other 
bank where this Jehan was. He had said to them that he would go to 
bring the boat that was set up for crossing, (but) the said Jehan feared that 
they were accompanied by nobles and thus refused to bring the boat, and 
then many habitants from the said village (ville) of Jaux appeared and 
fired (alTows) again at those who wished to pass, without wounding or 
hanl1ing them in any manner ... And for this these nobles and officers 
have had and demonstrated hate and ill feelings to the said Jehan for these 
'd ,]7 ~ Sal causes ... - -
The nobles' chevauchee should not be read as the end of rebellion, but rather the 
beginning of new nalTatives. In this example, the villagers of Jaux attacked the 
men of Compiegne because they thought they were aiding the nobles. The 
retaliation marked the continuation of old battles stalied by the Jacques, as well 
as new feuds stalied during the repression. 
;12 'et depuis Jes dictes commocions ou temps qui les nobles chevauchoient et aucuns officers de 
mons seigneur de nous et pJusiers autrcs de Ja ville de Compaigne feussent a Jez sur Ja Riviere 
d'Oise du coste divers Ja forest de compaigne et eussent vouJu passer ouJtre Ja dicte riviere en Ja 
dicte ville de .laux qui est de rautre coste divers dicelle ou estoit Jors le dit Jehan au qu'iJ dirent 
qu'il leur amenost ou Feist amener Ja nacelle qui Ja estoit ordene pour passer Ie quel khan 
doubtans qu'il ne feussent accompaignez de nobles leur reffusa du toute amener Ja dicte nacelle et 
lors plusiers habitans de Ja dicte ville de Jaux se avanturent et retraierunt ayceuJx qui vouloient 
passer sans ce qui aucuns d'iceulx sussent bJaciez ou naures en aucune maniere du elit trait ... Et 
pour ce que les cliz nobles ou otTicers poun-oient avoir et pOlier haine et malivolence au elit khan 
pour les causes dessus dictes ... ' AN, JJ86, f. 123, no. 362. 
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It is worth noting too that that the peasants did not passively receive their 
punishment. While the chronicles and the remissions agree that the bloodshed 
was mostly on the part of the nobility, these examples of peasants taking up arms 
against the noble contingent shows that they still rose up even after the 
repressIOn. Resistance to the nobles' retaliation was not the only example of 
peasants organising in defence against attack in the wake of the revolt in the 
region, a topic which we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 6. For example, 
in 1359, at Longueil-Saint-Marie (Oise), near Compiegne, Guillaume l' Aloue 
rallied 300 local peasants against the English cavalry, later in the year, the men 
of Chiitres fortified their church unsuccesfully against the same foe, and then in 
1360, in Thouri-en-Beauce, peasants again organised against English troops.313 
The remission that recorded the most damage caused in the retaliation was issued 
to a number of communities pardoned for defending themselves from attack by 
the nobles in the region of Reims. Their campaign seems to have been a long, 
drawn-out offensive against the region's communities: 
Let it be known to all present and future that the inhabitants of the 
villages (villes) of Marne de Saint Thien-y, that is to say Saint Thien-y, 
Thil, Merly le Grant and Ie Petit, Pouillon, Villers-Sainte-Alme, Chenai, 
Chalon sur Veslee and of Villers-Franqueux have humbly begged us [for 
grace] ... News reached the said habitants and many other villages 
(villes) that the said nobles were trying once again pillage the said 
countryside ... The said nobles were at Loivre near Rein1Z, and had come 
to assault many of the said habitants and were shouting 'Death to the 
rustics!', and it was said they had executed fifty or more of them ... [The 
nobles] worked and strove day after day, raiding these said villages 
(l'illes) and attacking them continually these said villages (villes) , 
executing and ten-ifying men and workhorses and putting towns and men 
, 14 to ransom.' 
313 These will be discussed in more detail in -Peasant Resistance', Chapter VI. 
314 'Savoir faisons il tous presenz et il venir que a nous ont fait humblemcnt supplier les habitants 
des villcs de la Marne dc Saint ThieITY c'est assavoient de Saint ThieITY, Thil, Merly Ie Grant et 
Ie Petit, Pouillon, Villers-Sainte-Anne, Chcnai, Chalon sur Veslee et de Villers-Franqueux ... Et 
pour ce que aus diz habit;.lns et a plusiers autres villes fut rappOlie que les dis nobles refforcerent 
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The execution of these villagers was represented as exceptional. Although this 
remission highlights the violence of these repressive attacks, not least the 
likelihood of mass executions, it also indicates several other types of oppression 
that the nobles inflicted on the peasantry: destruction and theft of property, 
ransoming of both towns and individuals, and arson. Certainly in the eyes of the 
villagers making the appeal, the repression by the nobles was just as bloody as 
anything that went before it. 
The nobles' focus does fall mostly on the peasants, but urban dwellers were not 
safe from the counter-offensive. According to the chroniclers, the city of Senlis 
,vas the scene of much violence at the end of the Jacquerie. According to the 
Clzronique des Quatres Premiers Valois: 
I am told that after the defeat of the Jacques, a troop of gentleman sought 
to take the city of Senlis, took one of its gates, and entered inside. But 
the townsmen fought them with such force that they poured boiling water 
on top of the gentlemen. The fittest and best equipped of the town 
courageously met them with carts, which they rolled onto the gentlemen 
with such force and power that they were chased out of town.315 
The attack on the town, by the same forces who attacked the rebels, resulted in 
more deaths for both nobles and inhabitants. We find a similar emphasis within 
the remissions - the assault on Senlis was the cause of confusion and violence: 
Let it be known to all present and future that we have heard the 
supplication of Jehan Charnel, which contends that, on the day of the 
Benediction (3 June) that has just passed, during the time of the terror, 
commotions, rebellions and assemblies the men of the plat pays had held 
against the nobles of the realms, many gentleman had made efforts to 
de pil1ier ou dit pais ... D'iceulx nobles les quiex estoient it LoivTe devant Reimz et lors iceulx 
nobles feussent vcnuz assailir plusiers des diz habitans en crient a la mort au villains ct la en 
eussent mis a mortjusques au nombre de cinquante et plus ... [les nobles] se soient depuis 
efforeies et s' efforcent cn de jour en jour de ehevauehier et chevauchent eontinuellment es dictes 
villes de lllettre it lllOIi et peurs gens et chevaux de hurnous et autres Ii raneonncr villcs et gens.' 
AN, 1186, f. 130, no. 380. 
315 Chron. premiers Valois, pp. 76-7, tr. Cohn, PP, p. 162. 
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enter into the town (1,ille) of Senlis and to take it, and because. of this they 
declared in the said town (ville) that all those gentlemen that [the 
townsmen] had in their houses must be sent and forced out. Because of 
this said declaration someone who lived in the said town (ville), who 
hosted in his house the lord of HardencoUli and two of his squires, one of 
whom was named Jehan des Prez, sent out the said knight and his squires 
from the said house; the said squires, we do not know for what cause, 
then killed the said knight, for which reason the cry of 'Ho, murder!' was 
raised against these squires. Because of that and this cry there then 
assembled a great number of habitants of the said town (ville) of Senlis, 
and the said .Tehan de Prez was executed by this said assembly of which 
the said supplicant was part. We have quitted, remitted and pardoned 
[them], and especially the said habitants of the town (ville) of Senlis ... 316 
The noble offensive against urban settlements could be just as troublesome as 
those against the peasants. The tale may well be fictitious: there is no way of 
knowing who exactly killed the master, and whether Jehan Charue! really was 
attempting to avenge the noble's death. This remission, however, records the 
confusion that resulted from these nobles' revenge. First, the inhabitants of 
Senlis had lived with nobles in their midst throughout the Jacquerie, yet it is the 
the repression that causes civil strife between townsman and their betters. 
Second, in these towns, where the line between lord and servant were less clear, 
the borders became blurFed between aggressor and defender. The Lord of 
Hardencourt and his squire were not the only high profile casualties: Henri de 
Murat was killed in the assault, and his property was given to one of the nobles 
316 'Savoir faisons it tous presenz et a venir que, si comme avons veu par Ia supplicacion khan 
Charuel, contenant que, comme Ie jour dc Ia Bcnediction derrainement passee, pour Ie temps que 
Ies etrroiz, commocions, rebellions et assemblees estoient des genz du plat pais contre Ies nobles 
du royaume, plusieurs gentilz hommes se feussent efforciez d'entrer en Ia ville de Senlis et 
prendre ycelle, et pour ce fu Iors crie en Ia dicte ville que tous ceuIx qui aroient gentilz hommes 
enIeurs maissons Ies meissent et boutassent 11Ors, pour Ie que! cry un hoste ou habitant de Ia dicte 
ville, qui avoit en sa maison herbergiez ou hostellez Ies seigneur de Hardencourt et deux de ses 
escuicrs, dont run estoit appellc lehan des Prez, mist et bouta hors de sa maison Ies dessus diz 
chevalier et escuiers, Ies queh escuiers, ren ne seet pour quelle cause, tuerent tantost Ies dit 
chevalier, pour la quelle cause ren cria 10rs sur yceulx escuiers 'Haro, Ie mUlire!' au quel eri et 
pour Ie quel fait s'asembIerent grant foison des habitanz de la diete ville de Senliz, par les quelx 
Ie dit lehan des Prcz fu mis a mOli, en la quelle assemblce et fait feri Ie dit suppliant. Et eomme 
nous, depuis que nous venismes derrainement en nostre bonne ville de Paris, aiens quittc, remis et 
pardonne, et espeeialement aus habitans de Ia ville de Senlis dessuz dictes..:, AN, 1186, f. 147, 
no. 421. 
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involved.317 In Soissons, there were two more casualties in the nobles' counter-
offensive.318 The attacks by the nobles upon urban areas supposedly favourable 
to the Jacques were more problematic for the crown than the conflicts with 
villages, and the blurring of lines is clear in these remissions: the nobles killed 
other well-heeled individuals, not faceless peasants. 
There were other assemblies of nobles from which the counter-offensive 
originated. In the remission for Jean Bonilis, nobles were reported to have 
gathered together at Lagny (Seine-et-Marne). Along with general misdeeds 
towards the men of the countryside, Jean's paliy were accused of three specific 
crimes: the murder of a man in Bordeaux (Seine-et-Marne), the burning of a 
house in Tromi, and the rape of a woman named Tassone in Vaires near Lagny. 
The nobles were pardoned, yet four years after the fact, specific crimes were 
mentioned. The crown obviously considered that these four specific allegations 
required inclusion within the remission nan·ative. The authorities did not forget 
the acts of the nobles quickly. 
Vengeance was not just carried out by lords: two remissions detail how 
employees of the crown had been involved in violent transgressions. On two 
occasions, it is bligands, acting in the employ of the crown to guard the areas 
which it could not itself guard, who brought vengeance across the countryside: 
For the paliy of Regnier de Sala, Philip de Florencia, Nicholas Becque, 
John de Navare and many other brigands, on horse and on foot, 
galTisoned at Cella in Brie, set forth from their position, where, by 
themselves, from the tenth day of September in the year 1358 up until to 
the present, they were able to serve our said lord and in the present wars 
mAN, JJ86, f 56, 110. 171. 
3J8 AN, JJ86, f 120,110.352 and f. 121, no. 356. 
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against enemies on behalf the said King, and especially in stabilizing and 
holding the said place and in the place Crecy in Brie. In that place and 
other said neighbouring places they patrolled, for protecting and 
defending the said location and the inhabitants there, day and night, 
frequently against many and diverse dangerous opponents, and they 
vanquished the said hostile enemies, and killing and wounding the said 
enemies ... And dming the said time the brigands did not have sufficient 
provisions and other necessary things, and those nearby failed to make 
their payments, [so they took] more goods, provisions, gannents, animals, 
horses and captured other goods of our subjects, and applied their 
propeliy to their own uses, against the will of the persons who previously 
had the goods and indeed the many said subjects. And they often 
accidentally wounded or killed men, and they raped women against their 
will, and committed many other crimes, degradations, bad acts, 
oppressions, and burdens ... unduly and unjustly they increasingly 
suppressed, injured and burdened our subjects, both clergy and laity.319 
Acting in the King's serVIce, these soldiers began stealing from the local 
inhabitants, which led to far more heinous activities. In another document, some 
of the inevitable violence of the Meaux counter-offensive comes to light. Five 
brigands, descIibed as archers of the garrison at the Marche. of Meaux, headed 
south to Montlhery (Essonne) after the offensive, and pillaged the countryside 
and the port, coming into contact with the knight Bensin de Menegny, guard of 
the gate: 
Let it be known to all present and future that we have heard the 
supplication of Bensin de Manesny, esquire, guard of the port of 
Montlhery, contending that on Friday before the feast of Saint M31iin 
last, five brigands, archers ofthe ganison of the Marche of Meaux as they 
claimed, had come to the said town (ville) of Montlhery and its environs 
and committed many acts of pillage and bad deeds. At around four 
0' clock that night they had come to the said port of Montlhery where 
there was much merchandise and goods belonging to many merchants 
and other good men. These things, merchandise and goods were under 
the guard of the said supplicant. The brigands had brought three wagons, 
all harnessed, one of which was loaded with oats and the two others were 
empty. The cats were loaded with the said things, goods and merchandise 
that were in the keeping of the said supplicant and were carted off to 
wherever they wished to take them. The people at the mill at Lierry came 
to tell him inmlediately, and because it was his duty to protect the said 
goods he went off without delay to try and recover them, and with him 
]19 AN, JJ90, f. 156, no. 444, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie. pp. 303-4. 
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went the men of justice of the said place and some of the merchants .... 
For having guarded and defended the said goods which were in his 
keeping ... against the said brigands that had come to pillage ..... we 
d . d . po par on, remIt an qUlt.--
The gatekeeper of Montlhery, who had not been involved in the Jacquerie, was 
caught up in the retaliation, and was pardoned for his aggressive methods of 
reinstating the peace. In this case, the behaviour of the brigands made his actions 
acceptable, while in the fanner remission, the brigands themselves needed to 
seek grace. Both of these indicate that forces of the crown acted in an 
unacceptable manner. The fanner case details rape and murder, and the latter 
case, theft of possessions, indicating that the retaliatiory forces were not only 
nobles seeking vengeance, but also privateers seeking to profit from their 
positions as arbitrators of justice. 
Along with great campaigns, the remISSIOns indicate repreSSIOn on a much 
smaller scale. Individual royal officials often took it into their own hands to 
punish rebels.3~1 Jean Rose, who carried letters to Compiegne, was executed by 
the bailli who 'with a heart full of anger' had mistaken him for one of the leaders 
320 'Savoir faisons a tous presenz et a venir aye sieome nous entendu par la supplicaiton de 
Bensin de Marrengy escuier garde du port de Montery contenu qui comme venredi avant la teste 
Saint Mmiin delTier passe, cinq brigands archers de la gamison du Marchie de Meaulx si commc 
ron disoit fussent venus en la dicte ville de Montery et environ Ie terroir d'icelle et la eussent 
faites plusiers pilleries et ma1efacones et environ quatre heures de nuit fussent vcnus au dit port 
de montery au qu'il avoit plusiers marchandises et biens appertenu a plusiers marchans et autres 
bonnes gens et les quelles dannres et marchnndises et biens estoient en la garde du e1it suppliant et 
la cussent iceulx brigans amcnc trois charretes to utes attelces dont rune estoit chnrgee d'avoine 
et les deux autres vuides, les quelles ils chargerent e1es dictres dnnrees biens et marchandises 
estands en la garde du dit suppliant comme dit cst et ycelles mistrent en voie et a chemin pour 1es 
rober piller emporter ou emener hors ou il vouloicnt la queUe chose 1cs gens qui estoient au 
Moulin de Lierry et pour ce Ie vindrent tantost dire au dit supplicant Ie qu'il tantost er sans e1elai 
pour ce qui la garde d'ieeulx biens Ie appertenoit camille e1u est et a la tantost pour gareler 
detendre et recouvrir iceulx biens sicolllllle devoit et tenus y estoit et avecques Ii alerent la justice 
du dit leue et aucuns de Illarchans .... Pour garder et defendre les diz biens dont la garde ... 
especialment contres 1es diz brigands qui In estoient venus pour piller ... nous avons pardonnc, 
remis et quictc' AN, JJ86, f 146, no. 420. 
m These incidents have not been included within the table, as they do not represent organised 
attempts at repression by groups of nobles. 
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of the Jacques.322 Ancella Pippe, a knight from Chalence, who had seen his 
house at Dhuizy (Aisne) pillaged by the habitants of Acy near Soissons (Oise), 
responded by seizing the horses and beasts of inhabitants.323 Most remissions 
hint at an underlying mistreatment of the peasantry by the nobles: almost all 
remissions issued to peasants testify to the 'ill-feeling and hostility' held towards 
them by their noble lords. Whether this hate manifested itself physically in 
violence against persons or property, or whether it simply was indicative of 
tension that remained in the North of the France after the rebellion, it shows the 
strained relationship that the remissions were intended to heal. 
One of the crucial aspects of the Jacquerie to commentators was the speed of its 
rise and fall. Leguai called it a 'blazing fire of fifteen days,.324 Yet the Jacquerie 
did not pass so quickly. The repression that followed continued deep into the 
year and, as noted earlier, was not always passively received by the peasants. 
Celiain attacks were relatively close to the end of the initial revolt. For example, 
the brigands' attack on Montlhery (Essonne) happened ten days after the assault 
on the MarcM of Meaux, on 20 June (the Wednesday before the Feast of Saint 
Martin of Tongres).325 The counter-offensive from Saint-Dizier (Haute-Marne) 
started on 24 June (the Feast of the Nativity of St. John the Baptist).326 However, 
the brigands who had ravaged the sUlTounding countryside in Brie did not begin 
their violence until 10 September (ninety-two days after the Jacques' defeat at 
Clermont) and that their attacks had continued for a long time after that. 327 The 
mAN, JJ86, f 130, no. 380. 
mAN, JJ90, f 192, no. 530. 
324 Lcguai, 'Lcs revoltcs rurales' p. 58. 
325 AN, JJ86, f. 147,110.420. 
326 AN, JJ86, f 49, 110. 142, reprinted in Lucc, Jacquerie, pp. 247-8. 
327 AN, JJ90, f 156, no. 444, reprinted in Lucc, Jacquerie, pp. 303-4. 
139 
repression of the towns and the countryside lasted far longer than the initial burst 
of rebellion. Differences in scale and speed of responses varied, but this 
repression did not disappear quickly - it continued deep into the year, and 
instability was still reigning while these remissions were being issued. 
It should be noted that we only hear of the violence that the crown 
granted pardons for, so this certainly does not represent the whole story. 
Moreover, the crown was willing to forgive its subjects for violence in excess of 
what the peasants committed. Brigands in its own charge were forgiven for 
bloodying the countryside for little reason other than their own financial 
benefit.32S Nobles were forgiven for rape, murder and arson. By contrast, the 
peasantry were forced to justify their actions, and, most often, insist upon their 
innocence of the most heinous of charges against them. For brigands to simply 
list their crimes and receive a pardon does suggest that the context of the 
lacquerie was enough for most sins to be forgiven. 
However, nobles and brigands still needed to seek grace, and used the 
same apparatus as the peasants to gain forgiveness for their actions, Neither 
peasant nor noble violence was sanctioned by the state, and even the Lord of 
Saint-Dizier had to appeal for forgiveness from the Regent for his actions, which 
were at least ostensibly an attempt to stop a peasant offensive that was still 
ongoing in his region. The crown certainly did not wash its hands of the deeds of 
their more senior subjects, as it could have. 
323 I have used the word in the documents, 'brigands', even though the modern connotations may 
be misleading. 1t is unclear how these brigands were in the crown's employ, in one case 
gaITisoned at Mcaux, but it seems more likely that the usage of 'bJigand' is closer to the original 
meaning: 'the word initially indicated, until the end offourtccnth century, a foot-soldier who 
made up part of a company'. Dictiollnaire hislorique de fa fmzgllefrancaise, ed. A. Rey (Paris: 
Dictionnaires Ie Robert, 1998), 
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Those issuing the remissions make two important concessions. First, they 
recognised that in many cases villagers who had not pmiicipated in the Jacquerie 
had suffered equally with the guilty in the retaliation. This was unacceptable; 
violence committed against innocent individuals was no better than the actions of 
the Jacques. Secondly, they conceded that even when the peasants had been 
involved in the uprising, celiain levels of violence were unacceptable. 
Retaliation could be understandable, but perpetrators had to seek legal grace 
from the crown on account of their actions. 
Moreover, the crown could administer punishment, even within the act of 
granting grace. Conditions could be added to remissions; for example, 
specifying a pilgrimage that had to be undeliaken before grace would be granted. 
Havet de Hangest had demanded repayment from a celia in Jean de Blagny, from 
Cachi, who was known for having attacked the house of his cousin and her 
husband. The argument resulted in Havet killing Jean with his lance. For this 
crime, and taking into consideration Havet's previous good service against the 
crown's enemies at the battle of Poitiers and Malconseil, Havet received a letter 
of remission, on the condition that he go on pilgrimage to Notre-Dame de 
Boulogne-sur-Mer (Nord),329 roughly 90km to the north.330 For Thomas 
Cousterel, a similar punishment was issued: 
On behalf of the present friends of Thomas Cousterel who at the time of 
ten'or and commotion recently past between the nobles and the men of the 
plat pays the said Thomas who at the time was 'familier' and guard of the 
house of Messire Walle de Montingy, knight, and who went with others 
329 It was not only I-Iavet de I-Iangest who had to go to Boulogne-sur-Mer. One of the Jacques, 
Jean Bignet, 'electus capitainus' of Remy, was ordered to complete a pilgrimage there as well for 
his part in the uprising. AN, JJ89, f. 281, no. 609. 
!!O According to Gerard Jugnot, Notre-Dame de Boulogne-sur-Mer was the most common 
pilgrimage site in letters of remission issued betwcen 1352 and 1363. G. Jugnot, . Le pelerinagc ct 
le droit penal d'apres les lettrcs de remission accordecs par Ie Roi de France', in Le pelerinage, 
CaMel'S de Fanjellx 15 (Toulouse: E. Privat, 1980), pp. 191-206. 
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of the said nobles to . attack the men of the countryside and took, defiled 
and scattered their goods and also executed some of them. The baillif of 
our said cousin (the Bishop of Beauvais) had then placed him for a long 
time in prison of our said cousin and had him tortured most cruelly ... He 
confessed to the crimes mentioned above ... in particular that, at the time 
of the said telTor, he had executed Soybeli Ponquet who had .... stolen 
and calTied off the goods of the house of the said knight, his master, and 
had started the fire ... Before the next Feast of Saint Jehan the Baptist 
the said Thomas [must make] a pilgrimage to N otre-Dame of Roc-
amadour and on the completion (pelfectiol1) of the said pilgrimage he 
must bring back trustworthy letters (lettres creables) of proof to the 
baillif of Senlis. 331 
Pilgrimage as punishment drew some criticism from Simeon Luce, who 
considered this 'illusory punishment' to be representative of a 'prince who had 
been inclined never to appear to have the strength at heart to enforce' the law. 
When considered from a modern viewpoint, pilgrimage could sound like a soft 
option. However, pilgrimages were still relatively common as punishments laid 
down by both ecclesiastical and civil courtS.332 They were often added to letters 
of remission as conditional clauses.333 Gerard Jugnot records ninety instances of 
pilgrimages added to remissions between 1354 and 1368. That these two 
individuals only needed to complete pilgrimages to relatively local sites is not 
surprising either; after 1328, the vast majority of pilgrimages ordered by the king 
331 'Comme les amis charnelz de Thomas Cousterel ou temps de effrois et commocion, qui deux 
et n'a gaires ont est contre les nobles et les gens du dit plat pais icelui Thomas qui pour Ie temps 
estent familier de messier Walle de Montigny chevalier et garde de son hostel it este avecque 
plusiers es diz nobles contre les dictes gens du dit plat pais it prendre gaster dissiper leurs biens a 
aucune mis it mort. Le baillif de nostre dit cousin la tait prendre it tenu longuement en prison de 
nostre dit cousin et fait gehenne tres cruellement. ... il a confess les choscs dessus dictes ... 
especial a temps des diz effrois avoir mis a mort Soybert Ponquet qui avoit pille et en porte les 
biens de hotel du dit chevalier son maistre et y mis Ie feu .... icelui Thomas dedans la Feste de ]a 
Nativitie de Saint lehan Baptiste prochain (unreadable word) en pelegrinage a Nostre-Dame du 
Rocamadour et de la perfection du dit pelegrinage appOlie letters creables au bailli de Senlis·. 
AN, 1J86. f. 146. no. 419. 
332 For example, the Inquisitor Bernard Gui categorised sites as 'major' or 'minor' pilgrimages 
for punishing heretics. Flemish cities drew up a list of pilgrimages to shrines which related them 
to the crime that had been committed, D. Webb, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage ill/ize :i1edieval West 
(London: .l.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 51-63. 
m Oddly, there is no mention of pilgrimage in remission letters in Diana Webb's two survey 
works, Pilgrims and Pilgrimage and Medieval European Pilgrimage, c. 700-/500 (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002). 1. Sumption does mention them very briefly in his section of' Penitential 
Pilgrimages, Pilgrimage: an Jmage ojMediaeva/ Religion (London: Faber. 1975), pp. 98-113. 
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3'4 335 
were restricted to the north. ~ For nobles, pilgrimage still had resonance. 
These pardons were conditional on the supplicant completing this task and was 
perhaps indicative of the seriousness with which the crown considered the crimes 
they had committed. The whole process of the pilgrimage was similar to the 
grace that these same nobles were forced to seek from the crown itself, based on 
restoring the reputation of the individuaL 
Moreover, pilgrimage was not the only form of punishment. Prior to 
receiving his remission and presumably completing his pilgrimage, Thomas 
Cousterel was imprisoned before the remission had been granted, and was 
tOliured into confessing.336 While it was in Cousterel's interests to exaggerate 
the hardships he had suffered, this is clear evidence that the justices were 
interested in finding and prosecuting errant nobles, even if their methods crossed 
the line into 'great cruelty'. 
So if the crown did not approve of the methods of the nobility, at least not 
beyond a celiain point, and punished errant nobles, how did the crown believe 
the rising should have been policed? The crown had its own punishments to 
mete out to the peasants, but did not involve the same level of bloodshed. Many 
)34 Jugnot, 'Le pelerinage', p. 199. 
m Geoffrey de Charny (whose property is destroyed during 1358, perhaps by Picrre Gille's mcn 
on the way to Meaux) mentions pilgrimages as a way of improving one's wOlih as a knight, 
although he is specifically talking about foreign pilgrimages, in The Buok of Chivairy, trans. R. 
Kaeuper and E. Kcnnedy (University of Pennsylvania, 1996), pp. 91-3. Webb stresses that even 
a local pilgrimage issued as punishment could have serious social implications: 'a shOli local 
pilgrimage was a form of public penance which exposed the offender to the scrutiny of people 
that mentioned them'. Webb, Medieval E1Iropeall Piigrimage, p. 90. 
336 As an aside, this is the only remission describing the Jacquerie that I have found which 
mentions torture. In this case, the choice of the word 'confessu' maybe important; the cOllli may 
have recognised that a confession under torture was unreliable. That said, it is wOlih noting that 
the remission does not dispute the cenu'al fact ofthe case, that Cousterel murdered Soybert 
Ponquet, but only gives an explanation of why Cousterel killed him. The evidence presumably 
gi\'en through confession (pertaining to Cousterers responsibility) is still recorded as fact in the 
remission narrative. 
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of the villages were levied with what seems to be a standard fine of 1,000 ecuz 
each for their involvement: 
... our friend, loyal counsellor and lieutenant in these parts the Count of 
Vaudemont summoned [the villagers of Betancom1 and Vroil (Marne)] 
before him at a ce11ain time and place. On the day and place these 
inhabitants did not dare appear in person out of fear of the great and cruel 
executions that our lieutenant had carried out and was continuing day 
after day against the people of the country. Instead they sent certain 
procurellrs on their behalf to our lieutenant. Without knowing any more 
about these inhabitants, he condemned them to pay a fine of two thousand 
',7 
ecuz [between them]. 0_ 
The villagers would appear before the King's lieutenant, who would then issue a 
fine, in this case without hearing their case. Even amidst the 'great and cruel 
executions' being committed throughout the countryside, the crown was 
simultaneously exacting its own punishment on the villages that rebelled. Two 
thousand ecuz was a huge sum - for example, this would be equivalent to the 
yearly wages of ten well-off ploughmen, if we were to generously estimate that 
they would make 20 ecuz a year each.33s Six penalties of this sum would have 
paid the ransom required for the Earl of Warwick to vacate the nine fortresses he 
had occupied after Poitiers.339 This was not the only example of fines being 
issued. Villages that assembled in Champagne were issued with similar fines. 34o 
The village of Bucy-le-Repost (Marne) paid a sum of 200 florins d'or, and the 
village of Chavanges (Aube) was forced to pay a fine of five hundred escuz d'or 
337 AN . .JJ86. f. 117. no. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 266-8, trans. Cohn. PP, p. 187. 
m These numbers are suggested by K. Fowler, The Age of Plantagenet and Valois (London: 
Ferndale Editions, 1980), p.ll. Fowler estimates that a 'ploughman doing weII' would make 
between 40-60 shiIIings a year (although the Statute of Labourers of 1351 supposedly limited the 
amount to only 10 shillings per year), wOl1h approximately between 14 and 20 eell::; Spufford 
suggests by this period the eell:: was worth about 23 sous, or just more than 3 shillings, in P. 
Spufford, Handbook ofMediem! Eyc1/aJ1ge (London: Offices of the Royal Historical Society, 
1986), pp. 189-203. I have attempted to select the most appropriate exchange rates dependent on 
when the remission was issued, but it is worth nothing that coinage in this period was 
exceptionally unstable; Spufford reports that 'between 1 February 1337 and 5 December 1360. 
there were no les than 85 changes in the coinage', and describes 'wild oscillations in the silver 
content of the tournois', ibid., p. 176 . 
. '.'9 On 13 May 1360, the Earl of Warwick was paid twelve thousandji-anes. The eCII:: (23 sous) 
was worth a little more than thejl-allc (20 sous) at that time. Sputlord, Handbook, pp. 189- I 93. 
340 AN, JJ86, f. 121- 122, nos. 356,358,359,360. 
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in two instalments: three hundred before the feast of Saint .Andre, and another 
two hundred before Christmas of that year.34 ! These villages appealed for grace 
specifically to avoid these fines, and were considered worthy by the crown. 
Considering that presumably many were not pardoned, and that the fine was the 
stimulus for the villagers to seek grace, it is clear that these must have been 
issued widely to numerous settlements. We have no evidence of how these fines 
were administered, but their existence indicates that the crown, apart from the 
pardoning process, did take a proactive role in punishing the peasants.342 By 
demanding financial reparations, the crown could bolster its cotTers, but also 
could reward loyal subjects and pay reparations to those whose propeliies had 
been destroyed.343 For example, later documents specify that Robert de Lorris 
needed 25,000 livres in compensation for the destruction of the chateau at 
Ermenonville (Oise), amongst other expenses, or around 140,000 escuz: the 
crown would have needed to succesfully collect the fines of 140 villages to have 
paid for the reconstruction of the chateau. 
Of course, by specifying a particular manner in which the rebels should 
be treated, they set a precedent for punishment that was financial but also 
peaceful. The violent transgressions of the nobles had to be punished because 
they clashed with the measured approach of the crown. 
The example of the J acquerie shows us something very different to 
Spierenburg's model mentioned earlier, where the crown sanctioned private 
vengeance because it could not effectively punish insurgents: in 1358, nobles had 
341 AN, JJ86, f. 91, no. 271 and JJ86, [217, no. 596. 
342 Charles Y, in both his regency and as king, punished noble rebels by stripping them of their 
land and wealth: 'one cannot help but notice that in the years of crisis - 1358-9, 1364, 1369-72, 
1378 - he made the widest use of forfeitures as an instrument of policy, as a means of 
punishment, reward and incentive'. Cuttler, The Laws o(Treasol1, p. 180. 
343 For examples, see AN, JJ90, f. 139, n.271 and JJl02, [40, no.96. 
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to seek forgiveness from the crown for the damage they had done to the rebels 
and their propeliy. The state did act as a reconciliatory power, but not by 
accepting private violence without question. Nobles were not immune from 
prosecution, but rather reconciliation was achieved through exactly the same 
system which the peasants used for their appeals. 
Of course, most generalised models on the effects of retaliation have 
necessarily assumed that the 'state' was the organ of repression, and legitimate 
violence in quelling revolt becomes 'domestic state violence' once it crosses an 
acceptable threshold.344 Yet again, the J acquelie represents something different: 
there were two distinct responses to the revolt. The first was initiated by the 
crown - fines, confiscations of property and implisomnent of individuals; the 
second by the enraged nobility - violent executions, destruction and theft of 
property and ransoming. This violence took a variety of forms, fro111 drawn-out 
ransacking of the countryside to quick pillages of certain sites.345 
This could be the reason for the different tenor of retaliation from other 
medieval revolts, where the participants are treated with leniency. In the vast 
majOlity of revolts of the fourteenth century, where repression was rare and often 
non-existent, the insurgents fell under the jurisdiction of a central authOlity 
344 Howard Brown discusses the distinction between appropriate, legitimate violence in ending a 
revolt and 'domestic' state violence, which is generally considered to be excessive. In many 
cases, this distinction seems artiticial: violence, when it begins, is always judged to be 
appropriate, and the degeneration into illegitimacy may be unconnected to the state, but rather 
through inappropriate behaivour of its agents. Moreover, in this period, the links between 
repressive violence and the 'state' are far from clear. The crown does not, in the case of the 
.Iacquerie, orchestrate the repression, but guidance is coming from several different individuals, 
like Charles of Navarre and the lord of Saint-Dizier. Yet Brown's distinction can be considcred 
important: there is a point whereby repressive violence outstrips its utility and is viewed by many 
to be cxcessive. H. Brown, . Repression from the Croquants to the Commune', The Historical 
JOllnzal 42 (Sept, 1999), pp. 597-622. 
34> Two different responses tl'om the 'state' and the nobility have also been noted in reference to 
the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381, although in that case the reactions arc reversed: "[the 
nobles'] reaction seems to have been considerably cooler than that of the Commons', See lA, 
Tuck, 'Nobles, Commons and the Great Revolt of 1381', in The English Rising, ed Aston and 
Hilton, p. 212, 
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equipped to deal with them, such as the local civic oligarchy. The revolt of the 
Jacquerie was too big, too great a social phenomenon, for the central powers of 
lordship to contain it. This is evident in the way in which the revolt is finally 
quelled: it was an outside force, Charles ofNavalTe's anny, which eventually put 
down one large Jacques' force, and at Meaux the nobles were assisted by men 
from outside the borders of France. The crown needed to employ brigands at 
Montlhery and at Meaux; both these groups later turned on the peasantry and 
their excesses were mentioned in remissions issued by the crown. Remissions 
were intended to paper over the cracks in the fractious relationship between 
nobles and peasant and to re-establish the 'good peace' across the countryside. 
They could also be used to excuse nobles who had acted improperly, but more 
than that, the very fact that these nobles had to seek pardons for their actions 
shows that the crown considered them to have acted wrongfully. In some cases, 
nobles were imprisoned. Pilgrimages were issued to rehabilitate knights who had 
strayed from their moral duties. The remissions give the clear impression that the 
crown did not approve of the ransacking of the countryside after the Jacquerie; 
by that token, the remissions also imply that the crown had little control over the 
retaliation. 
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5. IDENTIFYING THE JACQUES 
In any protest, the identity of its paIiicipants shapes the ideology of the crowd. 
The 'social category' that the insurgents define themselves as, be that peasant, 
worker or something else, defines the very nature of the rebellion: the crowd 
does not act as a collection of individuals, rather, 'the beliefs that guide them are 
the collective beliefs of the associated groups' to which they belong. Indeed, 
perceptions of identity are the basis on which revolts work: '[l]arge numbers of 
people can act together in the crowd ... to the extent that they share a common 
sense of identi ty'. Thus, the 'identity' of the Jacques is the key to understanding 
the revolt itself346 
When attempting to identify the Jacques, remissions provide impOliant 
infonnation about the recipients, including occupations. Remissions were 
expensive, and issued on the renown or status of the supplicant, and thus we 
should expect that only Jacques with substantial reserves of money, land or 
prestige would have been able to obtain one. Yet if this bias is accounted for, 
some assessment of the social character of the insurgent rank-and-file might be 
possible. 
A systematic study of these rem1SSIOns can counter many of the 
arguments made about the Jacques in the historiography. When Raymond 
Cazelles described the Jacquerie as a mixture of royal officials, clergy and 
artisans, and featured as many burghers as peasants, he based his theory paIily on 
a few scattered examples from the remissions. The overriding in±1uence on his 
judgement must have been the historiography, which emphasised elite 
participation in revolts. Cazelles specifically acknowledges Yves-Marie Berce's 
346 S. Reicher, Socialldentiy and Leadership Dynamics (forthcoming). 
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work, which suggested that early modem revolts relied upon the participation of 
women and on the instigation of the clergy. By studying the remissions, even 
with their bias towards the wealthy and privileged, can we confinn that the 
Jacques were townsmen, artisans or elites, mainly women or led by churchmen'? 
Were the Jacques really not the 'men of the countryside' the chroniclers 
described? 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE JACQUERIE 
It was at this time that the nobles in derision called peasants and simple 
folk Jacques Bonhommes. That year men sent to the wars who bore anns 
in rustic fashion of peasants were given the name Jacques Bonhommes by 
those who mocked and despised them, and thus lost the name of peasant. 
Both French and English called peasants this for a long time afterward. 
But woe is me! Many who then derided peasants with this name were 
347 later made mortal spoli of by them. 
As Jean de Venette indicates, the tenn Jacques Bonhommes had become such a 
common description for rural folk that the word 'peasant' was almost redundant. 
When Jean Ie Bel and the Anonimalle Chronicle both created a leader supposedly 
representative of the 1358 revolt of these rebels, they named him 'Jak 
Bonhomme' ,348 and when choosing a title for the rebellion, the contemporaries 
drew directly from the name given to the 'rustics'. Since then, the tenn 
'jacquerie' has become synonymous with the rural rampage of desperate 
peasants.349 NonnaUy triggered by the onset of famine or bad crop yields, 
villagers rose up in a seasonal madness. 
3~7 Venette, Chrol1., v. 1, p. 240, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p.63 . 
. '43 Bel, Clzroll .• v.2, p. 261, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 153; The Anonil71a/le Chronicle, ed. V.H. 
Galbraith (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1927), pp. 42-3, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 172-3. 
349 Zola, The Earlh, trans. D. PaTIllee, p. 91. 
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Even when the chroniclers used more specific identifiers for the rebels 
than just the 'Jacques", they are identifiably rural. For Ie Bel, they were 'gens de 
villes champestres,;35o for the Clzroniqlle des Quatres Premiers Valois, 
Clzronique Nonnande and Jean de Venette, they were 'paysans' or 'paisans,.351 
For the continuator of Richard Lescot, they were 'rusticos.352 and the Chronique 
des regnes de Jean 11 et Charles V considered them to be 'menu gens' and 
'communes".353 Even though this chronicler conceded that 'rich men, bourgeois 
and others filled their ranks', he insisted that the Jacques were largely rural 
peasants: 'assemblies were compromised mostly of gens de labour 
(labourers354),.355 
Yet in recent years, the notion that the peasantry was at the heart of the 
Jacquerie has progressively come under attack. The social and economic 
historians of the 1960s stressed that the ile de France was the lichest region in 
France for the rural worker in the 1350s, and they were far from the most 
desperate peasants in the country.356 The idea that revolts are made up of the 
most desperate peasants is demonstrably false. Social scientists and historians 
have thoroughly rejected the notion that people rebel only at their lowest ebb;357 
Cohn has shown from a sample of 1,112 revolts that bread riots and other form of 
350 Bel, Chron .. v.2, p. 261. 
351 Chron. premiers Valois, p. 71; Chroll. 110rm., p. 127; Venette, Chrol1., v. 2, p. 263, trans. 
Birdsall, Venelle, p. 71. 
352 Lescot, Chron., p. 126. 
353 Chron. des regnes. v.l, p. 188. 
1)4 The term 'gens de labour' will be discussed in detail later, as it appears with regularity in the 
remissions for the Jacques, but it is intrinsically linked to the notion of the rurallandworker. 
355 ibid., trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 166-7. 
356 See R. Fossier, HislOire sociale de l'occidelllmr!xlieval (Paris: Al1l1and Colin, 1970), G. 
Fourquin, Les campagnes de fa region parisienl1e a lafill dll Moyen Age (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1964) and G. Duby, Rural Economy and Country Life in the Medieval 
Wesr, trans. C. Postan (London: Edward Arnold, 1968), p. 309. 
357 Mollat and Wolff recognised that revolts could only happen 'when a calamity has not become 
a total scourge', Popular RevolwiolZs, p. 93. 
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revolts involving the most desperate elements of society were extremely rare.358 
Nonetheless, Raymond Cazelles has claimed that the Jacques was not made up of 
peasants at al1.359 Suggesting that 'cultivators' would never revolt at the end of 
Mayor the beginning of June, because it would damage their crops, Cazelles 
insisted that peasant revolts would only take place in the autumn. But this makes 
little sense: first, we have historical examples of peasant revolts at this time of 
year. In France, there were other peasant revolts during May and June, even in 
the Beauvaisis: in May 1338, for example, the villagers of Brissy and Remies 
rebelled against the bishop of Laon and the crown's troopS.360 Indeed, the most 
famous rising of all, the English Peasants' Revolt, took place in June 1381.361 
Second, at this time, agricultural workers have little to do but watch the crops 
grow, while in late SUlmner, harvest-time, they are at their busiest. The peasants 
preserved their crops, specifically targeting houses, castles and goods belonging 
to the nobility. There is no suggestion that they targeted the fields or the 
countryside around these properties, or did anything that might have been 
counter-productive towards their own goods; remissions even discussed the 
participants' wishes to secure their crop yields: '[the supplicant] will reap and 
send to safety his goods which are of the fields, work and cultivate his lands and 
. d ' ,60 vmeyar s : - Instead, the nobility chose to destroy their fields during the 
30S Cohn, L{{st/or Liberty, pp. 70-75. 
309 Cazelles, 'The Jacquelie', pp. 75-6. 
360 See Cohn, LlIstfbr Liberty, p. 31. The rest of the chapter on 'Peasant Revolts', p. 25-52, 
details several peasant revolts that oecuned in Mayor June, for example, two revolts in 1355 
involving the peasantry of Lucca and Rimini. In 1422, a rebellion in Forez (perhaps closer to 
rural brigandage than a true revolt) broke out in May, as did most famously the Peasants Revolt 
of 1381. 
161 Indeed, both rebellions covered roughly the same period, with Guillaume Cale and Wat Tyler 
being executed on 10 June and IS June respectively. The feast of Corpus Christi fell between 
both revolts; for discussion of its relevance to the Great Rising, see M. Aston, 'Corpus Christi 
and Corpus Regni: heresy and the Peasants' Revolt', Past and Present, v. 143 (1994), pp. 3-47. 
162 This phrase appears in sixty remissions. It will be discussed later in this chapter in more 
depth. 
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retaliation; as the Clzronique de regnes des Jean II et Charles V recorded, the 
nobles 'bumt and destroyed all the countryside between the Seine and the Marne 
rivers,.363 
Nonetheless, Cazelles went back to the remissions (at least Luce's sample 
of them), and proclaimed that the Jacques were 'more rural artisans than 
peasants,.364 In his analysis, the revolt crossed social barriers and included 
officers of the crown, churchmen, peasants and burghers; 'the rich found 
themselves side by side with the poor, the royal official with the lord's 
subject'.365 Although the numbers were not tallied, Cazelles gave the impression 
that Luce's sample strongly suggested this to be the case. But as discussed 
above, Luce's sample does not represent the full range of remissions concerning 
the Jacquerie. By retuming to the documents, the range of the Jacques' 
occupations can be compiled, even if focus on these occupations recorded in the 
remissions may be misleading, because these letters were not available to alL 
Three factors may cause us to question the representativeness of a sample 
compiled from the remissions. First, remissions were expensive. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, the charge was at least 3 livres, but potentially much more with 
additional taxes and surcharges. Sixteenth-century costings suggest two months 
wages for a waged labourer. 366 Apart from communities who appealed for a 
pardon together to avoid a fine, there was little financial imperative for an 
363 Chron. des regnes, v.l, p. 188. Crops could not only bc dcstroycd, but also stolen. Phillipc dc 
Baucncourt stoIc horscs and 'goods ofthc ficld' from thc villagers of Sompuis to compcnsatc him 
for damagc caused by the Jacques. AN, JJ86, f 87, no. 258. 
364 Cazelles, 'Thc Jacqucric', p. 76 . 
. '65 ibid. Going cvcn further, in the cntry on the Jacquerie in the Dictionary of/he Middle Ages, 
Henneman states that 'contcmporary sourccs do not offer much evidence that the Jacquerie of 
1358 was an uprising of pc as ants', and argues the remissions 'identify most ofthc participants as 
3!1isans, stonccuttcrs, pctty functionaries, and even clergy, but rarely as cultivators of thc soil', p. 
36. As this chapter will demonstrate, that assertion is simply wrong . 
. '66 For a discussion ofrcmissions and thcir cost, see 'Rcmissions: Form and Function'. Also see 
Gcrcmck, The Margins o.{Society il1 Late Medieval Paris and Davis, Fiction in the Archives, p. 
154. 
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individual to seek grace. The remISSIOns do not record. fines for individual 
rebels; therefore, we can assume that the cost of obtaining a remission was not 
balanced with the reduction of a levy. The remissions for the Jacquerie were 
even more exclusive than the conUllon pardon; recorded in the royal chancery, 
these remissions were intended to be kept permanently in the crown's own 
records, and subsequently cost more for that privilege. Individuals needed to be 
willing, not only to spend significant sums of money on a remission, but also to 
pay more to have it included pel111anently in the chancery. 
Secondly, as we have said, remissions were as much a judgement on a 
supplicant's past as the crime itself. The crucial clause turned on the pal1icipants 
'good name and renown', his loyal service to the crown, and how he was 
perceived in his community. In this manner, supplicants who had proven loyalty 
in the past, often tlu'ough military service, had the best claim to grace, and those 
who had high-standing in the conmmnity had the best testimonies on their behalf. 
These individuals would also be most concel11ed to regain their good standing 
within the community; the consequences of having a stained character in the eyes 
of the law would be more important for a citizen of some status than for a 
peasant of low-standing. 
Thirdly, the supplicants who received individual remissions were 
exceptions from those who received the general pardon. Neither were these men 
receiving pardons as part of the community - these supplicants received grace 
without the company of neighbours or villagers. In many cases, they were only 
interested in their own culpability, not their communities. For example, Jehan 
Fillon's remission was only concel11ed with proving he had not been involved 
with the murder of a man-at-al111S in Conches (Seine-et-Mal11e), not that the rest 
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of the inhabitants were innocent. 367 It is understandable that a royal s.ergeant of 
Paris, for example, would not expect the grace received for the village of Jaux 
(consciously refened to as 'gens de labour') to cover him.368 
Any sample of occupations based on remissions thus covers only the 
Jacques who possessed the social standing to obtain a remission, and who 
considered their reputation impOliant enough to petition the cOUli to have it re-
instated. These rebels were also the only Jacques who could afford it, and 
celiainly the only ones who wished it recorded in the royal chancery. Any 
sample suggesting a strong influence of elites within the Jacquerie could 
therefore be attributed to the nature of the sources. 
Nonetheless, the sample suggests that the Jacques consisted more of 
agricultural workers than townsmen, royal officials or even rural aliisans, as 
Cazelles asselied without supplying any quantitative evidence: 
Table XI. Occupations ofthe Jacques. 
OCCUPATION NUMBER 
'Sergeant a Cheval' or 3 
'Royal Sergeant' 
Curates or Priests 4 
Familier 1 
Butcher .., .) 
Carpenter 1 
Draper 1 
Mason 1 
Carpenter 1 
Fish Merchant 1 
Impoverished 8 
'Labourer' 2 
'Homme de labour' 9 
Communities described as 8 
'gens de labour' 
367 AN, JJ86, f 81, no. 244. 
368 khan Leber, 'mounted sergeant of Paris' , received a remission in AN, ]]86, f 73, no. 223; the 
participants of Jaux and their two capitaincs received remissions in AN, J.l86, f 123, nos. 361 
and 362. 
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Below the data is organised into the subgroups (excluding the communities 
described as 'gens du labour'): 
Table XII. Occupations ofthe Jacques organised into sub-groups. 
Sub-group 
Royal officials ,., (1.8%) .) 
Religious figures 4 (2.4%) 
Rural artisans 8 (4.8%) 
Rural Labollreur 11 (8.6%) 
Impoverished 4 (2.4%) /10 (7.2%) 
No occupation given 132 (82.5%) 
Of the first of these occupational groups, only three royal officials were involved 
in the Jacquerie.369 One of the three hailed who from Montdidier, a town which 
had links with the Jacquerie - although the inhabitants' opinions were divided -
and was one of the exceptions to the rule, a townsman who joined the rural 
rebels.370 The second was a 'mounted sergeant of the Chatelet of Paris', who 
found himself in Jaux (Oise), near Compiegne, where he joined the rebellion.371 
His role in Jaux was unclear, considering there were two captains of Jaux 
mentioned in other remissions; he seems to have been just a rank-and-file 
member of the rebellion.372 The last royal official is a sergeant from Noailles 
369 A founh royal sergeant is involved in the uprising in town of Lorris against the local fOliress 
in 1358, which is never explicitly linked to the Jacquerie; AN, ]]90, f. 24, no. 48. 
)70 AN, ]]86, f. 161, no. 456. 
m Jehan Leber. 'mounted sergeant of Paris', received a remission in AN, JJ86, f. 73, n. 223. 
372 The inhabitants of Jaux and their two capitailles received remissions in AN, JJ86, f. 123, 110S. 
361 and 362. 
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who became leader of four villages in the region. 373 Thus, all.tlu·ee rebels were 
townsmen who became involved with the peasants in their struggles. These men 
were very different from the standard Jacque Bonhomme who rose up with his 
village. 
Tuming to the aliisans, we fail to see the large proportions of craftsmen 
that Cazelles suggested filled the Jacques' rank and file. The above table 
includes only those who had their occupation specifically listed, not individuals 
with sumames which hints at an occupation. In one instance, for example, Raoul 
Ie Boucher is described as a 'homme de labour'; this document does not indicate 
he was a butcher as well.374 This has meant the exclusion of tlu'ee 'Ie Bouchers', 
one 'Ie Macon', one 'Ie Cordier', and one 'Ie Pontonnier'. Although the number 
of alii sans would have increased by another six, the sample still does not lend 
credence to Cazelles' claims. Because of the nature of the remissions, we would 
expect rural alii sans to receive a dispropOliionately large percentage of 
remissions, yet less than 5% of the individuals could be so identified, and no 
other evidence from chronicles or other sources suggests any large contingent of 
rural aliisans within the revolt. 
We cannot be sure what being a 'rural artisan' actually meant in this 
period, at least in comparison with the urban artisan. Georges Duby reports that 
these professions 'gave many a man frustrated by his insufficient resources ... 
the means of existence', rather than prestigious occupations in themselves.375 
Rural alii sans were not an emergent middle-class; their skills were often learnt to 
mAN, JJ90, f. 81, no. 148. 
3;~ AN, JJ86, [ 88, no. 262. 
375 Duby, Rural Economy alld COllntry Life, p. 154. 
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compensate small land holdings that were insufficient to provide sustenance376. 
Nor were these individuals comparable with their urban counterparis: they tended 
to be entirely dependent on their landlords, and the local economy was not 
subject to the same freedom as a Parisian artisan. 111ere is no suggestion in the 
limited literature that these individuals possessed greater wealth or social 
standing than the average land-holding peasanen . Moreover, were the 
comparative roles of a rural ariisan similar to that of an urban ariisan: was a 
village mason as skilled as a guild member from Paris? Was a village butcher 
anymore than a slaughtennan? 
The third group - those involved in labour - provides another interesting 
case. There are two types of 'labourer' included within the group.37S The first 
are those described as agricultural labourers within the early pari of the 
remissions, such as labourer de bras. The second is slightly more complicated: 
individuals (and connnunities) who were described as 'homme (or gens) de 
labour' immediately before or after the section of the remission that dealt with 
their good name and reputation. This tenn /zolJ1l71e de laboltr - has been the 
subject of some debate. Raymond Cazelles declares that this does not 
}76 To look at the English example, according to A. Everitt, in the sixteenth century the majority 
of rural artisans were labourers who 'naturally took up these employments' during the 'slack 
months': A. Evelitt, 'Fann Labourers', The Agrarian HistOf), of England and Wales, Vol. 4, 
ISOO-1640, ed . .r. Thirsk (Cambridge: CUP, 1967), p. 429. Even those who have disputed this 
characterisation agree that unskilled labourers readily practised trades and that their 'standard of 
life was little removed £i'om labourers', B. Sharp, In Contempt of All Authoritv: Rural Artisans 
and Riot ill the IYest 0/ England 1586-1660 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), p. 
174. 
m It is worth noting that the Statute 0/ Labollrers issued in England in 13S1 limited the wages of 
a mower to Sd a day and a reaper to 3d a day, while limiting the wages of a standard mason to 3d 
and a standard carpenter to 2d. For discussion of wages, see D. Farmer, 'Prices and Wages 13S0-
1400', The Agrarian HislOf), of England and Wales. vol. 8, 1348-1S00, eel. E. Miller (Cambridge: 
CUP, 1991), pp. 431-9S. Duby uses the example of a thatcher in Winchester, who at the end of 
the thirteenth could expect to earn three times as much as a reaper, but by the first half of the 
fifteenth century only earned a third more. Of course, the French experience may have been 
different, although Duby demonstrates that rura11abourers' wages doubled betwcen 1349 and 
1370 around St. Denis. Duby, RlIral Economy and COlln!ry Life, pp. 304-S. 
378 For discussion of rural labour in medieval France, see G. Small, Later Medieval France 
( feJI1hcoming). 
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necessarily mean an agricultural worker: 'they could well be labourers using the 
hoe, or the spade - working the land - but they could also be carters ... or 
labourers unloading wine ... or workers on the riverside' .379 However, labour 
most definitely means agricultural work. Robert's Dictionaire Historique 
describes labour as 'agricultaral', the 'way in which one loosens and tums land', 
and the verb labourer meant 'to loosen and tum over (the ground) with a 
ploughing implement, or with a tool by hand (shovel, spade, hoe)'. 380 Gauvard 
believed them to represent the 'superior level of the rural world' (as compared to 
the inferior labourer de bras), yet accepted that the technical definition was 
simply a man with the means to own his plough.381 Despite confusion about the 
status of an !zo111me de labour, there was very little doubt that these men were 
involved in agriculture. Perhaps they were more representative of the middling-
SOli of petty landowner than the traditional peasant fanner, yet they are 
undisputedly men of the countryside. While Cazelles is light to say that the tenn 
is not ubiquitous, 18.6% (eight of fOUliy-three) of all communities pardoned 
were desclibed as . hommes de labour', communities of small-scale rural 
workers. Of those individual rebels or groups of rebels asclibed an occupation, 
58.4% of them was described as rural labourer, or homme du labour. 
The final group is the impoverished, and I have recorded two categmies 
for this category. The first proportion is individuals where the remission 
exclusiveZv refers to the individual as poor (pauvre), miserable (miserable) or 
begging (mendiant). Not included in this group are those who also have other 
379 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie', p. 76. 
380 Dicliol1l1aire historique de la langueji-al7caise, ed. Rey. See also Cohn, PP, p. 149, where he 
finds that 'specialists in agricultural history and the historical dictionaries define the term as a 
substantial peasant who possessed a plough and might have had enough property to supplement 
his labour by employing others'. 
3S1 Gauvard, De grace especial, vol. I, pp. 402-6. 
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professions specified. The second figure were individuals described as poor, 
even if the remissions also specified an occupation. For example, Gillebmi Colas 
of Acy (Oise) is described as a 'small-scale and poor seller of eggs, fish and 
cheese' ,3~2 and thus included in the figure in parentheses, as is Jean Chacon of 
Montataire (Oise), a 'poor labourer,.383 This number is presented separately so 
that proportions can be tallied to 100%, but also to indicate the regularity of 
rebel's low-standing. The remissions described more supplicants as 
impoverished than identifIed as rural miisans, which is remarkable giving the 
cost of obtaining a remissions. 
Remissions that ascribe no occupation whatsoever to supplicants were the 
most common. Normally, a supplicant, ifhe had an occupation worthy oflisting, 
would probably have wished to include it for his good name and reputation. Thus 
the relative rarity of Jacques with occupations listed was probably indicative that 
they had no 'trade' worth recording, and therefore were common Jacques or 
peasants. The remissions, biased heavily in favour of the upper classes or skilled 
artisans, indicate strongly that even the better-off rebels were still, at their heart, 
connected to the rural world. Of course, the Jacques may not have been the 
lowest of peasants. Claims of poverty are relative, and that individuals were 
destitute yet still able to pay for the remission appears contradictory. But even 
where occupations were indicated, pardoned rebels were in fact listed as 'most 
often gens du labour', as the chroniclers would have us believe. 
But we can go beyond specified occupations in the remission to perceive the 
rural origins of the revolt. In addition to the remissions constantly using the tenn 
302 AN, JJ86, f. 166, no. 470, 'petit et pouvre marchant de poulaille, de fourmage, oeux et autres 
petites marchandises·. 
3S3 AN, JJIOO, f. 220, no. 643. 
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'genz du plat-pais' to describe the rebels, the crown's scribes used another phrase 
regularly (especially in JJ86 and in the immediate aftel111ath of the Jacquerie). 
Sixty remissions have the following phrase near the end of the pardon, 
concerning the supplicant's intentions after receiving his pardon: 
He might reap his goods which are in the fields and send them to safety, 
and will work and cultivate his lands and vineyards.384 
To be sure, this was not just a stock phrase: it does not appear in any remissions 
for urban rebels. Nor does the second clause appear for the 'artisans' within the 
sample. It is fair to assume that this phrase indicates that the supplicant worked 
or owned land. There is no infol111ation to help us estimate how much land ~ 
these men may be have been working their own field or rural landlords who 
possesed many fields. Although not all rural remissions have this phrase (in later 
years, the emphasis of the latter lines of the document are on preserving the 
supplicant'S 'body and goods' from further attack), the relative frequency of this 
line along with the ubiquitous 'genz du plat pays' indicates the rural roots of the 
rebellion. 
Claude Gauvard's De Grace Especial tallied occupations of supplicants in 
remission letters overall from 1380 to 1422.385 The proportions and percentages 
that go into the calculations are not always transparent. She does not indicate the 
numbers, only the percentages, so it is difficult to get a sense of sample size. 
Supplicants often were specified by 'more than one occupation'; it is, however, 
unclear whether these occupations were double-counted in the original survey. 
384 '11 soit cuiller et mettre a sauvete ses biens qui sont aus champs, labourer d cultiver ses terres 
et vignes·. 
185 Gauvard, De grace especial, v.I. p. 403. 
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Moreover, individuals without occupations were not listed .. Nor has she included 
poverty or begging as an occupation in her tallies. 
Table XIII. Frequency of occupations in Gauvard's sample and the 
Jacquerie. 
GAUVARD'S SAMPLE JACQUES 
Royal Officials 5.4% 2.4% 
Clergy 0.4% 2.4% 
Aliisans 15% 4.8% 
Labourers 19% 8.6% 
Others 3.2% 2.4% 
Unknown 57% 82.5% 
Other factors make such compansons somewhat questionable. Gauvard's 
remissions were issued in the reign of Charles VI, and the full sample includes 
such matters as boundary disputes, tax evasion, theft, pillaging and blasphemy. 
Her sample covers between 1380 and 1422, incorporating areas the size of the 
Languedoc and regions as distant as Toulouse and La Rochelle. There are more 
remissions in Gauvard's sample from Macon or the Cotentin than there is from 
Vitry or Melun, two regions important in the Jacquelie. As mentioned, the 
sample includes records not kept in the chancery, like the registers of the 
Parlement, but it is unclear whether these are included in all tables. 
A comparison does highlight a few key points: first, rural labourers, or 
land workers as we might call them, appear frequently (the vast majority of 
potential supplicants lived in the countryside, after all); in fact, if we remove 
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those who specify no occupation, the propOliions of laboureurs within the two 
samples are relatively close (41.19% in Gauvard's sample compared with 
49.14% of the Jacques). However, in Gauvard's general sample the proportion 
of alii sans is three times higher. Only 17.5% of Jacques specify an occupation, 
compared with 43% of Gauvard's sample.386 From this comparison, the Jacques 
appear exceptional compared to the standard recipients of the remission. 
A better comparison can be made if we look at other revolts from this area, and 
this period; for example, here is the tallied occupations of the Parisian revolt and 
the attack on the MarcM of Meaux in 1358: 
Table XIV. Occupations of the Parisians and the men of Meaux. 
REMISSIONS SUPPLICANT OCCUPATION 
86,206 Pierre de Lagny 
86,209 Nicolas Ie Flamenc Draper 
86,214 Guillaume Ie Fevre Fish-merchant 
86,216 Jacques du Chastel 
86,220 Nicolas de la COUli-Demie 
86,230 Jean Hersent 
86,233 Laurens de Veullettes Lillgier 
86,238 Jehan de Monteux Knight 
86,248 Henry de Chastillon Knight 
86,252 Guillot Bonnachet Man at arms 
86,253 .Tehan Fagnet Merchant 
386 Although the sample would probably be large enough, as Gauvard does not give us integers, it 
is impossible to run t-tests or other tests for statistical significance. 
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86,271 Gie±fron Ie Flamenc 
86,272 Thomas Gascogne 
86,278 Etienne de la Fontaine Argentier du roy (Royal 
Master of the Robes) 
86,282 Etielme de Resnie Captain of many soldiers 
86,285 PhiIIipe de Jeurre Espieier 
86,289 J ehan Pardoe 
86,292 Maron Pardoe Youngman 
86,371 Jehan de Lyon Sergeant of Anns 
86,390 GuiIIaume d'Augueil 
86,519 Salemon de la Tour poor archer and miserable 
person 
86, 527 Jehan de Saint-Leu cure of Ste Genevieue 
90,078 Nicolas de la COUli Nemie 
86,n.148 J ehan de Congi 
86, n. 211 .Tehan Chandelier Draper. 
86,n.213 lehan Ie Ladre Mounted Sergeant of the 
'Gate' 
86,n.236 Raoul d' Aucamps 
86,11.274 GuiIIaume de Chavenoil Priest, Canon 
86,n.290 Thibaud Farcault 
86,n.300 J ehan de la Ramee 
86,n.312 .Tehan Rose Maitre, eonseillor 'du 
roy', avoeat du parlement 
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86,n.340 J eannin des Champs 
86,n.341 Regnault Blouart 
Of the thirty-three remISSIOns for individuals who were pardoned for their 
paliicipation in either the Pmisian rebellion or the attack on Meaux, eighteen of 
these individuals had occupations identified; of these, two were churchmen, five 
were 'artisans' (a draper and two merchants), while the other eleven were royal 
officials or soldiers (of various ranks). Although one of these was listed as poor, 
the other eight were probably important members of the local political 
conmmnity. 
Below these numbers are broken up into the categories we used earlier: 
Table XV. Occupations of Parisi.ans and men of Meaux, in subgroups. 
Group Number (Percentage) 
Royal Officials / Military men 11 (32.4%) 
Churchmen 2 (5.9%) 
Aliisans 5 (14.7%) 
Rural Laboureurs 0(0%) 
Poor or Impoverished 1 (2.9%) 
No Occupation given 15 (44.1 %) 
Here the social configuration is radically different from the remissions granted to 
the Jacques. There are no laboureurs within this urban sample. 
Before we compare the rebellions, there is another point of comparison 
available for how insurgents were represented in the remissions. Leon Mirot 
collected the remissions of the Revolt of the Hammennen and the Harelle in 
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1382,387 when the "[cJraftsmen came forth from all parts, raising a standard of 
white cloth', according to Cousinot Ie Chancelier.388 Miroes sampling was 
problematic. For example, in one section Mirot offered a short list of 
supplicants' occupations, but a few pages later, he detailed some additional rebel 
craftsmen. With this in mind, it is possible that Mirot does not record 
everything. Yet only fourteen of the sixty-four individuals named within the text 
have no occupation directly attributable to them, implying that professions was 
something that Mirot did note when relevant: 
Table XVI. Occupations of Maillotins and those of the Harelle. 
Group Number (percentage) 
Royal Officialsj~~ 4 (6.3%) 
Religious Officials-,)I) 1 (1.6%) 
Artisans or middling sorr;~ I 43 (67%) 
Laboureur 0 
Poor or impoverished"')- 3 (4.8%) 
No occupation'ij 14 (21.9%) 
337 L. Mirot, Les insurrections IIrbaines au debut dll rcgne de Charles VI (I 380-J 383) (Paris: 
Fontemoing, 1905), particularly p. 114, but also pp. 114-140. 
333 Guillaume Cousinot I, Gcsle de l1oblcs, ed. Vallet de Viriville (Paris, 1859), ed. and trans. 
Cohn, PP, p. 300. 
339 There are two royal valets, one marescf1a/ and one maire. 
39(J There is one cleric in the sample. 
391 Included in this category are bankers (1), leathermakers (2), pioncers (1), marc/zands (1), 
drapers (3), shoemakers (3), potmakers (2), innkeepers (1), winesellers (I), notaries (1), ollvrier 
d 'images (1), goldsmiths (3), bee1111akers (1), drapes-sellers (3), bakers (I), knifemakers (3), 
skinners (1), balTel-makers (1), vinegar-vendors (1), money-changers (1), hoodmakers (2), 
hOl71l11es de Illestiers (I), candlemakers (1), engravers of seals (I), minstrels (I ),formiers (1), 
embroiderers (I) and doubleticrs (1). 
392 Included in the 'poor and impoverished' are two individuals described as 'pauvre et miserable 
personnes' and one as a 'manservant'. Rather than leave the latter out of the sample, he has been 
included in this column. although one could argue he should have his own category . 
. '93 Not included in the "no occupations' is one individual described as a 'young man', who has no 
occupation described for him but may not have been old enough to have developed a trade. This 
is why the proportions do not add up to 100%. 
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In the case of 1382, remissions are plimarily issued to. the urban artisan. There 
are no labourers or menial workers within this sample, although two are issued to 
'poor' supplicants and one for a young man. These three examples confirm that 
while remissions were issued to insolvent supplicants, they were very much the 
exceptions. This sample also shows us what an artisan revolt (how Cazelles 
described the J acquelie) would appear in the remission record: almost two-thirds 
of the individuals in 1382 were aliisans, and a wide range of trades were 
represented, ranging from shoemakers and drapers to money-changers and 
g?ldsmiths. 
Comparing the Jacquerie with the two Parisian revolts, then we see a 
definitive difference between the rural rising and its urban countel"paris: 
XVII. Comparison of occupations. 
Jacquerie Paris 1358 Paris 1382 
Royal Officials 2.4% 32.4% 6.3% 
Clergymen 2.4% 5.9% 1.6% 
AIiisans/Middling 4.8% 14.7% 67% 
SOli 
Labourer 8.6% 0% 0 
Impoverished 7.2% 2.9% 4.8% 
No occupation 80.1% 44.1% 21.9% 
gIVen 
Compared to Etienne Marcel's rebellion, only a very small percentage of royal 
officials appear in the Jacquerie; Marcel and his troops were clearly the political 
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and military elite of Paris. Noticeably fewer artisans and more impoverished 
supplicants staffed the Jacquerie than appear in either of the Parisian revolts; 
again, the Jacques were undoubtedly of lower status than the Parisian rebels. The 
two most significant differences, however, were first that fewer rebels among the 
Jacquerie possessed an occupation listed at all, and second that men who worked 
or owned land compose the bulk of Jacques (lzomme de labourer). Such 
identification does not appear once within the two Parisian revolts. The first 
observation indicates that the Jacques were poorer than urban rebels; the latter 
shows the Jacquerie to be what the chroniclers said: it was a rural rebellion by 
the men of the countryside. Where occupations were listed, which was rare, the 
insurgents were most often rural figures who wished to be allowed back to 
'cultivate their lands'. Sadly, we cannot glean any information as to how well-
off (or otherwise) these individuals were. What we can say is that even within a 
dataset that heavily favoured the richest of urban society, the evidence is 
overwhelming that the rebels were agricultural toilers. When they had no 
occupation specified, which was most often, we can hardly presume that they 
were higher up the village hierarchy than the lzomme de labour. The Jacques 
were notably different from those of the Parisian rebellions of 1358 and 1382, 
and from the general population who received pardons for common crimes and 
reasons other than popular protest. 
THE CLERGY AND THE JACQUERIE 
The ascendancy of the parish priest over his parishioners often had the 
effect of placing him at the head of a revolt, either as its instigator or even 
as its leader.. . They were tailor-made spokesmen for their parishioners 
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who could articulate their local grievances ... Knowing the misery. and 
the hopes of his parishioners better than anyone else, he could establish 
himself as the defender ~ both tactical and passionate ~ of the interests of 
1 . . 394 lIS commumty. 
Yves-Marie Berce's model of early modem revolt placed the rural clergy at the 
centre of rural protest. The quote above indicates the two-fold importance that 
Berce considered the clergy to possess in uprisings. First, their position in the 
heart of village society and their understanding of peasant concems placed them 
at the centre of any uprising. Secondly, the clergy's role at the head of village 
society translated directly into a leadership role within the rebellion.395 These 
twin roles supposedly enabled the clergy to assume leadership roles in the 'pre-
industrial riot'. 
The little that has been written on the Jacques has stressed the surprising 
silence of the clergy in the records of the crown and the clu'oniclers. Michel 
Dommanget made the point that 'if the clergy had taken part [in the revolt], the 
Church is not once blamed' .396 The chroniclers were not hesitant to blame 
churchmen for their part in other revolts, most famously Robert Ie Coq, bishop of 
Laon, whom Jean Ie Bel described as 'spiteful' for his part in the uprising in 
Paris of 1358.397 Yet there is nothing recorded in the chronicle accounts that 
would imply other churchmen were involved in the Jacquerie of 1358. 
Systematic study of the chronicles in this period suggests the same is true for 
many medieval revolts; Cohn argues that 'civil revolts that were led by clerics or 
that even mentioned them were extremely rare' .398 
394 Beree, Revolt and revolution in early modem Europe, tr. Bergin, pp. 67-70. 
395 'The clergy of the parish, being themselves ofloeal origin, took part in local life and could 
easily come to hold a decisive position in their village', Berce, Revolt and revolution, p. 70. 
396 M. Dommanget, La Jacquerie (Paris: F. Maspero, 1971), p.85. 
397 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p. 264, trans. Cohn, pp, pp. 154 
398 Cohn, Lustfor Liberty, p. 112. 
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Yet others have emphasised that Berce's vision can be applied to the 
Jacques. Raymond Cazelles declares that '[t]here are clerks, priests, incumbents 
of rural parishes and even a canon from Meaux,.399 As the chronicle accounts 
make no mention of the clergy (barring Robert Ie Coq's involvement with the 
rebellion in Paris), Cazelles's only source of reference for this statement is the 
remissions catalogued by Luce. Once again, however, Cazelles at best has 
allowed Luce's skewed sample to mislead him, but even here, he does not supply 
numbers or even examples, other than the urban canon of Meaux, who was not 
involved in the rural Jacquelie. If we tum to the whole population of remissions, 
only four churchmen appear: 
Table -"-rvUI. The clergy and the Jacquerie. 
REMISSION NAME LOCATION TITLE 
JJ86,265 Jean Morel Blacy (Marne) 'prestre, cure' 
JJ86, 365 Jean Rose Angicourt 'clerc, tonsuree' 
(Oise) 
JJ86,386 J ehan N erenget GilocoUli 'prestre, cure' 
(Oise) 
JJ86,465 Colin Ie Barbier Ballilleo (Oise) 'clelici tonsUli' 
The rarity of the clergy is stliking. The remissions count as many rural butchers 
recorded as rural clelics. Cazelles' assertion that clelics composed a substantial 
part of the revolt is sheer conjecture. Even the four exceptions do not clearly fit 
Berce's vision of the rural clergyman involved in the pre-industrial riot. While 
the curates were obviously important figures in their rural palishes, the roles of 
199 Cazclles, 'The Jacquerie', p. 75. 
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the clerics, Jean Rose and Colin Ie Barbier, within their village is unclear (Rose 
in particular becomes involved through his links to the bonne ville of 
Compiegne). 
To be more generous, Cazelles's claim may derive directly from Luce's 
Pieces Justfficatives, where tlu'ee of these four were recorded. As Luce reprints 
only thiliy-three remissions issued to individuals, it may give the impression that 
religious men make up a more sizeable number than the whole collection of 
remissions attest to (still, it would only be around 9%). Yet, only one other 
remission outside Luce's collection is issued to a clergyman, and they make up 
just 2.4% of the individual Jacques pardoned.40o Considering clerics are one of 
the groups whom would be expected to apply for remissions, both in tenns of 
ability to afford them and also necessity of preserving their 'good name and 
reputation', this seems surprisingly low, and contradicts traditional 
understandings of pre-modem revolts, in particular Berce's emphasis on 
transferral of the priest's central role in rural life directly into rural rebellion. 
Some may have suspected the clergy of playing a role within a rebellion, 
but not the crown. Jean Morel's remission starts with this interesting statement: 
It is said, and we believe, that the curates of the villages of these plains 
[around Blacy] , and especially the said supplicant, were favourably 
disposed and obedient to these lords in the region. [Yet] they [the nobles] 
considered them all traitors, and especially the said curate ... as a result 
of which many of the said curates ... were several times put in great 
401 danger. 
400 See the previous section on 'The Composition of the Jacquerie' for the calculation of this 
percentage. 
401 AN, JJ86, n. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 188. 
170 
The nobles around Blacy jumped to the same conclusion as Berce: that the 
curates must be involved in their parishioners' rebellion.402 With there being a 
definite benefit to playing down one's involvement in any given remission, no 
doubt the curates would claim their innocence anyway. Yet the acceptance of the 
crown of the innocence of the local curates, not just the petitioner, indicates that 
the crown did consider the rural clergy to be blameless in this incident, and the 
comparative absence of other churchmen in the remissions suggests the same 
across the north of France. 
This is supported when we consider the individual stories contained 
within the remissions. Jean Rose came from Angicourt, but sent his family to 
safety in Compiegne because he feared the rebels. When he did join the Jacques, 
he did so under constraint, and was sent to Compiegne by Guillame Cale himself, 
holding letters intended to form an alliance with the townsmen. Rose's 
relationship to his home village had no impact on his role within the rebellion.403 
Jean Morel was suspected of having supplied the commoners with grain, but 
claimed that the rebels had actually stolen it. Worse, they 'ordered him to dance, 
keeping him in line with his stick' .404 This priest was a focus for bullying, not a 
catalyst to rebellion. These individuals were not empowered by their links to 
their villages: Jean Rose acted outside his own parish, and Jean Morel was 
treated as an outsider (and as an enemy) by his own parishioners. 
These men were not leaders: Jean Morel was subordinated and humiliated 
by his parishioners. Jean Rose may have been a more ambiguous case. He was 
402 Interestingly, later monarchs like Charles VII did use mendicant friars as spies within 
communities, but never curates or village clergy. See M. Vale, Charles V!! (New Jersey: 
University of Califomia Press, 1974), pp. 121-3. 
403 AN, JJ86, n. 365, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 272-4. 
404 Of course, it would have been in Morel's interests to downplay links between himself and the 
rebellion, but there is no particular reason to believe that Morel fabricated this anecdote. AN, 
JJ86, n. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP. p. 188 
171 
executed by the baillif whose 'hemi was full of anger', and believed him to have 
been the leader of the Jacques. The remission then notes that this was despite the 
fact he was 'tonsured and in habit'; the implication being that Rose's habit and 
tonsure made it unlikely that he was the leader, the opposite of Berce's 
contention that clerics were the natural leaders of pre-industrial popular protest. 
Only the remission for Colin Ie Barbier suggests an active role that 
churchmen may have played within the revolt. Wonied about a potential attack 
on his village of BallilIeo, Colin rang the village's two bells to summon 
defenders to defend the parish against enemies.41J5 The rural clergy could be 
impOliant in the assemblage and beginnings of the revolt, because they held 
within their jurisdiction a powerful tool for summoning and organising potential 
rebels: church bells. Jean Morel was even suspected by the nobles as having 
'sold the bells', which was one of the reasons that the nobles distrusted him.406 
As Corbin writes, 'in this domain, a decisive mission was devolved to the bell-
linger,.407 The functions that church bells could have in the community - the 
impetus to assemble, to celebrate, and to arm - were in the hands of the 
clergyman. Yet announcing assemblies was not a crime in itself, nor were bells 
required to assemble. Colin rang the bells only when his parish was threatened, 
not when they were seeking to join the Jacques' pillaging. As Natalie Davis has 
stressed, peasants often assumed the position of preacher408 (in the example of 
~05 AN, JJ86, f. 164, no. 465, 'nisi cum sola campana pulsare presumeret, nisi propter timorem et 
strepitul11 inimicorul11 regni, in quo cavere Iiceret cuicumque, ad pmTochie tuiccioncm ct 
dcfcncionem ac inimicorum reistanciam, cum duabus pulsare campanis, ad finem quod gentes 
annorum, secundum cujuslibet facultatcm, ad villam ubi son us seu pulsacio dictarum 
campanarum inciperet, mitterentur, ad resistendu111 inimicis et ad eorum potenciam 
cleprimendam' . 
"06 AN, JJ86, f. 89, n. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 189. 
"07 A. Corbin, Les cloches de la terre, paysage son are et cultllre sensible dans les call1pagnes au 
XIXe siecle (Paris: A. Michel, 1994).p. 155. 
408 In 'Religious Riof, Davis argues that although 'clerics and political otTicers were activc 
membcrs of the crowd, though not precisely in thcir official capacity'(p. 66), 'not all religious 
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Ballilleo, another individual wams the villagers with his 'loud voice,409), and 
peasants could also assume control of the bells. Bell-ringing was not solely the 
preserve of the rural clergy, and only this remission shows a churchmen acting in 
this manner.410 
Cazelles is right that there were churchmen in the revolt, but they were 
rare and played only minor roles, if indeed they played them at all, within the 
rebellion. Just as the chronicles do not see the clergy as complicit in the revolt, 
three of our clergymen were pardoned for acting under constraint or for having 
only acted in self-defence. Moreover, none was considered to have had a 
prominent role in the rebellion, none were leaders, and all were ancillary to the 
main criminal acts specified in the remissions. Colin Ie Barbier summoned the 
villagers but could not be blamed for their actions afterwards. Jean Rose was 
wrongly executed, and was only the unwilling messenger in the negotiations 
between Cale and Compiegne. Worst of all, Jean Morel was humiliated and 
literally whipped into action by the villagers that Berce's model suggested he 
should lead. The clergy within the Jacques were notable because their position in 
rural society did not translate to an equal standing within the revolt. 
If this revolt cannot be characterised by the involvement of clergy then neither 
can it be characterised by violence against clergymen. Even Ie Bel, who 
describes the Jacques as Saracens and defines them by their ungodliness, makes 
riots could boast of officers or clergy in the crowd' (p. 67). Moreover, often the crowd would 
often assume the clergy's function during religious riots: 'we have seen crowds taking on the role 
of priest, pastor or magistrate to defend doctrine or purify the religious community" (p. 90). 
~09 AN, JJ86, f. 164, n. 465, 'et special iter per unum hominem alta voce ad ara se prompcius 
preparent clamantem'. 
410 E. Cockayne, 'Cacophony, or vile scrapers on vile instruments: bad music in early modern 
English towns, Urban Hist01J!, 29, n.1 (2002), pp. 35-47. 
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no mention of any specific acts against the Church.41 1 We have only one set of 
remissions that suggests any anti-clerical violence at the time. These four 
remissions, issued to five villages that sent men to an assembly in Champagne, 
alleged the following: 
they set many conspiracies, alliances and monopolies against the nobles 
and the clergy for their destruction and executions.412 
This phrasing is exceptional, and appears nowhere else 111 the sources; 
presumably it refers to specific acts of anti-clerical violence. However, its 
existence both highlights the rarity of anti-clelical violence, while indicating that 
the crown was interested in punishing it when they could establish that it 
happened.413 
The clergy did not play the role in the Jacquerie that Berce imagined, nor do the 
Jacques 'envelop the priests and nobles in a common hatred,.414 Models that 
emphasise the importance of churchmen as both instigators and targets of 
popular violence do not fit the Jacquerie. Rather, the peasants were empowered 
to reject traditional 'leaders' who the social hierarchy provided, and instead 
selected their own champions and find their own impetus to revolt. Moreover, 
the rebels' lack of interest in attacking the church emphasises again that these 
411 Ie Bel does state that 'had God not remedied matters by His grace, the commoners would have 
destroyed all the nobility, the Holy Church, and all the rich throughout the country', but he makes 
no mention of any violence committed against the property or persons of the Church. Bel, 
Chrol1., v.2, p. 257, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 152. 
412 AN, JJ86, f. 125, no. 367, and f. 122, nos. 358, 359, 360. 
413 Dommanget argues that this indicates that in the region around Pelihois, Chaumont and Vitry 
thc peasants 'envelopperent dans une haine commune les prctres ct les nobles', mentioning that 
the remissions use the above quote. Yet there are many remissions from that area that do not 
mention the clergy (for example, the much quoted remission for Bettancourt and Vroil, AN, JJ86, 
f. 117, no. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 266-9, reprinted in Cohn, PP, pp. 187-8). Only 
thc four remissions issucd in connection to this grand assembly in Champagne usc this form of 
phrase. With that in mind, it seems likely that this was one specific ineidcnt of anti-clerical 
violence, rather than indicative of the character of violence in the whole region. Dommanget, La 
Jacqllerie, p.85. 
414 ibid. 
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rebels were not simply striking out .at authority, but rather were. focussing upon 
the property of nobility. 
WOMEN AND THE JACQUES 
The involvement of women was also traditional. They were to be found 
first of all in the grain disturbances, where they often formed the maj ority 
of the crowds. In other types of disturbance, they might also appear in 
the front ranks, where their presence was a more eloquent sign of the 
misery and determination of the community.-m 
For Yves-Marie Berce and others, the pre-industrial revolt was characterised by 
an emphasis on food riots, and therefore by the involvement of women.416 
Women, whose responsibilities extended over the hearth and were chiefly 
affected by domestic clisis, were the first to mobilise in these stlUggles.417 This 
argument is central to the image of the 'pre-industrial revolt', although its 
relevance to the medieval period has recently been called into question.418 Yet 
while many other generalisations of Berce, such as the impOliance of the lUral 
clergy, have been enthusiastically applied to the Jacquerie by historians such as 
Raymond Cazelles, there has been no mention of women in any of the studies 
. 1 J 419 concernmg t le acques. 
415 Berce, Revolt alld revolution in early modern Europe (Manchester, 1987), tr. Bergin, pp. 107-
8. 
~16 Also see Rude, Paris and London in the Eighteenth Ceil/lilY for the impOliance of the food riot 
in the so-called pre-industrial riot. 
417 Of course, the Jacquerie was no food riot, and it has been categorically shown by Cohn that 
the food riot itself was far from prevalent in the medieval world (Cohn, Lust/or Liberty,p. 70-
75). Nonetheless, Beree's theories have been widely accepted by scholars like Raymond 
Cazelles, as suggested earlier. 
41S 'To conclude that women were the traditional participants or the leading force behind 
medieval revolts, however, would be to disregard the sources entirely'. Cohn, LliST /01' Liberty, p. 
135. 
419 Cazel1es, 'The Jacquerie', in The English Rising, ed. Aston and Hilton. 
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The involvement of women in the Peasants' Revolt of 1381, most studied 
of all the great uprisings of the fourteenth century, had been largely ignored in 
recent years until Sylvia Federico's recent article on the subject.42o This is all the 
more surprising considering that there is documentary evidence of women's 
impOliance within the English rising.421 Pardon rolls for 1381, very different to 
letters of remission but serving the same general function, contained the names 
of women: Fedelico records one roll as listing thirty female names.422 Federico 
unfOliunately does not give us the relative proportion of female to male names; 
nonetheless, the fact that it contained women's names at all illustrates that 'royal 
officials could imagine women acting as perpetrators in [the revolt]. ... That 
these women sought pardon in the first place suggests ... that they, too, could 
. . 1 If" 47, Imagme t 1emse ves as perpetrators 0 cnme.-' While the Peasants' Revolt 
celiainly could not be characterised as predominantly 'female' ,424 there is 
documentary evidence that women were part of the rising, even acting as leaders, 
like the remarkable Johanna Fenour.425 
420 S. Federico, 'The Imaginary Society: Women in 1381', The Journal of British Studies, 40, No. 
2 (April, 2001), pp. 159-183. Before that, discussion of women in the Peasants Revolt can be 
found in A. Reville, Le soufeFement des rravailleurs d Angfeterre ell 1381 (Pmis, 1898). 
421 Federico starts her aJiiclc off with the example of Margery Stane, \vho is said to have bumt 
clerical records. Moreover, Henry Knighton believed that the improper treatment of women by 
the crown's officers instigated the revolt, and there are numerous legal cases in which rebels are 
charged with crimes of rape or abduction of women. S. Federico, 'The Imaginary Society', pp. 
159, 178. 
422 ibid., p. 163. 
423 ibid., p. 164. Federico uses the telln 'horizon of plausibility' to describe women's 
involvement: thnt it was considered plausible by contemporaries that women had been involved 
in the rising. 
424 Chroniclcrs like Knighton and Walsingham almost exclusively use 'men' to describe the 
insurgents. For example, tIle Chrollica kJaiora describes the peasants from Essex as 'weary of 
their prolonged exertions, and were to some extent desirious of seeing their homes, wives and 
children again' (p.433), and that the rebels were 'abandoning ... their wives' (p. 413). The 
Chronica Maiora o{Thol7las Wafsingham, 1376-1422 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2005), trans. 
D. Preest, ed. J. Clark. 
42:' 'Johanna ... went as the chief perpetrator and leader of a grent society of evildoers fj'om Kent', 
KB 27/842 rex. m 3.d, translated by Federico, 'The Imaginery Society', p. 168. The full 
documcnt is transcribed in Reville, Le sOlifeFemenl (Paris, 1898), pp. 199-200. 
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As regards the Jacquerie, the chronicles of 1358 make .no mention of women 
acting as insurgents. In this respect, the Jacquerie appears similar to the third 
great revolt of the later Middle Ages, the revolt of the Ciompi. The general 
tenns for the insurgents may not always be gender specific - commoners, 
'peuple', rustics - but the implication is that these offenders were male.426 
Women do get the occasional mention, however, even if they remain largely in 
the background. The Chronique des Quatre Premiers Valois mentions that the 
countess of Valois gave the Jacques provisions outside Gaillefontaines and also 
suggests that rural women may have had a logistical role in the revolt: 
For they [the Jacques] had become accustomed in the villages and places 
they passed through to have the people, men and women, put tables out 
into the streets.427 
This is not repeated by any other chronicler, but it seems plausible that villagers 
supported and supplied the Jacques with food, while not joining the rebellion 
themselves. Even in stocking the rebels, men were still involved; even this was 
not a specifically 'female' role. 
Alongside this single chronicle account, we have only one remISSIOn 
connected to the rebellion of l358 that mentions women taking an active role. 
The account however has little to do with the Jacquerie itself, but is illustrative of 
one potential function of women within the revolt: their ability to start violence. 
In this case, the parliament sent Hue de Saint-Amle, a baillif and sergeant of the 
parlement, to arrest one man, Jean Sirejean, who with another male Jean Daulle 
had been fined 1,300 livres toumais for their pali in the commotion: 
426 The name' J aequerie' of course originates fi'om the slang name used condescendingly by the 
nobility. Better evidence, perhaps, is the insistence by the remissions that the culprits were the 
gelZz du plat-pays. 
427 Chrol7. premiers Valois, p. 72, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 160. 
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That bailliff (Izuissier), went with Jehan of AlTaz, our sergeant of the 
provoste of Montdidier, to the said town (ville) of Hangest (SOlllille) 
where they found the said Jehan Sire in his hostel and they placed him 
under alTest in our name, and they wished to take him prisonner. Then 
the valet of the said baillif picked up his sword drawn and ran to the the 
church of the said town (ville). As soon as the women who were there 
who saw the said valet with the said sword unsheathed, they uttered a 
great cry. At that great cry, Nicaise Sire Jehan, PielTe Patin, PielTe Sire 
Jehan, Jehan du Lot and Martin Troquet mshed out there, each with an 
. . d I . l' 1 d 40 8 1ron-t1ppe ance or axe m l1S lan s. -
The incident diffused without fuliher violence but shows women instigating 
popular action. The 'great cry' came close to creating a mini-riot, as it did in the 
beginning of several other late medieval revolts, like the Maillotins. 429 This 
incident, however, was not pari of the Jacquerie, but rather the alTest of rebels 
several years after the initial revolt. If anything, it highlights the absence of 
women from the remissions associated with the Jacquelie. Although women 
could instigate popular violence in late medieval revolts and their actions could 
be recorded in pardon-tales (as N.Z. Davis has shown), such incidents were not 
recorded during the rebellion of 1358.430 
The remissions concerning the Jacques only record the names of women 
when they are making claims on behalf of their husbands . .!3] For example, the 
remission for her husband Jean Rose, who had carried letters to Compiegne for 
the Jacques but been executed when mistaken for a leader, was sought by 
428 'LequeI hussier, avec lui lehan d'AITaz notre sergent la provoste de Montdidier, allerent en 
ladite ville de Hangest en laquelle iI trouverent Jehan Sire en son hostel, auquel il mirent la main 
dc par nous, et Ie vouldrent amener prisonnier. Et lors Ie varlet dudit hussier print son espee et 
COUITU devant Ie moustier de laditte ville, et tantost 1cs fcmmes d'icelle qui virent !edit varlet avec 
Indite espee tout nue, firent et getterent un grant cry. Pour lequc1 frant cry, Nicaise Sire lehan, 
PieITe Potin, PieITe Sire lehan, lehan Du Lot et Martin Troquet, saillircnt suz, chascun un baston 
feITe ou haches en leurs mains'. AN, 11107, no. 186. This remission is transcribed by Gauvard, 
De grace especial, v.l, pp. 342-3. 
429 For some examples ofrcvolts triggered by women's cries, see Cohn, LlIsl/or Liberty (2006), 
pp. 132-3. 
·130 Sec, for example, 'Women on Top', in Davis, Society and CIIIIlIre in Early Modern France, 
pp.124-152. 
4,1 Therc are many examples of this. See AN, JJ86, f 120, no. 352, where Isabelle, wife of PicITe 
de Soissons, appeals for grace on behalf of her late husband, murdered in the nobles' retaliation. 
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'Jehanne, wife of the late .Tehan Rose ofla Pirelle near AngicoUli,.432 Not only 
did Jehanne claim that .Tehan had committed crimes only under duress, but also 
she required a posthumous pardon for her husband to 'feed three children'. This 
remission is also indicative of the passive role that the pardon-letters suggest 
women played in the revolt: her husband sent Jehanne and her children to safety 
in Compiegne by the husband when violence broke out. 
Chronicle and remission evidence suggest that women were connected to 
the Jacquerie in only two ways. First, they appear in the chronicle record as 
having supported the effolis of the Jacques by providing food and supplies. 
Second, and most commonly, they appeared in their role as wives; submitting 
claims for grace to re-establish their property, good name and renown. All these 
examples place women as secondary to the active agents of the rebellion, defined 
by the crown as exclusively male, Women were. only recorded as aides to an 
entirely male insurgency, 
It should be noted that women were not as numerous in the registers of the 
chancery as the men. Bourin and Chevalier estimate that 6,5% of remissions in 
.c I L ' . d 4i3 lourteent l-century Olre were Issue to women, - This number falls even 
fUl1her as the period continues: in the reign of Charles VI, only 4% were issued 
to women, and by the reign of Charles VIII, it was lower than 2.5%.434 This is 
432 AN, JJ86, f 124, no. 365, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, p. 272-4 This remission has been 
transcribcd by Luce, and has been detailed elsewhere. 
·m M. Bourin and B. Chevalier, 'Le COl11portelnent Criminel dans Ie pays de la Loire l110yenne 
d'apres les lettres de remission (vers 1380-1450)', Anl1ales de Bretagne et de pays de I'ouest, 88 
(1981), p. 251. 
434 Gauvard, De grace especial, pp. 300-30 I. Gauvard believes this is due to the increase in types 
of homicide pardonable by remission that, as most homicides are committed by mcn, causes a 
greater imbalance bctween the sexes: '[pJlus qu'iJ une evolution de la eriminalite feminine, eet 
affaiblissment est du a revolution de la source considcree qui, au cours du xv siecle, filtre de 
plus en plus Ie, types de Climes rel11is pour reduires pratiquel11ent a l'hol11icide des la XVIe 
siecle'. 
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considerably less than we might expect, considering what little we know of 
female criminality. 10% of those recorded within the Registre Criminel elu 
Chatelet were women;"35 Nicole Gonthier estimates for Montpellier that women 
committed almost 20% of all crimes in the area.436 This difference may be 
explained by the tJ:equency of homicide within the chancery: homicide was the 
most common crime recorded, and almost all murderers pardoned by the crown 
were male.437 There would have undoubtedly been practical problems for 
women receiving remissions: they would need high standing in the community 
and willing character witnesses or supplicants who would make their case to the 
crown. They also required the financial capability to afford a remission, which 
as demonstrated was outside the reach of the vast majority of individuals. Yet it 
is important to stress that women did receive remissions for crimes they 
conU11itted. 
The chronicles of the Jacquerie do mention women, but only as victims of male 
violence. All of the chronicles indicate that the brutality of the Jacques was not 
just targeted against noble men: 
And when the Jacques saw what a great crowd they were, they charged 
against the nobility, killing many. Worse, they became deranged, mad 
people of little sense, often putting to death noble women and children.438 
The implication here by the otherwise sympathetic Chronique des Quatres 
Premiers Valois was that the targeting of women was something extraordinarily 
immoral, even compared with the murder of the men. The sign that the crowd has 
435 Gauvard, De grace especial, p.301. 
436 Quoted in Gauvard, ibid., p. 30 I. For recent work on crime in the medieval period, see N. 
Gonthier, Ie chfilill1ent dll crime au Moyen Age (XIf-XVI siecles) (Rennes: Presses Universitaires 
de Rennes, 1998). 
437 For example. Gauvard records that over 99% of all homicides in her sample were committed 
by men, p. 307. 
438 Chroll. premiers Valois, p. 71-2, trans. Coiln, PP, p. 160. 
180 
become deranged and lost its senses is not their attack against the nobility but 
rather when they turned their attention to women and children. Violence against 
women is repeatedly used by chroniclers to indicate how the Jacquerie was 
exceptionalZv savage: 
The traces of their wickedness swelled: they put to death any noblemen 
they found, even noble children ... [a]nd even many noble ladies and 
maidens were rounded up to be inhumanely murdered.439 
For Richard Lescot, the treatment of women was the worst wickedness the 
insurgents committed. Jean de Venette, one of the more sympathetic chroniclers 
of the Jacquerie, sounds the same note: that while the destruction of noble 
property was unacceptable, the execution of 'noble ladies' was 'still more 
lamentable,.440 
Rape and sexual violence represent the worst excesses of peasant 
violence and the best indication of the inhumanity of the mob. For Froissart, the 
attack on the Marche of Meaux was specifically an attack upon 'a great gathering 
of ladies and maidens with their young children'; their intentions were not to 
have overthrown the fortress but to have 'violated, raped and killed' these 
441 
"maidens'. Jean Ie Bel declares the Jacques were boastful about the sexual 
violence they committed: 
There were even those who confessed to have helped in raping the ladies; 
some claiming six ladies; others, seven; still others, eight, nine, ten, and 
twelve, and they killed them as well, even if they were pregnant.442 
In his most famous example, Ie Bel records in detail a women who was gang-
raped then force-fed the roasted flesh of her husband before being executed. 
This kind of horrific, misogynistic violence was used regularly by the chroniclers 
m Lescot, Chrol1., p. 126, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 170. 
44f) Venette, Chrol1., v. 2, p. 264. trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 77. 
441 Froissart, Chrol1., v. 5, pp. 104, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 156. 
442 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p. 259. trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 151-2. 
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to illustrate the exceptional brutality of the revolt - le Bel states that he 'would 
not dare write or tell of ... the indecorous things they did to ladies,.443 This 
rhetoric undoubtedly impressed on readers the atrocious behaviour of the 
peasantry. 
It is then surpnsmg to find no remISSIOns whatsoever that mention 
women as victims of the Jacquerie.444 No single individual or group is accused 
of attacking a woman, and neither are any communities implicated in any such 
violence.445 General remissions do not mention women either. In contrast to the 
chronicles, the common phrase that appears in the bulk of remissions does not 
mention rape; rather, the Jacques 'assaulted their fortresses, distributed their 
goods and executed them', and 'they' represents the male nobility.446 In many 
cases, their targets are specified as the gentillzoml71es. 
There is only one remission that specifies any acts of violence against 
women cOlmected to the Jacquerie, but it was not issued to the Jacques. The 
remission was for Johanis de Bonolis, an esquire (annigerus l1obilis) who had 
assembled (congregatis) with several nobles of the realm in Lagny to retaliate 
against the peasantry, which resulted in a murder, an arson attack and the rape of 
a woman named Tassone at Vaires near Lagny (Seine-et-Mame).447 This 
443 ibid., pp. 151-2. 
444 Remissions were issued only when the crown considered the applicant wOlihy of being 
pardoned; it could bc that attacks on noble women within the .Iacquerie were considered 
unpardonable offences. However, under normal circumstances men were regularly granted 
remissions for both rape and murder where the victim was female, so this seems unlikely. 
44:' One should note that women were less likely to be the victim in a recorded remission in the 
Regislres des Td;sor des Chartes than men. Only 9% of Gauvard's sample of remissions record 
violence against women, so evcn in this regard the sources mostly concern males. Yet 9% still 
represents several thousands of remissions; and we would surely expect at least one incident in 
the remissions that exist for the rebellions of 1358 that featured some mention of sexual violence. 
446 In the original, this appears as 'abatre plusiers Iieux fortresses et dissiper leurs biens et aucuns 
d'iceulx mis a mort", with variations. AN, JJ86, f 123, no. 363. 
447 The reproduction of this remission is ditlicult to read, and cuts offsevcral sentences. The 
surnamc of Tassonc and the namc of her husband is obscured, with the line reading 'raptu 
Tassone quondam uxorum Mas[xJ', with [xl marking the point where the illegibility begins. The 
next line resumcs 'Vares prope Luaginicum'. The name of the individual murdered is unclear, 
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remission, written in Latin and issued to a noble, is certainly exceptional, and the 
immoral violence against a helpless woman was not the chivalric ideal presented 
by Jean Ie Bel, Froissart or other noble chroniclers where violence towards 
women is mentioned. 
For the chroniclers, violence towards women was not only part of the 
general violence of the revolt but also what distinguished the Jacquerie as 
exceptionally brutal. In comparison with what chroniclers like Jean Froissart 
might have considered the typical conduct of war (even if that conflict was 
between peasants and knights), the targeting of children and especially women 
was focussed upon to mark out this revolt as something particularly abhOlTent. 
Again, it is surPlising that this emphasis was not transfened into the issuing of 
pardons and remissions. Of course, the stOlies of violence that caught the eye of 
the chroniclers may not have been representative of the behaviour of the whole 
of the peasant force, or may have been simple rhetorical devices. Perhaps in the 
process of re-establishing the peace the crown intentionally focussed on disputes 
concerning men and propeliy. Nonetheless, the issue of the action of the Jacques 
towards women is one area where the chronicles and the records of the chancery 
do not concur. 
The phrase used in remissions to describe the rebels - the gem: dll plat-pais -
seems to be an accurate image of how the sources gender the revol t. It could be 
that women were simply hidden within pardons issued to village communities, 
but the absence of specific remissions of individuals seems more than a 
coincidence. When women do appear, they provide backup to men by providing 
'Guilli [xl hominibus en villa de boneullis', where [xl is unclear. The individual whose house 
was bumt down is 'Johanis Cousselli ad sancti Tromi de Bonuellis'. AN, JJ91, f. 173, no. 333. 
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assistance or seeking grace for them. More surpnsmg IS the silence of the 
remISSIOns concerning violence done to women: the only example is violence 
done to a peasant, not a noblewoman. While other revolts and scholarship 
suggest that it is very unlikely that the Jacquerie was solely a male enterprise, the 
chroniclers' eyes and the crown's grace fell solely upon men, and the pardon-
tales tell us only of crimes committed by and to them. 
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6 - DISCOVERING THE JACQUERIE 
Much of what has been wlitten up to this point has been about establishing what 
the Jacquerie was not. The rebellion was not co-opted by elites like Charles of 
Navarre or Etienne Marcel. Neither was it a brief spark centred on a small area 
around P31is; it spread across the whole of the nOlih-east of France. The 
repression was bloody, but not spearheaded by the crown, who instead 
concentrated on re-establishing peace in their realm. The insurgents were not 
townsmen, artisans or royal sergeants, but rather the 'men of the countryside'. 
Nor does the revolt follow the model suggested by Berce for the early modem 
peliod and supposedly pre-industrial revolts writ larger; it was not dominated by 
women nor instigated by the clergy. 
If it was not any of these things, what was it? How could a revolt as large 
as the Jacquerie work? What instigated it? The remissions are not silent on 
these issues. Rather, they establish the foundations for a new model of how 
large-scale rural revolts might work, one that perhaps can be applied to other 
such risings. Born of a peasantry already actively engaged in resisting the forces 
of both the French, English and Navarrese crowns, villages rose up against 
individual fortifications. Before rising, they appointed leaders from the local 
community, met in assemblies to discuss action and select objectives, and sent 
emissaries backwards and forwards along trade routes. The linging of bells, 
audible cal1s-to-anns and even letters could be used to pass messages back and 
forth between insurgent groups. Individual local cells assembled against nearby 
nobles; rather than joining grand annies, they remained in small collections of 
villages and concentrated on their surrounding areas - recognised as p31i of 
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something bigger ('the Jacquerie'), these rural settlements pursued their own 
"micro-insurgencies' against the local nobility. 
This section will first establish the culture of resistance in the ile de 
France, before indicating just how these rebels did conduct themselves. We will 
explore the peasant community - the village and how it represented the base 
unit of rebellion, and how these micro-insurgencies on a local level came 
together under the umbrella of the Jacquerie. The issue of leadership will be 
addressed: who led these peasants, and how were leaders chosen? Finally, we 
will look at communication: how these communities organised and kept in 
contact, and what linked these local rebellions micro-insurgencies - together. 
PEASANT RESISTANCE 
The idea that a peasant without a lord was like a sheep without a 
shepherd, easy prey to any passing predator, was popular with preachers 
but not much supported by the evidence. The arrival of the soldiers in the 
localities did not, usually, result in the scattering of a community but a 
drawing together of that community around the political organisation of 
the village which had served it so well in previous crises. ·448 
Using chronicle accounts, vernacular literature and letters of remission, Nicholas 
Wright's Knights and Peasants makes clear that 'social contlict was part and 
parcel of the Hundred Years' War in the French countryside,.449 Where the 
soldiers of the contlict went, violence followed; military historians have 
established that 'the direct intlicting of misery and harm on the enemy population 
was one of the three main tools in the hands of the medieval commander, along 
44, N. Wright, Knights and Peasants. the Hundred Years War in [he French Countryside 
(Woodbridge,: Boydell, 1998). p. 115. 
449 ibid. 
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with battle and siege' .450 The ferocity of al111ed assaults on non-combatants was 
on a new scale in the nOlih: the 1346 chevauclu!:e, for example, had stretched 
from Caen to Boulogne and Pontoise.451 Instead of arguing that peasants were 
'helpless before the power of the soldier', Wright showed that they actively dealt 
with the increased threat from the military, brigands and even the nobles.452 
Evidence from chroniclers and remissions show that the lacquerie was the most 
widespread and violent outbreak in a period of sustained social conflict between 
the peasants and the nobility. 
This wave of resistance was not simply restricted to France but spread 
across Europe in the wake of the Black Death of 1348. The most recent addition 
to the historiography of medieval peasant revolts, Lust for Liberty, argues that 
something changed in the psyche of the medieval peasant (and townsman), not 
immediately following the first strike of the plague, but by the middle of the 
1350s: 
Postplague popular revolt reflects an analogous about-face from utter 
despondency and fear to a new confidence on the part of peasants, 
aIiisans and workers.453 
Uprisings like the Peasant's Revolt in 1381 and the Ciompi of 1378 are the best 
studied examples of this trend;454 but in excess of one thousand smaller revolts 
were recorded across the continent by contemporary chroniclers. In the wake of 
the plague, ordinary inhabitants of medieval Europe shifted from passive 
4,0 C. Rogers, 'The Age of the Hundred Years War', in lvledieval Warfare. A HislOlY (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999) ed. M. Keen, p. 133. 
4,1 ibid., p. 151, and also C. Rogers, War. Cruel alld Sharp, English Strategy Under Erhvard III, 
1327-1360 (Boydell: Woodbridge, 2000), especially 'To Make an End to the War by Battle: The 
Crecy CheW/Lichee, 1346', pp. 238-272. 
4,2 C. Allmand, 'War and the Non-Combatant', in Medieval Wwfare. A History, ed. M. Keen, p. 
205. 
453 Cohn, LlIstfor Liberty, p. 237. 
454 Indeed, Dyer describes the English Peasants' Revolt as coming out of 'well-informed self· 
confidence rather than a blind search for vengeance' in the original proceedings of the Past and 
Present Society Conference, The English Rising of 1381 (The Past And Present Society, 1981), p. 
31. 
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responses to direct action when dealing with social problems, particularly 
through protest and social revolt. In the late 1350s, the French peasantry took 
anns to defend their settlements against opposing annies and the nobility. 
However, when historians have attempted to explain the reason for the 
Jacquerie, their focus has fallen on so-called economic factors: the Jacquel-ie 
was, according to Fourquin, a 'revolte de misere,.455 Mollat and Wolff claimed 
that 'fiscal problems were again a source of discontent', and included the revolt 
within their chapter 'Revolts Against Poverty' .456 There have been several 
suggestions as to what these problems were,457 including the first attempts to 
raise ransom due for King Jean II, who was held under captivity in England, 
although the sum would not be fonnalised until the Treaty of Bretigny in 1360.458 
That said, more than one qumier of the noble contingent of the French mmy had 
been captured at Poitiers in 1356, including 1400 belted knights, fourteen 
different counts and twenty-one barons.459 If the ransoms for these lesser figures, 
not dealt with by the Bretigny settlement, had been paid before 1360, they would 
weighed heavily upon their subjects.46o Mollat and W olff suggest that the Black 
Death of 1348 had a catalysing effect on social tensions by creating a greater gap 
455 Fourquin, Les call1pagnes de la region parisienne, p. 233. 
N Mollat and Wolff, Papillar Rel'olutions, p. 127. 
457 For example, Richard Kaeuper argued that virtually every potential trigger of the Jacquerie 
was essentially financial: 'peasants ... found themselves expected to pay not only taxation for 
what seemed a war rapidly being lost, but also money to ward off deprivations of English, 
Navarrese or even royal solidcrs, and ... fines ... at the same time, their lords seemed to have 
increased their demands'. R.W. Kaeuper, War, Justice and Public Order, England and France ill 
[he Laler Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), p. 353. 
N Sumption, Fire, p. 447. 
m ibid, p. 247. 
460 Accurate amounts for these ransoms is difficult to obtain, even for the high nobility; Given-
Wilson and Seriac argue that it is 'no easy task to discover the amounts for which Edward III 
e\'entually ransomed the prisonners - or, indeed, how many of them were asked to pay ransoms 
at all' (p. 817). Moreover, 'non-payment of ransoms was, in tact, extremely common in the 
Hundred Years' War (p. 829). The exact financial implication for the subjects is unclear. For 
these quotes, see C. Given-Wilson and F. Seriac, 'EdwardllI's Prisoners of War: The Sattle of 
Poitiers and its context', English Historical Review, 468 (2001), pp. 802-33. For wider 
discussion of the ransoms and Poitiers, see C. Given-Wilson and F. Seriac, Les prisonniers de la 
bataille de Poiliers (Paris: H. Champion, 2002), especially p. 167-195. 
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between rich and poor,461 although this case has never been properly 
demonstrated.462 Fourquin blamed the so-called price-scissors effect, when the 
price of agricultaral produce falls but the price of 'industrial' goods remains 
stable, which began as early as the grain crisis of 1315.463 Yet Fourquin and 
others, as mentioned earlier, have also shown that the lIe de France and the 
sun-ounding regions were comparatively well-off in comparison to the average 
medieval French peasant, even the wealthiest rural regions of France in the 
fOUlieenth century.464 Did this grain clisis persist for so long? Even if it did, 
why did peasants wait over fifty years to revolt? Why economic motivations 
caused these seemingly solvent peasants to rebel, and why these tensions erupted 
in 1358 and not earlier, has gone unexplained. 
On the other hand, the chroniclers do not mention destitution, starvation 
or even financial impositions as the cause of the Jacquelie. Nor do they list any 
such demands against taxes or dues. Rather, they highlight the failure of the 
nobility to hold up their end of the social contract as the social scientist 
Banington Moore suggested: in general, the peasants provided for the lords, but 
the lords could not in tum protect them from ham1.465 As Peter Lewis wrote, the 
J acquelie was the result of 'hatred engendered by the failure of the nobility to do 
its social duty and protect the people from the miseries of warfare' .466 Jean de 
Venette indicated that the peasants had a 'zeal for justice': 'since their lords were 
461 Mollat and Wolff, Popular Revolurions, pp. 110-115. 
462 For example, Colin Platt argued that the Black Death actually calmed social tcnsions, through 
increasing the value of the peasants' labour. C. Platt, King Death. the Black Dealh and its 
aftermatlz in Late Medieval El1gland (London: UCL Press, 1996). 
463 Fourquin, Les campagnes de la region parisiellne, p. 233. 
464 For example, see Fossier, Hisloire sociale de I 'occident 1I11idieval. This issue was mentioned 
in note 344. 
465 'Therc is considcrable evidence to support the thesis that, where the links out of this 
relationship between ovcrlord and peasant communities are strong, the tendency toward peasant 
rebelIion (and later revolution) is feeble', B. Moore, Social Origins a/Dictatorship and 
Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press 1961), p. 469. 
466 Lewis, Larer A1edieF{l1 Fral1ce, p. 284. 
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not defending them but oppressing them, [they] turned themselves to base and 
execrable deeds,.467 Jean Ie Bel described the peasants' motivation as anger 
against the 'nobles, knights and squires [who] were ruining and disgracing the 
kingdom' .468 The Chronique NormLlnde made quite clear that revolt was caused 
by the French army's looting: 
Then the regent was advised to order those of his knights in the lIe de 
France and the Beauvaisis who had fortresses to stock their garrison 
quickly with plenty of provisions .... some did not have means to supply 
the provisions for their castles ... so they were advised to take the 
provisions from their own people ... these peasants were mortified that 
the knights who were supposed to protect them had seized there 
property.469 
Not only did the nobility fail to protect the peasants from the ravages of war, they 
were in tum responsible for those ravages. Suffering from a lack of supplies, the 
crown's own troops resorted to pillaging the countryside. The continuator of 
Richard Lescot's chronicle records that by the summer of 1358, '[s]ince the 
plundering was everywhere and no-one was around to oppose the brigands and 
enemy troops, the fields now lay barren' .470 The first time the chroniclers 
mentioned this plundering concerning the lIe de France was in 1358, as the 
precursor to the Jacquerie; the clu'oniclers believed these recent activities were 
the trigger of the revolt. 
It was not only the French troops gan-isoned in the Beauvaisis who were 
responsible. Charles of Navane's initial push east into the tIe de France can be 
seen as one of the main catalysts for the rebellion. On 12 March 1358 the great 
French strongholds of Arpajon and Montlhery (Essonne) were taken by the 
467 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Venetie, p. 77. 
468 Bel, Chron., v.2, p. 256, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 151. 
469 Chroll. norm., p. 127-8, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 163. 
m Lescot. Chroll., p. 126, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 170. 
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Navarrese; both of these two areas would become targets of the Jacques.·m 
Robert of Clennont attacked Corbeil (Essonne), effectively bringing the war 
directly into the healiland of the Jacquerie.472 By 25 March, the Dauphin had to 
flee Paris. Through April, the Anglo-NavalTese forces had Sens (Yonne) and 
Chateau-Landon (Seine-et-Mame). In May, it is safe to presume that their troops 
were pushing even further into the I1e de France. Connected to this military push 
was an increase in brigandage: historians have extensively covered the trouble 
that the infantry - the Great Companies - caused in the lIe de France.·m During 
this period, the peasantry faced numerous threats - from the crown's troops, the 
Anglo-Navarrese troops and unaffiliated brigands ravaging the countryside - but 
all were connected to the Hundred Years' War. The nobles both failed to protect 
the peasantry, and were responsible for the conflict that threatened the peasants. 
To understand a revolt, we must 'consider it from [the rebels'] 
perspective, using their categories of understanding', and the best way to 
understand their perspective is to examine their actions, and paliicularly their 
objectives. As William Reddy wrote, speaking of a riot in Rouen in 1752, 'the 
targets of these crowds thus glitter in the eye of history as signs of the labourers' 
. f 1 f" 474 conceptIOn 0 t le nature 0 socIety. The Jacques expressed their ideology 
through the murder of nobles, the destruction of their propeIiy, and assaulting 
military fOliifications. This revolt of the 'non-nobles against the nobles' was 
clearly marked by the division between these two 'orders'; those were the terms 
471 Sumption, Fire, p. 315. 
412 ibid., p. 316. 
473 For examples, see Fowler, A1cdicl'al Mercellaries, Volllme I: The Great Companies; Allmand, 
'War and the Non-Combatant' in ivfedieval Warfare, ed. Keen; Wright, Knights and Peasants, 
pp. 89-95. 
474 W. Reddy, 'The Textile Trade and the language of the crowd at Roucn, 1752-1871', Past and 
Present 74 (1972), pp. 62-89. This quote was used in Reicher, The P,ycho!ogy a/Crowd 
Dynamics. 
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by which rebels and victims alike viewed the. conflict. The nobles' property was 
a natural objective to aim for. However, important military locations, like castles 
and fortresses were destroyed as well: many remissions attest that the rebels 
'attacked, pillaged and burnt their fortresses', along with their 'houses and their 
goods,.475 How many of these fortresses were currently in use by an army? 
There is little information on the exact details of the targets. Yet other 
remissions point to the rebels selecting and attacking buildings that were 
undoubtedly manned by soldiers (for example, the attack on castle of Villers-
N .. A' ) 476 aux- onnms 111 Isne. Individual knights were assaulted,477 and more 
imp 0l1antl y, so were garrisoned troopS.478 The initial incident which spurred the 
whole movement, the attack on Saint-Leu d'Esserent (Oise) was desclibed 
primarily as an attack upon the milites; according to Luce, the f0l1ifications had 
been occupied by two men in the service of the Dauphin, one of them. being 
Robel1 of Clermont, Marshal of Normandy.479 As the Chronique de ni:gnes de 
Jean II et Charles V reported, the peasants then 'charged against many 
gentlemen who were in Saint-Leu, killing nine - four knights and five 
, 480 grooms. 
If we accept the premise that the Jacquerie was prompted by increased 
military activity in the region and anger towards the local nobility, then the 
Jacquerie was part of widespread peasant resistance towards nobles and armies in 
this period, not least dming the summer of 1358 itself. Five remissions for 
m 'abatre, gaster et ardoir leurs fortresses, maisons et leurs biens' AN, .lJ86, f 77, no. 237. 
Variations of this phrase often include c/zaslcls, hOlcls or chdlCazcr. 
476 AN, J.J86, f 132. no. 383. 
477 For cxample Jehan OUl'ccl was pardoned for his pati in the murder of three knights near Port-
Saint-Maxence. See AN, JJ94, f 2, no. 4, replinted in Luce, Jacqllcric, pp. 328-30. 
m The men of Bruyeres, for example, attacked a local 'garrison' (JJ86, f. 204, no. 556). 
479 Luce, Jacqllcric, p. 276. 
4S0 Clzrol1. dcsregncs. v.l, p. 177, trans. Cohn,PP, p. 166. 
192 
rebellion were issued to settlements south of the Paris that historians traditionally 
considered pati of the Jacquerie: Orleans (Loiret), Givry (Aisne), Lorris (Loiret), 
Vitteaux (Cote-d'Or) and Vermenton (Yonne). However, nothing in the 
remissions shows that these rebellions were a pati of the Jacquelie: none 
mentioned the 'gens du plat-pais'; only Orleans mentioned the conflict between 
'nobles and non-nobles' and the latter three described themselves as 'enemies of 
the crown', a term never used to describe the Jacques. Luce included these 
revolts because of the coincidence of these communities lising up, within 100 
miles of the fIe de France and at the same time as the Jacquerie. However, they 
share not just chronology, but also the same objectives: all five were focussed 
against military installations or soldiers. These five rebellions were not pati of 
the Jacquerie, but rather the Jacquerie itself was part of the bigger wave of 
rebellions against the nobility and the annies. For example, below is the 
remission for Orleans: 
And of these said men, after many liots and dissensions with some of the 
knights who lived in the town of Orleans, these habitants has become 
deadly enemies of the said soldiers. And at the time of the commotions of 
the non-nobles against the nobles, they had wished to destroy the said 
castle of Aula (chateau-la-Cour), and then certain parties knocked it 
down.481 
Just like the Jacquerie, tensions between combatants and non-combatants erupted 
into violence. This also happened in Vitteaux (Cote-d'Or), as far south as Dijon, 
where the townsmen rose up against the garrisoned troops: 
Some of the inhabitants of the town [ville] of Vitteaux, among those this 
said Johannes called Turelin, of Salvoloco, came to the castle of Dracy, 
where the knights were, catTying sticks and swords, and they angrily 
entered castle, in which were swords, wines and other mobile goods of 
~Sl 'quin imo diete gentes, post plures rixas et dissensiones quas cum aliquibus habitatoribus ville 
Orleans habuerunt, eo quod ipsi habitatores qui dicto militi fuerant inimici capita1es et qui 
tempore commocionis innobilium contra nobi1es dictum castrum de Aula destruere voluerant et 
iam qU3mcJam partem prostraverunt', AN, JJ91, f. 74, no. 227, reprinted in Luee, Jacqllerie, pp. 
324-7. 
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the said knights were held, and then with strength and violence certain 
.. ~, partIes knocked thIS castle to the ground.... -
The above attack draws a perfect parallel with the initial attack of the Jacques at 
Saint-Leu d'Esserent: the gens d 'armes and the eCl/yers, who looted their 
supplies from the peasantry, became a focus for the villagers' frustI'ations. At 
Lorris (Loiret) there was a struggle with the inhabitants of the fortress at the 
Chateauneuf-sur-Loire.483 In Vermenton (Yonne), near Auxerre, the gens 
d'armes got involved in a violent dispute with the people of the surrounding 
484 
area. 
These incidents demonstrate a culture of resistance against the nobility 
and the armies in France during 1358. The Jacquerie was not the only expression 
of this feeling; it was part of a wider social movement across the nOlih of France 
and beyond. Within the previous twelve months, royal officers were attacked in 
Forez and there were attacks on tax collectors in the south of France, including a 
revolt in Toulouse.485 Similarly, Jean de Venette recognised that peasant 
resistance had begun in the ile de France and elsewhere. The peasantry had 
stmied taking matters into their own hands, and were organising resistance 
against the military and the brigands in the region: 
In the same year, in the ile de France and elsewhere, the peasants 
dwelling in open villages with no fortifications of their own made 
fortresses oj" their churches by surrounding them with good ditches, 
4~2 ',igentibus commocionibus nequissimis que inter nonnullos populares regni nostri a ribus 
annis citra viguemnt, nonnulli habitatores ville de Vitteaux, inter quos erat Johannes dictus 
Turelin, de Salvoloco, ad castru111 de Draceyo nuncupatu11l, quod est dicti 111ilitis, cum fustibus et 
gladiis acccsserunt, ct illud castru11l, in quo bladorU111, vinoru11l ct alioru11l bonoml11 mobiliull1 
dicti militis copia maxica existebat, hostiliter invasemnt, ac eciall1 vi et violencia quandall1 
pmtell1 dicti castri ad tcrra11l prostraverunt ... ', AN, JJ91, f. 20, no. 71, reprinted in Luce, 
Jacquerie, pp. 322-3. 
4S3 AN, JJ90. f. 24, no. 48. 
4S4 'ceulx qui en rannee dcrnierc passe vindrent et encores sont et dCl11eurant en la fortresse de 
Ligny-Ie-Chastel et es pmties d'environ, Icsquelx a grant nOl11bre et force de gens d'all11es sont 
plusiers foiz venuz en la dicte ville de Vell11enton et es parties d'cnviron' AN, J.l90, f. 61, no. 
110. 
4S5 Cohn, Lust/or Liberty, p. 221. 
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protecting the towers and belfries with planks as one does castles, and 
stocking them with stones and crossbows. Thus they could defend 
themselves if perchance enemies should attack them, as I have heard, 
they did fairly frequently ... By day they kept lookouts on top of the 
church towers ... When they saw the enemy coming in the distance, they 
blew a horn or rang bells. Then the peasants who ,vere at work in the 
fields or busy with other tasks in their houses ran with all speed to their 
churches which they had fortified and took refuge in them,.4s6 (emphasis 
mine) 
Peasants actively resisted the military; rather than an initiative by royal sergeants 
or landlords, the rural labourers themselves stood up to the annies of France, 
England and Burgundy. The construction of new fOliified places within the 
villages across France had become widespread: in 1371, royal commissioners 
found over 111 fOliified places in the bailliage of Caen.,m The creation of these 
fOliifications was noticed as early as February 1358 by the Estates-General, 
which demanded that all the petites fortresses be destroyed for security 
reasons.
488 
Jean de Venette showed a shift in philosophy towards villagers taking an 
active role in defending their locales against invaders before the Jacquerie; he 
also recorded that resistance canied on after the Jacquerie of the summer of 
1358. The most famous story concerned Guillaume L'Alou who was, according 
to Luce, 'the obscure peasant of Longueil-Sainte-Marie [who] deserves to 
occupy a place of honour in our annals' .489 The story of Grandfene and 
Guillaume L 'Alou is reported by several chroniclers, all of whom gave slightly 
different versions of the story.490 In 1359, the peasants of Longueil-Sainte-Marie 
486 Venette, CllrOIl., v. 2, p. 268, trans. BirdsalL Venetie, p. 85. 
4S7 Sumption, Fire, p. 386. 
4SS ibid. What exactly constituted petite fortresses was not specified, but it seems reasonable to 
assume that the fOliified churches that Jean de Vcnette described could be classed as such. 
4S0 S. Luce, 'l'\otice Sur Guillaume L'Aloue" Anl111aire-Bu!!elin de fa societe de! 'izisloire de 
France (Paris, 1875) p, 150. 
490 These include The Chronicle of Jean de Venelle, and the Chrolliqlle Normande. The major 
difference is that the former considers GrandfeITe and Guillaume I' Aloue to be two different men, 
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(Oise), near Compiegne in the he31iland of what was the Jacquelie, rose up in 
rebellion, this time against the English troops. The leader, a rustic named 
Guillaume l' Alou, repulsed one attack from the English troops, and then his 
right-hand man, a peasant known as Grandfene, repulsed another.491 A 
remission issued some years after the event confirms l'Alou's role as a leader of 
peasant resistance in the lIe de France: 
Charles, by the grace of God King of France, let it be known to all 
present and in the future future that we have received the humble 
supplication of Hemy Staidue of WaugicoUli, contending how, at the time 
of the great wars, discord and dissension that was in the countryside of 
the Beauvaisis and thereabouts, the said supplicant, wishing to serving us, 
put himself under the governance of Guillame I' Alou who was at war 
helping the good men of the countryside against the enemies of the said 
countryside for the honour and profit of us, then regent of the realm, and 
inflicted with his companion great damage on these enemies at Longueil 
Saint Marie and elsewhere ..... However, in the time he was with the said 
Guillaume l' Alou, around sixteen or seventeen years ago now ... he and 
another companion that had served the said Guillaume found a valet or 
boy on foot between Senlis and Saint-Clu'istopher, and they beat him and 
wounded him until he was dead, and they stole his gold and the money 
that he had, so that the said supplicant no longer dares to go to that 
. 492 
regIOn ... 
This movement, in the area where the Jacquerie was bloodily put down just one 
year before, is a good example of continued peasant resistance after the great 
revolt of 1358. Each chronicler characterised the rebels as being rural; for 
example, the English chronicler Sir Thomas Gray described that 'the people of 
while the latter believes them to be the same individual. Also see Cohn, L1(st/or Liberty, pp. 37-
8. 
491 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 286, trans. Birdsall, VenetIe, p. 90-2. 
492 'Charles, par le grace de Dieu roy de france, sa voir faisons a tous presenz ct a venir nous 
l'humble supplication de Henry Stadieu de WaugicoUli avoir receue, contenant que comme jiJ. 
pieca, au temps de grans guC1Tes, descors et discensions qui estoient ou pais de Bauvoisin et 
environ, ]edit suppliant se feust mis pour nous service soulz le gouvernant de Guillaume I' Alou 
faisant gueITe iJ. raide des bonnes genz du pais aus ennemis estanz out dit pais pour i'onneur et 
profit de nous, lors regent Ie royaume, ausquelx ennemis par lui et les siens fut porte tres grant 
clommage en plusiers lieux, tant iJ. Longueil Saint Marie comme ailleurs ... toutefoiz, pour ce que, 
ou temps qu'il cstoit avec Ie dit Guillaume rAlou, seize 01.1 dix-sept ans a ou environ ... et que il 
ct un autre compaignon qui estoit soubz le dit Guillaume trouvcrent un varlet ou garcon a pie 
entre Sen liz et Saint-Christophe, lequel il batirent ou navrerent tant que il moru, et lui osterent 
ror et rargent qu'il avo it, ucellui suplliant ne se ose comparoit au pais', AN, J]]08, no. 350, ed. 
Luce, 'Notice Sur Guillaume L'Aloue', pp. 153-4. 
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the fOliress were saved, being for the most being only brigawltz and common 
folk of the band of the Jacques Bonhommes,.493 Moreover, Jean de Noyal 
emphasised that far from a flash in the pan, these peasants remained a constant 
threat in this period: 'they sustained many strong attacks on the paIi of their 
enemies and held their place throughout the whole course of the war' .494 
The men of Longueil-Sainte-Marie (Oise) was not the only example of 
resistance Jean de Venette provided. Townsmen were particularly active, 
resisting the English troops in Soissons and Troyes. At Compiegne, 'several 
townsmen had bravely issued fOlih to conquer the English in the woods', 
although they were eventually destroyed.495 However, it was not only the bOl1l1es 
villes that resisted attacks: numerous 'little towns' offered 'such a brave defence 
and a stout resistance that the English could not take it by stOll11' .496 Little towns 
and villages regularly took up arms. Although they were unsuccessful, Jean de 
Venette used Orly (Seine-et-Mame) as an example: 
Among [the fOliified country villages] was a church and its tower in a 
village near Paris called Orly, which had been fOliified by the men of the 
village. They had fitted it for a strong defence as well as possible and had 
stocked it with crossbows and other means of defence and with food in 
abundance. About two hundred men from the village occupied it. But 
those who trusted their strength and their fOliresses in the end were 
I . 1 d . d 497 U tlmate y ecelve . 
Jean de Venette is not the only source in which we find continued rebellions by 
peasants and townsmen towards the military forces (and the nobility who 
sanctioned them) marauding around the countryside. The remissions offer other 
~93 In the original French, thesc individuals were described as 'lez plusours fors brigauntz et gentz 
du comune et du couyn lakes Bonhom'. The 'fortress' was 'a fortress in an abbey which the 
French had fortified between Creil and Compiegne', according to the chronicle, Sir Thomas 
Gray. Scalacrollica. 1272-1363 ed. and trans. A. King (SUliees Society: London, 2007), pp. 164-
5. 
49~ 'Fragment de la chronique inedite lean de Noyal', ed. Luce, rcprinted and trans. Birdsall, 
Venelle, p .258. 
495 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 302-3, trans. Birdsall, Venelte, p. 102. 
496 ibid. 
497 ibid., p. 99. 
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examples of settlements rising up even after the Jacquerie of 1358. In May 1359, 
for example, the townsmen and peasants from Nevers (Ni€we) attacked the royal 
lieutenant and the troops he had brought with him to the area.498 In Troyes 
(Aube)), 1360, a noble and his accomplices were murdered because they were 
considered to have been involved in brigandage.499 These attacks were not 
simply restricted to the towns. Fronville (Haute-Marne) is a village a few miles 
south of Joinville, close to Saint-Dizier, one of the centres of the Jacquerie and 
also the nobles' retaliation. Yet even these inhabitants were not cowed. In 1360, 
the villagers attacked troops ganisoned at the local castle, during which Henri de 
Somerville killed a man. soo Villages to the west of Rouen, specifically Hauville, 
Le Landin, Ie Haye-de-Routot and Guenouville (Eure), attacked the men-at-arms 
and the soldiers of Pont Audemer and killed four.50l The villagers of Saint-
James (Manche), south of Rouen, along with their local capitaine, a knight, 
evicted their bailiff Thomas Pinchon and his men that were occupying the local 
castle, because they were alleged to have treasonous links to Navan-e.502 There 
was a riot between 'celiain chanoiners' and the habitants of the town of 
Grenoble (Isere),503 and a fight in Lyon between royal sergeants and the 
townsmen in 1360, but this could simply have been a braw1.504 Peasants made 
several attempts to resist the Navan-ese forces. 505 Whether these were true social 
movements, or simply everyday struggles between the populace and authOlities, 
is sometimes unclear, but they once agam emphasise how the presence of 
mAN, .lJ90, f. 136, nos. 258, 259, 260, 261. 
mAN, .lJ89, f. 181, no. 413. 
500 AN, .lJ88, f. 82, no. 27. 
501 AN, JJ87, f 21, no. 34. 
502 AN, JJ87, f. 72, no. 61. 
50) AN, .JJ87, f. 54, no. 73. 
504 AN, JJ89, f. 123, no. 290. 
505 Sec section on 'Navarre', in particular AN, JJ90, f. 62, no. 113; fo1. 81. no. 149 and to1. 97. 
no. 177. 
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soldiers could spark popular violence; suggesting that, as Peter Lewis stated, 
'peasant disorder was endemic wherever there was military disorder'. 506 The 
same issues that were at stake during the Jacquerie continued to kindle later 
peasant uprisings. 
Some have viewed peasant resistance as doomed to failure, or as token 
effolis unrepresentative of the peasant masses, who presumably accepted their 
enemies' impositions with fatalism. 507 Yet resistance could be found in 
numerous villages across the countryside, and there were probably even more: 
for the most part, the remissions only tell us about resistance towards the men of 
the French crown, but not to the English troops. Was it likely a peasant church 
could hold out against an am1Y? Such a result would have been rare. Perhaps 
resistance represented only a pynhic victory rather than an actual one, perhaps it 
had real benefits in terms of negotiating tenns from the enemies, or it may have 
provided time for the peasantry to 'send their goods to safety' .508 Wright argues 
that 'for everyone disastrous encounter between a large company of soldiers and 
a pathetically vulnerable parish garrison, there would have been a hundred 
encounters between parishoners and very small companies of pillagers' .509 What 
is indisputable is that peasants continued to resist, even after so-called failures, 
like the bloody end to the Jacquelie. 
506 Lewis, Larer Medieval France, p. 286. 
507 Sumption states that the 'great majority were militarily useless', but only offers two examples 
offailure, one being Orly (Sumption, Fire, p. 386). Allmand argues that 'since these eannot have 
presented mueh of an obstacle, they were little or no use against large and detennine forces 
against whom walled towns and castles constitued reasonably sure plaees of safety', yet offers no 
examples of combat between armed forces and peasant fortifications, or suggests why the 
peasants may have continued building such obstacles. C. Allmand, The Hundred Years War 
(Camridge: Camblidge University Press, 1998), pp. 76-87. 
50S The phrase 'cuiller et mettre a sauvete ses biens qui sont aus champs' appears rcgularly in the 
remissions. For example, AN, JJ90, nos. 162, 288, 356, 413, 419, 635. 
509 Wlight, Knights and PeasaF1ls, p. 113. 
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The chroniclers and remissions identify that not only was the Jacquerie 
instigated by ill-feeling towards the nobility and the annies of the Hundred 
Years' War, but so were many other smaller rebellions. Did the Jacquerie trigger 
this wave of anti-military behaviour? More likely, it was simply the biggest 
expression of the wave of anti-military, anti-noble feeling that was sweeping 
across France. Local expressions of frustration against the troops of both the 
crown and the English continued throughout the years following the Jacquerie, 
even in the ile de France, the area supposedly cowed by repression in the wake of 
the Jacquerie. The Jacquerie was not an expression of desperation by the 
peasantry of one region, or a revolt that spread for violence's sake alone. Rather, 
the same common cause could be seen to unite disparate peasant groups across 
the length and breadth of the country, as part of a large-scale expression of the 
violence and resistance towards nobles and annies that was occurring in the north 
between 1357 and 1360. 
PEASANT COMlVlUNITIES 
To realise the causes of the success of the revolutionary armies we must 
remember the prodigious enthusiasm, endurance, and abnegation of these 
ragged and often barefoot troops ... The history of the annies of the 
Revolution recalls that of the nomads of Arabia, who, excited to 
fanaticism by the ideals of Mohammed, were transfonned into fonnidable 
armies which rapidly conquered a portion of the old Roman world.510 
When historians describe popular movements, they often compare the insurgents 
to the usual unit of violent struggle: the traditional anny. In this extract, 
Gustave LeBon described the French peasants as forming 'formidable annies' 
510 O. LeBon, The French Revolution and the Pcl)'ch%gy of Revolution (London: Transaction, 
1980), pp. 217-8. See the chapter 'The Annies of the Revolution', pp. 223-231. 
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during the Revolution of 1789, caught in the contagion of fanaticism. An 
analogy between a revolutionary force and an anny can often be misleading. It 
implies that agency in the rebellion was the preserve of one unified force, that 
rebels were subject to a military hierarchy and that they were bound together into 
a homogenous unit that could be deployed at the will of its commanders. 
The scholarship sunounding the Jacquerie has also made extensive use of 
this metaphor. The insurgents are often described in militaristic terms. Mollat 
and Wolff, still unchallenged on many of their descriptions of the peasant 
rebellions of the late Middle Ages, describes the nature of the rebellion thus: 
'Carle selected the castles and strong places which would furnish support ... [h]is 
,511 h' . ful troops were never very numerous . Sumption, whose ot erWlse insIght 
account mentions a plurality of groups, local leaders and different targets, still 
relies on inappropliate terminology to describe the rebels, describing them as 
'annies' and Cale's collective as a 'grand force,.512 Dommanget's description is 
even more explicit: 
This primitive and essentially anarchic and spontaneous tenor ... was 
succeeded by an ordered phase. They established some progress towards 
a military point of view. There was a certain discipline: there was the 
1 . f 1 h' f'in se ectlOn 0 troops, t 1ere was a supreme c le .' -
This terminology is imbedded in the description of histOlical revolts, and is 
revealing about the assumptions sunounding how peasant revolts actually 
happened: the repeated comparison with an 'anny' implies that this main force 
was representative of the .lacquerie. This supposed anny was responsible for the 
51 I Mollat and Wolff, Popular Revolutions, pp. 124-5. Mollat and WoHT use the [0011 'Carle' for 
Cule throughout their book, which is only used by Jean de Venette does use 'Karle', Chronique 
laline de Guillallllle de IVangis (ed. H. Geraud, Paris, 1847). 
512 Sumption, Fire, pp. 331-3. 
)1) Dommanget, La Jacquerie, p. 58. 
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attacks of the movement, and therefore the heads of the am1Y were respoI\sible 
for orchestrating the revolt. 
A similar set of assumptions has govemed study of another great rural 
revolt, the English Peasant's Revolt of 1381 but for it, there has been some 
debate. Nicholas Brooks, for example, believes that this emphasis on the great 
military might of the peasants is because of the inability of historians to accept 
that planning and local knowledge were the reasons for its relative success: 
It is not medieval chroniclers (who are entirely silent on the matter) but 
modern historians who have repeatedly refened to the 'march', the 'long 
walk' or 'the wonderfully quick march' on London of the commons of 
Kent and Essex. It is a revealing assumption which re±1ects the lack of 
attention to the inception of the revolt and an unwillingness to suppose 
that fourteenth-century peasants were capable of organizing a co-
ordinated rising with military precision. No one would pretend that every 
recorded action of the insurgents of Kent and Essex fits into a neat and 
readily comprehended master-plan. But if we allow that the insurgents 
raised a mounted force in each shire and struck with devastating speed ... 
we shall be less surprised at their success in ovemmning the capital and 
at the discipline and selectivity of their targets there.Sl4 
Brooks is right to take to task those who believed in one solid force of peasants 
traversing the countryside and cOlmnitting crimes at random, and to focus on 
individual forces fi:om different shires, rather than one grand army of peasants. 
However, his view still assumes that there must have been a central place of 
plmming and cOlmnand: 
The synchronised assembly and movement of the insurgent forces in the 
two counties did not fit by chance into so neat a pattem. Decisions had to 
be taken and orders sent about meeting places, about dates and about 
targets; these decisions had to take account of the distances to be covered 
by each band on each day and of the time that would be needed to open 
gaols and to break into propeliies and destroy records. Every vill that 
sent men to the assembly points had to be contacted in advance.51S 
514 N. Brooks 'The Organisation and Achievements of the Peasants of Kent and Essex in 1381', 
in Stlldies in Medieval History Presented to R.H. C. Davis, ed. H. Meyr-Hm1ing and R.I. Moore 
(London: Hamb1edon Press, 2003), p. 240. 
<15 ibid., p.240. 
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Brooks rails against those who believe one military unit was behind the entire 
campaign, but clings to the belief that one organisational unit, a peasant high-
command, lay behind the entire revolt. Both of these models rely upon 
manipulation from a peasant 'centre' and demand exceptional levels of cross-
border organisation. 
These models represent two Images of medieval popular movements. 
The first, more generalised, is that of a peasant anl1Y, a single unified troop 
marauding around the landscape creating havoc, moving from target to target. 
The second, more nuanced, has an organisational high command, often with a 
chmismatic leader at its head, orchestrating and micromanaging numerous 
attacks. In the case of the Jacques, the instrument of revolt is either a 'grand 
force' of peasant 'troops', or a high-command of chief capitaincs like Guillame 
Cale. 
There is a simpler explanation for the events of an upnsmg like the 
Jacquerie, where large areas were covered, local objectives selected and castles 
overtIu·own. It relies neither on a grand army nor military precision in planning. 
Rather than one central core specifying the movements of every peasant, local 
peasant groups were acting independently. Individual villages took actions into 
their own hands. How did the peasants know where the tax collectors and 
sheliffs were on a pmiicular day? Rather than conspiracy between the distant 
chiefs who had calculated itineraries, the local peasants, aware of the actions of 
their fellow peasants across the countryside, caught the contagion of rebellion 
and struck out against enemy propeliies independently.516 If the villagers 
"16 It has been argued that the defining characteristics ofthe violence committed by peasants in 
1381 was 'a combination of neighborly vendetta, family group activity .... the strategic 
confiscation of objectionable documents'. Federico describes numerous instances of familial 
groups plundering records concerning them from the local nobility, like Matilda and Robeli 
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wished to attack a noble homestead or fOliification, then their local knowledge 
would have been paramount; they may even have been the defence force that the 
lord would have normally relied upon. This model has recently become 
popularised in the media.517 Today, visions of Al-Qaida, a fonnless ideological 
'leadership' floating above specific cells each of which independently selects 
their own local targets, dominate popular conceptions of how ten'orist 
movements operate.518 
In the case of peasant revolts, these smaller cells were tied together by 
something more tangible than class consciousness, and less susceptible to the 
variations in status of its members. The impOliance of community bonds within 
revolt was paramount. Berce writes that '[t]he local community was the 
fundamental bond, the first resort in cases of confrontation, and the most potent 
source of outbursts of collective violence'. 519 For urban uprisings, this is 
certainly demonstrable. Richard Trexler went to great lengths to show how the 
Revolt of the Ciompi was infonned by neighbourhood loyalties and geographic 
ties between different insurgent groups, and Sam Cohn showed these bonds 
through man-iage records.52o Historians of the later period such as Roger Gould 
emphasises communal bonds in the 1871 Pm-is Commune. He concludes 'the 
Aleyn who stole a chest of documents trom the London house of Hugh Ware. Moreover, there 
are instances oflocals encouraging their neighbours to rise up (Margaret Stafford, for example, 
'encouraged the people to rise' in Larktleld). See Federico, The imaginary Society, pp. 159-83 
017 In the case of revolts, however, others are still tempted to assume some f01111 of guiding 
organisation behind it. During the Ban lieu Riots of autumn 2005, French interior minister 
Nicolas Sarkozy declared 'We were struck to see in the deparments - notably Seine-Saint Denis-
a largc organisation', implying that the riots had been encouraged by Islamic insurgent groups. 
This was despite assurances trom the Chief of Police that this was not the case. Notably, when 
BSC reporter David Chazan asked if anyone was organising the violence, a 19-year old youth 
replied 'We are' ("Bravado and anger in riot suburb', Wednesday 23 November 2005, 
http://news.b bc. co. uk! I /hi/wor I! europe/ 4463862. stm). 
518 For a description of the scale-tree network that supP0l1s terrorist movements, and can be 
applied to peasant insurgencies, see A.-L Barabasi, Linked (New York: Plume, 2003), 
pm1icularly 'Web Without A Spider', pp. 249-254. 
519 BerCt\ Revolt and revolution in early modern Europe, p. viii. 
520 Trexler, 'Neighbours and Comrades'; Cohn, The Labouring Classes, pp. 171-5. 
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reasons for taking pali in the fighting for most of the rank and file involved 
membership in an urban community understood plincipally in spatial terms', and 
that 'the urban community defined in spatial tenns was the fundamental unit of 
political action'. For Gould, 'insunection on a citywide scale, ultimately framed 
in terms of a cit}'\vide collective identity, required the interplay of local 
neighbourhood solidarity with extralocal organizational networks forged by the 
mobilisation period itself. 521 
Even tighter than bonds linking neighbourhoods or city quarters were the 
bonds linking the inhabitants of the village. Peasant communities in the Middle 
Ages were sources of independence and power. While the village boundaries 
might contain varied individuals with different status and personal wealth, the 
village itself represented an impOliant administrative unit involving all 
inhabitants.522 Village units. were responsible for keeping the peace. Leopold 
Genicot speculates that the village could make community wealth from rents on 
the leasing of COlmnons, fines for unrest within the village, and proceeds from 
local taxes. 523 The village was then able, with the money locked in the common 
safe, to buy landed properties and to construct common buildings.524 In the 
mountains around Florence, collective action controlled the 'settlement of 
disputes with other parishes, revision of village statutes, discussion of civic 
issues and the initiation of litigation, the appointment of advisors to the parish or 
5:1 R. V. Gould, 1l1sllI'gcl1tldcntities, Class COlJ1munity and Protest in Paris Fom 1848 to thc 
Communc (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). See pp. 154-194, 'Neighbourhood, 
Class and the Commune of 1871', for a full explanation of how these solidarities work. The 
quoted passages come from pp. 154-155. For a medieval example, see Trexler, 'Neighbours and 
Comrades'. 
522 Leopold Genicot describes them thus: '[rJural communities may well be notable for the variety 
contained within them, but they all exhibit a level of coherence and unity.' L Genicot, Rural 
COll1munities il1 thc Mcdicval West (Baltimore: 10hns Hopkins University Press, 1990), p. 57. 
523 For an example, see SJ. Payling. 'Law and Arbitration in Nottinghamshire 1399-1461'. in 
People, Politics and Community in the Later Middle Ages, ed. J. Rosenthal and C. Richmond 
(Gloucester: A. Sutton. 1987) pp.141-160. 
524 Genicot, Rllral COllJmunities in the Medieval West. p. 57. 
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commune, and most frequently the election of their own lay syndics who ... 
negotiated with the city of Florence on mattters such as tax relief and 
indebtedness and ... decided how taxes were to be aportioned within the 
community' .525 The village was also an important legal unit in England: Hilton 
offers examples of villages in which inhabitants \vould make legal presentments 
on their communities' behalf.526 Moreover, these communities had strong 
conceptions about what constituted an outsider within their community, 
regulating and selecting new tenants.527 This strong sense of responsibilities, 
boundaries and outsiders indicates a belief in the cOlllinunity as individual and 
distinct from those around it. 
Village communities made these decisions collectively, through meetings 
or councils. Little is known about the practical application of these, but from 
regulating defence to the appointment of local officials and the upgrading of the 
local infrastructure (with approval of their lord), these decisions were made as a 
unit, and for that to be the case, it indicates the existence of a process by which 
these decisions could be made.528 The community was not only used to acting 
together, but had appropriate methods for making collective decisions, an 
025 S. Cohn, Creating [he Florentil1e State. Peasants and Rebellion 1348-1434 (Cambridge: CUP, 
1999), pp. 52-3. 
526 R.H. Hilton, A Medieval Society, The West Midlands at the end (jfthe Thirteenth Centlll:v 
(London: Weiclenfeld and Nicolson, 1966), p. 150. 
027 Hilton offers an example where a sale cannot be sanctioned until the tenants approved the new 
o\vners. ibid., p. 151. 
028 For example, mountain villages around Florence required all adult men of the parish to be 
present when electing the village priest. Cohn, Creating the Florentine State (1999), pp. 50-1. 
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assembly.529 These assemblies, whose heritage stretches back to the Carolingian 
era, were central to the democratic core of the village.53o 
These communities were the units of mobilisation of the Jacquerie and 
answer the dilemma Brooks posed in his discussion of the events of 1381. 
Rather than a single military movement rampaging across the landscape, or one 
organisational high command co-ordinating and micro-managing rebel groups, 
individual villages under the umbrella of the Jacquerie were selecting their own 
objectives across the countryside. This allowed targets over a wide area to be 
struck simultaneously, explains why organised assaults on fortresses occurred 
alongside small-scale cnmes like the looting of gardens, and allowed 
communities scattered from the lIe de France as far as Bar, or from London to 
Norfolk, to join under the same banner in their attack on the nobles. 
There is no doubt that the Jacques exhibited a degree of 'negative class 
consciousness,.531 However, while the distinction between the victims and 
perpetrators was couched by the courts in almost proto-class tel111S - the nobles 
and the non-nobles532 - this does not mean that the rebels mobilised under these 
auspices, and were organised in these ranks. The peasants' attack was not 
organised into one army of non-nobles. Rather, the base unit of peasant 
mobilisation was their own local communities. The remissions are quite clear 
that the village, settlement or town provided the organisational backbone to each 
individual action of revolt. 
)29 For a discussion of the functions of the village, and the mechanisms that must have existed to 
facilitate them, see Z. Razi, 'Family, Land and the Village Community in Later Medieval 
England', Past and Presellt, 93 (Nov., 1981), pp. 3-36, especially pp. 13-16. 
530 See S. Reynolds, Kingdoms and Commullities in Western Europe, 900-1300 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1997), pp. 138-152, for a description of the 'rural community' as it developed 
into the later Middle Ages. 
m For a discussion oftl1is concept of 'negative class consciousness', see R.H. Hilton, Bond Men 
Made Free (London: Temple Smith, 1973), pp. 119-134. 
532 'les non-nobles contre les nobles', as it appears in the remissions. 
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Luce's Pieces Justicatives (on which some historians may have relied) 
strongly suggests that the majority of rebels who received pardons did so in the 
form of a personal remission issued to an individual appellant. Not including 
ones for Meaux, or that focussed upon Paris, thirty-nine remissions were issued 
for Jacques. Of these, thirty-three (85%) were issued to one or two individuals, 
while six (15%) were issued to small towns or settlements. The impression is 
clear: remissions were individual. 
With the larger set of remissions within the Archives Natimzales, 
individuals also receive pardons more often than conununities, but a substantial 
number of peasants (and almost definitely the vast majority of them) were 
pardoned in groups alongside their communities. Of the 146 remissions from 
JJ86 and JJ90 (between 1358 and 1360 in the wake of the revolt) that can be 
classified as instances of the Jacques revolting, 107 (73%) were issued to 
individuals or a handful connected to this particular uprising. However, thiliy-
nine (27%) were issued to a community (sometimes combing as many as four 
different villages or parishes). Considering that these villes included perhaps 
hundreds of rebels, the greatest number of Jacques received grace in these 
community pardons. Even if we assused only thirty inhabitants were involved in 
each ville, then the number of Jacques pardoned with their conununity would be 
ten times that of those who received individual personalised remissions. 
These communities often came together in assemblies. Of the sample of 144 
mentioned above, twenty-seven made some reference to 'assemblies' or the 
rebels having 'assembled". That the phrase reoccured with such regulmity in 
what could often be a standardised remission indicates the impOliance the 
208 
authOlities placed on this practice. Rural assemblies are paramount in the 
transmission of non-official news and rumours to the masses, and thus in the 
" fl' I 533 transmISSIOn 0 revo utlOnary zea . It was in an assembly that the villagers 
around Favresse (Marne) elected Jean Flageolot their leader. Assemblies were 
forums for fonning village decisions on action: the village of Grandvilliers 
(Oise), under the captaincy of Simon Doublet, held 'assemblies in the fields to 
take anns' .534 For neither was rebellion a foregone conclusion: in the case of the 
villagers of Bettancourt and Vroil (Marne), the inhabitants assembled before 
deciding not to take part. 535 Assembling, of course, aroused the suspicion of the 
authOlities; while it was not always illegal (villes often received pardons because 
presumably this was all they had done), it meant that the local nobility assumed 
they were rebels. In this latter case, the villages were fined the large sum of 
2,000 eeltz based on assembling alone. These assemblies could also be cross 
parish bound31ies. For example, five villages were indicted for their 
paIiicipation in a grand assembly somewhere in Champagne: 
'Charles, let it be known to all present and future .... the habitants of 
Heis-le-Marru (Marne) in the prevote of Vitry went in person or had sent 
certain representatives with the habitants of many other villages (villes) of 
the land of Champagne to many assemblies .... and at these assemblies it 
is charged that there were set many conspiracies, alliances and plots 
against the nobles and the clergy for their destruction and executions 
.... for this also these said nobles had pillaged and marched through the 
said village,536 
5.13 See C. Gauvard, 'Rumeur ct Stereotypes a la fin du Moyen Age', in La circulation des 
nouvelles au Moyen Age. XXIVe cOlZgres de la s.H.M.E.s. (Paris: Publications de 1a Sorbonne, 
1994), pp. 157-177. 
5.14 AN, 1J86, f. 136, no. 392. 
535 AN, JJ86, f. 117, n. 346, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 266-9, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 187-8. 
536 'Charles, savoir faisons a tous presenz et a venir ... oye comme les habitans de la ville de 
Heis-Ie-Marru en la provoste de Vitry aient este ou envoie certain personncs avec les habitans de 
plusiers autres villes du pais de Champaigne en plusiers assemblecs ... en quelles assemblees 
aient este faictes sicome en leur impose plusiers conspiracions alliences et monopoles encontre 
Ies nobles ct c1ergie du pais pour les dcstruere et mcttent a mort ... pour ce aucuns des diz nobles 
aicnt pille et couru la dicte ville', AN, JJ86, f. 125, n. 367. 
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Identical renllSSlOns are issued for four other villages: Etrepy, Vi try-l a-Ville, 
BignicoUli-sur-Salle and Drouilly (Marne).537 According to the pardon, these 
villagers had only sent their delegates to this grand assembly, but along with 
being ravaged by the nobles' counter-offensive they had already been fined 1,000 
ecus for their peaceful participation. These five, however, represented 
exceptions: the documents suggest that many more settlements sent villagers 
there, some of whom went beyond discussion to direct action against the nobility. 
Nor was the assembly in Champagne the only large-scale meeting: the 
remissions list others, such as a grand assembly at Saint Vrain (Marne), for 
which five villages received pardons for attending.53s 
The villages were not deciding whether join one big organization, 
Guillaume Cale' s anl1y. Rather, they were deciding whether to rebel in clusters 
that extend beyond their home parishes, and on which properties to attack. 
Villagers focussed on local objectives, rather than on fulfilling a grand plan 
coordinated by Cale and his accomplices. Our map in Chapter 2 indicated the 
targets of the rebellion. When a village attacked a target within its immediate 
vicinity (for example, when the men of Fransures (Somme) attacked the noble's 
house in the village) it was marked orange; targets beyond the settlement 
pardoned are marked red. The following map contains the same data with the 
insurgent groups added in blue, when they attacked sites not within their 
immediate proximity. Not included on this map are individuals, for whom it is 
m The last two viIIages named are pardoned in the same remission. AN, ]]86, f 122, nos. 358. 
359,360. 
538 The assembly at Saint-Vrain is mentioned in AN, JJ86, f. 103, no. 3 I I, f 124, no. 365 and f. 
133, no. 386. 
210 
not specified they were acting with their fellow villagers, were involved in the 
attacks on specific property. These examples are instructive:539 
Map IX. Villagers and their targets. 
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Village communites attacked nearby nobles' property. The longest 
journey the rebels took was when the men of Chavanges (Aube) crossed the 
Marne to attack Saint-Vrain,54o or when the men of Crugny (Marne) and Cuiry-
Rousse (Aisne) joined forces to attack a castle in La Fere-en-Tardenois 
(Aisne),541 but even these were no more than five kilometres from the rebels' 
homes. This shows a familiarity with the apparatus of power: the locals knew 
potential objectives within reach. Secondly, it undermines the idea that the 
participants required massive military organisation to overthrow a castle. These 
villagers were well outside the traditional heartland of the rebellion. There is no 
evidence of any assistance from the 'military expertise' of Guillaume Cale, and 
539 The scale of this map is 1 / 2,000,000. 
540 AN, 1186, f. 217, no. 596, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 283-5. 
54 1 AN, 1186, f. 133, no. 386. 
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no reinforcements. Without any safety-net of.a rebel army nearby, villagers on 
the border with Bar, like many others, took rebellion into their own hands. 
Moreover, these rebels were not being drawn inwards towards the ile de France 
or to a central force organised by Guillaume Cale or anyone else. The men of 
Crugny (Marne) headed south and the men of Chavanges (Aube) headed north, 
not west; the men of Melmecy and Ballancourt (Essonne) headed south to find 
their target, and the men of Lignieres, Grandvilliers and Poix (Somme) headed 
north, all away from the so-called epicentre of the violence. Cale's force, near 
Clennont, was not a whirlpool drawing rebels in; rather, rebels selected their own 
particular aims independently of events elsewhere. 
These villages also combined together with other communities to attack 
local targets. Pardoned in three separate remissions, the villagers of BallancoUli, 
Mem1ency and Saint-Fargue attacked a castle at Villiers-aux-NOlmains, just 
outside La Ferte-Alais:542 
Many of the habitants of the village (ville) and parish of Menency '" who 
with many others of the surrounding countryside who had previously 
been involved with the men of the countryside against the nobles of the 
said realm, attacked many of their fOliresses, dissipated their goods and 
also executed them. They especially attacked the castle of Villers near La 
-43 Ferte-a-Alays.) 
The same remission is repeated for the villagers of Balancourt and a certain 
Jehan Bruyent (with an addendum indicating that the supplicant was imprisoned 
542 Cazelles, in 'The Jacquerie', claims that the Parisians and Marcel's troops to have been behind 
an attack on La Ferte-Alais, but there is no evidence to support this claim. Presuming CazeIIes is 
discussing the attack on the castle nearby which these documents mention, then the remissions 
explicity state that the castle was taken by 'the men of the plat-pais', not the Parisians. 
Moreover. CazeIIes' assertion implies that Parisian troops made a 100km round trip to complete 
this attack, \vhich in turn suggests that Marcel's forces was far bigger and more mobile than 
Cazelles can prove. What the remissions indicate was that nearby villagers came together to 
make an attack on this local target. 
543 'Oye comme plusiers des habitants de la ville et paroisse de Mencncy ... este avec plusiers 
autres de pais d 'environ au efn:ois qui deux et n 'a gaires ont este fais par les gens du plat pais 
contre Ie nobles du dit royaul11e Ii abatre plusiers lieux fortresses et dissiper leurs biens et aucuns 
d'iceuIx mis a 1110rt ct cspecialement Ii abatrc Ie chaste de villers empeschent Ia fcrte a aIays 
AN, JJ86, f. 123, no. 363. 
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by the capitaine of Corbeil for his participation in the attack). The villages were 
all less than a couple of kilometres apart, and all within six kilometres of their 
selected focus . This attack, south of Paris, was outside the traditional boundaries 
of the Jacques ' heartland, and was not mentioned in the chronicle accounts or 
within any of the remissions that mentioned Cale. Nor was this organised, co-
ordinated effort part of the main offensive; instead, the villagers identified a 
target in their locale and joined together to mount their own assault. This co-
operation can be seen regularly. This map records villages that joined together to 
assault a noble fortification (colours included just to indicate separate groupS):544 
Map X. Village co-operation. 
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The villages are all local to each other. When communities came together, it was 
always with their immediate neighbours. Nearby villages like Egly, Boissy-sous-
Saint-Yon and Marolles-en-Hurepoix (Essonne) joined forces . Notably, there 
could often be different groups of rebels operating together in the same area. 
Rather than forming into one large force, they remained in small collectives even 
544 This map is to a I / 1,800,000 scale. 
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when they were close to other groups .. The villagers of Poix, Grandvilliers and 
Lignieres (Somme) did not feel the need to join those around Montdidier in their 
attack. 
Village movements show the rebels' powers of organisation. Here a 
collection of three villages came together to assault fortified property. The rebels 
also displayed a familiarity with the possessions of the nobility. Most striking, 
however, is the sheer daring of many of these assaults. The typical paradigms of 
medieval revolt give us three pillars to base our studies upon: that peasants 
cluster into marauding bands, that the violence is spontaneous and contagious, 
and that the rebellion is unavoidably a desperate failure. Yet the J acquelie shows 
individual cells, well organised with specifically selected propeliies. Moreover, 
they were remarkably successful - far from being desperate failures, the 
documents attest to the ability of communities to cause real damage to the 
fortified settlements of their local lords: rebel communities managed to 'assault 
and attack' or even 'bum many fortresses and houses' of the nobility. Villages, 
like Vitteaux, or the combined force from the villages of BallancoUli, Mennency 
and Saint-Fargue, perpetrated raids that were organised and effective. These 
stories can be found tlu'oughout the documentation: cOlmlmnities such as 
Fontaine-sous-Montdidier (Somme) joined neighbouring villagers to attack the 
house of a local noble before moving on to the local castle at COUliemanche;545 
the men of Buchy (Seine-Maritime) and their neighbours brought telTor to the 
B 11 R 546 1 f C (M) d ray va ey near ouen; t 10se 0 rugny arne concentrate on two 
h ' . h h 547 C ateaux Just to t e nort . 
545 AN, JJ92, f. 125, no. 227. 
546 AN, 1187, f. 81, no. 117. 
547 AN, JJ86, f. 133, no. 386. 
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There remam some Issues about the ascription of 'communities' to the 
settlements listed in the remissions. While in some cases, they are established 
villages (and even small towns), in others, they were too small to be found on 
maps. Only one remission within the chancery records gives us a numerical 
estimate for the size of an insurgent group. This remission issued for the 
habitants of the parishes of Belleau and Givry (both Aisne) pardoned the thirty 
individuals from these two communities.548 That indicates that these groups 
could be small, but there is no evidence to indicate whether this is representative. 
Moreover, this document does not use the conm10n term ville to describe the 
cOllli11unity, implying that this was not as identifiable a settlement as most of the 
other cases. At the execution of lehan Bernier, there was 'two or three hundred' 
villagers present from Montataire (Oise), but many more may have been 
involved in the revolt.549 In another remission, the nobles allied to the lord of 
Saint-Dizier executed fifty rebels from a collection of settlements; how many 
rebels escaped execution is, of course, unknown. Two documents not held in the 
JJ series but included in Luce's Pieces Just(fzcatives also mention numbers: one 
records that 34 people were involved in the murder of a spy in Pont-Point 
(Oise),550 while an arret dll Parliament was issued against 46 individuals for 
having pillaged a house in Choisy (Oise).55! Again, however, we have no real 
frame of reference as to what constitued a ville. 
While they must have been relatively substantial to have inhabitants 
wOlihy of the pardon, the word ville can describe anything between a collection 
of settlements to a fully-fledged town, or even a city like Paris. Moreover, these 
5~, AN, JJ86, f. 109, no. 326. 
549 AN, JJ86, f. 102, no. 309, reprinted in Luce, Jacqlterie, pp. 261-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 191-2. 
550 X 1a 17, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 320-2. 
551 Reprinted in Luce. Jacqlterie, pp. 331-2. 
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remissions sound holistic in the pardoning of a settlement, but no notice is given 
as to what proportion of the population involved in the violence. That in itself 
indicates the crown considered the village rather than an amorphous group of 
people to be the unit that required pardons, but it does leave us unsure of the size 
of each unit. Yet even with this in mind, we must find that the village unit was 
at the heart of this revolt. Regardless of the size of the settlement, the court 
pardoned rebels in the name of their ville, and that was the unit beyond the 
individual who the crown heard supplications from and granted pardons to. But 
we also see that the rebels were able to organise themselves beyond their 
traditional units of religious and secular adminstration, framed for centuries by 
lay or religious authorities. 
Why is recogmsmg this model of action conU11Unities acting together -
important to understanding the Jacquerie? First, it establishes the only realistic 
model under which this revolt could have functioned. By understanding the 
Jacquerie to be individual conU11Unities who could join with its neighbours acting 
against local targets, a new image of localised peasant action can explain both the 
scale and speed of the revolt. No longer do the Jacques have to have covered 
large distances in impossibly short amounts of time with massive logistical 
demands, and neither would they have required military organisation to have 
operated successfully. 
Secondly, stressing 'community action' takes agency away from the 
image of the grand force that still dominates writings on the Jacquerie, whether 
that force be led by Guillaume Cale or more usually Etienne Marcel or even 
Charles of Navan"e. This deals with many of the practical problems that 
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traditional understanding of the revolt has caused. It also deals with many of the 
assumptions sunounding this topic - that the leaders of the grand force also had 
control over the individual actions. It changes the nature of the revolt from one 
that could be controlled and manipulated from the centre into one that was 
essentially expanding distinctly not only from the core but it-om the geographic 
margins as well: each node that exploded into rebellion was acting largely 
independently of what was going on in the Beauvoisin. 
Thirdly, it deals with one of the difficulties in assessing why 'peasants', 
with a wide dispaIity between wealth, status and lifestyle, would bind together 
against a common enemy. The defining issue is not one of monetary wealth, but 
rather it is one of community bonds that already existed. These men were not 
choosing sides dependent on their social status, but rather were reacting to a 
perceived threat towards their community, and lising together with those they 
had joined for years in legal, judicial and social matters. To paraphrase Gould, 
the pan-regional insunection (and what would later be defined by its rural 
collective identity) was dependent on local village communities in the first 
. 5"'1 
mstance. --
LEADERSHIP 
The issue of the leadership of the Jacquelie was confused even in the eyes of 
contemporaries. In Jean Ie Bel's chapter 'How ce11ain people without leaders 
rose Up,,553 he goes on to contradict himself, saying that the 'meschans gens had 
a captain called J aque Bonhomme, who was the complete rustic (pm/air 
552 The original passage fr0111 Gould, Insurgent Identies (p. 154) is included earlier. 
553 Bel, Chroi1_, v_2, p_ 255. 'Comment aueunes gens sans chiefs se leverenC_ 
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vilain/.554 This conf1ict.in the sources, between Ie Bel's assertion of the uprising 
being leaderless, other chroniclers pointing to a captain, most often Guillaume 
Cale, and the remissions pointing to a myriad of local village leadership, has 
never been satisfactorily resolved. Generally, studies of pre-industiial revolt 
have tended to hinge their analysis on individual leaders.555 With so many 
uprisings memorialised by association with a single leader (like Cade's 
Rebellion), the Jacques might be called Cale's Rebellion gIven the current 
histOliography. 
The predominance of leaders within a revolt was one of the main points 
under which Gustave Ie Bon proposed his model of crowd action. For Le Bon, 
'[a]s soon as a celiain number of living beings are gathered together, whether 
they be animals or men, they place themselves instinctively under the authority 
of a chief .556 Following in Ie Bon's footsteps, it has been assumed that the 
'leader' (or at least an individual who has orchestrated the revolt) holds the key 
to discovering the ideology and the aims of the Jacques themselves. It is on this 
premise that Cazelles and Bessen's theOlies of co-opted rebellion are based; by 
selecting an influential figure who shapes the will of the crowd, be it Etienne 
Marcel or Charles of Navarre, it is assumed that their ideology was transferred 
onto the rebels. 557 
:':'4 fhid., 'et avoient ces meschans gens ung chappitaine qu'on appelloit Jaque Bonhomme, qui 
estoit un parfait vilain'. 
555 For the Peasant's Revolt, Dobson states that '[v]irtually every aspect ofWat Tyler's career is 
controversial', yet histOlians like Alistair Dunn have been quick to ascribe aspects of the rising to 
the 'personal nature of his leadership'. B. Dobson, The Peasants' Revolt of 1381 (London: 
Macmillan, 1970), p. 24 ; A. Dunn, The great rising of 1381 (Stroud: Tempus, 2002), p. 119. 
:':'6 Later psychologists, notably Allport and Freud, while taking issue with many other of Le 
Bon's arguments, continued to stress the importance of the leader. Their theories suggested that 
the crowd automatically revelis to the ideology of the leader at times of disorder. It was not until 
the 1950s that these ideas were systematically challenged. 
557 Cazelles, 'The Jacquerie' and Bessell, 'The Jacquelie: Class War or Co-Opted Rebellion'?'. 
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Most works on medieval revolts have devoted substantial space to the 
discussion of who exactly was in charge of the uprisings. 558 While this was no 
doubt worthwhile for establishing the identity of the key actors in a movement, it 
is questionable what light this has actually shed on the mechanisms of any given 
revolt.559 Even in cases where a rebellion survives in popular memory as being 
connected to one individual, like Cade's Rebellion of 1450 in the south-east of 
England, not much has been done to establish what it was that the leader actually 
did within the crowd. We know virtually nothing about Jack Cade, and what 
sources we have are contradictory. The crown seems to believe he may have had 
ties to the House of York, but other clu'onicle accounts paint him as a physician, 
notary or even a sorcerer.560 He is by different accounts a devil, a peasant and a 
nobleman.561 Even less is recorded of his actions - while the rebellion has come 
to be identified with Cade, Cade himself is curiously absent from the action, 
apmi from when his head is placed upon a spike in London.562 
Those historians who have searched for a leader in the Jacquerie, and 
found Guillaume Cale, have reinvented him to fit their thesis. Rodney Hilton, 
who theorised that the Jacquerie was orchestrated by well-to-do peasants, comes 
to the conclusion that Cale must have been a 'well-to-do peasant' himself. 563 
There is no specific evidence for either asseliion, but in the models that 
)58 In the case of the Peasants' Revolt, see the substantial literature spent discussing Wat Tyler. 
559 Ryan, in her work on 19th century Irish suffi'age movements, describes the problems of 
historical research into the leaders of crmvds thus: . In our search for neat, complete and 
comprehensible histories, 'the cult of personality' focuses our attention on the 'leading lights' of 
specific organisations and masks the wider complexities of leadership in the movement as a 
whole', in L. Ryan, 'The Cult of Personality: reassessing leadership and suffrage movements in 
Britain and Ireland', in C. Barker, A. 10hnson and M. Lavalette (eds.), Leadership alld Social 
Movements (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001) , p. 21 I. 
560 For a short sun'ey of what is (and is not) known about Cade, see I.M.W Harvey, Jack Cade 's 
Rebellion of 1450 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), pp. 78-79. 
)61 ibid., pp. 78-9. 
562 ibid., p. 100. Although throughout the text the insurgents are referred to as 'Cade's men', it is 
unclear when Cade is with them. 
563 Hilton, BOlld Men Made Free, p. 123. 
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historians have created, Cale becomes a representation of the top-level of the 
hierarchy. Of all the recent historiography, the passage that most explicitly 
grants attributes to Cale is from MoUat and Wolff: 
He possessed a certain gift for organisation, appointed a chancery, and 
divided his followers into troops, each subdivided into groups of ten. He 
had a feeling for tactics. Left to themselves the Jacques had pillaged at 
random. Guillaume Cafe selected the castles and strong places vvhich 
would jill"l1islz support at key points. and he was not vFit/lOlit political 
,564 ( . l' ) sense. my Ita lCS 
There are no footnotes in Mollat and Wolffs work, but if there were references, 
they would point directly to the Chronique des Quatres Premiers Valois, the 
most sympathetic account of Cale. Yet nothing within even that Chronicle 
suggests that Cale 'selected the castles and strong places'; rather, this is Mollat 
and Wolff s speculation, putting the entire campaign waged by the Jacques as the 
enterprise of its heroic leader. Implicit is the understanding that the crowd was a 
rabble, similar to Ie Bel's 'animals' or Flanul1ennont's depiction of the 'uncouth 
peasants', until Cale instilled order in the masses. For these historians, only Cale 
could have organised them, and his authOlity extended over the entire group of 
rebels from Rouen to Bar. 
This is a direct result of the confusion that exists between historians' 
definitions of a leader, and historians' definition of leadership. The two have 
been welded together in such a way that a 'leader' must have performed all tasks 
associated with leadership - mobilised the army, shepherded the troops towards 
their objectives, controlled the programme of the revolt. This approach not only 
minimises the insurgents, but also over-simplifies the role of the leader. The idea 
one heroic individual controlled the masses, forcing the peasants to act in a 
manner different to that which suited them, is typical of the Le Bonian model of 
564 MoJ1at and Wo1ff~ Popular Revolutions, p. 124. 
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crowd leadership described by social psychologists as 'zero-sum games,;565 an 
understanding of the crowd where 'leader agency is achieved at expense of 
follower agency' .566 A leader forces the crowd to act in accordance with his own 
aims, and the crowd relinquishes its power over its actions to the leader; as Le 
Bon wrote, the crowd places itself entirely under the control of the heroic 
individual. 
This view has been systematically refuted by recent scholarship. Within 
a revolt, it has been shown that the construction of an ideology is a two-way 
process between leaders and followers. Studies like Adas' survey, work on 
Indian peasant revolts and others all stress that during a peasant revolt leadership 
comes from within the crowd, not outside it. 567 Leaders cannot simply substitute 
their agenda for that of the crowd's, because the crowd does not accept it.568 
Rather, direction comes from the crowd. The submissi.on of the crowd to the 
power and control of one individual is rejected. 
Yet at first glance, the chronicles may seem to suppOli the 'heroic 
individual' theory. Of these accounts, four chroniclers specify the same 
565 In a zero-sum game, anything 'added' must be balanced by the same amount 'subtracted'. In 
this case, there is only so much leadership to go around: any input by the leader neeessmily takes 
away from the input of the crowd. S. Reicher, S. Haslam, and N. Hopkins, 'Social identity and 
the dynamics ofleadership: Leaders and followers as collaborative agents in the transfonnation 
of social reality, Leadership Quaterly (2005, in press), p. 2. 
566 ibid. 
567 M. Adas, Prophets of Rebellion: millenarian protest movements against the European 
colonial order (Cambridge: CUP, 1987) and M.l. Akbar, . Riot Ajier Riot' - Reporting on Caste 
and Communal Violence in India (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1988). 
568 For a contemporary example, see BlIl"I1, Baby, Bum, The Los Angeles Race Riot (London: 
Gollancz, 1966); J. Cohen's and W.S. Murphy's account of the Watts Riots of 1965. The Los 
Angeles Police Department produced several individuals (like civil-rights activist and comedian 
Dick Gregory) who were supposed to then assume control of the crowd. The crowd rejected 
these individuals on the grounds they did not share an ideology, with one individual responding 
to the activist's pleas with 'Baby, if you're going to be one of us, here's a bottle - throw it'. For 
an example closer to the Jacques, the crowds rejection of the \vords of Lord Jean des Mares, and 
his attempts to appease the rioters, in the tax revolt in Paris of 1382: in the Chroniqlle du 
Religew; de Saint-Denys, YIIJ, Book 3: Chapter I, trans. Cohn, PP pp. 275-280. 
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individual to have led the peasants: Guillaume Cale.569 Three of them describe 
Cale as being elected or chosen by the Jacques to lead them. For most, 
descriptions of Cale's actions are vague and unspecific, as with the Clzronique 
des regnes de Jean II et Charles V: 
They elected a captain called Guillaume Cale and went to Compiegne, 
but the townsmen would not let them enter. Then they went to Senlis and 
forced many of the town to flee into the countryside. They knocked 
down all the fortresses of the region ... 570 
Only the Chronique des Quatres Premiers Valois attributed any specific actions 
to Cale, and it gave him the role of chief negotiator, trying to temper the violent 
rage of the Jacques. 
Cale is not just memorable for his actions; for each of the chroniclers, 
Cale becomes a representation of how they understood the Jacquerie. For 
Richard Lescot, who saw the Jacques as rabid dogs, Cale was simply a 
'rustico,.571 For Jean de Venette, who saw them as acting with some misplaced 
sense of justice, the leader is an 'astute peasant' .572 Furthelmore, the Chronique 
des Quatres Premiers Valois, who disapproved of the Jacques but saw them as 
well organised and effective, the leader is a stabilising force: 'a knowlegeable 
man ... many times Guillaume Cale told them they had gone way too 1'ar,.573 
This chronicle even offers an entirely different explanation to anything recorded 
elsewhere - Cale was seized and forced to lead the Jacques. This account 
foreshadows the repeated defence used in the remissions that individuals were 
569 Guillaume Cale is referred to as 'Guillaume Cale' in Clzroll. des reglles, v.l, p. 177, 
'Guillaume Charles' in Chron. premiers Va/Dis, p. 72, 'Guillelmus Calle' in Lescot, Chrol1., p. 
126, and 'Guillelmum Karle' in Venette, Chron., v.2, p. 263 . 
. '70 Chroll. des regnes. v.l, p. 178, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 166. 
5/1 Lescot, Chrol1., p. 126, 'quodam rustico qui Guillelmus Calle vocabatur'. 
572 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Venelle, p. 71. In the original Latin, Calc is 
described as a 'rusticum magis astutum'. 
573 Chron. premiers Va/Dis, p. 71, t1'ans. Cohn, PP, p. 158-62. He was also described as a 'ung 
homme bien sachant et bien parI ant, de belle figure et forme'. 
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coerced into leading troops.574 These last two sympathetic pictures of Cale are 
what shaped the visions of Hilton, Cazelles, Mollat and Wolff. 
However, Cale does not appear in all chronicle accounts; JeanIe Bel and 
others depicted a very different individual. The cannibalistic Jak Bonhomme is 
clearly a dramatic invention, a personification of the worst excesses of peasant 
violence. The Anonimalle Chronicle sees him as akin to the Devil: 'Jak 
Bonehonune ripped babies from their mothers' wombs and with these babies' 
blood quenched their thirst and anointed their bodies in contempt of God and his 
saints ... a haughty and anogant man with the hemi of Lucifer in executing his 
deeds,.575 Jak Bonhomme is not a real individual, but beneath the hyperbole 
there lies an important point. The chroniclers made the same connection as their 
contemporaries and the modern reader: they intended the allusion to the' Jacques 
Bonhommes', the slang term for the peasantry.576 Rather than a case of mistaken 
identity, these chroniclers prefen'ed to leave an image of peasant bmtality 
antlu'opomorphised into an individual. For several chroniclers, no single leader 
led the Jacques but rather the bloodlust of the peasantry itself: 'he who dared 
commit the greatest evil and the vilest deeds was deemed the greatest master' .577 
Not only was Cale's leadership undercut by those who considered the 
movement spasmodic, violent and leaderless, it was also questioned by those 
who forfwlrd Cale as the leader. There are contradictory notes as to how much 
574 ibid., 'dont Guillaume Charles leur dist souventeifoiz qu'ilz excedoient trop grandement, maiz 
onc pour ce rien n' en lasserent'. 
575 Anollimaiie Chronic/e, p. 42, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 172-3. 
576 The exact date of the tenn's origin is clouded ~ the continuateur of the Chronicle of Guillaume 
de Nangis mentions it appearil1g as a tenn of derision used by the nobility to describe the entire 
peasant class in 1356. For discussion of the tenns rise to prominence, see Luce, Jacq1/erie, pp.4-
6, and Medeiros, Jacq1/es c{ Chroniquers, p. 184. For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that 
the tenn was certainly well-known and widespread by the time chroniclers like Ie Bel created the 
character of 'Jak Bonhomme·. 1t was also used in the remissions as early as November 1359 
(AN, JJ90, t 182, no. 354). 
577 Bel, Cflron., v.2, p. 257, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 151. 
223 
control Cale held over the Jacques. The Clzrol1ique Normal1de suggests that Cale 
was not even in charge of the greatest portion of the Jacques: whilst Cale' s force 
at Clermont of around eight hundred was slaughtered by Charles of Navan'e's 
army, over two thousand Jacques were slaughtered by the nobles' counter-
offensive in the north of the Paris basin.57S The Clzronique des regl1es de Jean II 
et Clzarles V places Cale similarly, beheaded at Clermont after individual groups 
of Jacques were defeated in the repression originating in Meaux, as does the 
Chroniqlle Quatres Premiers Valois. 579 Given the many kilometres between 
Clennont, where Cale was beheaded, and the thousands of peasants executed 
around the countryside, Cale could not have effectively controlled all the rebels. 
This distance from the the mass of rebels, scattered across much of the n01ih of 
France, indicates the problems with assuming Cale's position to be analogous to 
that of the typical military commander. There are other suggestions that Cale was 
not in complete autonomous command. When Cale tried to preserve the revolt in 
face of an oncoming defeat by the opposing annies, he met resistance from his 
charges: 
Guillame Charles said to them 'We will go towards Paris and take up a 
position there, since we will have support and aid of those of the city'. 
Then the Jacques cried out they would never flee. sso 
Even in the account that credits Cale with the most direct action, his control of 
his men is described as tenuous. The Chronique des Quatres Premiers Valois 
also names a hospitaller who seems to have been on an equal footing with 
578 Chrol1. 110rm., p. 130-1, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 164. 
579 Chrol1. des regnes. v.l, p. 184, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 167, Clzroll. premiers Valois, p. 73-4, trans. 
Cohn, PP, p. 158-61. 
580 Chroll. premiers Valois, p. 73-4, trans. Cohn, pp, p. 158-62. 
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Cale;5S1 the Clzrollique Normande alone mentioned that Cale was just. 'one of a 
number of captains' .582 
Yet despite this inconsistency between his position and his power, 
Guillaume Cale, unlike Jak Bonhomme, IS a verifiably real figure, and was 
recognised by the crown and the individual Jacques as a leader. The letters of 
remIssIOn give some evidence that Cale was an important leader within· the 
rebellion. Twice they refer to him by name, and on five other occasions, they 
make reference to a ruling capitaille (or capitaines) of the countryside. 
Considering that Cale is referred to as the ruling capitaine in the same body of 
sources, it is a fair assumption that it might be Cale: 
Table XIX. Mentions on general capitaine. 
JJ Place Terminology 
JJS630S Mello (Oise) 'by constraint of the said people and their 
. . ,';S, 
capztame - -
]]S6309 Mello, Pont- 'by constraint of the said people and their 
Saint-Maxence capitaille', 'in the absence of the general 
and Montataire . . '584 capztame 
(Oise) 
JJS6344 Conty 'capitaine subj ect to the ruling capitaines 
(Somme) of the countryside,585 
JJS6345 Courtes 'by the constraint and entreaties of the 
(Oise) capitaines of the countryside,586 
JJS6391 Catenoy 'by the force and constraint of the late 
(Oise) Guillaume Calle previously made capitaine 
of the people and communities of the 
beauvaisis' , 'in the said company of 
581 ibid. The original states: . Maiz cle fait les Jacques Ie prindrent et en tirent leur gouverneur 
avecques ung home qui estoit hospitalier, qui avoit veu des guerres·. 
,82 Chrol1. 110rm., p. 129-30, trans. Cohn, PP, p. 164. 
583 'par contrainte dudit peuple et de leur capitaine', AN, JJ86, f. 102, no. 308, reprinted in Luce, 
Jacquerie, p. 260. 
'S~ 'par contrainte dud it peuple et de leur capitainc', 'en I'absence de leur capitaine general', AN, 
JJ86, f. 102, no. 309, reprinted in Luce, Jacijllerie, pp. 261-2. 
,85 'capitaine subjct des souverains capitaincs du plat pais', AN, JJ86, f. 116, no. 344. 
586 'par la contrainte et entretment des capitaines du dit plat pays', AN, JJ86, f 121, no. 355, 
reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie. pp. 268-70. 
5S7 'par la force and contrainte de feu Guillaume Calle n'a gaircs estoit capitaine du pcuple et 
communes de beauvaisis' ; 'en la dicte compangie of Guillaume Calle', AN, JJ86, f. 136, no. 391. 
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Guillaume Calle')~/ 
JJ86437 Montdidier 'With other capitaines of the plat pays')O~ 
(Somme) 
JJ98252 Montataire 'Guillaume Cale, the capitaine of the said 
(Oise) men of the countryside' 589 
The most famous of these remISSIOns is the last one, used by Simeon Luce, 
Raymond Cazelles, Leon Mirot and Sam Cohn to illustrate a variety of different 
points regarding the Jacquerie. The remission broadly agrees with the more 
sympathetic picture painted by the Clzronique des Quatres Premiers Valois. Far 
from being a monster, or a token 'captain' of a spasmodic movement, Cale 
exercised control of his charges. Indicative of this is the remission issued to 
Mahieu de Leurel, who had assisted in the murder of Jean Bernier, a member of 
the Jacques accused of treasonous complicity with Charles of Navarre: 
Around the time of the feast day, Jehan Bernier, a non-noble, was 
allegedly accused of treason, because letters from the King of Navane 
were found on him, and he was commonly known for such deeds in this 
region. From this, he was led to Guillaume Cale, then captain of the 
people of the countryside, to be tried and punished. Guillaume handed 
him over to Etienne du Wes, then captain of the village of Montataire, to 
be put to death, if he (Etienne), the villagers and those of the sunounding 
countryside judged that he deserved it. 590 
After being brought initially to face the 'captain of the people', Bernier is 
handed over by Cale to a local captain to receive his punishment. If we do 
assume Cale to be nominally 'in charge' of the Jacquerie, then this remission 
suggests a pyramid of organisation below him. 
This remission is not without its problems: it was issued in March 1364, 
almost six years after the insunection. Bearing in mind that the name of 
5S, 'avec autrcs capitaines des plat-pays', AN, J./86, f. 154, no. 437. 
589 'Guillaume Cale, lars capitaine dez dictes gens du dit plat pays', AN, JJ98, f. 120, no. 252 
590 AN, JJ98, f. 120, no. 252; reprinted in Luce,Jacqllerie, pp. 333-5, tr. Cohn, PP, pp. 191-2. 
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Guillaume Cale was known by chroniclers as far north as Flanders and as far 
west as the Rouen, it can be assumed that Cale's reputation was well known 
within the lIe de France as well. In the document, Cale is a shadowy figure who 
Mahieu himself does not interact with. This suggests there is symbolic value to 
mentioning Cale - the name is recognisable enough to wan-ant inclusion within 
the remission. Moreover, it increases the power of the plea for clemency - for 
Mahieu, claiming reduced culpability for the homicide, who better to mention 
than Guillaume Cale himself, whose name was still memorable years after the 
event? More than just confirming his position as the head of an organisational 
structure, they confirm Cale's position as the symbolic head of the movement. 
His name was important in both the histories and the legal documents, either for 
retelling the story of the Jacquerie or for explaining the individual stories of the 
Jacques. 
However, another remission gives us a better sense of Cale having led his 
men. Issued in the aftennath of the revolt - August 1358 - the remission details 
the involvement of Arneul Guenelon, an individual who rose to prominence Cby 
force and constraint', as the remission maintains) as leader of the rebels from the 
village (ville) ofCatenoy (Oise). According to the pardon, he was forced to take 
charge of this settlement by Guillaume Cale, here described as the 'capitaine du 
peuple et communes de beawnonsis'. However, more interesting than this plea 
for clemency, Cale is then described as issuing an order to Guenelon's troops: 
under force and constraint of the late Guille Calle, previously capitaine of 
the people and community of the Beaumonsis, his adherents and 
companions of the region assembled for knocking doV'm, destroyed and 
bumed the houses, mansions and fOliresses of the nobles .... [Cale] 
ordered the said company to execute several persons, make several 
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pillages .and bum houses and several others went to the castle of 
Em1enonville ... their company was sent to the town of Senlis.591 
The men from Catenoy attacked the castle at Ennenonville, and then moved on 
to Senlis. This action was confinned by another remission: Germain de 
Reveillon is said to take control of the attack on the castle at Ennenonville when 
he became capitaine "in the absence of their general captain'. 592 These two 
remISSIOns together show Cale taking direct action - sending groups of 
individuals to Ennenonville, south of where Cale would eventually meet his 
death at Clennont. 
Even within these descriptions, we see that whatever hierarchical 
organisation the Jacques had was dynamic. Guenelon has control of his men in 
Catenoy, but sUITendered authority to Cale, while his men are subsumed into the 
bigger group of rebels. He had control of them again on the trip to Em1enonville, 
but when they aITive it was Germain de Reveillon who was their capitaine. 
Cale's absence from such an important (and well-reported) moment in the 
uprising as when Senlis refused to allow the Jacques within the walls indicates 
that much of the action happened without their general captain. 
Three of the five remissions that mention a top-rung of leadership in the 
Jacques also indicate a plurality of leadership at the top of the upnsmg. 
ConculTing with the Clzronique Normande, and the Clzronique des Premiers 
Quatres Valois, they suggest that Cale was not the only important leader. These 
three, all issued in August of 1358, mentioned multiple capitaines, in one case 
091 'par la force et contrainte de feu Guille Calle n'a gaires esleu capitaine du peuple et commune 
de Beaumonsis de ses adherens et complices assembles au dit pais pour aler abatre et destruire 
ardoir et abatre les chiiteaux mansones lieux et for(Tesses des nobles ... ordenes de la dicte 
compaigne furent plusiers personnes mises a mort, plusiers pillages arsures de maisions et 
plusiers aucunes gu'il firent du chastel d'ennenonville ... leur compagnie mettent en la vile de 
Senlis' AN, JJ86, f. 136. no. 391. 
on 'en l'absence de leur capitaine general', AN, JJ86, [ 102, no. 309, reprinted in Luce, 
Jacquerie, pp. 261-2. 
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describing a local capitaine as 'subject to the sovereign captains of the 
countryside'. This direct recognition that leadership was not solely the preserve 
of one individual indicates the complexity of this crowd. 
Cale is referred to as the capitaine of the 'men from the Beauvaisis' in 
one remission. All five of the remissions that mention Cale or a singular ruling 
capitaine come from the same general area, the area between Clermont and 
Senlis - near the heartland of the Jacquerie, or at least one of its most important 
nodes, but only a small fraction of the area that the rebellion encompassed:593 
Map XI. Guillaume Cale's involvement. 
Clermont 
• 
• Catenoy 
• La Presl • 
• Milo Pont-Saint 
• . Maxence 
Manta Ire .SENLIS 
Green places on this map indicate where Cale was mentioned. The 
actions he directs - the murder of Jehan Bernier and the deployment of Arnuel 
Guenelon's men - take place within the same belt (Ermenonville is just a little 
south of Senlis). This area is little more than 30km from point to point, and 
concurs with the chronicle accounts: Cale was murdered by Charles of Navarre at 
593 The scale of this map is 1 / 850,000. 
229 
Clennont, and hailed from the village of Mello. We have no evidence of Cale 
operating outside this region (small in ten11S of the range of the Jacquerie, which 
spread past Amiens to the nOlih and as far east as Bar and west to Rouen). It is 
hard to make the case for him exhibiting control in the majority of villages 
outside this central pocket. 
These remissions, like the chroniclers, offer us a double vision of Cale's 
role within the Jacques. They confinn that Cale was viewed as the symbolic 
head of the uprising, but was only a regional leader. Cale did exercise power 
over his charges: not only did he pass Jehan Bernier to the villagers of 
Montataire for execution, but he deployed the men of Catenoy towards Senlis 
and Ermenonville. Simultaneously however, like the chroniclers, the remissions 
undercut the notion that Cale was in complete control of what was a complex 
movement. Cale only has control in the area he came from, around Clermont. 
According to the remissions, there were many ruling capitaines of the Jacques. 
In addition, these ruling capitaines were not always the driving force; instead, 
local capitanes controlled their men, like Etienne du Wes and Arneul Guenelon. 
These individuals may have occasionally received orders and directions from the 
top, but they also operated independently: it was up to the villagers of Montataire 
and their elected capitaine to decide the fate of Jehan Bernier. 
Peasant communities largely operated independently with their own separate 
capitaines, providing the organisational thrust to the Jacquerie, rather than one 
symbolic leader or a small group of centralised chiefs. While chroniclers and 
historians have focussed on the prominent individual, the remissions provide 
another layer of leadership, a myriad of intluential figures within a myriad of 
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communities. In comparative studies of peasant revolt, the phenomenon of 
primary and secondary leaders has been recognised the fonner providing a 
focal point or figurehead (often prophetic), with the latter providing the 
organisational dynamism (and aggression) to the revolt.s94 While painting Cale 
as a prophetic leader would be misleading, his representation has served to 
obscure the real thrust of leadership that according to the remissions came not 
from the top of any hierarchy of the Jacques, but rather from the bottom, within 
the individual villages communties that rose up. 
Within the remissions, seventeen documents mention a local leader, 
whether it is an individual receiving the remission or within another's pardon 
nan-ative.595 They are identified by the single reoccun-ing word, capitaine, which 
appeared from the earliest remissions just months after the Jacquerie, until the 
last mention in the middle of the 1360s.596 These local captains provide the real 
driving force behind groups of Jacques acting against local targets: 
094 The terms 'primary' and 'secondary' should not be seen as declaring one type ofleadership 
subservient to the other. Adas does partly intend to illustrate how a revolt can deviate from its 
original intentions, but as regards the Jacquerie, this is not the case. See Adas, Prophels of 
Rebe/1iol7, pp. 130-7. 
090 In several occasions, such as in the remission of Mahieu de LeureI, the capitail1e is mentioned 
in the narrative of the remission, rather than the capitail1e being the individual who is receiving 
the remission. 
096 All twenty-one remissions use the telln capitail1e to describe leaders. 
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Table XX. Mentions of local capitaines. 
NAME REMISSION PLACE Occupation? 
Jacques de JJ86207 Montmorency None 
Chennevieres (Val d'Oise) 
Guillame JJ86221 Deuil None 
Lanyeux (Val d'Oise) 
Jean Hullot JJ86298 Etavigny None 
(Oise) 
Germain de JJ86309 Ermenonville Familier de 
Reveillon (Oise) Comte de 
Montfort 
Colart Ie JJ86344 Conty None 
Maunier (Somme) 
Estienne Nolon JJ86361 Jaux (Oise) None 
Jean Ie Grant JJ86362 Jaux (Oise) None 
Arnoul Guenelon JJ86391 Catenoy (Oise) None 
Simon Doublet JJ86392 Grand vill iers None 
(Oise) 
Jean des Hayes JJ86444 Rhuis (Oise) None 
Jean Bignet JJ89609 Remy (Oise) None 
Philippe JJ90148 Ponchon Royal sergeant 
Poignant (Oise) 
Jean Flageolot JJ90292 Favresse None 
(Marne) 
Hue de JJ90298 Angicourt None 
Sailleville (Oise) 
Michel Marin JJ90234 Saint-Amand None 
Gilles Ie Haguez JJ90354 Chambly None 
(Oise) 
Pierre Paingnant JJ90364 Neuilly None 
(Aisne) 
<unnamed JJ94004 Oize None 
capitain> 
Etienne du Wes JJ98252 Montataire None 
We are told virtually nothing about these individuals, their status or their position 
in society, except in the case of Philippe Poignant. Many of the remissions give 
us little idea of what these capitaines may have done. The most extreme 
example of this is the fragment of the remission for Michel Martin, which simply 
states 'Item - another similar and in the fonn of the previous one ... for Michel 
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Martin of Saint-Am and made capitaine by the habitants of the said town of 
S · A d' '197 HId a111t- man.- owever, t 1ese ocuments can shed light on the nature of 
leadership in the J acquerie. 
In almost every case, the inhabitants of these communities select and 
promote individuals to be capitaines. They are not appointed from Cale or 
another ruling captain but rather by their neighbours. These individuals are 
'made capitaine' by the villagers, often after they have 'assembled'; indeed, 
Jehan Bignet was 'electus capitainus,.598 This people power extended to the top 
level; according to Jean de Venette, the peasants 'combined in great numbers and 
appointed Guillame Cale ... their capitaine', although there is no specific evidence 
about how this election might have taken place.599 
In several of these cases, the elected capitaine seemed to renounce his 
role in the remission, or claimed to have been forced to act. This could be seen 
to reaffinn the power of the crowd: the rebels may elect representatives, but they 
may also discard them. And of course, there may be confusion: historians may 
use different categories to ascribe leadership to individuals than a fourteenth-
century court. Although these rioters may well have been described as 
capitaines, that does not necessarily mean that they led the revolt in the way we 
might assume. More likely, this is an embodiment of why Davis describes 
remissions as 'fiction in the archives,.6oo These individuals have a vested interest 
in proving themselves im10cent of any crimes they are accused of. The majority 
597 'Item .. autre semblable et en 121 foullne de ceste dessus passee et signee comme dessus pour 
Michel Martin de Saint-Amand esleu capitaine par les habitans de la dicte ville de Saint-Amand', 
AN. JJ90, f. 150, no. 293. 
598 AN, JJ89, f. 218, no. 609. 
<99 Venette, Chron., v. 2, p. 263, trans. Birdsall, Venette, p. 7l. 
600 Davis, Fiction in the Archives. 
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wished to portray themselves as individuals 'under the constraint,601 of either the 
community that they served: 'Estienne Nolon was made lieutenant and capitaine 
against his will and wishes by the habitants of the said village (vi1le),,602 while 
Amuel Guenelon acted 'by the force and constraint of their lord Guillaume 
Calle,.603 As with all remissions, we must remain vigilant - appellants had to 
mll1Ull1se their role within the movement to be granted a pardon. Pierre 
Paignant, for example, who became capitaine of the prevatt of Neuilly (Aisne), 
sought his remission after being 'sent to prison in the belfry at Soissons' for a 
year, and would not have been wanting to linger too long upon his crimes.604 
Despite the denials of individual involvement, leadership within the riot did 
exist: village assemblies regularly fonned and elected them. The revolt was not a 
spasmodic rising. Its programme was not selected randomly, nor handed down 
from above by an overarching authority beyond the boundaries of the ville. 
When Cazelles and Hilton considered Cale, they both placed him at the 
top of the highest social group that fits their model of the Jacques. This implies a 
reliance on a kind of natural order to the crowd - that they select leaders from 
whom they were naturally led by. However, certainly in the experience of 
peasants in other contexts, this is relatively rare. Many examples indicated that 
the crowd 1110st often subverted the natural (or imposed) hierarchy of the village. 
In early modem Japan, for example, peasant revolts and petitions regularly 
601 Of our sample of 20 leaders, 6 mcntion that they may be acting under constraint. Terms used 
include 'contrc son gre et valente' (AN, JJ86, f 123, no. 361), 'par contrainte' (AN, JJ86, f 123, 
no. 362) and 'par la force ct contrainte de feu Guille Cale' (AN, ]]86, f. 136, no. 391). 
602 'Estienl1c Nolan eust este csleu contre son gre et volente par les habitans dc 1a dicte ville 
lieutenant du capitaine d'icelle' AN, JJ86, f 136, no. 391. 
603 'par la force ct contrainte de seignuer Guille Calle'. 
604 AN, JJ90, f. 124, no. 364, Phi1lipe Paingnant was 'mettent en prison au belfroy au Soissons'. 
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bypassed the authority of the village 'headman'. 605 Remissions for the J acquerie 
emphasise a similar lack of reliance on the old order. Had they held to it, the 
clergy would have been prominent as leaders and, as we have seen, they were 
not. In most cases, communities of Jacques have selected leaders who were not 
prominent even within their own community. Only two give any sign of their 
employment. One of those is a royal sergeant, and ifhis role as a capitaine could 
be multiplied many times over this may lend truth to Cazelles' ascriptions,606 the 
other is afamilier of the count of MontfOli, and leads the rebels from the town of 
Ermenoville. Yet, these are the only cases of such individuals. Instead, the 
silence concerning the occupations of the other individuals is telling. There is no 
mention even of the better-off peasantry or rural landowners (nonnally signified 
by the phrase lzommc de labolll)' If the insurgents did contain several members 
of the military, then we would expect to see them prominently at the £i'ont of 
these crowd movements, as in the cities, especially Paris. We might also expect 
to see evidence of local officials orchestrating their charges' actions. In a village 
society that had a perceptible hierarchy to it, one would think this would be 
visible in the organisation of the peasant clusters, but it is not. In Jaux, for 
example, where a Parisian sergeant is pardoned for joining the revolt, there is no 
implication that he was in charge of the groUp.607 Rather, two individuals from 
the village who had no occupation wOlih recording both assumed the mantle of 
60; See l.W. White, lkki: Social COllflict alld Politica! Protest ill Early Modern Japall (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1995). For other examples of crowds selecting individuals other than 
an existing hierarchy might suggest, see Cohen and Murphy, BlIrn, Baby.Bum: in both instance 
no community leaders featured within the crowd, and leadership was instead provided by 
individual instigators identifying new targets. Barker et a1. in their discussion ofleadership find 
that in many movement contexts "[c]onventional cultural capital can be a positive hindrance', C. 
Barker et ai, "Introduction', Leadership and Social Movemellts, p. 8. 
606 AN, JJ90, [ 81, no. 148: Poignant is described as being "sergcnt du nostre dit seigneur'. 
G07 AN, JJ86, [ 76, no. 233. 
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leading this community at different times. 608 That insurgents certainly ignored 
their traditional representatives like mayors and clerics is indicative of their 
power: the Jacques themselves held ultimate control of their actions. 
In modern models of crowd action, the leaders' responsibilities are to 
help groups achieve their goal or to interpret their agenda into direct action. 609 It 
falls to the leader to channel the crowd's emotions, and to tum the crowd's 
wishes into action. Although the matter is dealt with in two separate remissions, 
Simon Doublet led the villagers of Grandvilliers, Poix and Lignieres (all Somme) 
to destroy the castle at Poix,6]O and may also have played a part in the murder of 
the knight Guillaume de Picquigny by a group of 'murderers and rebels' midway 
between the latter two settlements.6]] Jacquin de Chennevieres led the men of 
Montmorency (Val d'Oise) against local targets, specifically the chateau there.612 
It was not only on the offensive that local leaders made their presence felt. Two 
leaders, Jean Flageolot and Jean Ie Grant, came to prominence in their 
settlements after the initial burst of violence, as they reorganised their followers 
to resist the attacks of nobles. When the nobles in their counter-offensive were 
attempting to gain control of the forests around Compiegne, Jean Ie Grant and the 
men of Jaux refused to send the felTyboat to them.613 Flageolot (appointed 
through the absence of their original leader) brought together several villages that 
assembled to protect themselves from the lord of Saint-Dizier's counter-
60S AN, JJ86, f. 123, nos. 361 and 362. Remissions are issued for two capitailZcs, Estienne No10n 
and Jean Ie Grant. 
609 Reichereral., 'Socialldentity', p.17. 
610 AN, .IJ86, f. 136, no. 392; ]]87, f. 1, no. 1. 
611 AN, JJ86, f. 54, no. 165; reprinted ill Luce, Jacqllcric, pp. 245-7 'rebelles et murtiers'. 
612 AN, JJ86, f. 67, no. 207. 
613 AN, JJ86, f. 123, no. 362. 
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offensive against the men of the countryside.614 These individuals turned the 
anger of the non-nobles under their command into direct action against the 
nobility, either through resistance or attacks on their property and persons. There 
is no trace here of any direction from Guillaume Cale, or anyone else at the top 
of some regional or pan-regional heirarchy. 
The remissions show that any hierarchy within the Jacques was not static. What 
these remissions indicate, like the Chroniqlle Normande and Chronique des 
Quatres Premiers Valois, is that leadership was not a strict hierarchy like 
Cazelles proposed.615 What did exist was informal. In some cases, leaders 
seemed to be serving other leaders; the episode concerning Etienne du Wes is the 
best example. This was not the only example, however: 'Colart Ie Maunier who 
lived in Conti in the county of Clern10nt was made a capitaine subject to the 
1· .. f h 'd ' (PI . ) 616 ru mg capztaznes 0 t e countrysl e at pazs . In other cases, different 
leaders could work alongside each other: two separate individuals led the village 
of Jaux. The inhabitants needed Estienne Nolon to organise their attacks on the 
nobles, and Jean Ie Grant to organise their defence.617 The .Tacquerie provides 
another example of "the complex and messy dynamics of a historical social 
618 
movement' . 
The role of capitaine was not fixed: as mentioned earlier, Gern1ain de 
Reveillon originally acted under constraint of Cale, and then became captain 
614 AN, J190, f 97, no. 292, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 293-4, 'acceptant Ie dit oftice de 
capitcnarie pour ce que Ie Seigneur dc Saint-Dizier accompaignez de grant nombre dez gens 
da1111es chevauchee jusques les gens clu pais'. 
615 Ryan, 'The Cult of Personality', p. 211, as 'images of activisits ancl leaders have become 
mediated through layers of representation ... [ilt is all too easy for movements to become reified, 
their internal dynamics and collective identity processes no longer visible to the modern 
researcher'. 
616 AN, JJ86, f 116, no. 344. 
617 AN, JJ86, f. 123, nos. 361 and 362. 
61S Ryan, 'The Cult of Personality', p. 211. 
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himself (although, he claimed, only for one day and one night) in Ca1e's 
absence. 619 Presumably another capitainc, Arnuel Guenelon of Catenoy, came 
under Reveillon' s charge there. 610 
This flexible chain of command, with power being held by individual 
collectives of villages, towns and peasants, not by a think-tank powering the 
whole movement, represents the only manner wherby a movement like the 
Jacquerie could function. Philippe Poignant was leading his troop apparently 
under duress, but then brought them into the main force for a great 
'chevaucMe,.621 Groups, like that of Poignant's, could act as independent entities 
before joining the main force and falling under the control of (presumably) Cale 
or his counterparts, if they ever did. These men and their followers were not 
controlled from above by their superiors. There is no other evidence of any 
orders or objectives being specified from above than the two remissions that 
mention Cale. Any hierarchy may well have been symbolic, known to the 
insurgents in concept rather than through direct contact with the ruling 
capitaincs. This fluid organisation would fit a movement like the Jacques, which 
covered a massive area, especially considering that Cale's name appears nowhere 
outside the immediate sunoundings of the fIe de France. 
In contrast, these local leaders are scattered across the whole north of 
France. These individuals who came from these groups can be found across in 
the area where Jacques rose up (which was larger than Mollat and Wolff would 
1 b 1· ) 6"0 lave us e leve : --
610 AN, .1186, f. 102,110.309, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 261-2. 
620 ibid., and AN, JJ86. f. 136, no. 391. 
621 AN, JJ90, f. 81, no. 148. 
622 The scale of this map is 1/1,500.000. 
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Map XII. Local leaders' involvement. 
AMiENS 
Conty 
• Grandvilliers 
Clermont . Jaux 
. Ponch • Catenoy 
• • urt La Pres. 0 .... ;5 
• Milo Pont·S,,,m 
Manta ire ;:~~I~ce 
N·euHly 
. Ermonvi lle 
~tav;gny 
• Favresse 
Green place-names indicate mentions of Guillaume Cale, blue place-names 
indicate local capitaines specified by the remISSIOns. The change in the 
respective area covered is remarkable. Not included on this map, there is a 
fragment of a remission which mentions Michel Martin to have been the leader 
of a force at Saint-Amand, which is almost as far north as Tournai.623 There are 
two leaders found within a couple of miles of each other, south of Amiens.624 
Jean Flageolot is said to have led several villages around Favresse (Marne), 
which is right on the borders of Bar, level in longitude with Verdun.625 These are 
what we might consider the furthest reaches of the Jacquerie, yet local leaders are 
by no means only found on the periphery. The majority come from the heartland 
of the Jacques, between Paris and Beauvais, with men like Gilles Ie Haguez in 
Chambll26 (Oise) and Pierre Paignant in Neuilly (Aisne).627 This heartland also 
spreads to Compiegne, with villages such as Jaux (Oise). We also see individual 
623 AN, JJ90, f. 125, no. 234. 
624 AN, 1186, f. 116, no. 344 (Conty) ; JJ86, f. 136, no. 392 (Poix). 
625 AN, JJ90, f. 149, no. 292; reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 293-4. 
626 AN, JJ90, f. 182, no. 354; reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 297-9. 
627 AN, 1190, f. 186, no. 364. 
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leaders hailing from the same part of the country that Cale came from: those 
already mentioned like Gen11ain de Reveillon and Arneul Guenelon and others, 
none of whom make any mention of Guillaume Cale or any other regional leader. 
Moreover, the leaders were not outsiders. They led communities they were very 
much familiar with, if not born in: 
Table XXI. Mentions of the local capitaines. 
LEADER REMISSION HAILS FROM LEADS Distance AGAINST 
between? 
Jacques de JJ86207 Taverney Montmorency Around 10 
Chennevieres km 
Guillame JJ86221 Deuil Deuil 
Lanyeux 
Jean Hullot J.l86298 Etavigny Etavigny 
Gennain de .lJ86309 Ern1enonville Ennenonville 
Reveil10n 
Col art Ie JJ86344 Conty Conty 
Maunier 
Estienne Nolon JJ86 361 Jaux Jaux 
Jean Ie Grant ]]86362 Jaux Jaux Those 
attacking 
Jaux 
Arnoul .JJ86 391 Catenoy Catenoy Clennont 
Guenelon and then to 
Ennenonville 
Simon Doublet 1.186392 Grandvilliers Grandvi 11 i ers, Villages all 
Poix and within 
Lignieres 10km 
Jean Signet ]]89609 Remy Remy 
Philippe JJ90 148 Ponchon 4 towns Oize and 
Poignant Therain 
region 
Jean Flageolot J.J90 292 Favresse Several villages Organsied 
around Favresse defences in 
same villages 
Hue de .JJ90 298 Angicourt Angicourt 
Sail1eville 
Michel Marin JJ90234 Saint-Amand Saint-Amand 
Gilles Ie JJ90354 Chambly Chambly 
Haguez 
PieHe JJ90364 Neuilly Neuilly 
Paingnant 
<unnamed JJ94004 Oize 
capitain> 
Etienne du Wes ]]98252 Montataire Montataire 
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All these individuals are identified as from within or nearby the communities that 
they lead. Leaders for whom names and places of residence are listed came from 
the community that they rose to lead or from a neighbouring one. The most 
distant, Jacques de Chennevieres, hailed from Taverney (Val d'Oise), around 
eight kilometres outside Montmorency where he was their elected leader.628 
Even then, Taverney and Montmorency are both intimately linked - bordering 
the same forest and connected by road. In the remissions where the crimes of 
these companies of Jacques are listed, all of these groups acted against local 
targets: the furthest from their home that these rebels fought was Guenelon's men 
from Catenoy, who ended up ten kilometres to the south in Senlis on Cale's 
instruction, but this is only after causing devastation within their own region. 
These leaders were not in charge of large regional forces: some of these 
leaders operated very close to another capitaine. Jacques de Chemlevieres's 
force from Taverney, on the outskirts of what we would consider modern Paris, 
was just ten kilometres away from Guillaume Lanyeux and the inhabitants of 
Deui1.629 Simon Doublet may have led the villages of Poix, Lingnieres and 
Grandvilliers (all SOllline, south of Amiens) in rebellion, but again just ten 
kilometres away (the same distance that separated the villages under his 
command), Conty's force was following Colart de Maunier. 63o 
This is one of the reasons that we can be confident in saying that the 
surviving records represent only the tip of the iceberg, and that leadership 
permeated every single group of villagers who rose up. Of one hundred and 
seventy four individual references, only twenty make any mention of leadership 
within the Jacques. Can we really talk of a leadership hierarchy on a scattering 
628 AN, JJ86, f. 67, n. 207; reprinted in Luce. Jacquerie. pp. 254-6. 
629 AN, JJ86, f. 72, n. 221. 
630 AN, JJ86, f. 116, n. 344. 
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of names? Is there anything to suggest that this group made up anything more 
than just the second rung of Cale's hierarchy? 
Although we have only dealt so far with the remissions that have specified a 
capitaine, there is reason to believe that they represent just a small sample of the 
many leaders who were working within the Jacques. For example, numerous 
remissions described actions as being done in conceli with 'several others of the 
said town', which implies that the individual is either receiving the remission for 
the community as a whole (as a representative), or he is somehow considered to 
be more guilty than the other inhabitants. Jean Bouquel of Pont-Point (Oise), for 
example, was granted a remission for his part in the murder of the noble spy, 
conU11itted with thiliy-four habitants of the village and the adjoining 
settlement. 631 The implication is that Bouquel is seeking grace on behalf of 
himself and the villagers, and therefore may have been the 'leader' of that 
paliicular attack. 
Even without adding to the number of remissions that may well indicate 
leadership to have been present, we can still consider it likely that the majority of 
settlements had someone who fitted the tenn capitaine. Above all, the 
remissions indicate the necessity of even some of the smallest conununities 
needing a leader. Moreover, the contrast between the force marshalled by 
Philippe Poignant, who was at the head of four villages who then joined the main 
force with Cale, compared with those like Michel Martin who seemed to have 
held sway over only one village, indicates how levels of leadership varied and 
631 AN, JJ96, f. 220, no. 425, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllcrie, pp. 311-2. 
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thatall sizes of settlements generated leaders.632 These leaders each perfonned 
acts of violence during the insurgency on radically different scales, whether 
within the confines of the main force, as with Poignant, or Jean Ie Grant, the 
second leader of Jaux (Oise), who organised the villagers to bar entry to nobles 
and foreign mercenaries. Again, remissions only concern the exceptions to the 
justice administered by the crown to the people of the plat-pays, and we should 
consider these leaders either exceptionally f0l1unate to have escaped death at the 
hands of the enraged nobles, or exceptionally unfOl1unate to have been identified 
as a capitaine in the first place. 
The story that these remissions tell is ce11ainly suggestive of a large 
number of micro-insurgencies, all of which could have identified a leader 
amongst their midst. Certainly, these individuals do not represent some elite 
circle of leadership, or even the chief ringleaders, amongst the Jacques. If 
leaders were vital to such small cOlllil1Unities, then nearly every cOlllil1Unity and 
each individual attack, of which the remissions recount many, must have had at 
least some form of capitaine. 
To understand exactly the imp0l1ance of the leaders of the Jacques (and indeed 
any crowd) we must understand what it means to be a leader within a crowd. 
Trying to fit Cale, and the leadership of the Jacques, into the mould of a 
commander-in-chiet~ leads to misconceptions about his role. Hilton grapples 
with the concept of Cale as a military leader, deciding that the Jacques' 
shambolic defeat indicates that he had no preparation, yet the organisational 
abilities convince Cazelles that they must have been well-versed in warfare, 
632 AN, JJ90, f 81, no. 148 and f. 125, no. 234. 
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especially considering the speed at which towns and chateaux were taken.633 No 
remission, and only one chronicle, gives us any sense that Cale was involved in 
any SOli of military plaIlliing. 
Similarly, attempts to force a top-down hierarchy on the Jacques are 
misplaced. While it is obvious that Cale was viewed as the leader of the 
movement of the Jacquerie, and the remissions suggest that Cale may have held 
b f b 1· 634 h' 1 1" power over anum er 0 su - leutenants,' t ere IS no sense t 1at t 11S IS 
necessarily a military hierarchy, with Cale specifying targets that sub-groups 
would focus upon. 635 Rather, these rebel 'cells' were operating independently of 
the "ruling captain'. Very few of the remissions conceming 'leaders' mentioned 
any link with the hierarchy.636 There was no suggestion that Cale was an 
exceptional individual within the crowd, apart from those few that describe him 
as the most impOliant of them all. 
So if leadership was provided on a smaller scale, by men elected by their 
own communities, what did these leaders actually do? In the most basic sense, 
they represented the crowd, and were perceived by both crown and compatriots 
as being responsible for their charges' actions. More than that, their very 
existence provided a structure under which the movement could exist. By 
selecting objectives, casting the first stone or even just spearheading an attack, 
the leaders transfonned the ideological base of the revolt, the anger at the 
633 Hilton, Bond Men i,dade Free, pp. 119-122 and R, Cazelles, "The Jacquerie'. p. 79 While 
CazelIes emphasises the tactical value of their targets, Hilton calls the rebels' [mJilitarily 
inexperienced' . 
604 Again, the remission for Mahieu de Leurel is the best example of this. AN, JJ98, f. 120, no. 
252, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 333-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 161-2. 
635 Media eoverage focuses on the 'leaders' often'OJist organisations, but ten'orist cells operate 
independently ofthe 'leader' with whom they share only an over-arching ideology. This is an 
accurate comparison with the Jacquerie: the emphasis placed by historians upon Guillaume Cale 
obscures the independent aetions ofthe localised 'cells' acting against the crown, who were 
linked ideologically to Cale, but not practically. 
636 Fifteen make no reference to any form ofleaders, or group, operating 'above' the 10cal1eader. 
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nobility, into action. While the precise nature of these attacks varied, all the 
crowds interpreted them in a broadly similar manner, targeting in particular the 
homes and property of local nobles. There was undoubtedly a sense of purpose 
to those being led: it is mostly those Jacques outside the leadership structure (the 
two young men who stole the chickens and carps, for example) that behaved in a 
different manner. 637 
We can assume that most Jacques, with their neighbours and fellow 
habitants of the villages who assembled and bonded together, had some sort of 
capitaine within their association who directed their action. We can also assume 
that these men, rather than being manipulative outsiders, resembled their 
followers. Cale, and those other capitaines in charge of the main force, were 
impOliant, and their legend has been preserved for us when we consider the 
Jacques. But the important part of the revolt, the genesis of the programme of 
destruction, lies with the local leaders, not in the hands of the main force. Rather 
than memorialisinga heroic individual who marshalled the eventual defeat of the 
Jacques, credit should lie at the feet of Michel Mmiin and Guillaume Lanyeux, 
who, with their followers' blessing, led the groups to destroy numerous targets. 
The Jacques appeared to be a leaderless people, because active leadership was 
being provided by names that the chroniclers never knew. 
COMMUNICATION 
The unit of rebellion was the village community, and leadership was provided by 
local men within those conm1Unities, but when we think of the bigger picture, it 
637 AN, JJ86, f. 97, no. 291. rcplinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 256-7. 
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is necessary to understand how and why these communities felt they were pmi of 
the same wider rebellion. While each village did act separately, they also were 
considered (and considered themselves) to be part of something larger: the 
remissions described all actions as committed in conjunction with 'other men of 
the plat-pays', and in the remissions insurgents refer to themselves as Jacques or 
as motivated by the 'time of conunotions'. As illustrated, several knew the name 
of Guillaume Cale, and remissions make reference to assemblies, conspiracies 
and joint action: how could these messages be passed between separate insurgent 
') groups; 
In the models of pre-industrial revolt, popular preaching was one way in 
which rebellious communities can share and communicate ideas between 
themselves, and can foster the imagined bonds between them. 638 When we 
searched for the influence of the clergy in the Jacquelie, however, the sources 
were very quiet. Not only is church propeliy relatively undamaged in the revolt, 
very few mentions of preachers exist, and fewer still take a leading role in the 
campmgn. Moreover, we have no record of any preaching of revolutionary 
ideology from the pulpit, nor any popular religious fever like the kind that 
inspired the Flagellants to spread tlu'ough Gem1any and across the French border 
in the wake of the Black Death, or that can be seen in other late medieval revolts 
such as in Flanders in 1327 or more prominently in revolts ofheretics.639 
If the message was not coming from the pulpit, then, how were these 
village communities hearing the word, and spreading it onwards? How could 
63& The most commonly cited model is that ofY.-M. Berce, Revolt and revo/llfiol1. For a fullcr 
analysis, see Davis, 'Religious Riot'. 
639 See Cohn, LlIst for Liberty, pp. 100-104 for discussion of religious riots in the late medieval 
period. 
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news of the rebellion pass quickly enough that the peasantry as distant as on the 
borders with Flanders join the rebellion'? 
Recent scholarship has shown that the infrastructure of rural life in the Middle 
Ages was stronger than had previously been assumed. Most bridges were 
constructed at high-expense, built from stone, and lasted deep into the modem 
era. 640 In medieval England, for example, the price of transporting crops was 
relatively low; it was 40% less in the fourteenth century than it was in the 
. I 1 641 elg1teent1 century. The affordable cost of transport implies other things 
about medieval trade links: the proliferation of markets, the quality of roads and 
speed at which goods could be moved. Medieval infrastructure was good enough 
to foster links between cOlmnunities, and these links extended further and wider 
than previously assumed. 
Everything from the transfer of political rumours to religious heresy 
quickly disseminated throughout rural communities. Moreover, the transport of 
news could result in popular action. 642 In 1377, Berkshire villages came to a 
standstill on account of 'the great rumour among various other tenants', in this 
case an uprising of some forty villages in Wiltshire, Hampshire and SUlTey.643 
Letters of remission also testify to the swift passage of rumours from settlement 
to settlement. Many individuals mention continued 'ill wishes and hostility' long 
640 See D.F. HalTison. 'Blidges and Economic Development, 1300-1800', Economic History 
Review, 45 (1992), pp. 240-261. 
641 1. Masschacle, 'Transport Costs in Medieval England', Economic History ReFiew, 46 (1993), 
p.276. 
642 The importance of rum our in revolt has not diminished over the centuries. In the aftennath of 
the 1919 race riot in Chicago, the RepOli of the Chicago Commission on Race Relations featured 
a whole section on rumour, and concluded that '[rjumor, fennenting in mobs, prepares the mob 
mind for the direct suggcstion impelling otherwise law-abiding citizens to atrocities'. In The 
Negro in Chicago: A Studv o/Race Relations and a Race Riot (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1922), p. 35. 
643 R.J. Faith, 'The 'Great Rumour' of 1377 and Peasant Ideology', in The English Rising, ed. 
Aston and Hilton, pp. 43-70. 
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after the event from the local nobility: their reputations were known across the 
local area. 6.+4 Official pardons were about bringing an end to the rumours 
conceming these individuals' participation in the violence. 
So how did rebellion spread? The message could be transfened by individuals. 
When considering how revolutionary ideals spread to epidemic propoliions, 
Malcolm Gladwell used the example of Paul Revere and the spread of 
revolutionary fervour at the start of the American Revolution of 1779.645 
Revere's ride through the north-eastern towns spreading the word of rebellion is 
one famous example of how an individual can pass the message of revolt and 
rebellion onwards. This journey, encompassing several different conununities, 
provided a means to transmit this message to communities who wished to take 
part. According to Gladwell, word-of-mouth epidemics, like rebellions, require 
'connectors': individuals with links in several communities who can quickly 
disseminate ideas through their links.646 Thus, when considering the spread of 
revolt, it is wOlih considering the possibility of certain individuals having a 
particular importance in the spread of revolutionary ideas. 
We can find individuals like this, interacting with other communities, 
spreading the word of the Jacquerie, even in the letters of remission; for example, 
Jacques de Chennievieres travelled the few kilometres to the neighboUling 
6H 'malivolence et hayne', as it appears in the majority of remissions. 
645 M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point (London: Little, Brown, 2002). 
646 Recent studies into networks support this. In any given network, most nodes have relatively 
few connections, but a minority of key nodes have numerous connections which keep the 
network expanding. Sce Barabasi, Linked. For the application of scale-free networks to 
medieval rural society, see P. Ormerod and A.P. Roach, 'The Medieval inquisiton: scale free 
networks and the suppression of heresy' , Physica A, 339 (2004), pp. 645-52. With regard to 
insurgent movements, see pp. 219-225, and also M. S.-Y. Chwe, 'Structure and Strategy in 
Collective Action', The American Journal ojSociology, 105, n.1 (Jul., 1990), pp. 128-156. 
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village to lead them into revolt.647 Jean Flageolot helped some villagers around 
Favresse (Marne) to organise defenses. 648 Piene de MontfOli, citizen of Caen, 
was seen to be 'giving speeches of evil and disorder' to the people of the city and 
those around (even in Picardy), while also declaring loyalty to the men of the 
plat pais in their struggle. 649 An outsider, Jehan Charoit of Marioles, was 
pardoned with the habitants of Egly (Essonne).650 Individuals from the outside 
could convince new communities to rebel. 
We cannot, however, consider the individual to be paramount in the 
spread of the insurgency. As Gladwell stresses, the power lies within the 
message the men canied. Like any epidemic, rebellions require the agent to be 
contagious and adaptable enough to stick on when it is exposed to new groups. 
The agent could be transmitted in many f0TI11s. Most notably, rebels were often 
orators, and used words to convince others of their cause. The Parisians, for 
example had 'been won over by many false words, deceptions, proclamations 
and by other malicious and deceptive means,.6SI Etienne Marcel's greatest 
weapons were his words ; the standard start of the remissions for the Parisian 
rebels was ' ... at the instigation, prompting and encouragement of the deceased 
Etienne Marcel'. 652 In Amiens, as well, it was the spoken word that provoked 
the most action: 'many of Amiens said and spread astonishing and injurious 
words against our state and persons'. 653 As discussed in Chapter II, Marcel even 
sent lieutenants, like Jean Hersent, to villages dependent on Paris (like Chatres-
6H AN, .IJ86, f. 67. no. 207. 
6~S AN, JJ90, f 149, no. 292, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp.293-4. 
649 AN, JJS7, f. 136, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 291-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 189-
91. 
650 AN, .l.J86, f 70, no. 215. 
651 AN, JJ86, f. 79. no. 240, reprinted in Secousse, Ordonnances, pp. 346-7, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 
179-180. 
652 For example, see AN, JJ86, f. 68, no. 209. 
653 AN, JJ86, f 79, no. 239, reprinted in Secousse, Orilol1lwnces, pp. 97-9, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 
197-8. 
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sous-Montlhery) to convince the inhabitants to join the Parisian rebellion under 
the command of several "commissaries', even if this mission failed. 654 
This emphasis could be found in the countryside as well. As we have 
seen, Pierre de Montfort in Caen transmitted the message of rebellion through his 
'speeches of evil and disorder'. 655 In the village of Ballieo (Oise), an individual 
wamed 'in a loud voice' that the enemy intended to destroy their land, causing 
the men to assemble in Saint-Vrain with the intention of resisting the nobility.656 
Yet there is reason to believe that others perfom1ed a similar role. We have 
already discussed the capitaines, who were clearly involved in spearheading and 
organising their villages. Presumably, when Gennain de Reveillon took on the 
duties of the general capitaine it was his job to spread the message. 
The chroniclers also suggest the importance of oratory. Even Jean Ie Bel 
suggests a group was responsible for spreading the message: 
At first there were not a hundred of them, saying that the nobles, knights 
and squires were ruining and disgracing the kingdom, and it would be 
good if they all were destroyed. Each [rebel] said: 'He speaks the truth; 
he speaks the truth. Shame on him who allows them to live.657 
The agency for the spread of the rebellion is not placed in the hands of the 
peasants who attacked the battalion at Saint-Leu; rather, it was a group of less 
than one hundred rabble-rousers who convinced others of the 'truth' with whom 
the responsibility lies. Of course, there is no evidence that even one rebel said 
this line. This may have been chanted on the fields of the Beauvaisis, but was it 
chanted in Champagne or Picardy? However, it gives us an understanding how 
important the spoken word can be in h'ansmitting the message between a group 
654 AN, .IJ86, f. 76. no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 263-4. 
655 AN, JJ87, f. 136, no. 231, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 291-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 189-
91. 
656 AN, JJ86, f. 164, no. 465, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 281-2. 
657 Bel, Chrol1., v.2, p. 256, trans. Cohn, pp, pp. 152. 
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as large as the Jacques. Phrases and war cries can give us some sense of the 
appeal of the message, and how it applies to these individuals. The Chronique 
des Quatres Premiers Valois puts another phrase into the mouths of the rebels: 
All these nobles and many others whose names are not recorded here, at 
least a thousand men-at-anus, joined the King of NavalTe's company to 
face the Jacques, who with a fierce demeanour held their ranks, tooting 
their horns and trumpets and crying haughtily 'Mont joye', and they 
carTied many insignia painted with the Fleur-de-lis.65s 
'Mont joye' was of course the traditional battle-cry of the king of France. What 
that actually meant in a time of unceliain kingship is unclear: King Jean of 
course is held captive because of the perceived failure of the nobility; perhaps, as 
in the Peasant's Revolt of 1381, the rebels believed the dauphin to have been 
misled by his advisors. Even as short a chant as 'Mont joye' has important 
symbolic value. S. Reicher, discussing the work ofN.Z. Davis on religious riot, 
describes four functions that oratory and speeches perfonu: 
First they constitute the rival group as a threat which needed to be 
defended against. Second, they urge violent attack as the best fonu of 
defence. Third, they point to the particular fon1lS the violence should 
take. FOUlih, they legitimate and indeed sanctify such violence as doing 
the Lord's work. 659 
Under this critelia, 'Mont joye' is a potent chant indeed: the noble enemies are 
defined as being in opposition to the rightful king, the order is given in the fOlm 
of a war-cry which in tum infonued (or perhaps represented ) the force's 
decision to fight a pitched battle, and finally, it legitimises the revolt in the name 
of the lord, in this case secular rather than religious. 66o The Chrolliqlle' s repOli 
65S Cfzroll. premiers Valois, p. 74, trans. Cohn, pp, p. 162. 
6:'9 Reicher, 'The Challenge of the Crowd' (in press). 
660 An accurate assesment of what an average medieval peasant might have considered utopian is 
impossible to attain; however. the importance of the King in the Jacques' chants is similar to 
Hilton's characterisation of peasants' political vision in the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381: 'a 
popular monarchy. a state without nobles, perhaps without churchmen, in which the peasants and 
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of Clermont is problematic: it goes into great detail surrounding the battle, but no 
other account corroborates any of its details (or mentions similar sentiments 
towards the crown),661 and it was written some forty years after the violence. It is 
possible that the CJzronique des Quatres Premiers Valois may have been 
mocking the rebels - it seems unlikely that the peasants actually had horns and 
trumpeters alongside them. Nonetheless, the Clzronique did see fit to credit the 
peasants with a chant; the spoken word was one way in which peasants could 
show solidarity, redefine their identity, and convey their message to others. 
Recent scholarship has stressed that large-scale medieval peasant revolts were 
held together by a surprising emphasis on written messages. In Cade's Rebellion 
of 1450, there seems to have been an intricate web of communication amongst 
notaries and scribes - nearly every rebel leader had a scribe or messenger. For 
example, Thomas Cheyne, 'leader' of the rising in eastern Kent in 1450, had a 
scrivener who sent messages about the country.662 The English Peasants' Revolt 
displays similar links. In Wa1singham's record of the events of 1381 in England, 
he records that John Ball sent a letter to Essex exhorting them to continue their 
riot, which seems to have been reproduced and found on the body of an insurgent 
(Wa1singham uses 'these', implying he was carrying propaganda). Steven 
Justice makes the case that several of the rebels' speeches that Knighton records 
may actually have been letters produced to suppOli the case. Justice also argued 
their king are the only social forces'. Hilton, The Eng/ish Peasantl]! in the Later Middle Ages, 
p.14. 
661 Some chroniclers of the English Peasants' Revolt of 1381 suggested the peasantry held loyalty 
towards their monarch. For example, the AI/onima/le Chronicle, p. 148 reports the peasants 
kneeling down in front of the King and declaring 'Welcome our Lord King Richard, if it pleases 
you, and we will not have any other king but you', trans. W. Oman, reprinted in in The Peasants 
Revolt of 1381, ed. B. Dobson, p. 181. 
662 Harvey. Jack Cade's Rebe//iOiI Cif 1450, p. 75. That rebellion also produced a series of well-
infonned petitions, ibid., p. 105. 
252 
that differences in the dialect of these letters indicate. that these documents were 
copied and recopied.663 
Scattered references suggest letters may have been just as impOliant to 
the Jacques as they were to the English peasants some twenty years later. For 
example, in Etienne Marcel's communications with the bonnes villes, he claimed 
he had sent 'confidential letters to [the Jacques] to stop the great evil,.664 
Moreover, the remission issued to Jehanne Rose on behalf of her executed 
husband, the cleric Jean Rose, tells how Guillaume Cale sent Jean and another 
'constrained man' to negotiate a truce with the men of Compiegne. Jean, fearing 
for his o\vn life (and having sent his family to Compiegne for their own safety) 
agreed to carried the message to the townsmen: 
the said general capitain of the countryside sent the said Jehan and one 
other constrained man to carry letters to the bourgeois and habitants of 
the said town (ville) of Compiegne to ask them if they wished to become 
allies of the men of the countryside and sustain comfOli and aid them .... 
to these said letters the said bourgeois and habitants made responses to 
the said capitaine and his allies and adherents.665 
Letters were clearly important to the Jacquerie. In forming important alliances 
the written word, just like the channs of an orator or the words of a delegate, 
could be vital for the rebels. More importantly, Cale, his allies and adherents 
expected a written response. These rebels were communicating through writing 
with other communities in the realm: letters were important in convincing new 
allies to join the uprising. 
663 S. Justice, Writing and Rebellion, England in 1381 (Berkeley: University of Cali fomi a Press, 
1993). See 'Insurgent Literacy', pp. 1 3-66. 
664 Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Picardy and Flanders, trans. Cohn, pp, p. 177. 
665 'lc dit general capitaine du dit plat pais envoya icelui 1ehan et un autre homme contraintes 
porter lettres aus bourgeois et habitans d'ieelle ville de eompiegne a fin qu'il voussisent etre aliez 
avee les gens du dit plat pais et eulx soustenir conforter et aider en ..... des quelles lcttres les dis 
bourgeois et habitans firent response au dit capitiane et a ses allies et adherens ... ·. AN, 1J86, f. 
124,110. 365, replintcd in Luee, Jacquerie, pp. 272-4. 
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· Letters were not only useful in forging new alliances, but they could also 
be used to consolidate old ones. We have already drawn heavily on one letter 
concerning the Jacques, the pardon issued for the mason Mathieu de Leurel for 
his part in the murder of one Jean Bernier.666 This same Jean Bernier, who was 
suspected of treason with Navarre and was 'commonly known for such deeds in 
the region', was executed when 'letters from the King of NavalTe were found on 
him'. Obviously, this anecdote indicates the level of antagonism against NavalTe 
by the Jacques, but it also suggests of the importance of the written word. 
Whether Bernier held the letters, or was simply accused of holding letters, 
allegiance was indicated by documents rather than rumour. Writing was 
impol1ant both in communicating old loyalties and forging new ones.667 
Another signal that seems to be pat1icularly imp0l1ant for the Jacques, and 
intimately cOlmected to parish and community life, was the ringing of the church 
bells. For example: 
the lord of Saint Dizier with a great number of soldiers rode towards 
Vitry in Perthois. This greatly enraged the people of this region. In many 
villages, they rang their bells and assembled against this Lord of Saint-
Dizier, fearing he wished to hann them. 668 
Church bells held an exceptionally important role in pre-modem society, 
especially in rural societies: 'church bells ... might well be compared to the role 
of the telephone, radio, newpapers, clock, calendars and telegrams in our day ... 
they measured the time in daily practices and served as a channel to transmit the 
666 AN, JJ9S, f. 84, no. 252, reprinted in Luce, Jacqllerie, pp. 333-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 191-L 
667 Etienne Marcel himself scnt "letters' to the bOllnes villes to communicate his views on the 
Jacquerie. See "Letter of Etienne Marcel to the Communes of Pieardy and Flanders', trans. Cohn, 
PP, pp. 177-S. 
663 AN, JJ90, f 97, no. 292, reprinted ill Luce, JacqueJ'ie, pp. 293-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 190-1 
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most important messages,.669 Bells were a 'sacred object, symbol of the identity 
d 1 · f . ,670 A d' f ., d an co 1eSlOn 0 a commul11ty . s a me lUm 0 commul11catmg messages, an 
a call to assembly for the public, bells obviously had significance in the genesis 
of popular movements.67l Jelle Haemers, refelTing to fifteenth-century Flemish 
revolts, desclibes bells as 'the voice of power, a vital medium to mobilize the 
masses,.672 Improper ringing of these bells could result in the culprit being 
executed. The bells themselves could be the targets of retaliation; following the 
Harelle of 1382 in Rouen, the King 'dismantled the bell that had called the 
commune to action'.673 
In the case of the Jacquerie it was clear that the authorities construed the 
ringing of bells to be a call to arms for the peasantry. In the case of Jean 
Flageolot and his charges, the crown had originally considered the ringing of the 
bells to have been evidence in itself of the villagers' intent. 674 Although they had 
not attacked any local settlements, nor needed to defend themselves from the 
Lord of Saint-Dizier, the ringing of the bells was enough to suggest that they 
might have. In the same region, Jean Ie Jacqueminart's remission indicates that 
669 S. Menache, The Vox Dei: Communication in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), p. 9 The definitive work on the importance and symbolism of bells in rural life is 
Alain Corbin's Les Cloches de la Terre. Paysage sonore et cultllre sensible dalls les campagnes 
all XIXe siecle (Paris: Albin Miche'l, 1994), although it concentrates only on the 19th century. For 
works 011 sound in earlier periods, see Cockayne, 'Cacophony, or vile scrapers on vile 
instruments', pp. 35-47, and D. GaITioch, 'Sounds of the city: the soundscape of early modern 
European towns', Urhan HistofT 30, n.l (2003), pp. 5-25. 
670 Corbin, Les Cloches de la Terre. p.267. Bells were a crucial factor in a village community's 
own identity. Miguel Angel Marin suggested that because bell-ringing was 'probably a local 
feature that only natives would be able to understand', they 'helped to create a sense of spatial 
awareness and oflocal identity'. M.A. Marin, 'Sound and urban life in a small Spanish town 
during the ancien regime', Urban History, 29, n.l (2002), pp. 58-9. 
671 Berce describes the ringing of bells as one of the characteristics of the 'pre-modern' revolt: 
'Ringing ceaselessly, the alann bell summoned the inhabitants of the neighbourhood who flocked 
to join the pillage, of which they would have their share if the rioters left the town gates open'. 
Berce, Rel'O/l and revollliion, p. liS. 
672 J. Haemers, 'A Moody Community? Emotion and Ritual in Late Medieval Urban Revolts', in 
Emotions in {he Hearl oIthe City (Fourteenth 10 Sixteenth Centuries); Studies in Urban Historv, 
ed. E. Lecupprc-Desjardin and A.L. Van Bruaenl (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 41-62. 
673 Chronique dll Religiellx de Saint-Denys, vol. 6, pp. 144-5, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 281. 
674 AN, JJ90, f. 97, no. 292, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 293-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 190-1. 
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the villagers of Thiebelemont (Marne) were sunmloned .at the sound of bells.675 
The impOliance is underlined in another remission, where the priest Jean Morel 
was accused of having "sold the bells to the nobles,.676 Bells (and bellmakers) 
were important to the village, the community and their lords. Who had control of 
these 'sacred objects;, and what they did with them, was instrumental in bringing 
the villagers into revolt. Most explicit was a remission that details exactly how 
the bells could be used in case of danger. The ringing of the bells alerted 
villagers to danger, 'where anyone who was able was sent to the village (vme) 
where sounds or the striking of the said bells statied, to resist enemies and to 
suppress their force'. 677 The ringing of two bells in Ballieo (Oise) also allowed 
the assembly to hear the words of one individual who warned them that when 
'enemy parties an-ived, the whole parish would be devastated,.678 Bells both 
warned the villagers and sUlllilloned them together to hear the common message. 
The role of visual imagery within popular revolts has been much discussed, as 
has the importance of symbols and signs within uprisings. Symbols offer 
legitimacy to the crowd's actions. They also offer means of binding together 
individuals within the crowd to act in unison. 679 Trexler and Cohn have 
demonstrated the power of flags within the Ciompi,68o and while that patiicular 
practice was not common in the nOlihern Europe, other symbols took their place 
6
7
5 AN, JJ86, f 121, no. 355, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 268-70. 
676 AN, JJ86, f 89, no. 265, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 270-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 188-9. 
677 AN, JJ86, f 164, no. 465, reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie, pp. 281-2. 
678 ibid. 
679 Ralph H. Turner and Samuel 1. Surace write about the importance of the symbol, and how it 
can bind a disparate crowd if they know what it 'means, in their 1956 essay 'Zoot-Suiters and 
Mexicans: Symbols in Crowd Behaviour', in Collective Behaviour, ed. Ralph. H. Turncr and 
Lewis M. Killian (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1957): 'To the degree, then, to which any 
symbol evokes only one consistent set of connotations throughtout the community, only one 
general course of action with respect to that object will be indicated, and the union of diverse 
members of the community into an acting crowd will be facilitated', p. 19. 
680 Trexler, 'Follow the Flag', Cohn, Lustfor Liherty, pp. 177-92. 
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especially in the cities. 681 If we consider Marcel's revolt in Paris, chronicle 
accounts and also remissions indicate the importance of costume and image in 
the uprising. This is made clear by the remissions, like this one issued to 
Guillaume Ie Fevre: 
They wore a silver buckle enamelled half in vermilion, half in blue, with 
'to a good end' written underneath it. And they wore parti-coloured 
hoods as a sign to live or die with this provost, against all others. 682 
This symbol was clearly known in Paris, and the crown mentions it in several 
remissions. It is also clear that a substantial number of these individuals were 
specifically indicted for wearing this costume. Not only was it known to the 
French crown and the Parisian people, but other rebels in the north. For 
example, in Amiens, 'they put on the hoods, part blue and red, as a sign of their 
unity and alliance with the city of Paris,.683 Symbolism was not trapped solely 
within the crowd that was rioting, but it could spread beyond the boundaries to 
other crowds and other rebels - it could mean as much to outsiders as it did to the 
rebels themselves. 
We see nothing that matches the complexity of the urban examples, but 
there is scattered evidence of symbolism connected with the rising. Pierre de 
Montfort, for example, while attempting to convince the people of Caen to join 
the revolt, showed unity with the Jacques by replacing the feather in his hat with 
a model plough. 684 If this symbol was understandable to the townsmen, as the 
document states, then the men of Caen were both aware of the Jacquerie, and 
considered it to be of a rural origin. Other than that, we have the account of the 
Chroniqllc des QlIatres Valois, which describes the rebels as draped in banners 
6,1 Cohn, LlIst/or Liberty, pp. 183-188. 
682 AN, JJ86, f. 85, no. 255, reprinted in Secousse, vol I, pp. 83-4, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 192-3. 
683 AN, 1186, f. 78, no. 239, reprinted in Secousse, pp. 97-9, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 197-8. 
684 AN, JJ87, f. 136, n. 23 L reprinted in Luce, Jacquerie. pp. 291-2, trans. Cohn, PP, pp. 189-91. 
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emblazoned with the fleur-de-lis. The 'fleur-de-lis', especially in the context of 
the Hundred Years War, is powerfully symbolic: the symbol had been burned 
into popular consciousnesses as a stereotype for 'peace and justice,.685 This 
account only applies to Cale's force, and as established earlier, this did not 
represent the whole rebellion. As we mentioned, the clu'onicler may not be the 
most reliable source on the revolt. However, if either this account or the 
remission is accurate, the acceptance of some form of insignia was a sign that 
symbolism could be impOliant for these rebels, even if not to the same extent as 
for their urban counterparts. 
Communities may have acted independently in selecting their own targets, but 
they could and did communicate ideas tlu'ough a variety of means. Not only 
were letters transfen'ed between rebel groups, but non-verbal signs and signals 
could both bring together conu11Unities as well as spread the message to those yet 
to rise. Moreover, the infrastructure and social organisation meant that rural 
villages (villes) could pass these messages along established routes. As we have 
seen, individuals with links to other villages or towns could bring the message to 
new settlements, like Pierre de MontfOli in Caen, or could organise the peasants 
together, like Jean Favresse who brought together several small villages to 
defend against the possibility of a noble attack. Jacques Chennievieres, of 
Taverney (Val d'Oise), could lead the neighbouring settlement of Montmorency 
in violence. 
The real success of the Jacquerieis apparent in the speed at which 
peasantry outside the Beauvaisis, upon the first outbreak of rebellion, themselves 
685 Menache, The Vox Dei, p. 201. 
258 
took up anns. That message could be transmitted in a variety of fonns but the 
power of the message is what seemed important: speeches, phrases and letters all 
seemed to have a lasting legacy that could easily be recalled by the courts and the 
appellants months and years later when remissions were issued. The citizens of 
Caen may have seen the plough on Pierre de Montfort's cap, and knew that it 
symbolised the rising of the peasants; the authorities considered the message 
powerful enough for Pierre to be anested, over 100 miles nOlih of the supposed 
heartland of the revolt. 
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7 - CONCLUSION 
At the end of October and November 2005, the disaffected youth of the housing 
projects around the major French cities, stmiing in Paris, rose up into large-scale 
social protest. Although only one person was killed, thousands of cars were 
burnt, numerous buildings were destroyed and public services disrupted in the 
ensuing violence. The incidents caused political tunnoil throughout France, and 
led to the opening of political discussions on subjects ranging from inner-city 
poverty to the uniculturalist attitude that supposedly defined French cultural 
policies up until that point. 686 
The riots lasted roughly until 18 November, or twenty-two days. In the 
intemational press, they were often described as a purely Parisian problem - for 
example, ABC News ran a 'special report' on the 'Paris Riots in Perspective,.687 
Any true perspective on the rioting would have identified that a national (and 
international, in the case of some 'sympathy riots' in neighbouring countries) 
problem, affecting 274 towns over departements as far from Paris as Ille-et-
Vilaine and Bas-Rhin in the north and west, and Alpes-Maritimes and Pyrenees-
Atlantiques in the south. 688 
While many intemational commentators ignored the scope and scale of 
the uprising, their focus naturally fell on the damage and disruption caused. The 
686 For example, see A. Duval Smith, 'The Week Paris Burned', The Observer, 6 November 
2006, available at http://observcL£U3rdian.co.uk/focus/storv/0.6903,1635373,00.html; ], 
Baudrillard, 'The Pyres of Autumn; NeH' Left Review 37 (2006), pp. 5-7; a series of papers 
available at htm://riotstrance.ssrc.or£ ascribe the root causc ofthc violence to (amongst other 
factors) sociology, economics or post-colonial apmiheid. 
687 'Paris Riots in Pcrspective', ABC News Special Report, 4 November 2005, accessed 31 March 
2006 http://abcnews.go.com/International/story?id= 1280843. 
638 'Linkcd' attacks were reported in Spain, Berlin, Switzerland, Belgium. the Netherlands, 
Greece and Denmark. Many of these attacks demonstrated similar methods (the burning of cars 
and trashcans) and professed sympathy with the bal1lieue inhabitants. For example, on II 
November 2005 a crowd of 80 youths attacked the French Institute in Thessalonika, Greece. In 
the French Caribbean colony of Guadeloupe, there were also riots. 
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violence caught the eye of many journalists and academics, who emphasised the. 
seemingly unorganised rampages of the disaffected urban youth in a style that 
encouraged compmison with the Jacquerie of 1358. For example, Bernard 
Henri-Levy wrote in Le Point that the riots were: 
A sinister energy of pure hatred. A nihilistic whirlwind of violence 
without idea or plan which intoxicates itself: town by town, in the 
reflection of its own spectacle in the TV images, which is itself just as 
fixated [with the violence].689 
This idea of nihilistic violence was furthered by Swiss journalist Martin Meyer: 
They may be increasingly 'nihilist', and armed with a willingness to 
COlllillit a violence honed by thousands of computer games. The events 
satisfy their desire for action, and are steered by the vague 'idea' that 
'this'll show the people in power'. But this mentality, far from theory and 
doctrine, makes it extremely difficult for the public secmity forces to 
respond efficiently. The more a spontaneous terror movement sees itself 
as 'playful', the more difficult it is to tackle.690 
Despite this emphasis on a meaningless 'whirlwind' of destruction, Levy did 
note, however, that there was organisation ('the group joined, with mobiles, 
exchanging text messages), the groups were effective (,mobile units') and there 
was some sort of programme (the movement would not stop 'until they had 
burned or tried to bum every last representative building of France and the State 
of Law,).691 Indeed, a riot reported to have started when teenagers died hiding 
from the police in an electricity installation ended in the destruction of several 
power stations in Amiens. It was even suggested by some that there were 
shadowy organisations operating behind the rebels: In The Spectator, Rod Liddle 
commentated that' [i]t may well be that the motive for the rioting was nothing 
more than an inchoate grievance allied to youthful exuberance and a penchant for 
6~9 B.-H. Levy, 'Sur l'explosion des banlieucs', Le Point, 10 November 2005. 
690 M. Meyer, . Frankreich brennt', Nelle Ziircher Zeitlll1g, 7 November 2005, h·ans. 
www.signandsight.com. 
691 Levy, 'Sur l'explosin des banlieues', Le Point, 10 November 2005. 
261 
bad behaviour, but it was Islam which gave it an identity and also its 
retrospective raison d'etre.,692 Interior Minister Nicolas Sarkozy hinted at a 
'1 . . , b h' d h 1 693 NIl 1 d fi . arge orgal11SatlOn e m t e revo t. onet 1e ess, t 1e e mmg comment on 
the banlieue rioting was that it was a revolt without a message or progr31mne. 
The links between this reportage and the chroniclers' depictions of the Jacquerie 
are obvious. A French phenomenon reported as a Parisian problem, in the 
fom1er case; in the latter, a revolt covering virtually the whole of the north, but 
repOlied as only taking place in the lIe de France. Both were described as revolts 
seemingly without 'meaning'. The chroniclers, like today's cOlmnentators, 
repOlied a certain organisation within the revolt, but these accounts were 
discarded in favour of tales of extreme violence (on the part of both the peasantry 
and the nobility). As later commentators will be influenced by the images of 
buming vehicles in Seine-Saint-Denis, modem historians have been influenced 
by the accounts of violence recorded by the chroniclers. The 'blazing fire of 
fifteen days' ,694 which could not have been organised because 'the peasants were 
too brutish', 695 is a product of the most salacious reportage by contemporaries. 
Yet as early as the nineteenth century, Simeon Luce had uncovered a 
source that allowed historians to understand mechanisms of this 'rampage'. The 
letters of remission, recorded in the Royal Chancery records, offered insight into 
individual rebels and rebel communities. Although they have since been used by 
a variety of historians, the Pieces Justificatives compiled by Simeon Luce has 
692 R. Liddle. The Spec/aror, 11 November 2005. 
69.' C. Salhani, 'Bedlam to Ballot: More to French Riots than meets the eye', II Nowmber 2005, 
htip:llwww.khalecjtimcs.com/Displavmiicle.asp?section=opinion&xfilc=data/opinion!2005!nove 
mbcr/opinion novcmber79.xml. 
694 Leguai:Les revoltes ruralcs', p. 58. 
695 Flammermont, 'La Jacquerie en Beauvaisis', p. 12. 
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ever since been assumed to represent the fun extent of the surviving sources. In 
truth, Luce's collection was only a small proportion of them, and concentrated on 
the attack on Meaux rather than the Jacquerie itself, and curiously, his own 
analysis drew more upon the chroniclers than the remissions he skilfully 
transcribed. He barely scratched the surface of these sources' potential. 
Letters of remission offer those interested in the rebellions of 1358 access 
to over two hundred individual testimonies about the events of that rebellious 
summer. They offer vital crucial information about individual rebels and 
communities, including geographical data, names and dates. Moreover, the 
nanatives themselves contain a variety of data that can, when compiled, give us a 
real sense of the character of the Jacquerie. 
Of course, remissions were not available to all rebels. They were 
intended for exceptions: for those who missed the general amnesty, those who 
felt they were harshly treated or those who could afford an advocate on their 
behalf. We have no sense of the total proportion of rebels this sample represents, 
and the circumstances sunounding the production of remissions suggest that the 
sample is weighted towards the better-off Jacques. Neither should we always 
take their narratives at face value; these documents were primarily intended to 
put the supplicant's case in as positive a fashion as possible, and utilised 
formulae that were familiar to the crown - tenns like gens du plat-pays - to 
appeal in a context most likely to bring them forgiveness. 
Yet even within the rigid formulae, we can discem infonnation of the 
nature of the revolt. Although recent scholarship has emphasised links between 
the Jacquerie and the rebellions of Marcel and Charles ofNavane, the remissions 
suggest that the each individual movement was almost entirely distinct. The 
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Jacque1ie was not a co-opted rebellion as Cazelles and Bessen concluded; the 
crown of France certainly makes clear that each revolt was unconnected. Even 
the example of Jacques and Parisian cooperation at Meaux is unsupPOlied; apmi 
from Jean Froissart's second-hand account, no other evidence points to the 
Jacques playing a large part in the attack on the Marche. 
Studying the Jacquerie through the remissions highlights that many of the 
old models concerning medieval revolt are simply inadequate. The Jacquerie 
was certainly not a food riot, which historians such as Rude claimed to be the 
most common form of the so-called 'pre-industrial 1iot,.696 Neither were its 
participants primarily women. Neither could the revolt be marked as being 
dominated by the clergy, as Berce and other emphasised for the whole of 'pre-
industrial Europe'. 697 These Jacques were peasants, agricultural labourers or 
semi-skilled workers who lived and worked in the rural economy. 
But there is more to the remissions than simply negating CUlTent 
scholarship. They indicate exactly how a large-scale revolt like the Jacquerie 
could function. Rather than one grand 'army' led by a general, the Jacques were 
hundreds of individual units attacking their own targets. The unit tended to be 
the most natural bond in rural society - the village. The community where 
peasants controlled common places and local customs was the same community 
in which they rose up as rebels. These villages selected local objectives, and 
waged often successful campaigns to destroy their local nobles' property. 
Villages did not need to remain independent, although they often did. On 
occasion, they joined together with other local groups to fOTIn substantial forces, 
696 G. Rude, 'The London Mob of the eighteenth century', The Historical JOllrnal, v. 2 (1959), 
pp.I-18. 
697 Y.-M. Berce, Revolt and Revollition in eadv modem Europe, an esssay Oil the histolY oI 
political violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987), trans. J. Bergin, pp. 67-9. 
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able to destroy local fortifications and houses. To do so, they used a variety of 
methods of conU11Unication, including the written word; they also organised 
regional assemblies and congregations where they could decide on a course of 
action, even if they eventually chose to return to their pastures without further 
action. Even when these assemblies were large, however, the focus remained 
localised: assemblies near Saint-Dizier or south of Paris did not look to the 
supposed heartland of the ile de France, but concentrated on nearby installations 
and fortifications. 
Moreover, the villages were led by local people, not outside agitators or 
lieutenants sent out by Etienne Marcel, although they all perfonned different 
actions like ananging offensives or defensive fOliifications, These leaders came 
from peasant backgrounds and the villages themselves, or from nearby parishes, 
and were promoted from within the ranks of rebels, rather than from outside. 
Tactics were detennined by the peasants and landworkers, not elites or ariisans; 
from top to bottom, the Jacquerie was a peasants' revolt. 
While this image of the Jacquerie may contrast with older Images of 
revolt, it minors the cunent emphasis from social psychologists, who have 
sought to explain the complexity of popular movements and return the emphasis 
onto the insurgents themselves, rather than outside forces like the nobility.698 It 
also min'ors the work of recent scholarship into the popular movements of the 
Middle Ages. Systematic study of hundreds of medieval revolts has shown that 
'not even class-prejudiced chroniclers suggested that the subaltern classes 
depend on outside social superiors to lead them'. 699 They were often large-scale, 
69S Reicher, The Psychology of Crowd Dynamics (in press). 
699 Cohn, Lustfal" Liberty, p. 129. 
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well-organised, had lofty ideals (although on this we have little evidence from 
the Jacquerie) and created bold plans of attack. 
The Jacquerie was undoubtedly different to the majority of revolts of the 
Middle Ages. That the chroniclers treated the revolt and the retaliation as 
exceptional, plus the sudden weight put on the legal infrastructure with the mass 
issuing of remissions designed to restore the peace in the countryside, indicates 
something entirely new in the crown's experience. Yet much of this can be 
accounted for by the scale of the uprising, stretching as it did across much of 
northern France. Naturally, such a large revolt had a bigger emotional impact for 
the chroniclers and the crown than did the more regular urban uprising, often 
confined within city walls. There was more violence, but possibly proportionate 
to the increased scale of the rebellion. The nobles' retaliation was bloodier, but 
the crown sought to temper it by sounding a conciliatory tone in its issues of 
pardons and fines for the damage. 
In these new models, the Jacques were rebels who fought with a purpose, 
were often successful (at least in their short-term, accomplishing their tactical 
missions) and were capable of organising themselves without the help of the 
nobility. Rather than a post-traumatic psychological reaction to the coming of 
the Black Death, or an explosion of exasperation from the destitute peasantry, the 
peasants in this area acted to protect their communities against the military 
nobility who they saw as responsible for the bligandage then sweeping across the 
countryside. Many similar peasant communities in this period echoed these 
actions, some of which were also mistaken for taking part in the Jacquerie, like at 
Vitteaux near Dijon.7oo Nor did this movement die with the Jacques; rather 
700 See' Peasant Resistance'. p. 182-196. 
266 
resistance to anned individuals marked the relationship. between crown and 
peasants for at least the next several years. 
The tendency to describe the Jacquerie of 1358 as akin to the mindless 
displays of violence in the wake of the Black Death, like the Flagellant 
movement, is incorrect; rather, it is far closer to what has been described the so-
called cluster of 'complex revolts' between 1378 and 1382. The Jacquerie was 
not 'incoherent' nor 'spontaneous', the adjectives Mollat and Wolff used to 
describe it. 701 Rather, it was organised and directed with clear targets and 
identifiable chiefs, Using the remissions, we have come a long way from Jean Ie 
Bel descriptions of the leaderless rebels' 'mindless rampage' .702 The rediscovery 
of the Jacquerie as a dynamic movement of related peasant settlements renders 
d .. l'k' , ff h k 7()i escnptlOns 1 e 'unllnportant as 0 t e mar r. • The Jacquerie needs to 
reassume its rightful place as the most impol1ant social movement in the history 
of medieval France, as the chroniclers knew, and the remissions prove. 
701 MoJlat and Woltl, Popular Revollltions, p. 128. 
~02 BcI, Chrol1., v.2, p. 256, trans. Cohn, PP. p. 151. 
703 Lcguai:Lcs revoltes rurales', p. 58. 
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Appendix I: Letters of remission connected to the Jacquerie 
Remissions issued to suspected Jacques 
This table includes all remissions issued to supplicants (either individuals or 
communities) that were suspected of being part of the Jacquerie. When 
'individuals' is used, it indicates that a number of persons were identified by 
name; when 'inhabitants' is used, the remission is issued to the entire 
community. Note in some cases remissions refer to a specific individual and 
'others of the said ville': in this table, only the name of the supplicant is 
recorded. 
SERIES ITEM ISSUED TO ... 
(JJ) 
86 203 Oudal1 Rouy and Colet Yon 
86 205 Jacquin de Chennievieres 
86 207 Inhabitants ofBoissy-sous-Yon and Egly 
86 208 Several individuals from St. Martin (near Paris) 
86 215 Inhabitants of Boissy 
86 221 Guillaume Lanyeux 
86 222 Jean Boulaille 
86 223 Jean Leber 
86 224 Jean Ourcel 
86 ?,.,') _J~ Vincent de la Vallee 
86 '),., -_J) Thomas Couereusse 
86 239 Inhabitants of Amiens 
86 244 Jehan Fillon 
86 246 Inhabitants of Precy-sur-Oise 
86 247 Jehan de Four and Jacquet de Saux 
86 249 Guillaume Ie Charron 
86 250 Enguerran and Guillaume de la Mare 
86 254 Colin du Bruille 
86 256 Oudart Ie Colet 
86 262 Raoul Ie Bouchier 
86 265 Jean Morel 
86 267 Robert des Jardins 
86 268 Simon Ie Cordier 
86 269 8 individuals from Lucy-Ie-Bocage 
86 275 Thiebaut Ie Maire 
86 280 Inhabitants of Vemars-sur-Oise 
86 286 Four individuals from Tremblay 
86 291 Colin Francoise and Nicolas Ie Fremy 
86 297 Gauchier Lore 
86 298 Jean Huillot 
86 299 Pierre Hardi 
86 304 Six individuals from Loncjumeau 
86 305 .Tehan Ie Bouchier 
86 306 Tassin de Lannoy 
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86 308 Colmi du Four 
86 309 Germain de Reveillon 
86 310 Phillipe Ie Bouquillon 
86 311 Inhabitants of Saint-Vrain 
86 313 Roulant Ma1etrache 
86 314 Jean Gore 
86 320 Simon Ie Choine 
86 "')') .)-~ Inhabitants ofNeuilly-Ste-Fronte 
86 326 30 individuals from Belleau 
86 329 Inhabitants ofFontenay-les-Briis 
86 338 Pierre Benart and others from Liancourt 
86 342 J ehan Renmi 
86 344 Co1mi Ie Maunier 
86 345 Estienne Ie Champion 
86 346 Inhabitants of BetiancoUli and Vroi1 
86 352 Wife of Penot de Soissons 
86 353 Estienne Asse and others of Montmorency 
86 355 Jean Ie J acquirunmi 
86 356 Jacquet Diane 
86 357 Inhabitants of Heiltz-Ie-Maurupt 
86 358 Inhabi tants of Etrepy 
86 359 Inhabitants of Vitry-Ia-Ville 
86 360 Inhabitants ofBignicourt and Drouilly 
86 361 Etienne No1on 
86 362 Jean Ie Grant 
86 363 Inhabitants of Mennency 
86 364 Jean Bruyant 
86 365 Jean Rose 
86 366 Guillaume Brnyant 
86 368 Badouin Ie Charon 
86 369 Badouin Ie Paris 
86 370 Henri di Vi1ain 
86 377 Inhabitants of villages around Heiltz-Ie-Hutier 
86 378 Inhabitants of Songy 
86 379 Inhabitants of La Chapelle-sur-Colle 
86 380 Inhabitants of villages around Reims 
86 383 Jean Ie Gentil 
86 384 Lambert d'Autrefontaine 
86 385 Denisot Rebours 
86 386 .Tehan Nerenget 
86 387 .Tehan Bernie 
86 388 Inhabitants of Maisons 
86 391 Arnoul Guenelon 
86 393 Inhabitants of Balan court 
86 395 Denisot Rebours 
86 396 Baudin Ie Chanon 
86 397 Guillaume de Trie 
86 421 J ehan Charnel 
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86 422 Simon Ie Cordier 
86 424 Inhabitants of Cravant 
86 4')~ _J Jean du Bois 
86 430 Gillebari Colas 
86 437 Inhabitants of Montdidier 
86 444 Jean des Hayes 
86 456 Adam Ie Coq 
86 465 Colin Ie Barbier 
86 477 Warnier Ie Pontonnier 
86 480 Inhabitants ofBeaumont-sur-Oise 
86 484 Inhabitants ofXanteuiI and Abliages 
485 Inhabitants of Sagi-Ia-Ville, Courtemanche, Prusieux 
86 and other villages around Pontoise 
486 Inhabitants of Orgenay and other villages near 
86 Meulan 
86 495 Mahieu and Perrin Cordelle 
86 496 Inhabitants ofBoran-sur-Oise 
86 496.5 Inhabitants of Herennoville near Pontoise 
86 498 Pierre Ie Bouchier 
86 510 Iehan de Relenguet 
86 511 Gieffroy de Chennevieres, Henry Ie Pennetier, Raoul 
de Meulis. 
86 524 Inhabitants of Loissy-sur-Marne 
86 5"" .).) Inhabitants of Pethes 
86 534 Guy Michelet 
86 571 Pierre Ie Macon 
86 578 Inhabitants of Saint-Lumier 
86 584 Regnaut Corbel 
86 596 Inhabitants ofChavanges 
86 597 I ehan de la Basse 
87 46 Thomas de la Franc 
87 117 Garnot Bellehere 
87 118 J ehan de BruneI 
87 231 PielTe de MontfOli 
88 2 Radolpho Ie Fevre 
88 9 Nicolas Ie Mane 
88 31 Guerart de l'Esglantier 
88 43 J ehan Heudemare 
88 89 Inhabitants of GouyencoUli 
88 213 Rauol de Fevre 
90 48 Inhabitants of Lorris 
90 76 Inhabitants of Ferrieres 
90 82 Colin Fabri 
90 110 Inhabi tants of Vennenton 
90 III Inhabitants of Cerny 
90 161 Jacquet Bedin 
90 162 Francisco de Berne 
90 174 Johannes de Prunot 
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90 235 Phillipe Barnet 
90 243 Pierrot de la Sene 
90 244 Jehan HUliout 
90 271 Inhabitants ofBouchy-Ie-Repos 
90 288 Hue de Sailleville 
90 292 Jean FlageoIot 
90 293 Michel Matiin 
90 294 Jean Ie Fieron 
90 354 Gilles Ie Haguez 
90 356 Jean Lespert 
90 364 Pierre Paignant 
90 387 J ehan Hequet 
90 413 Pierre TrousseI 
90 419 Individual Ie Plessis-Bouchard 
90 423 Roger Rogier and others 
90 424 Pierre de Colebart and Pierre Rogier 
90 425 Pierre Ia Barreur 
90 446 Jehan Bonte 
90 476 Fremy Houdier 
90 488 Inhabitants of Marly-le-Roi 
90 496 Thomas Suavale 
90 556 Guillame de la Sengle and Jean Guillaume 
90 564 Inhabitants of Beauvais 
90 629 Henry Ravet 
90 635 Guillaume Porel 
91 71 Inhabitants of Dracy 
92 237 Inhabi tants of Courtemanche 
92 277 Inhabitants of Fontaine-sous-Montdidier 
94 4 J ehan Ourcel 
94 26 Jean and Robert Arnoul 
96 179 Perrin de Verberie 
96 393 Baudouin Ie Vasseur 
96 425 Jean Bouquet 
97 358 Individuals from Cachy 
98 252 Mahieu de Leurel 
99 480 Martin Ie Tanneur 
100 643 J ehan Chacon 
100 683 Jean de Dore 
101 55 J ehan Ourcel 
102 9 Jean Macreux 
102 96 Gilot and Jehan Dudelonge 
102 272 Sicart Ie Barbier 
106 393 Gille de Roy 
109 173 Guillaume Ie Penettier and Jean Cochonet 
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Remissions issued to non-Jacques that concem the Jacguelie 
The remissions tabulated below were issued to supplicants that were not 
considered to be Jacques, but the remission nalTatives detail either the Jacque6e 
itself or the retaliation that followed. Sometimes they do both - for example, the 
remission for Ancel la Pippe justifies his involvement in the retaliation by 
detailing the climes of the men of Acy against him. 
SERIES ITEM ISSUED TO ... 
(JJ) 
86 130 Jean de Donnans 
86 131 Mathiu de Roucy 
86 142 Seigneur of Saint-Dizier 
86 153 Jean de Chap on oval 
86 171 Jacques des Essarts 
86 173 Jean de Crevecoeuer 
86 258 Phillipe de Baucencourt 
86 352 PelTot des Soissons 
86 356 Jacquet Diacre 
86 372 Gui de la Conte 
86 373 Renier la Pippe 
86 395 Robin Charettier 
86 396 Raoul and Guillaume Ie Mabot, Guiot de Tremibiit, 
Jean de Hauchies and Jean Gobart 
86 402 Nobles of Trezan 
86 406 Maraguos Behosque 
86 419 Thomas Cousterel 
86 420 Bligands ofMontlhery 
86 421 Jean Charuel 
86 429 PielTe Langlois 
86 436 Count of Vaudemont 
86 456 Adam la C oq 
86 578 Seigneur of Saint-Dizier 
88 31 Guerart de I 'Esglantier 
90 151 PielTe d'Escart 
90 444 Brigands ofLa-Celle-en-Brie 
90 519 Nobles involved with the ganison at Meaux 
90 530 Ancel la Pippe 
91 3"" .:U Jean de Bonneuil 
96 179 Nobles at Pont-Saint-Maxence 
96 393 Badouin Ie Vasseur 
96 425 Nobles at Pont-Saint-Maxence 
97 358 Nobles at Cachy 
100 478 Jacquet de Bamain 
100 683 Gilot Dudelonge 
102 96 Sicmi Ie Barbier 
102 276 Gilot and Jean Dudelonge 
107 186 Squire of I--Iangest 
108 80 Robert Rogois 
115 297 Knights of Gien 
145 498 Nobles at Plainville 
272 
Appendix II: Letters of remission concerning the revolt in Paris 1358 
Series (JJ) Item Issued to ... 
86 185 Jean Morelet 
86 206 Pierre de Lagny 
86 209 Nicolas Ie Flament 
86 211 Jean Chandelier 
86 213 Jean Ie Ladre 
86 214 Guillaume Ie Fevre 
86 216 Jacques du Chatel 
86 220 Nicolas de la COUli Nemie 
86 230 Jean Hersent 
86 233 Laurens de Veullettes 
86 236 Rauol d'Aucamps 
86 238 Jehan de Monteux 
86 240 Men of Paris 
86 248 Hemy de Chastillon 
86 252 Guillot Bonnachet 
86 253 Jehan Fagnet 
86 255 Guillaume Ie Fevre * 
86 271 Gieffron Ie Flament 
86 272 Thomas Gascogne 
86 274 Guillaume Chavenoil 
86 278 Etienne de la Fontaine 
86 282 Etienne de Resnie 
86 285 Phillipe de J eurre 
86 288 Men of Meaux 
86 289 Jehan Pisdoe 
86 290 Thibaud Farcault 
86 292 Maron Pisdcie 
86 300 J ehan de la Ramee 
86 312 Iehan Rose 
86 340 J eannin des Champs 
86 341 Regnault Blouart 
86 371 Jehan de Lyon 
86 390 Guillaume d' Augeuil 
86 519 Salemon de la Tour 
86 527 Jehan de Saint-Leu 
90 66 Men of Amiens 
90 78 Nicolas de la COUli-Nemie * 
* This remission is a duplicate of a previous document 
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